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SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the writings of Soren Kierkegaard in the context of the social, 
intellectual and psychological characteristics of modernity. 
It is argued that, for Kierkegaard, the most pervasive and characteristic aspect of 
modernity is the experience of melancholy; and, consequently, melancholy - conceived 
as 'sorrow without cause' - is the central focus of the analysis of his writings. It is 
further argued that, from this perspective, the wide diversity of Kierkegaard's writings 
can be seen as both a coherent analysis of, and a well articulated response to, the 
conditions of modern life. The literary and psychological problem of the 
Kierkegaardian authorship is seen, thus, as defining and relating the different positions 
adopted by the various pseudonymous and signed works - conceived as independent 
authors - in relation to the general character of modern life; rather than that of 
harmonising these apparently divergent points of view with the hidden purpose of the 
'real' Kierkegaard. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. 
Part One deals with social and historical aspects of melancholy in relation to the 
emergence of modernity. It is argued that one way of understanding modernity is in 
terms of the emergence of a characteristic world view associated with Copernicanism, 
and that this transformation 'from the closed world to the infinite universe' is the 
context within which the old term 'melancholy' was redefined in terms of the modern 
experience of 'motion', 'distance' and 'reflection'. It is argued that an initial 
understanding of this relation provides a meaningful context for the reading of 
Kierkegaard's comments on his own society, particularly those contained in his Two 
Ages, his varied journalistic production, and his thesis, The Concept of Irony. 
Part Two attempts to define and present three distinct perspectives within which 
psychological, philosophical and religious dimensions of melancholy are explored. I 
have termed these perspectives, respectively, topological, anthropological and 
philosophical. Not only the aesthetic works, but the 'theory of the spheres' - which has 
played a central part in much contemporary literature on Kierkegaard - are here treated 
as exemplifying a topological approach to the central issues of modernity. In contrast to 
this horizontal perspective, and cutting across it at various points, a distinctively 
vertical analysis of experience is explored in a number of anthropological works, 
including, The Concept ofAnxrety. An openly philosophical analysis of modernity is 
then presented, using the works attributed to Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus. 
Part Three, as distinct from the secular works discussed in Parts One and Two, 
deals with Kierkegaard's explicitly religious writings. In these works, it is argued, 
Kierkegaard offers a description of religiously transformed, non-melancholic 
experience. He does so, however, by way of contrast with the melancholy which 
remains central to both our immediate and reflective forms of self-understanding. 
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Sadness 
Somewhere in a psalm it tells of the rich man who painstakingly amasses a fortune 
and 'knows not who will inherit it from him'. 
In the same way I will leave behind me, intellectually speaking, a not-so-little 
capital. Alas , but I know who is going to inherit from me, that character I 
find so 
repulsive, he who will keep on inheriting all that is best just as he has done in the 
past - namely, the assistant professor, the professor. 
(marginal note) 
And even if 'the professor' happened to read this, it would not stop him, it would 
not prick his conscience - no, he would lecture on this, too. And even if the 
professor happened to read this remark, it would not stop him either - no, he would 
lecture on this, too. For the professor is even longer than the tapeworm which a 
woman was delivered of recently (200 feet according to her husband, who 
expressed his gratitude in Addressea vises recently) -a professor is even longer than 
that - and if a man has this tapeworm 'the professor' in him, no human being can 
deliver him of it; only God can do it if the man himself is willing. 
Soren Kierkegaard - Journals, 6: 6817-18 
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PREFACE 
Prefaces bear the stamp of the accidental. 
Nicolaus Notabene - Prefaces 
Thesis writers are generally, and rightly, advised to avoid all personal references in 
their work. They would, in addition, like to present their findings as if they were the 
outcome of a process of research which is shaped entirely by the demands of 
scholarship. Anyone embarking upon a thesis on Kierkegaard can hardly hope to get 
close to their subject of study and live up those two demands. While accepting the 
constraints of thesis writing, a more personal tone is appropriate to a 'Preface' which 
ought, after all, to be distinct from the text itself. 
I came across Kierkegaard by accident. 
As an undergraduate in Sociology it was hardly surprising that no one had 
mentioned any of his works to me. And for several years after I graduated I knew of 
him only at second and third hand as a precursor, or possibly even the founder, of 
existentialism, a philosophical fashion I had felt safe in ignoring on the unassailable 
grounds of its already being dated. Then a momentary confusion in a darkened corner 
of Glasgow University Library (cut-backs / unreplaced fluorescent tube) placed 
Repetition in my hands. I had been ill-advisedly searching through 'unclassified 
philosophy' for works on logic and thought I had discovered a slim volume on 
'Refutations'. 
Under lustrous neon frustration gave way to bewilderment. And bewilderment, 
confronted with a strangely arresting title, a hopelessly contradictory subtitle - An Essay 
in Experimental Psychology - and a bizarre pseudonym, gave way almost at once to 
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fascination. I had at one time abandoned a course in experimental psychology, 
probably, I reflected, because it was a subject unsuited to essay writing. I borrowed the 
book. It was unlike anything I had previously read. But I did not understand what it 
was about, and I could not explain why it was so interesting. Part novel, part 
philosophical psychology, wholly unclassifiable, I was confident that it was interesting; 
indeed it was, to a large extent, about the category of the interesting. 
Uncomprehendingly I read that 'repetition' was the 'interest of metaphysics, and at the 
same time the interest upon which metaphysics founders. 
I went back to the library and, rather slowly, read my way through the Kierkegaard 
section. Or, to be more precise, I quickly read his aesthetic works, rather slowly 
familiarized myself with his philosophical books, and completely ignored his religious 
writings. In this way Kierkegaard, the name was quite sufficient to cause an 
anticipatory frisson of intellectual pleasure, became something of a hobby. Remote 
from my main preoccupations his works provided the ideal opportunity to indulge an 
admiration for sheer cleverness as well as, in gaining the acquaintance of a great but not 
well known writer, a degree of self-flattery. 
I knew well enough that this kind of youthful enthusiasm should pass, to be 
replaced by a passion for opera, or foreign travel. It surely should not have survived 
the daunting practicalities of helping to bring up three children. But, alarmingly, I 
seemed to be growing into, rather than out of an author whose unfailing strangeness 
continued to unsettle me. Gradually I found ways of introducing him into my own 
work, and from there it was an easy step to begin to work in areas where his writing 
could figure more prominently. After all the whole development of modern 
philosophical psychology could be read in a Kierkegaardian context, albeit one defined 
by reference to Heidegger rather than to Kierkegaard himself. 
In spite of an interest in the sociology of religion I was not tempted by 
Kierkegaard's religious works. Indeed I was somewhat embarrassed at the thought of 
the edifying discourses which I had never read, a neglect I justified not only on 
ideological grounds but in the conviction that they could not possibly contain anything 
more, or anything more exciting, than the extraordinary barrage of insights to which I 
had exposed myself in reading the pseudonymous works. Nonetheless, in claiming not 
to be tempted by them, I came to recognize that the discourses represented for me 
something other than an uninteresting, or even a merely interesting, extension of the 
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authorship, and in this recognition lay a wish to which I could hardly pretend 
indifference. And once I acknowledged that my denial was nothing but a negative 
affirmation that the religious writings were a temptation I could not decently resist but at 
once gave in. 
In fact I found the edifying discourses (only much later in the new Princeton edition 
did they become upbuilding discourses), disappointing. Relieved I returned to the 
relative conventionality of a sociological study of imprisonment, which, with the 
satisfaction of settling accounts with an awkward companion, I was able to interpret as a 
negative form of what he had called repetition. 
Of course, it was much too late, and no such simple act of expiation could free me 
from a writer who had got so far under my skin. I turned to fiction. But in spite of a 
robust determination to rid myself of all trace of the melancholic Dane, he intruded, not 
simply as an idea but as a character, in the story I was trying to write. Later academic 
studies did nothing to lessen my discomfort. There was every reason, certainly, to 
include him in the discussions of both pleasure and happiness which I undertook, but in 
both his presence acted as far more of a conditioning element than I had wished. Thus, 
much later than I should have done so, I decided to tackle Kierkegaard head on. 
The resulting thesis is not intended to be a definitive Kierkegaard. It is, rather, a 
thesis which seeks to explain why anyone interested in the character of modern life, 
should read Kierkegaard. Naturally many people read Kierkegaard from quite different 
perspectives and find in him compelling truths neglected in the following pages. An 
enormous secondary literature bears eloquent testimony to an interpretive fecundity 
which condemns every new book on Kierkegaard to the fate of disappointing those most 
inclined to read it. Equally, there are other sources from which insights I have come to 
think typically Kierkegaardian might be gleaned. 
Kierkegaard's works, it will be argued, shed a distinctive and invaluable light on 
inner-character of human experience in modern society. His works view modern 
experience in the light of melancholy. Yet, because of the range of complexity of his 
writings, on the one hand, and their allusive relation both to his own immediate 
experience and to the more general features of modern life, on the other, Kierkegaard's 
religious psychology is all too easily neglected. 
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My previous research, already influenced by aspects of Kierkegaard's writings, 
have shaped my attempt to come to terms with his work as a whole. As a result I have 
found new studies of the social and intellectual context of Kierkegaard's life and work, 
of great interest. And recent efforts to drag him into the vanguard of postmodernism (as 
a kind of pre-post-modernist) are both stimulating and relevant to the present approach. 
Yet I have found myself returning with these new perspective to older views in which 
melancholy plays a more definite role. Indeed it is, I believe, in the context of an 
historical understanding of melancholy that the newer contributions to Kierkegaard 
studies become most illuminating. 
All this, as Kierkegaard remarks in confessing that he was in fact the author of the 
pseudonymous works, 'can scarcely be of interest to anyone'. It serves only to make 
the rather obvious point that, as a powerful and genuinely original writer, each reader 
responds to Kierkegaard's works in a very personal fashion, but, as a lucid and rigorous 
thinker he provides us with the means by which we can together grasp the human 
possibilities given with the conditions of modern life. 
INTRODUCTION 
In addition to my other numerous acquaintances, with whom, on the whole, 1 have 
a very formal relationship, I do have one intimate confidante - my melancholy, and 
in the midst of my joy, in the midst of my work, she beckons to me, calls me aside, 
even though physically I remain on the spot. It is the most faithful mistress I have 
known - no wonder, then, that I must be prepared to follow at any moment. 
Soren Kierkegaard - Journals, 5: 5496 
Let us simply assume that melancholy has no content at all. He who is melancholy 
can name many cares which hold him in bondage, but the one which binds him he 
is unable to name, 
Soren Kierkegaard - Journals, 5: 5724 
Soren Kierkegaard's writings continue to exercise a growing and somewhat diffuse 
influence on contemporary culture. It is, in fact, only recently that his stature as a 
literary and philosophical figure of major importance has been widely recognized. The 
publication of an authoritative English translation of his works, which itself indicates 
his growing reputation, will, doubtless, stimulate a horde of 'assistant professors' to 
fresh expository efforts. And if the immediate context of their composition - the 
religious and cultural interests of European intellectuals in the aftermath of Hegel's 
philosophy - remains a matter of fascination primarily for specialists, the prescience of 
his 'critique of modernity', the experimental character of his discourse, and the way in 
which his own experience became central to his understanding of the world, make him 
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relevant to a host of contemporary debates. As a result, and perhaps appropriately for 
an author who wrote so diversely and whose most famous work is subtitled A Fragment 
of Life, Kierkegaard is read partially and from widely divergent perspectives. 
He is, perhaps, best known for his 'aesthetic' works, and for the distinctively 
personal point of view from which they were written. In this context he occupies a 
position, chronologically and psychologically towards the end of a series that begins 
with Goethe's The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774) and ends with Dostoevsky's Notes 
From Underground (1864). Until recently his influence in philosophy was primarily 
through these same works, viewed somewhat distantly through the 'mediation' of 
Heidegger and Sartre. 
As a religious writer he has been just as one-sidedly treated, his Discourses, 
ignored as theology have been read, when at all, primarily within the tradition of 
homiletic literature. Yet Kierkegaard, fearing (rightly) that in due course he would 
become famous as a merely 'interesting' writer, always claimed to be a 'religious' 
author. This claim ought to be taken seriously; and it can be taken seriously without 
rejecting his singular brilliance as a psychologist, or ignoring the seriousness and 
originality of his philosophy. Indeed, his psychology is penetrating just because it is 
religious in nature (and not simply in context); and his philosophy is interesting 
precisely because it is so highly charged with a realistic sense of life; and both are made 
possible (rather than merely facilitated), by a supreme mastery of language. 
The variety of his literary production is astonishing. Clearly there is some sense in 
which the disparate elements of the authorship are inter-related. It is less clear that they 
form a coherent and unified view of the world. Rather than claim some spurious 
'totality' for the synthesizing power of his literary art, or his philosophy, or his 
religious outlook, the connections among his various styles of work should be sought in 
the character of modern life itself. 
This is not to invite biographical speculation. Though there is no doubt his own 
life, as it is for any writer, was significant to the origin and development of his thought, 
Kierkegaard is, in fact, rather careful in the way in which he allows his personal 
experience to intrude into his works. It is not that a narrative of life events could 
'explain' his books, but, rather, the general 'feel' of his inner-experience which 
provides a clue to the deliberately fragmented character of his writing. He refers to his 
own experience as dominated by a feeling of 'melancholy'. And it is by reconstructing 
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the meaning and significance of melancholy that the originality and the 
comprehensiveness of Kierkegaard's religious psychology of modern life can be 
appreciated. 
Melancholy is something more than a pervasive 'mood', albeit it, for modern 
society, its most widespread and in some sense most characteristic mood. One might 
say it is its only mood; or, to be more precise, that what at one time might have been 
defined as its transient 'colour', has become the defining tone of its every experience. 
Kierkegaard seems to recognize something melancholic in the very possibility of 
experience. 
The notion of melancholy has been adapted to describe everything which is peculiar 
to the modern world. Hence the somewhat diffuse, and at times even contradictory, 
character it assumes. Melancholy is a modern Proteus, transforming itself with every 
twist and turn of existence, becoming almost indistinguishable from being itself. Yet, 
the most diverse schools of modern thought protest in unison against any such identity, 
and insist, in any number of ways, that melancholy has no substance of its own, that it 
is 'only' the sombre mirror in which being reflects itself. Thus, of the multiplicity of 
modern attempts to define melancholy, two apparently unconnected formulations have 
become canonical; melancholy is both 'sorrow without cause' and 'loss of being'. 
The modern, disenchanted, disillusioned, wholly secular individual is expected to 
be melancholic. The Enlightenment tradition, together with its army of critics eager to 
go 'beyond' its brutal rejection of all outmoded religious views of the world, speak with 
a melancholic voice. Yet melancholy itself remains an embarrassment to modern 
thought. How can there be 'sorrow without cause'? Surely if it is 'real' sorrow' its 
cause is just as real, but, temporarily, unknown; it is merely 'unexplained sorrow'. 
And what is the 'loss of being' other than a resilient but dangerously sentimental 
nostalgia over visions of a 'pre-modern' world that, in fact, never existed? In modern 
thought every effort is made to overcome melancholy by 'rationalization. That is, by 
finding its cause and defining its lost reality, an attempt is made to assimilate it to the 
otherwise endlessly interlinked field of representations. But the reverse, in fact, has 
taken place. Melancholy, mute and unassimilable, refuses every flattering advance and 
continues to hide beyond the reach of every seductively intended conceptualization. 
Worse than that, it breaks into every chain of reasoning, and thoughtlessly undermines 
every effort to 'grasp' and control the nature of modern experience. 
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As an incontrovertible 'sign' of modernity melancholy is strangely equivocal. Its 
inexplicable character as a primitive experience in which, in spite of everything, 'being' 
discloses itself as an empty and barren nothingness, makes melancholy the sorrowful 
drain into which the western religious world view emptied itself before vomiting forth 
new and deceptive forms. The Enlightenment project foundered upon melancholy, not 
upon the 'theory' of melancholy, but upon the 'simple fact' of sorrow. And 
wretchedness, upon the ruins, awakened to a new religious sensitivity. Melancholy, 
paradoxically, is the disillusionment which prevents the complete triumph of 
disillusionment. Modern religion is focused on melancholy, then, less to preserve a 
dubious claim to console, than to worry (as a dog might sheep), what remains 
undomesticated by the modern arts of life. 
Religion in modern western society is at once melancholic and the 'cure' for 
melancholy. For modern society, indeed, melancholy alone has 'depth', and it is its 
'presence' which lends expression to the profound unease within, if not disease of, 
existence. 
PART ONE 
THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE PRESENT AGE 
The present age is essentially a sensible, reflecting age, devoid of passion, flaring 
up in superficial, short-lived enthusiasm and prudentially relaxing in indolence. 
Soren Kierkegaard -TwoAges 
Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and it is 
of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation... 
The frivolity and boredom which unsettles the established order, the vague 
foreboding of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. 
G. W. F. Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit 
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CHAPTER ONE 
MELANCHOLY: THE DEPTH OF MODERN LIFE 
When the low heavy sky weighs like a lid 
Upon the spirit aching for the light 
And all the wide horizon's line is hid 
By a black day sadder than any night; 
Charles Baudelaire, Spleen 
Whence, did you say, does this strange sadness rise? 
Like tides that over naked black rocks flow? 
- When here the heart's once trampled-vintage lies, 
Living's a curse. A secret all men know, 
Charles Baudelaire - Semper La dem 
Soren Kierkegaard claimed to have been deeply melancholic throughout his life. In a Journal 
entry from 1844 headed 'Quiet Despair; A Narrative' he associated melancholy with his earliest 
recollections, and, lacking nothing in modern sensibility, made both central to his effort to 
understand himself: 
There was a father and a son. Both were highly endowed intellectually, especially 
the father. Everyone who knew their home was certain to find a visit entertaining. 
Usually they discussed only between themselves and entertained each other as two 
good minds without the distinction between father and son. On one rare occasion 
when the father looked at the son and saw that he was very troubled, he stood 
quietly before him and said: Poor child, you live in quiet despair. But he never 
questioned him more closely - alas, he could not, for he, too, lived in quiet despair. 
Beyond this not a word was exchanged on the subject. But the father and the son 
were perhaps two of the most melancholy human beings who ever lived in the 
memory of man. I (Journal, 1: 745) 
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Between two melancholy people, each self-absorbed to an extraordinary degree, there 
could be no real communication. The 'rare occasion' had not really broken their mutual 
incomprehension: 
And the father believed that he was responsible for his son's melancholy, and the 
son believed that he was responsible for his father's melancholy; therefore they 
never raised the subject. That outburst by the father was an outburst of his own 
melancholy; therefore when he said this, he spoke more to himself than to his son. 
(Journa ls, l: 745) 
Melancholy is essentially incommunicable. It might be recognized by interpreting 
another person's reserve, laconic manner and apparent disinterestedness in the world on 
the basis of one's own self-absorption. But these 'symptoms' should not be mistaken 
for the condition itself. Lethargy has become a kind of conventional token of 
melancholy, but, just as often it may lie concealed in a 'normal' level of sociability. 
Kierkegaard's melancholy was of this latter secretive type. Dissimulation became part 
of his nature, not so much because he wished to spare others the burden of his own 
inner wretchedness (though, most of the time, he did wish this), as because conventional 
forms of sorrow were wholly inadequate to express its 'depth' and 'weight'. In his most 
explicit autobiographical writing, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, which 
was composed in 1848 but not published until after his death, he confessed, but could 
not adequately describe, his melancholy. In fact he took pride in an uncanny ability to 
conceal his spontaneous feelings. From the beginning, he claims, he had acted a part: 
From a child I was under the sway of a prodigious melancholy, the depth of which 
finds its only adequate measure in the equally prodigious dexterity I possessed of 
hiding it under an apparent gaiety and joie de vivre. So far back as I can barely 
remember, my own joy was that nobody could discover how unhappy I felt. 2 
(Point of View, p. 76) 
Though 'favoured in every way, so far as intellectual gifts go and outward 
circumstances' Kierkegaard could not rid himself of melancholy. He lacked nothing in 
self-confidence; his abilities, he knew, were quite exceptional and he believed himself 
capable of achieving whatever he set his mind to. This well founded conceit 
encompassed everything 'only one thing excepted, all else absolutely, but one thing not, 
the throwing off of the melancholy from which and from its attendant suffering I was 
3 never entirely free even for a day'. 
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Melancholy had made Kierkegaard prematurely old. His early years spent under 
the immediate and powerful influence of a gloomy father was completely incompatible 
with the playfulness of childhood. In his father's relentless piety the young Soren was 
'travestied as an old man'. He claims that 'Already in my earliest childhood I broke 
down under the grave impression which the melancholy old man who laid it upon me 
himself sank under'. 4 Though he came to regret his 'crazy upbringing' he did not 
blame his father for his own melancholy. Neither the general atmosphere of a 
claustrophobic household, nor the early death of all but one of his siblings, nor Soren's 
discovery of some specific offense at the root of his father's intense guilt-feeling, 
accounts for the origin of his inward gloom, far less for its literary transformation. 5 
Melancholy isolated him from others, and, again from his earliest recollection, he 
knew that 'for me there was no comfort or help to be looked for in others'. His 
melancholy, rather than his talent, made him exceptional; and his talent purified his 
melancholy. There was, for him, something alluring in this 'lonesome inward torment'. 
At times he exulted in an 'unlimited freedom of being able to deceive' which allowed 
6 him the privilege of being 'absolutely alone with my pain'. 
Thus, 'relegated to myself and to a relationship with God', Kierkegaard, from an 
early age, invested his melancholy with a unique value. Melancholy, for him, was more 
than a mood, or even the peculiarity of a specific temperament, it was, rather, a 
particular way of existing as a human being. And more than that it was the way of 
existing which he came to view as that most appropriate to the condition of modern life. 
There was, in Kierkegaard's view, something uniquely truthful in melancholic self- 
withdrawal. Such 'inclosing reserve' might even be imagined the authentic inwardness 
of modern life. Melancholy is conceived to be symptomatic of both the character of 
modern life and of the possibility of a freedom which protests against modern life.. ' To 
grasp how this is possible, and to understand in just what way he accepted the 
melancholy he believed to be his inescapable shadow, is, in part at least, the task 
Kierkegaard set himself in his authorship. Yet it is just their melancholic character that 
makes these works difficult to understand. Melancholy cannot be directly expressed, so 
that Kierkegaard was forced into a whole series of experimental forms and literary 
subterfuges through which something of the meaning and significance, of this inner- 
experience might be aroused in an unsuspecting reader. Furthermore, as his works 
were designed to transform, and not merely to describe, this inner experience, it is 
hardly surprising that his books appear odd, disjointed and unconnected with the major 
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literary and philosophical traditions which we have come to expect lurk within the 
covers of any major work. 
Kierkegaard, however, was less alone than he claimed, or possibly wished, himself 
to be. In defining his experience of himself, and of the world, as melancholic, he was 
in fact exploiting a long and significant tradition of western 'psychology', as well as 
implicitly claiming a community of feeling with many of its most illustrious exponents. 
Melancholy, that is to say, is a constitutive part of his writing, and not the adventitious 
(and unbalancing) mood in which it was created. His work as an author, therefore, can 
be approached by way of this tradition. 
The Perspective of Melancholy 
Melancholy, and reflections upon it, have a long history in western society. This 
history cannot be reconstructed here; but it is only by alluding to its very different past 
that the specifically modern character of Kierkegaard's melancholy can be appreciated. 
Originally melancholy, or black bile, was identified, along with blood, phlegm and 
yellow (or red) bile as one of the four fundamental bodily fluids, or 'spirits'. As such 
melancholy constituted one of those naturally occurring quaternaries which were 
associated together as the mode of differentiation common to all created things. Under 
the influence of Pythagorean, and even older mythological thought, the health of the 
human body was held to be dependent on the maintenance of an equilibrium of these 
four distinct substances, and illness was conceived as the excess of one humour 
(chymor: juice or flavour) over the others. 8 Bodily states, mental imagery, and 
characteristic forms of behaviour which had been regarded as symptomatic of illness, 
and thus of humoral imbalance, were progressively associated together as general 
dispositions or character types. Humours, thus, came to 'denote either pathological 
states or constitutional aptitudes'. 9 
The melancholic humour was 'cold and dry' and as warmth and moisture appeared 
to be essential to vegetative growth, procreation, and interaction with all life-giving 
substance, the melancholic individual was excessively taciturn, withdrawn and lethargic. 
Such individuals were also liable to uncontrollable fits of madness. Yet melancholy 
could also be viewed as the bestowal of spiritual privileges. Plato, in the Phaedrus, 
redefined the melancholic as a highly sensitized soul peculiarly adapted to the reception 
of the most valued of ecstatic states. 'We receive the greatest benefit through frenzy', 
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he declares, and the melancholic is more fitted than any other to receive this 'divine 
gift'. 10 Even more significantly for the development of subsequent ideas about 
melancholy, an Aristotelian text brought together earlier medical notions with the 
Platonic conception of frenzy. Problem XXX. 1, established a paradigmatic conception 
of melancholy in its opening question; 'Why is it that all those who are outstanding in 
philosophy, poetry or the arts are melancholic? ' 1I Likening the effect of black bile to 
that of wine, the Aristotelian theory proposed a naturalistic-pneumatic theory relating 
divergent bodily states to the physical condition of bodily fluids. The sensitivity, 
mobility and quickness of thought, of the poet and philosopher depended on the 
maintenance of a narrow range of predisposing conditions. When bile was too cold and 
excessive in quantity the person experienced 'numbness, despondency and fear', and if 
it became overly heated the unfortunate individual would be seized with an 
uncontrollable mania. It was not only the exceptional example of tragic heroes like 
Ajax and Bellerophon who suffered melancholic madness as a divine retribution for 
human defiance, but, more generally, all really outstandingly gifted individuals were 
visited by melancholia. But however successful this attempted 'naturalization' of 
Platonic frenzy, for later generations, promiscuously influenced by all preceding 
traditions, melancholy was rarely regarded in a wholly naturalistic fashion. 
Melancholy, understood within either interpretive context, represented nobility and 
sensibility, each confirming in its own terms that 'a man's spiritual greatness was 
measured by his capacity for experience and, above all, for suffering' . 
12 
These ancient ideas persistent, and were re-absorbed in a variety of ways in the 
long development of western medical and philosophical conceptions of the relationship 
between 'body' and 'temperament'. Most significantly, perhaps, Galen, whose 
extensive writings on medical matters and on natural history were composed during the 
second century C. E., provided a sophisticated development of the Aristotelian theory. 
His unique and long-lasting authority brought into prominence two aspects of ancient 
melancholy which remain of fundamental importance to an understanding of 
Kierkegaard's insight into its modern form. 
Firstly, Galen defined melancholy in terms of an inner experience or feeling, rather 
than as a set of explicit symptoms; it is 'fear and sadness without a real reason... an 
unnatural dread. 13 And, secondly, he associated melancholy with darkness; 'the 
humour, like darkness... invades the seat of the soul, where reason is situated'. 14 Galen 
held that black bile, secreted in the liver, gives rise to a dark vapour which, rising in the 
body, is responsible for both aspects of this physical /psychic gloom. And, developing 
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the analogy with vision, 'as the crystalline lens of the eye if it is limpid allows a clear 
view... but if it becomes ill and opaque it does not allow a distinct view', he argues that 
in melancholy an inner fog of sour and acid bile 'envelops the rational parts of the soul, 
upsetting them so that man necessarily is afraid of what he imagines'. 15 It is as if, being 
cut off from proper contact with both the world, and his or her own rational soul, the 
melancholic comes to fear self-generated images whose real origin and nature remain 
mysteriously obscured. 
Throughout later developments, and in quite different contexts, two somewhat 
contradictory notions of melancholy were held together. The melancholic was 
characterized both by a lethargic and torpid nature, and by periodic spasms of furious 
and uncontrollable passion. These opposed tendencies were taken to be typical of 
melancholy, whether this condition was to be understood in 'spiritual' Platonic, or in 
'bodily' Aristotelian terms. Indeed, in relation to melancholy, which was always 
understood as bearing both a bodily and a spiritual significance, the distinction between 
'medicine' and 'religion', in principle, hardly applied. In the medieval period, 
however, in association with the differentiation of an educated ruling class, the growth 
of an urban secular culture, and the renovation of monasticism, melancholy itself 
dissolved into a number of distinct tendencies and conditions. 
Under the influence of Arabic writers, and especially of Avicenna, a more 
specialized medical theory of melancholy emerged. Melancholy was seen as the 
consequence of the corruption of anyof the body's natural humours. In a 'burnt' 
condition, some or all of the 'symptoms' which had previously been viewed as a 
consequence of the simple preponderance of black bile within the body, could be 
produced. And in the case of melancholy 'adust' or burnt melancholy the whole 
condition was intensified. An already 'dry' and unresponsive spirit was further 
desiccated, and melancholy came generally to refer to diseased spirits of any kind rather 
than to a specific humoral imbalance. 16 
In addition to this medical context melancholy gained wide currency throughout the 
medieval period as acedia. The term has biblical antecedents (particularly as the 
'noonday devil' of Psalm 90), but its medieval usage is usually traced to a listing by 
Evagrius of Pontus towards the end of the fourth century C. E. of the 'eight evil 
spirits', or 'vicious thoughts', which assail the solitary monk in his desert cell; 
'gluttony, lust, avarice, sadness, anger, spiritual apathy (akedias), vainglory and 
pride'. 17 Acedia (without care), in contrast to the Platonic valuation of melancholy, 
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appears as a perversion of, rather than a complement to, the soul's seizure by higher 
spiritual powers. Evagrius vividly portrays the torpor which is likely to oppress the 
monk; 
The demon of acedia, also called the 'noonday demon', is the most oppressive of 
all demons... First he makes the sun appear sluggish and immobile, as if the day 
had fifty hours... Moreover, the demon sends him hatred against the place, against 
life itself, and against the work of his hands, and makes him think he has lost the 
love among his brothers and that there is none to comfort him. 18 
But it is to John Cassian, the founder of western monasticism, to which most later 
writers turned for an authoritative description of The sin of sloth'; 
Our sixth battle is with what the Greeks call acedia which we might name tedium 
or anxiety of heart. It is related to sadness, and is especially troublesome to 
hermits, a dangerous and frequent enemy of desert dwellers. It disturbs the monks 
especially at noon, like a fever recurring at regular intervals, bringing its burning 
heat in waves... A kind of unreasonable confusion of mind like some soul-darkness 
takes hold of him, making him idle and useless for every spiritual work. 19 
Cassian specifically distinguishes the spiritual apathy of acedia from the purely 
secular sorrow of tristitia, (which was later celebrated as love-sickness) and, by 
implication, both from the medical condition of melancholy. 20 Yet they remain 
inextricably linked through the common topos of darkness. A cold shadow falls over he 
hermit's soul even as the burning sun stands directly above him in the sky. The soul 
becomes both actually and metaphorically opaque, impenetrable to the activating 
radiance which was the nurturing medium of human physical and spiritual well being. 
For many ancient and medieval thinkers light was much more than the condition of 
passive sight, it conveyed directly a life-giving and formative power. 21 The cosmos 
shone with a penetrating divine light, and it was this radiance which melancholy 
unnaturally obscured. Acedia, therefore, was a sin; a wilful, if unwanted, 'disgust with 
the spiritual'. Wrapped in its insulating darkness the monk sank into a kind of waking 
torpor in which he was liable to be assailed by terrifying visions. 22 And clouded by 
acedia, everything in which the individual should rejoice became a source of renewed 
sorrow. 23 
Whether as bile, tristitia, love-sickness, or acedia, melancholy enveloped the soul 
in a dark cloud, isolating its victims from the world, from other people, and from a true 
understanding of themselves. These various forms of isolation were linked, more 
systematically, as disturbances in the naturally created order of things. Throughout the 
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medieval period a Christianized version of Greek cosmology provided an intellectual 
and spiritual context within which the human being was conceived as a microcosm This 
was understood to mean not only that the human frame, constitution and inner nature 
were in some way 'modelled' on the structure of the cosmos as a whole (as they had 
been by Plato in the Timaeus), but that human beings were completely integrated into 
24 this macrocosm as an essential link in the natural hierarchy of creation. 
Humoral psychology was absorbed into a Christianized version of the Neoplatonic 
worldview. The doctrine of four temperaments thus became directly linked to a 
religious cosmology. Original Man, Adam, was a warm and moist creature, but in the 
Fall was corrupted into variations of cold and dry types. In the twelfth century, for 
example, William of Conches held that the choleric, phlegmatic and melancholic types 
were all fundamentally alike in being sinful deviations from the sanguine. It was not, 
therefore, sensuousness as such, but corrupted sensuality, which was essentially related 
to sin. 
Throughout the medieval period melancholy, as a natural quaternary division, was 
reproduced and could be rediscovered, within any realm of created being. Not only the 
human body, the original locus of melancholy, with its variable combination of the four 
primary constituents of nature (earth, air, fire and water), in their specific bodily forms, 
but the different orders of living creatures, seasons, hours of the day, ages of man, and, 
through the development of iatromathematical concepts, the planetary signs, were 
ordered and divided according to their humour. A twelfth century writer, for example, 
describes the structure of the mind as follows: 
the mind also makes use of the four humours. In place of blood it has sweetness, 
in place of red bile bitterness, in place of black bile grief, in place of phlegm 
equanimity... Thus in contemplation lies sweetness, from remembrance of sin 
comes bitterness, from its commission grief, from its atonement equanimity. 25 
The persistence of the sanguine - the happy (and rare) combination of warmth and 
moisture within the body - like the spectacle of nature's undying perfection in the night 
sky, was seen as an echo of man's paradisaical origin, and the promise of his 
redemption. And the more normal melancholic state was, therefore, simply one aspect 
of the entire corruption of nature within the sublunary sphere, after the Fall. 
Melancholy, with the other humours, therefore, was a natural disposition of the mind. 
The hierarchy of being was a natural order, each 'level' of creation depending for 
its existence upon the greater being embedded in the level immediately above it. 
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Equally each level of created being represented the divine presence upon which all 
rested. Created matter, thus, was a kind of visible symbol of the spiritual reality which 
supported its temporary and imperfect form. Increasingly natural and human 
phenomena were understood in terms of elaborate symbolic homologies and analogies. 26 
Importantly, however, the human being was always in continuity with the entire world 
of being which it symbolized. The part always represented the whole to which it 
naturally belonged, and to which it was related by an unbreakable tie of solidarity. 
The breakdown of feudal societies in the west was associated with the emergence of 
a new understanding of melancholy. During the transitional period a highly 
sophisticated use of the notion of symbolic relations between microcosm and macrocosm 
formed the context in which Marsilio Ficino revived the Platonic praise of 
melancholy. 27 For Ficino and a number of his contemporaries the connecting spiritual 
medium between microcosm and macrocosm was conceived to be a subtle fluid. It was 
this presumed, underlying but actual, continuity that justified the development of highly 
elaborate astrological and iatromathematical schemata through which the condition of 
the human soul could be understood and manipulated. It was this universal animating 
medium that connected the inner life of the individual with celestial dynamics. The 
condition of human spirit, 'a vapour of the blood, pure, subtle, hot, and clear' was 
necessarily linked to the disposition of the planets, as well as to the condition of the 
'heart, liver and stomach'. 28 Those born under the influence of Saturn tend towards 
melancholy, and, according to Ficino this is by no means always unfortunate. Reviving 
Plato's views Ficino regards melancholy as an intellectual gift, which in turn stimulates 
two other divine frenzies, poetry and philosophy. But a positive interpretation of 
melancholy did not lead him to underestimate the suffering which is the normal cost 
extracted for its privileges. Nor does his attempt to articulate a magical-erotic 
worldview (which was rooted in ancient paganism, and was shortly to be overtaken by a 
new scientific rationalism), prevent him from grasping its most significant personal 
features. Indeed, in treating melancholy within the new social context of a postmedieval 
civic culture, Ficino provides a strikingly modern depiction of its travails: 
It is astonishing that whenever we are at leisure, we fall into grief like exiles, 
though we do not know, or certainly do not think of, the cause of our grief. Thus 
it has come about that man cannot live alone. For we think that we can expel our 
hidden and continual grief through the society of others and through a manifold 
variety of pleasures. But we are only too deceived. For in the midst of the plays 
of pleasure we sigh at times, and when the play is over, we depart even more 
sorrowful . 
29 
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The strange grief of melancholy induces an inward, and often outward, restlessness; a 
perpetual, aimless and tormenting motion which can finally be calmed only by a proper 
use of the melancholic's gifts for spiritual elevation. 'Rest is judged to be much more 
perfect than movement' so that the melancholic longs above all for the soothing 
tranquillity of permanence, and especially for the unalterable inner stillness of a return 
to a primordial state of spiritual ecstasy. 30 Ficino's therapeutic magic is, thus, more 
ambitious than Petrarch's secular 'Remedies', which are powerless to console those 
'troubled by nostalgia for the celestial fatherland'. 31 The Renaissance melancholic, 
estranged from that state of spiritual solidarity with the cosmos in which the promise of 
happiness is held fast, was condemned to a fruitless wandering which could not be 
escaped unaided. 
Ficino is often credited with celebrating notions of individualism and of artistic 
genius which anticipated modern dynamic conceptions of the human personality. 32 Yet 
in the maintenance of an ideal of spiritual rest and cosmic self-communion his 
worldview remained decisively pre-modern. Nevertheless Ficino effected a fundamental 
shift in the traditional conceptions of melancholy towards what was to become a 
decisively modern view. His originality lay in the view of melancholy as perpetual and 
useless movement, rather than as lethargic immobility. Equally, and paradoxically, it is 
conceived as heaviness rather than darkness. The intellectual proclivities of the 
melancholic have to do with the 'earthy' nature of black bile, which is the sediment left 
after the more subtle fluids have been evaporated, as it were, from the blood. In 
thought and speculation the person 'draws in upon itself from external things', and is, 
therefore, like the earth in its quality of self-adhering cohesion. The melancholic, as it 
were, compresses the soul within his body, making it more material and weighty. 33 
There is here the beginning of 'a new analogy between the force of gravity and mental 
concentration' . 
3'I 
This, from the viewpoint of medieval thought, contradictory combination of 
mobility and weightiness quickly came to define, not only the temperamentally 
melancholic individual, but the peculiar character of modern life itself. As the notion of 
the 'dignity of man' it became central to both the Italian Renaissance and Northern 
Humanism. This important transformation was associated with the emergence of a new 
cosmological picture and a revaluation of the significance and worth of human beings 
within creation. 35 
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It is hardly surprising that the breakdown of the traditional world picture, and the 
gradual emergence of a new 'system of the world' which was understood according to 
radically new principles, implied equally fundamental changes in the notion of 
melancholy. It is worth emphasising, however, that in spite of the emergence of a new 
interpretive context, the complex of phenomena bound together in the term 'melancholy' 
to a large extent persisted as a unity. Indeed the Aristotelian equation of melancholy 
with intellectual and artistic gifts only really came into its own in the Renaissance And, 
furthermore, older conceptions did not simply wither away, but, however anachronistic 
they might come to appear, persisted alongside quite new ideas. 
But melancholy, and not merely ideas about melancholy, did change, and in 
profound ways. In relation to the emergent cosmological setting new meanings were 
attached to the traditional affliction. The Elizabethan Age was rich in melancholy, and 
increasingly 'heaviness' replaced 'darkness' as one of its defining characteristic. 36 Over 
a long period authors from quite different backgrounds agreed and were eventually to 
retrace a diversity of insights back to this common source. Melancholy is to be 
'overwhelmed with heaviness... heaviness without cause'37, 'dolour or hevynesse of 
minde'38, and 'unwelcome heaviness'. 39 It is ' anguish, dullness, heaviness, and 
vexation of spirit'. 40 It is a 'devitalized existence... heavy with daily sorrows' 41 
Inexplicably a multitude of sorrows 'suddenly weighs one down'42, and the 'frailest 
memories take on the weight of rocks'. 43 
The formation of the new worldview within which these typifications were to gain 
currency, has been described as a transition 'from the closed world to the infinite 
universe'. 44 At its most general level this involved 'the geometrisation of space and the 
dissolution of the Cosmos' . 
45 For the Ancient and Medieval world the cosmos was a 
closed and finite structure within which the totality of created beings were ordered 
hierarchically according to their relative degree of perfection. The sublime and 
changeless substance of celestial beings occupied the outer region of the cosmos, while 
the lesser, corruptible and changeable being of earthly natures occupied the degraded 
centre, at the farthest possible distance from God. 
The qualitative distinction of place gave way gradually, but in the end completely, 
to the formless indifference of space. This transition can already be glimpsed in 
Nicholas of Cusa's 'negative theology'. On Learned Ignorance, in opposition to the 
hylomorphic order of a 'chain of being', insisted not only upon the absolute 
transcendence of God in relation to His own creation, but, more particularly, on the 
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consequential uncertainty of any humanly conceivable ordering of the natural world. 
All human judgements were judgements of a relative sort, and as untrustworthy as any 
other manifestation of human, and thus corrupted, nature. God's absolute simplicity, 
thus, remained unknowable; 'the infinite as infinite is unknown', he bluntly declares. 46 
And the mere appearance of creation offers us a vision of ourselves, rather than the 
undeniable 'evidence' of a Divine Will; 
We are also unable to understand how God can manifest Himself to us through 
visible creation... Who can understand how all things, whilst differing from one 
another by reason of their finite nature, are an image of that unique infinite 
form? 47 
The radical implication of such a view - that the 'cosmos' is a human image of nature, 
rather than the natural structure of creation - were not immediately apparent. But 
Cusanus stands at the beginning of a transformation in the human understanding of the 
physical world which, in retrospect at least, unfolded itself over a period of three 
centuries with syllogistic necessity. 
But this entire movement of thought, internally coherent as the consecutive steps of 
a single argument, additionally 'made sense' in virtue of the still more revolutionary 
demand for the overthrow of traditional valuations of human nature and its relation to 
God. It was the corrupted and worthless character of man after the Fall which had 
condemned him to the ignominy of the central and fixed place of the cosmos. Both 
within orthodox Christianity, as in the case of Cusanus, and outside it, as in the revival 
of Neoplatonic mysticism exemplified by Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandallo, 
human being was dignified in its own right. Consequently the links in the 'chain of 
being' began to come apart. 
Man, created in the 'image and likeness' of his Creator, could claim at least the 
dignity of self-movement, and the motion of the earth expressed his present worthiness 
and future perfectibility. Copernicus, who admired Cusanus, claimed the greater 
simplicity and elegance of an astronomy which allowed the earth to rotate. And long 
before his supposition gained the force of a physical demonstration it gained enthusiastic 
adherents because it was consonant with newly articulated expressions of human 
dignity. Some of his followers, indeed, such as Giordano Bruno and Thomas Digges, 
were as bold as Cusanus himself and leapt to the conclusion that the physical universe 
was 'in actuality' infinite. The earth, freed of the dubious distinction of occupying the 
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central place of the cosmos, was liberated into a boundless space occupied by an infinite 
number of other worlds. 48 
The ancient distinction between the sublunary sphere of changeable and corrupted 
nature and the superlunary sphere of more perfect celestial bodies composed of a 
weightless 'quintessential' element gave way to the uniformity of physical nature and 
infinite space. Matter was everywhere the same, distributed throughout the infinity of 
space in self-adhering quantities. The new image of the cosmos extended to human 
beings both a greater intimacy with, and a greater distance from, God. The earth 
moved, and was no more or less privileged than any other heavenly body; it was, 
therefore, as equally close to God as any other point in the universe. But neither God, 
nor any natural body, occupied a specific place in the cosmos. And because the cosmos 
was itself infinite, God could not be locate' as a kind of boundary around His creation. 
Space, as pure extension, had no moral or religious connotation. The earth, endowed 
with effortless and aimless motion was liberate' into the void, 'something new arose: an 
empty world'. 49 
This fundamental transformation in human self-understanding was associated with 
the transformation of traditional societies; from fixed hierarchical communities to the 
inherent dynamism and freedom of civil society, founded upon the unlimited 
exchangeability of commodities. Society, like space and time became the pure 
dimensionality of interaction among essentially identical units linked together according 
to universal 'laws of nature. Civil society was composed of 'individuals' equally 
endowed with the capacity to reason, an inner-tendency to seek pleasure, and an 
unchallengeable privilege of knowing their own interests. The cosmos, similarly, was 
made up of units, 'solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles', interacting 
according to universal laws. 50 Of course there was considerable variety in the way in 
which the apparent coherence and order of both society and the physical world could be 
understood. There was a notable and growing difference between accounts which 
attempted to grasp the 'system of the world' (society) in terms of the inherent properties 
of particles (individuals) themselves, and those which sought to illuminate larger 
structures dialectically in terms of the characteristic relationships presupposed in them. 
However incompatible such approaches might seem to us now, they are both 
fundamentally modern in character. Neither is conceivable outside of the new 
worldview of which they were a part. However significant the differences between 
Newton and Leibniz, or Locke and Hegel, the distinctions they represent only appear 
within a cosmology of self-moving, rather than of dependent, being. sl 
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In this transition new meanings accrued to terms and concepts whose linguistic 
labels remained unchanged. Melancholy, both as a concept and as an experience, was 
transformed in somewhat complex and unpredictable ways. At first sight, in fact, it 
might seem that modernity, as both a social and cosmological liberation from a closed 
world, was a decisive break with the tradition of melancholy. In the context of the 
decline of feudalism, the intellectual and cultural vitality of both Northern Humanism 
and the Italian Renaissance appear contrary to any conception of human wretchedness. 
Is not modernity, by virtue of its self-assertive autonomy, the denial of melancholy? 
Deeper reflection put a swift end to all such premature optimism. Nature, rather 
than being a symbolic intermediary, emerged in the new world picture as an 
insurmountable obstacle, between man and God. The Creator was removed to an 
infinitely remote point in space and time; and as this was no point at all He could be 
conceived in relation to creation only as an eternally present but impotent deus 
absconditus: as the hidden god of an inner faith. And the very immediacy of this direct 
confrontation reduced the human person, once again, to wretchedness. Whether viewed 
atomistically as a naturally given unity, or dialectically as the emergent properties of a 
specific set of relations, the human individual found himself or herself in a condition of 
'unprecedented inner loneliness'. 52 The inner-world of human subjectivity, as 
boundless in its potentiality for experience as was the new cosmos in its capacity to 
contain matter, felt itself drawn to melancholy as never before. 
The seemingly contradictory tendencies which had been traditionally subsumed in 
the notion of melancholy - spiritless indifference and states of ecstasy - were now 
intimately bound together as a sense of cosmic dislocation. The feeling of being alone 
in a void, of isolation in the face of the double infinity of external and internal 'space', 
is at the heart of both Bruno's frenzy and Montaigne's sorrow. 
Melancholic isolation later became the truth of modernity both for religiously 
inspired individuals deprived of a meaningful cosmological picture, and for atheists 
intent upon the hopeless quest for authentic self-actualization. Romantic writers, 
recognizing this, immodestly claimed for their poetry a heightened spiritual significance 
as the modern locus of spirit. Thus, for example Jean Paul's melancholy is given a 
cosmological significance; 
No one is so much alone in the universe as an atheist. With an orphaned heart that 
has lost the greatest of fathers, he mourns by the immeasurable corpse of Nature, 
which no universal spirit moves and holds together... The whole world reposes 
20 
before him, like the huge Egyptian Sphynx of stone half lying in the sand; and the 
universe is the cold iron mask of a shapeless eternity. 53 
The full consciousness of the modern age came to itself as a depressive mood that 
deepened and persisted into a new mournful sensibility. Any sense of 'contact' with an 
external reality came to depend, in fact, on a presumed community of melancholic 
spirits. Schelling expressed the pervasive sentiment of modernity in a way that made 
only too obvious our remoteness from Being: 
A veil of sadness is spread over all nature... a deep unappeasable melancholy... 
The darkest and deepest ground in human nature is... melancholy. This is what 
really creates the sympathy of man with nature. For in nature, too, the deepest 
ground is melancholy. Nature also mourns a lost good. 54 
Melancholy, no longer one type or disposition among several, far less a degenerate and 
unbalanced spirit, came into its own as the immediate experience of modern life. If the 
melancholic 'primarily suffers from the contradiction between time and infinity' then 
there was nothing illusory about such painful incompatibilities, which resided in the 
world itself. 55 Thus, while the 'choleric', 'phlegmatic' and 'sanguine' prolonged their 
shadowy existence in the quaint terminology of an outdated psychology, melancholia, 
the inner-truth of modernity, was accorded the dignity of a palpable reality. 
The self-absorption of melancholy was justified in the context of the new 
cosmology. Man was still, in some sense, a microcosm, but rather than directly 
reproducing in himself the structural pattern of the world within which he remained 
inescapably embedded, it was in the aimless freedom of a 'self-adhering body' that a 
universal principle linking nature and man was established. Rather than look outwards 
to discover in the pattern of nature and social life a model for experience, the inner-life 
was itself regarded as a realm of infinite freedom. The human being thus became a self- 
moving and self-determining individual; each one possessed of the mobility and inner 
'weight' which was at the root of the experience of melancholy. Truth lay within, and 
introspection (rather than obedience to a given authority) was recommended to the 
spiritually anxious. 56 But if God had hidden Himself in creation, the inner infinity of 
human being was no less reticent of the Divine Will. Melancholy, in the modern world, 
was the compulsion to fruitless introspection and endless self-preoccupation; and given 
the double infinity of cosmos and psyche, this proved to be a uniquely truthful mode of 
being. 
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The Distraction of Philosophy 
The emergence of modernity, in both its social and intellectual aspects, was 
accompanied, therefore, by a redefinition and revaluation of melancholy. As the 
'Elizabethan Malady' it became, rather than a particular disposition or pathological 
condition, the leading characteristic of the age. In England and the Continent, in 
Catholic as well as Reformed circles, for secular as well as for religious reflection, 
melancholy was a central concern. 57 
By the time Burton wrote his Anatomy of Melancholy(first edition 1621), he could 
afford to make his claims rhetorically; 'For who indeed is not a fool, melancholy, 
mad? '. 58 Thomas Nashe and Ben Johnson had already satirized its more self-conscious 
and affected devotees, while Timothy Bright's A Treatise ofMelancholla (1586) had 
established a new medical tradition in its study and treatment. 59 For both literary and 
medical authors melancholy represented something fundamental to the modern 
condition. It could not be treated as a set of purely physical symptoms, nor as an 
arbitrary and rare derangement of the sensibilities or of the mind. Melancholy had its 
roots in the inescapable reality of human existence. Burton, as both a divine and a 
physician, was, therefore, especially well qualified to be melancholy's anatomist. 60 
And although Burton writes of melancholy as a 'humour', such is the self-expanding 
range of symptoms, forms, variations, sub-divisions and characteristics which belong 
to it that, in fact, this term no longer refers to a particular type of person or human 
constitution, but seems rather to encompass the entire realm of normal psychic and 
psycho-somatic possibilities. 
Burton's torrential prose, then, is not intended to have, and certainly does not 
have, the effect of more clearly defining and accounting for the central object of his 
concern. The impressive analytic apparatus, and even more the welter of 'authorities' 
he cites and incorporates into his text, is an artifice through which melancholy can 
expand, unobstructed, to touch every aspect of life. 61 
Indeed, it is not Burton's intention to 'explain' melancholy, nor yet to express the 
manner in which it gripped him. Like Michel de Montaigne, whose lapse into 
melancholy might 'rationally' (and partially) be accounted a 'reaction' to the deaths of 
his father and his great friend Etienne de La Boetie, Burton was 'enraptured by sadness' 
and anatomized melancholy to distract himself from its torments; 'to ease my mind by 
writing' "62 
And readers of the Montaigne's Essays, like readers of Burton's Anatomy, 
both of which are constructed with extraordinary care and precision, lose their way in 
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these labyrinthine texts because they are as fluid and restless as their author's 
symptoms. 63 Burton might well have appended Montaigne's famous and deceptive line 
to his own work; 'I myself am the subject of my book. But their authors', in fact, are 
neither Montaigne nor Burton, but personae conjured from melancholy itself; the 
writers who call themselves Michel de Montaigne and Democritus Junior. Melancholy 
is the subject of their books. The authors of these books are themselves melancholy. 
But they write to distract themselves from their own wretchedness, and, thus, in writing 
about melancholy hope to express something other than melancholy itself. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as melancholy is touched by rapture and ecstasy its victims are 
'beyond themselves'and in seeking distraction seeks to 'return' to their proper selves. 
Thus, inasmuch as their works are successful antidotes to melancholy they are authentic 
but untruthful, and where they are truly melancholic they are inauthentic. Here the 
whole problem of 'indirect communication', and its relation to melancholy, which 
Kierkegaard was to make so peculiarly his own, is introduced into modern western 
literature. 
Burton's choice of pseudonym is significant in a number of respects. It is, first of 
all, a response to a challenge issued by Erasmus to discover a second Democritus to 
mock the follies of the world. The Anatomy is thus connected with The Praise of Folly, 
and immediately, therefore, with a radical inversion of the scholastic tradition. 
Christianity is presented as a non-rational faith, analogous to madness, rather than to the 
ordered result of reflection and contemplation. 64 More generally it links the Anatomy 
with the ancient doctrines of both atomism and melancholy. Democritus of Abdera, 'a 
little wearish old man, very melancholy by nature, averse from company in his latter 
day, and much given to solitariness', was said to have been writing a book on 
melancholy, and to this end anatomized the carcasses of various animals to discover its 
seat. As the name of Democritus is also associated with the foundation of atomism 
Burton is able to allude to the revival and transformation of both. In a lengthy, and 
apparently superfluous, 'Digression on the Air' Burton 'rising' through the air surveys 
the entire cosmos in his mind's eye. This practical demonstration of the unlimited 
capacity of the human imagination, far from being incidental to his main topic is, in 
fact, central to the entire book. 65 
The causes of melancholy are legion, or at least appear to be. Any illness, 
misfortune, or circumstance of life may be either a cause or a symptom (or both) of 
melancholy, but it is the imagination that makes it so. Melancholy is uncontrolled 
imagination: 
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... this strong conceit or imagination is astrum hominis (a man's guiding star), and 
the rudder of this our ship, which reason should steer, but, overborne by phantasy, 
cannot manage, and so suffers itself and this whole vessel of ours to be overruled, 
and often overturned. 66 
Allowing the imagination its own freedom 'is most pleasant at first' and, indeed, 
melancholy isolation is powerfully attractive. It is 
... a most delightsome humour, to be alone, dwell alone, walk alone, meditate, lie in bed whole days, dreaming awake as it were, and frame a thousand phantastical 
imaginations. 
" 
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But even his Greek model was unable to 'moderate his affections', and 
... the scene alters upon a sudden, discontent and perpetual anxiety succeed in their 
place; so by little, by that shoeing-horn of idleness, and voluntary solitariness, 
melancholy, this feral fiend, is drawn on... now it is bitter and harsh; a cankered 
soul macerated with cares and discontents. 68 
And as his 'Digression on the Air' had shown the imagination becomes 'giddy' even 
when it is guided by nature. Burton's often repeated and concluding advice 'be not idle, 
be not solitary' is not, therefore, a cure for melancholy, but a means only of 
ameliorating its worst excesses. 
Burton devotes an entire Book to two specific forms of melancholy, love- 
melancholy and religious melancholy. This by no means unbalances his work because 
these are the specific forms through which melancholy has become a general 
characteristic of modern life. Love, which includes the intimate friendship praised by 
Montaigne, is a 'free' relationship subversive of 'community' and all fixed and 
hierarchical social relations. As a 'vehement perturbation of the mind' love touches 
every aspect of existence and is 'the circle equant of all other affections'. 69 It is the 
passion in which imagination plays the greatest part, and is, therefore, most vulnerable 
to melancholic inversion; 'love is plague, a torture, an hell, a bitter-sweet passion' 
which turns easily to jealousy, hatred and madness. 70 Similarly, the religious anguish 
he documents is connected to the inner restless freedom of the imagination. Religious 
freedom, the destruction of the hierarchical cosmos, and the crystallization of modern 
religious life in the notion of faith as a personal relationship with God, all provoked 
new forms of religious melancholy. In a typically torrential passage he writes: 
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These and the like places terrify the souls of many; election, predestination, 
reprobation, preposterously conceived, offend divers, with a deal of foolish 
presumption, curiosity, needless speculation, contemplation, solicitude, wherein 
they trouble and puzzle themselves about those questions of grace, free will, 
perseverance, God's secrets: they will know more than is revealed of God in His 
Word, human capacity or ignorance can apprehend ... 
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If religious thought and feeling had been liberated from the constraint of an 
authoritarian and hierarchical church, it had not simultaneously freed the individual 
from the anguish of religious suffering. Indeed, in now conceptualising such torments 
as self-imposed, it intensified, rather than reduced, their effects. Religion - which is at 
the centre of life - is thus both a cause of, and a cure for, melancholy. 'The last and 
greatest cause of this malady', Burton tells us, 'is our own conscience', and conscience 
(rather than contemplation or passive ritual) is, for him, the primary modality of 
religious experience. 72 
The spectacle of modern life is indeed melancholy; a 'vast, infinite ocean of 
incredible madness and folly' in which all human beings are prey to 'melancholy fears 
without a cause', and are distinguished by being 'miraculously vain, various and 
wavering'. 73 Imagination, which is a kind of infinite inward space, has been wrenched 
free of a fixed cosmological order and places its relentless question mark over every 
momentarily settled state of being. The modern form of melancholy joins modern 
cosmology and psychology to the traditional imagery of the Fall. As a divinely cunning 
punishment for disobedience God has granted man an inner freedom which, finally 
realized in the modern world, proves to be a torment which individuals cannot help but 
impose upon themselves. 
Burton recommends study and sociable leisure pursuits as antidotes to melancholy. 
But distraction is proposed as a means of living with, and not of curing, melancholy, 
which continues to lurk, so to speak, in the heart of every self-generated means of 
avoiding its wretchedness. 
The Philosophy of Distraction 
The religious significance of melancholy in modern society is not restricted to the 
ideology of the puritan tradition. Montaigne was, in his own eyes at least, an orthodox 
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Catholic, and in Pascal we can find the first fully developed religious psychology of 
melancholy. Pascal, among the most gifted mathematicians and physicists of the 
seventeenth century, as well as one of its most incisive moralists, makes explicit the link 
between cosmos and psyche, between infinite space and inward wretchedness. 74 The 
unity of his thought is revealed in his uncompromising religious vision of human 
existence. For him the communal and hierarchical principles of traditional conceptions 
have lost their inner meaning, and are rejected in favour of 'the totally different 
concepts of the isolated individual and of infinite space' . 
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Pascal is fully alive to the post-feudal conception of reason as a purely human 
faculty. Human greatness lies in the capacity for knowledge, and above all for self- 
knowledge. In an infinitely extended universe human beings have no option but to 
fasten upon themselves as the centre of their own existence. We can no longer see 
ourselves as part of a cosmos, as a division within its divine totality and inevitably we 
grieve over this loss of intimacy. We must, rather, look out upon the world at large, 
and seek within the confines of this standpoint itself for a comprehensible order and 
meaning in existence. In this perspective human knowledge stands apart from the world 
which it reconstructs in conceptual form. 
The new science conveys a picture of nature as a coherent mechanism. But this does 
not mean that we now 'understand' nature, which, from a deeper viewpoint remains 
fundamentally incomprehensible; 
Why is my stature what it is and the span of my life one hundred and not one 
thousand years? Why did nature give me this span of life, choosing it rather than 
any other from out of the infinite number available, where no compelling reason 
imposed on her this choice rather than another? 76 
The religious problem of modernity is that both nature and its personal subjective 
equivalent, the ego, must be conceived as autonomously functioning, and meaningless, 
bundles of relations. The spiritual value of existence cannot any longer be revealed by a 
mind which mirrors God's structural plan of the cosmos. Pascal does believe, however, 
that this plan is revealed in the spontaneous movement of the heart; in the inner 
experience of self-affirming and extra-rational activity. 
In a strikingly compact formulation Pascal writes that 'Man's greatness comes 
from knowing he is wretched' . 
7' The peculiar privilege of human reason is the 
knowledge of its own limitation; the fall from the ineffable self-sufficiency of its 
primordial state. Pascal elaborates the point by way of a celebrated metaphor: 
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Man is only a reed, the weakest in nature, but he is a thinking reed. There is no 
need for the whole universe to take up arms to crush him: a vapour, a drop of 
water is enough to kill him. But even if the universe were to crush him, man 
would still be nobler than his slayer, because he knows that he is dying and the 
advantage the universe has over him. The universe knows nothing of this. 78 
Within his nostalgia for the security of the old cosmology (authority and 
community), lies a more specific discomfort which is the unease of modern melancholy. 
It is not just a sense of dislocation and disorientation, but of estrangement. And yet the 
fact that we find the cosmos to be an alien and comfortless mechanism is in an odd way 
the only guarantee of our original unspoilt nature. 'If man had never been anything but 
corrupt', he points out, 'he would have no idea either of truth or bliss'. 79 In fact, 
however, as science and morality attest, we have a living conception of both. But only 
a conception, so that, 'unhappy as we are (and we should be less so if there were no 
element of greatness in our condition) we have an idea of happiness but we cannot attain 
it'. 80 We cannot know God directly, yet neither are we condemned to eternal ignorance 
of His nature. God is hidden, rather than revealed, in his creation. And though 'God 
has appointed visible signs in the Church so that he shall be recognized', he has so 
planted them 'that he will only be perceived by those who seek him with all their 
heart'. 81 It is, therefore, in sincerity of heart rather than in natural reason that 
happiness is discovered. Melancholy is, thus, a consequence of the Fall for modern 
individuated self-consciousness, and a symptom of. the unquenchable longing this 
implies; 'man wants to be happy, only wants to be happy, and cannot help wanting to be 
happy'. 82 
By reason alone man cannot 'cure death, wretchedness and ignorance' and 
consequently seeks diversion from naturally gloomy thoughts. People therefore seek 
'some novel and agreeable passion which keeps them busy, like gambling, hunting, 
some absorbing show, in short what is called diversion. And Pascal, more rigorous 
but no less human than Burton, does not condemn them for this; 'they are not wrong to 
want excitement', he admits. 83 The modern world offers as consolation for the 
wretchedness upon which it is built nothing but the distraction of perpetual and 
thoughtless activity. 
Distraction is a paradox; it is continuous movement in the pursuit of absolute rest; 
'We seek rest... (but) rest proves intolerable because of the boredom it produces. We 
must get away from it and crave excitement. 84 Distraction is a continuous oscillation 
between energetic ecstasy and lethargic indifference. But these polarities are 
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fundamentally identical. They are merely different forms of boredom. Pascal 
understands that diversionary activities do not surmount, but carry within them, the 
boredom which is their immediate cause. And it is firstly as boredom, therefore, that 
melancholy becomes a common experience. Pascal, indeed, is the first to define 
boredom as the central experience of modernity. Boredom is inherent in the secular 
individualism which is the only moral foundation of modern (specifically modern 
capitalist) society. And although it often appears disguised in the particularities of a 
more specific malady, boredom is the commonest of diseases and reveals a boundless 
spiritual longing: 
Man is so unhappy that he would be bored even if he had no cause for boredom, by 
the very nature of his temperament, and he is so vain that, though he has a 
thousand and one reasons for being bored, the slightest thing, like pushing a ball 
with a billiard cue, will be enough to divert him. 85 
Left to himself man generates, from within his own soul, an image of fulfilment 
which he cannot reach. It is the persistence of this authentic longing for happiness that 
renders everything unconnected with it dull and lifeless. It is the sense of loss of, and 
of longing for, a vanished perfection that repeatedly compels us to futile activity. 'We 
are full of things that impel us outwards' ; of 'wants' we unthinkingly attach to external 
objects whose subsequent possession we vainly hope will secure our lasting happiness. 
But the 'depth' of human longing is infinite and cannot be thus easily assuaged. 'Man 
infinitely transcends man' and as, for the modern world, neither nature, nor religious 
'belief' in the sense of a morally binding and universally valid account of the 
significance of human existence, provides an intersubjective medium of transcendence, 
the human soul must fashion it anew from within the resources of each individual 
psyche. Self-awareness must, therefore, continually stretch beyond itself, and even for 
those who sense the vanity of wants, 'our instincts make us feel that our Happiness must 
be sought outside ourselves. Our passions drive us outwards, even without objects to 
excite them'. 86 
Melancholy, the secular world of endless and fruitless diversions, is, above all, a 
sign of lost innocence; 'What else does this craving, and this helplessness proclaim' 
Pascal asks rhetorically, 'but that there was once in man a true happiness, of which all 
that now remains is the empty print and trace'. 87 The objects that excite our futile and 
vain passions cannot fill the emptiness of the soul, 'since this infinite abyss can be filled 
88 only with an infinite and immutable object; in other words with God himself' " 
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Immediate self-knowledge is the 'unhappy consciousness' of wretchedness and 
inconsolable cosmic grief. A soul lies within us, and stirs to life as the power of 
reason, but it gives us no joy. Its presence, rather, is a perpetual irritant, a tormenting 
reminder of how far we have fallen beneath an ideal state of bliss. The more, therefore, 
that we use the natural capacity of the soul to direct our own lives the more we obscure 
our true end and the more firmly we become rooted in its graceless limitations: 
Our soul is cast into the body where it finds number, time, dimensions; it reasons 
about these things and calls them natural, or necessary, and can believe nothing 
else. 89 
Pascal, thus, fully aware of the genuine triumph of human reason in reducing the 
appearance of nature to a comprehensible system of relations, nonetheless fastens upon 
its inherent incapacity to secure human happiness as the true beginning of both self- 
knowledge and knowledge of God. Melancholy, as distraction and boredom, may be 
traced to a sense of cosmic estrangement but, at the same time, it is a sign that we have 
not been abandoned by God. Our failure fully to comprehend ourselves, or to reduce 
our passions to the ordered logic of a 'system of nature', signifies (in a way which also 
remains incomprehensible) God's presence within us. 
He therefore rejects out of hand the comforting optimism spread by the more 
popular forms of modern materialistic psychology. Such approaches, which by 
implication at least rejoined us to 'nature' by reducing consciousness to an arrangement 
of particles, in fact utterly fail to jump the abyss between matter and soul which their 
very theories presupposed. Alluding to radical Cartesian psychology, for example, he 
remarks: 
When they say that heat is merely the movement of certain globules and light the 
conatus recedendi (centrifugal force) that we feel, we are amazed... the feeling of 
fire... the reception of sound and of light, all seem mysterious... It is true that the 
smallness of the spirits entering the pores touches other nerves, but they are still 
nerves. 90 
We perceive the world, not the nerves, and for Pascal it is absurd to regard pleasure as 
simply a 'ballet of spirits'. 
Both real knowledge of God and authentic self-knowledge begin in this failure of 
reason; we cannot conceive of either as an 'object' with definite characteristics, 
magnitude, position and so on. They are sensed as 'subjects', as infinite and 
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inexhaustible reservoirs of feeling. We know God, therefore, as we know ourselves, in 
our hearts. In a famous phrase Pascal tells us that 'the heart has its reasons of which the 
reason knows nothing; we know this in countless ways'. 91 And this is just another 
expression for faith, which he defines as 'God perceived by the heart, not by the 
92 reason'. 
It would be just as misleading to view Pascal's thought as a continuation of the 
medieval mystical tradition, as it would be mistaken to see his practice of natural 
science as a simple development of late medieval scholasticism. Both are new in 
principle, adapted as they are to post-feudal cosmology and the social logic of emergent 
capitalism. This is particularly evident in Pascal's own intellectual brand of asceticism. 
'We must love God alone and hate ourselves alone', he remarks at one point, the deep 
paradox of his instruction less evident to us than he might have wished. The point is 
that 'love of God' and 'love of self' can, for the first time, become allied together, if 
not, indeed, identified with each other. Pascal goes even further and deeper in his 
rationalization of Christian categories than does Calvin. He expressed with unrivalled 
eloquence and intensity the 'unprecedented inner loneliness' of the individual adrift in 
the void of modernity; 'the eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with dread'. 93 
He seeks to resolve this tension by identifying the self with God and God with the self. 
'Self-hatred' is only hatred of what the self has become in the secular world. Authentic 
selfhood requires an ascetic rejection of all diversions as an empty and futile gesture, as 
boredom. Pascal, thus, draws an implicit distinction between the self (authentic inner 
being), and the ego (immediate experience of the social world). There is, thus, nothing 
negative or life-denying in genuine asceticism. To allow the self to turn towards God, 
seriously to long for the unique object which is its authentic goal, is to realize the self as 
well as, or even rather than, to overcome the ego. 
Pascal insists that the ego alone is sinful but is so wholly and always,; 'denying it, 
we can never be unhappy: indulging it, never happy'. 94 That this is no ordinary 
injunction to 'self-denial' emerges in a passage, remarkable even by the standards of the 
Pensees: 
The true and only virtue is therefore to hate ourselves, for our concupiscence 
makes us hateful, and to seek for a being really worthy of love in order to love 
him. But as we cannot love what is outside us, we must love a being who is within 
us but is not our own self. And this is true for every single person. Now only the 
universal being is of this kind: the kingdom of God is within us, universal good is 
within us, and is both ourselves and not ourselves. 95 
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The deeper meaning of the Reformation is revealed in the discovery of God within 
the human subject, as an internal relation of self-transcendence. Salvation no longer 
depends upon man finding his proper 'place' within a cosmic plan through which God 
reveals himself. God hides in creation, a concealment which, never quite complete, 
urges upon the human subject the necessity of completing himself in the external 
expression of an inward movement of faith. Pascal is deeply conscious of the religious 
implications of his acceptance of the new cosmology. For him, paradoxically, the 
infinite is a relation that is discovered within the finite. 96 Human subjectivity tends 
towards its own spiritual elevation through passionate self-reflection, rather than by a 
process of reasoning about the natural world. The infinite is not grasped through an 
inconceivable expansion of the soul through the cosmos, as if, like some sort of spiritual 
balloon it becomes puffed up by God's presence. The infinite, rather, is discovered 
within the limitations and constraints of a particular existence. 
The new cosmology need not lead, therefore, to a purely secular psychology. 97 
Indeed, the interiorization of God, His presence within the heart, means that the human 
affections can never be understood in terms of a rational order. And even for those 
(that is for almost everyone), who do not consciously sense the heart's mysterious 
presence, and consequently devalue their own passions, human feelings open upon an 
incomprehensible depth. In every detail of his humanness 'man infinitely transcends 
man '. 
Man is passionate creature. This follows necessarily from human imperfection and 
incompleteness, and from God's concealment. We are constantly driven, by 
externalizing its inner movements, to discover the soul's inwardly hidden aspects. 
Melancholic self-absorption has, as its corollary, the need for self-awareness. This urge 
towards self-expression manifests itself as love; in Pascal's view the most general means 
of connection between the interior self and the world; 'Disguise it, in fact, as we will, 
we love without intermission... we live not a moment exempt from its influence'. 98 In 
continually seeking that which is hidden we become conscious of the enormous gulf 
between the immediate experience of ourselves and self-generated images of perfect 
happiness. It is this disparity which continues to drive our passions outwards. If we 
truly possessed God, we would dwell happily within ourselves. But as 'Man cannot 
find his satisfactions within himself only; and, as love is essential to him, he must seek 
the objects of his affections in external objects'. 99 Man seeks 'beautiful' objects to 
satisfy his longing for happiness, and, 'as he himself is the fairest being that the hand of 
God has formed, he must look within himself for a model of those beauties which he 
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seeks elsewhere. It is the power of his own soul, casting about it, as it were, an 
aura of attractiveness, which confers upon external things their quality of beauty. Only 
those objects which 'partake of his own resemblance' have the power to attract, and this 
resemblance is just a consequence of a projective externalization of our own self-image. 
All love, in fact, is self-love; 'all possess in themselves the original of that beauty which 
they look for externally'. 101 
'Man is full of wants', of deficiencies rather than wishes, and he 'loves only those 
who can satisfy them. 102 And what we love in others are just those qualities we feel 
lacking in ourselves; 'we never love anyone, but only qualities', those 'borrowed 
qualities' which reflect our own wants. 103 The unique individuality which connects the 
various qualities of the self is, in itself, incommunicable and cannot be loved directly by 
another; 'And if someone loves me for my judgement or my memory do they love me? 
me myself? No, for I could lose these qualities without losing Myself'. 104 
It is, in fact, to Pascal, rather than to the Puritan divines, that we are indebted for 
establishing the framework of a new religious psychology. The solitariness of the 
individual soul, fixed arbitrarily between 'infinity and nullity' is estranged from itself. 
Christ, 'totally abandoned' and 'alone on earth' was uniquely capable of tolerating 
authentic spiritual selfhood. 105 In its struggle to free itself from its own limitations the 
human self projects itself into the social world and seeks to realize its hidden inner value 
in activity. It fails; and in substituting distraction for happiness discovers the empty 
pleasure of the ego. In a society apparently held together by mechanical principles (the 
interaction of individuals motivated by the rational pursuit of their private interests), 
Christianity, though it retains an institutional presence in public and communal forms, 
progressively defines itself in terms of private 'conscience'. 
The more ardently Pascal sought God, the more completely he felt he discovered 
himself. After an intense religious experience in 1654 he tried, with increasing 
desperation, to rid himself of the burden of his own body and its secular appetites. In 
imitation of forms of asceticism he had himself criticised, he lived with increasing 
simplicity and austerity. Fearful that the world might ruin the state of heightened 
spiritual tumescence he longed to make permanent, he withdrew from society, became 
suspicious of affection, and abandoned the intimacy of friendship which at one time, in 
common with Montaigne, he had held to be the rarest and most precious of the heart's 
affections. 106 
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The coldness of the intellect overwhelmed his heart and Pascal's introversion 
deepened into a psychotic withdrawal from the world. Nonetheless he serves as a 
prototype of the modern religious personality. Melancholy sets in motion, through the 
deepening self-awareness implied in the failure of distraction to cure us of unhappiness, 
the specifically modern longing for authentic selfhood. The life-task of modernity is to 
liberate the unique individually which lies within us. And however secular the language 
of self-development became, the fervour with which this universal vocation was 
embraced marked it unmistakably as a religious quest. 
Modernity and the Experience of Melancholy 
'That our age is an age of mental depression, there is no doubt and no question'; its 
ubiquity rests on the consciousness of the modern world as a set of individuated 
'objects', isolated in space, and set in motion according to universal 'laws of nature' 
devoid of intention, or design, and blind to their consequences. 107 The classical 
language of melancholy, and its associated network of moral and psychological ideas, 
has been transformed and adapted to describe the immediate experience of modernity as 
the consciousness of 'inner loneliness'. Both cosmos and society appear as a 
meaningless and chaotic background to the emergent 'ego' which, resting on nothing 
more substantial than its own image, is swept into the turmoil of civil society, or, 
withdrawing, oscillates between depressed self-absorption and extravagant states of 
rapture. 108 A remark of Montaigne' s anticipates the new perspective: 'being consists in 
motion'. 109 The melancholic individual (and in modern society all individuals are more 
or less melancholic), is self-moving, but, in a world which is a perpetual chaos, this 
becomes an arbitrary displacement lacking any sense of direction. It is motion 
productive of disorientation and dizziness and prolongs the traditional contrariness of 
melancholy, which is now viewed as both heavy-bodied and light-headed. 110 
After Rousseau, in the literary movements of Romanticism, writers celebrated the 
absolute freedom of the subject which melancholy, in both its aspects, seemed to 
represent. The modern hero 'discovered' himself only by going 'beyond' or 'outside' 
himself. This was a process which began in brooding self-contemplation and ended in 
ecstasy. A description by Hoffmann, which assumes melancholy to be a commonplace, 
might serve as representative of many: 
Let me ask you outright, gentle reader, if there have not been hours, indeed whole 
days and weeks of your life, during which all your usual activities were painfully 
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repugnant... your breast was stirred by an obscure feeling that a noble desire for an 
object surpassing all earthly pleasures must somewhere, sometime be fulfilled... 
this yearning for something unknown obsessed you wherever you went... You 
crept to and fro with downcast gaze like a rejected lover, and none of humanity's 
many and varied activities gave you either joy or pain, as though you had ceased to 
belong to this world. I Il 
In the same context Tieck writes that 'existence and torment are one and the same 
word', and of modern life as 'an unveiling of the madness, the frenzy of all life', as 
1 sheer nervousness'. 1 12 
In making of melancholy a starting point for reflecting upon the character of 
modern life, Kierkegaard could have claimed to be the inheritor of an ancient tradition 
newly restored and reinvigorated. That he did not, but preferred to write as if from a 
position of extreme isolation, might be interpreted as a symptomatic of his own 
melancholic temper, but, in fact, had more to do with the tension between this tradition, 
on the one hand, and theological or philosophical speculation, on the other. Philosophy 
increasingly defined modernity in terms of the problem of knowledge, or, more 
generally, of representation. If the world had been emptied of real symbols - if we were 
no longer part of the world that we sensed beyond ourselves - then how could we be 
certain what this world was like? Whether sceptical or otherwise modern philosophy 
began with the disjunction between knowing subject and unknown object. But this was 
to accept that which melancholy protested against. The bifurcation of reality, the 
withdrawal of objects into themselves, to face, uncomprehending, the internal world of 
the subject, the unbridgeable gulf that marked the 'antinomies' of bourgeois thought; all 
these followed upon an unacknowledged but pervasive melancholy. Modern 
philosophy, particularly in Descartes, Kant and Hegel, presupposed as a permanent 
condition the melancholy of modern life, and made this central to their reflection. And 
in doing so they domesticated the subversive genius that clung to every real instance of 
'sorrow without cause'. To cross swords directly with the tradition of philosophy, or to 
summon up as its challenger an alternative sequence of 'great thinkers', would be to 
admit defeat. It would be no better than bad philosophy. The point is not to 
philosophise at all; but to disarm philosophy with the 'weight' of melancholy which it is 
powerless to relieve. 
Melancholy, unimpressed by philosophical sophistication, nonetheless had 
intellectual resources of its own. Modern melancholy, mournful, heavy, and dizzy with 
infinity, is also charged with the 'metaphysical lucidity of depression'. 113 Like the 
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pictures of Caspar David Friedrich, and of Giorgio di Chirico, the impenetrable 
objectivity of the modern world presents itself to the detached and aimless spectator as a 
sequence of pure and unconnected appearances, and, thus, with dreamlike clarity. 114 
The lucidity and depth of melancholy is quite distinct from the rigour and 
profundity of philosophy. The former can never be exhausted, it is sublime because it 
brings the subject directly into contact with his own free and unbounded nature. The 
'zone of melancholy' is a meeting ground between the finite and the infinite, a perilous 
collapsing in upon itself of the entire human capacity for representation, a 'zero degree 
of symbolism'. 115 Philosophical discourse, on the other hand, is profoundly beautiful 
just because it does not issue in conclusions; it is interminable. Kierkegaard realized 
that, gifted dialectician though he was, his melancholy was deeper than his philosophy, 
and that systematic reflection, dialectical skill, and rational inference, would never 
relieve him of its weight. He began (one is tempted to write 'therefore', but there is no 
'reason' here) with melancholy, with his own melancholy, and, in its isolating self- 
enclosure, could not appeal to his immediate predecessors but had to discover anew, the 
force of their anti-philosophical critique of modernity. 116 
Kierkegaard was, of course, aware of his predecessors. He fought against his own 
melancholy, and rejected the partial defences offered to it in the traditions of modernity 
outlined above. He disregarded Burton's and Montaigne's moderate stoicism and sided 
decisively with Pascal in regarding the wretchedness of melancholy as a sign of spent 
perfection rather than as the 'natural' condition of modernity. At the same time, 
however, he rejected the Romantic and mystical elevation of rapture into an image of 
human freedom and human happiness. But he never used them systematically. For 
Kierkegaard, the problem posed by modern life is not that of negating 'unhappy 
consciousness' in favour of ecstasy, but of transforming both immanent tendencies of 
melancholy into real happiness. Kierkegaard, thus, treated the opposed tendencies of 
melancholy as aspects of despair and sought to define the conditions under which 
despair, in all its guises, might be overcome. It is in this context that he developed a 
distinctively religious psychology of modern life. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
IRONY: THE ROMANCE OF DISTANCE 
Am I not a jarring note 
In the heavenly symphony 
Since devouring Irony 
Gnaws me, shakes me by the throat? 
Charles Baudelaire - Heautontimoroumenos 
Skyward again and again, like the man in Ovid, 
Toward an ironic heaven as blank as slate, 
And trapped in a ruinous myth, he lifts his head 
As if God were the object of his hate. 
Charles Baudelaire - The Swan 
Melancholy is the empty depth of modernity. The sense of simultaneously being in a 
void, and of enclosing a void - of being nothing but an arbitrary division within the 
formless immensity of space - is reflected in, and reflected upon, by the ironic form in 
which so much of the 'progressive' literary and artistic culture in which Kierkegaard 
spent his prolonged student years was cast. I Melancholy has become the emblem of 
modernity primarily because of its sublime self-sufficiency; as 'sorrow without cause' 
it is indifferent to the world and, therefore, unresponsive to all rational therapeutics. In 
the modern world this, 'holding back from an engagement with existence' seems 
entirely justified as a primitive 'understanding' of the abyss which has opened in the 
development of western society between the two opposed worlds of object and subject. 2 
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Irony is, equally, detached and self-absorbed. It is as inconsolable as melancholy. 
Indeed, both appear to be mysterious diseases. An autobiographical section of Stages in 
Life's Waymakes the connection, 'What is my sickness? Melancholy. Where is the seat 
of this sickness? In the power of imagination'. 3 And, like melancholy, irony has a 
'weight' of its own. We talk of 'heavy' irony where its presence becomes too obvious, 
when it is not 'lightened' by wit. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kierkegaard, as an 
unusually gifted student and as a supremely melancholic individual, should choose Irony 
as the subject for his Dissertation, for the Degree of Master of Arts. 
Kierkegaard himself excludes this elaborate work, together with some earlier 
polemical essays and reviews, from the 'authorship' proper. Fully to appreciate the 
several separate but related strands of this authorship as an exploration of melancholy, 
however, The Concept of Irony, must serve as the essential, if deceptive, starting point. 4 
Indeed, prior to November 1842, when he completed Either/Or, Kierkegaard had 
already produced a variety of writings which bear directly on his interpretation of some 
of the most distinctive features of modern culture. A lengthy article, 'From the Papers 
of One Still Living', criticising a novel by Hans Andersen for J. L. Heiberg's literary 
review, is a somewhat distant anticipation of his later and much more important piece of 
contemporary literary criticism Two Ages. More significantly, his incomparable 
Journals, which, although not written for immediate publication, unquestionably formed 
from their inception a major part of his literary work, reveal a number of drafts and 
writing plans. 
There exist in Journal form ideas for a series of literary/philosophical works 
exploring the nature and significance of a number of primordial character types. He 
refers most frequently to plans to write on 'The Master Thief', 'Don Juan', and 'The 
Wandering Jew'. These plans are significant, firstly, in indicating that from his earliest 
days as a writer Kierkegaard thought primarily in terms of the irreducible character of 
personal experience, rather than in terms of 'ideas', and secondly, in the range and 
variety of such representations he is evidently preoccupied with the categorical 
distinctions which appear among them. Don Juan, thus, is conceived to be nothing but 
pure sensuousness, Faust represents doubt, and Ahasuerus personifies despair. These 
initial experiments were soon absorbed into a more ambitious 'Faust Project' in which 
the mythical character would be made to reflect all three primordial forms of 
1 negation'. 5 
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These plans additionally reveal an important feature of Kierekgaard's persona as a 
writer; namely a powerful and spontaneously 'polyphonic' imagination. 6 Kierkegaard 
possessed to a high degree a poetic facility for the representation of human types. His 
artistic genius, characterizing the fullness and inexplicable diversity of life's inner- 
forms in wonderfully plastic images, was from the beginning as essential to him as was 
his prodigal talent as a dialectician.? These early experiments in portraying 'world- 
historical' characters were later metamorphosed into a series of pseudonyms through 
which Kierkegaard was able to typify the variety of incompatible forms through which 
the modern world could be grasped as personal experience. It would be misleading, 
however, to view Kierkegaard's 'development' as a writer in terms of an unfolding 
poetic vision of the world. He was both attracted and repelled by his own literary 
talent, which was, for him, an ideal object of dread, from which he could never 
completely free himself. 8 
Prior, then, to the delineation of an existential topography of modern life 
Kierkegaard outlined the central problems of personal existence in terms of irony. In 
spite of its ambition and intricacy, however, he was soon to dismiss The Concept of 
Irony with the curt and damning remark; 'What a Hegelian fool I was! '. Infatuated with 
what he took to be the philosophical originality of his own age he had been foolish 
enough to regard it as a 'defect on the part of Socrates to disregard the whole and only 
consider numerically the individuals'. 9 He quickly reversed this judgement, seeing in 
Socrates not only the originator of that authentic irony to which its modern exponents 
had proved unfaithful, but the personality whose presence had somehow insinuated itself 
into the entire course of western philosophical reflection and, therefore, had become 
part of its very life. Whatever judgement might finally be made of it The Concept of 
Irony hardly deserves the neglect its author encouraged. 10 
An early interest in irony, and particularly in its modern literary form, can be seen 
retrospectively as something of an intellectual temptation for Kierkegaard. The fear that 
he later expressed - that for subsequent generations his works would become 'merely 
interesting' - might be applied to his first major book in relation to his own mature 
work. In The Concept of Irony, intellectual brilliance and the poetic capacity to form 
images were freed from ethical considerations and the more distant religious goal which 
conditioned all the works of the 'authorship'. The rather harsh judgement which he 
formed of it shortly after its completion was the product of a fundamental shift in his 
conception of the purpose of writing. Yet it remains an invaluable clue, both to 
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Kierkegaard's own development as a writer and as a personality, and, more importantly, 
to the meaning of his authorship as a whole. It remains, however, a clue that is difficult 
to interpret. The complexity of the language makes it difficult to follow the argument. 
Worse, there is the suspicion, forced on any reader acquainted with Kierkegaard's 
pseudonymous works, that this is not only a work on irony, but an ironic work. So 
much was clear, indeed, to its academic examiners who voted unanimously for its 
acceptance for the Degree of M. A. (the equivalent of a modern Doctorate), and were 
equally unanimous in their criticism of its style. " The difficulties associated with the 
pseudonymous works are, therefore, already present in his academic dissertation. The 
author's words can never quite be taken at face value, even when they are published 
under his own name. 
Irony is no arbitrary or accidental starting point for Kierkegaard's sustained 
reflection on the character of modern existence. It is, so to speak, the most general 
'solution' to the 'problem' of melancholy; the cure which is rooted in the same 
conditions which produced the sickness. It is, for this very reason, a false beginning, 
which lacks the discriminatory power Kierkegaard required to mount a genuinely 
critical analysis of the contemporary world. 
One of the most striking features of The Concept of Irony is, thus, that it exhibits 
powerful influences from, though not slavish devotion to, two sources which shortly 
thereafter were to become polemical targets for Kierkegaard's own writings; 
Romanticism and the philosophy of Hegel. Irony, indeed, had emerged in the Romantic 
Movement, among creative writers, literary critics, and philosophers as a term held to 
be descriptive of the most general and fundamental characteristics of modern life. For 
Friedrich Schlegel, Solger, Tieck, and many others, including Kierkegaard, inspired by 
the subjective turn in modern philosophy, irony was far more than a literary technique. 
For them the possibility of irony - of communicating a meaning or intention quite 
distinct from the explicit meaning of the words used (most readily, in fact, an opposite 
meaning) - raised the more general problem of the possibility and limitations of human 
communication as such. 12 In irony the privileged status of a single cosmologically valid 
perspective is abandoned in favour of an infinite multiplicity of equally plausible, and 
equally unconvincing, points of view. And this was a problem that, after he had 
rejected both Romanticism and Hegelianism, remained central to Kierkegaard's life and 
work. 
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In its distinctively modern form, indeed, irony seemed to have infected every life- 
relation. Every aspect of life had become charged with its corrosive freedom so that 
nothing could be taken at face value, and in every communication there seemed to lurk 
some other, and perhaps sinister, message. Irony, in fact, seemed to be a fundamental 
characteristic of modern life; an aspect of the breakdown of a fixed cosmos and a 
language linked to it. The entire world of symbols, which, for the realism of medieval 
thinkers, had been rooted in things themselves, had become transformed into an 
autonomous domain of arbitrary signs. The entirety of communicative signals had been 
cut adrift from any necessary order in things themselves, creating, as it were, another 
world, coherent and well formed in itself, but wholly detached from the world of 
substance which it claimed to represent. For the Romantics this implied, above all, a 
new and in principle infinite liberty of human subjectivity. The creative freedom of 
human imagination had been liberated from the fixed order of nature. 
The particular fascination with irony for the Romantic Movement, can be 
conveniently traced to the writings of Rousseau, and particularly to the confessional 
form in which he cast his literary work. The artificiality of social life, the ambiguous 
and illusory character of everyday language, made impossible any direct communication 
of an inner truth. It was, thus, upon the reality of modern life, rather than in imitation 
of an ancient rhetorical device, that the ironist founded a new literary art. The true 
character of human life as inwardness could be expressed only indirectly, and the 
ironist, seizing Rousseau's anguish in a new way, accepted this limitation as the binding 
precondition of a new freedom. 
Irony, that is, for all its world conquering superiority, arrogance, and sense of 
lofty detachment from the 'illusions' of everyday life, is a literary form which begins by 
admitting its own limitations. Yet it is in this very limitation that its real value is 
expressed. Embodied in its form - the indirect communication of the hidden truth of 
inwardness - is the very superficiality and deceptive ease of modern life. Irony, that is 
to say, does not 'touch' the reality which is of compelling interest to every human 
being; it must be content, rather, by throwing the reader into a state of frustrated 
bewilderment, to hint at the existence of such a reality. 13 And in admitting this failure, 
the writer forces upon the reader a confession of his or her own. In living amidst the 
superficialities of everyday life - of vanity, ambition and amour propre - they are, 
similarly, living in a world detached from the reality of their own hearts. Irony, thus, is 
a 'negative philosophy', the main preoccupation of which is to expose the arbitrariness 
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inherent in the apparently fixed order of everyday life. Everything the reader thought to 
be true, permanent, valuable and proven is, in fact, the figment of a dehumanised 
imagination. For the Romantics, indeed, irony in the modern era becomes synonymous 
with the human characteristic of self-consciousness, viewed in the 'negative' perspective 
of its boundless enthusiasm for subversive self-criticism. For the ironic self- 
consciousness, that is for the modern age generally, no action or value seems 
worthwhile; everything has attracted to itself the aura of contingency, doubt, and 
superficiality. 
As a student Kierkegaard was attracted by this point of view. Intellectually he 
found it interesting, and aesthetically he favoured the literary experiments of its leading 
exponents. He was even more attracted to Hegel, who, in claiming to have 'gone 
beyond' the romantic perspective of irony, drew irony itself into the fold of a systematic 
speculative philosophy. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Kierkegaard was deeply influenced 
by Hegel's scattered remarks on irony, which form, in fact, the point of departure for 
his own original analysis of the phenomenon. 
Hegel's View of Irony 
The negative character of irony is taken by Hegel to be its defining feature. As 
such it is a 'moment' in the unfolding of self-consciousness and enters, therefore, as a 
'world-historical principle', into the dialectic of the spirit. The lack of seriousness in 
the ironic is a token of its detachment from the world of actual events, and it is by 
adopting an ironic pose that the modern Romantic spirit seeks to preserve undimmed 
within itself the full potentiality of the human; 'Irony knows itself to be master of every 
possible content; it is serious about nothing, but plays with all forms'. 14 Hegel, 
developing a phrase of Solger's, furnished Kierkegaard with the most general 
formulation of modern irony (or the irony of modernity), as 'infinite absolute 
negativity'. 15 Kierkegaard expounds Hegel's formula as follows: 
It is negativity, because it only negates; it is infinite, because it does not negate this 
or that phenomenon; it is absolute, because that by virtue of which it negates is a 
higher something that still is not. The irony establishes nothing, because that 
which is to be established lies behind it. (Irony, p. 261) 
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Irony, that is, presupposes, but at the same time obscures, something positive which lies 
'beyond' the field of consciousness. And in escaping, as it were, from all immediately 
given experience, irony preserves for us a corrupted sense of the greater totality of 
which both it, and the actuality from which it departs, really belong. 
The truly human, that is to say, cannot be positively defined or limited in advance, 
and cannot be bound to any fixed order. Rather, as a constantly malleable spirit, it 
continually creates and finds new forms into which to empty itself. These forms, which 
are at any moment only the temporary evanescence of the spirit, should not be taken to 
be exhaustive of the human potential which carries them forward in the world. 
Hegel also provided Kierkegaard with an important critique of Romantic irony as 
the illusion, rather than as the intuition (far less the realization), of human freedom. He 
contrasts the specifically modern form of ironic detachment and lack of steadfast 
seriousness with a properly religious subjectivity: 
The other side of this, that subjectivity has cast itself into religious subjectivity. 
The utter despair in respect of thought, of truth, and absolute objectivity, as also 
the incapacity to give oneself any settled basis or spontaneity of action, induced the 
noble soul to abandon itself to feeling, and to seek in Religion something fixed and 
steadfast; this steadfast basis, this inward satisfaction, is to be found in religious 
sentiments and feelings. 16 
The freedom, perversity and infinitizing character of irony is no more than a 
glimpse of the ultimate and abiding reality of spirit. Irony is not a reflection upon 
spirit, so much as the spiritual element in life playing, so to speak, with its own 
creation. Hegel criticises the Romantics just because they identify the spirit's power to 
manifest itself in human self-creation with the ego's capacity to project itself into the 
world. This tendency towards egoism, which Hegel sees as the consequence of an 
enthusiastic but hasty reading of Kant, is exemplified in the radical subjectivism of 
Fichte. From the proposition that 'all knowledge is only images, representations', 
Fichte had proclaimed the inner-life of the individual human subject to be a realm of 
total freedom. The godlike independence of the ego, once it has grasped itself as the 
source of consciousness destroys every possible boundary to its own freedom. In 
Hegel's view the realization of such freedom, were it to be possible, would result in a 
curious loss of reality, the world would become no more substantial than a dream: 
this virtuosity of an ironical artistic life apprehends itself as a divine creative 
genius for which anything and everything is only an unsubstantial creature, to 
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which the creator, knowing himself to be disengaged and free from everything, is 
not bound, because he is just as able to destroy it as to create it. 17 
It is, in fact, just this dream-like quality into which Fichte and the Romantics wish to 
plunge. Their ideal is of an immediately responsive world which has become identical 
with our image of it: 
Images are: they are the only things which exist, and they know of themselves after 
the fashion of images; images which float past without there being anything past 
which they float... I myself am one of these images; nay, I am not even this, but 
merely a confused image of the images. All reality is transformed into a strange 
dream... 18 
For the Romantic ironist nothing can have value for itself, nothing can be earnest. 
Consequently, melancholy, which is the oppressive weight of an arbitrary and 
unassimilated exteriority, is turned, ironically, into sheer playfulness. Romantic irony, 
in other words, is nothing but a 'concentration of the ego into itself, for which all bonds 
are snapped and which can live only in the bliss of self-enjoyment'. 19 But, for Hegel, 
this is not only a mistaken view of human experience it fails properly to appreciate the 
essentially transcending character of irony, which always points towards a 'higher' and 
as yet undisclosed reality. 
Kierkegaard's decisive break with Hegel, and with Romanticism, both of which 
were connected with the formulation of his literary project as a specifically Christian 
endeavour, should not blind us to the significance of his early infatuation with both. 
These enthusiasms not only play a vital part in his analysis of the phenomenon of irony, 
their subterranean and never wholly exorcised presence charge the entire authorship 
with aesthetic and philosophical tensions, and, therefore, remain relevant to any 
adequate understanding of his religious psychology. Kierkegaard's initially excited 
reaction to both Romanticism, and to Hegel's philosophy which he approached first as 
an argument against Romanticism, was, however, far from being uncritical. It is with 
some justification that Kierkegaard's view of irony has been called 'Hegelian and anti- 
Hegelian at one and the same time'. 20 Equally it might be said to be Romantic and anti- 
Romantic at one and the same time. To define his relationship to both he set the 
analysis of irony in a much broader historical and cultural perspective. 
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Socratic Irony 
The subtitle of Kierkegaard's thesis, 'with constant reference to Socrates', is highly 
instructive. It makes clear his intention to expose the root of irony in western thought 
and to uncover the hidden source of both Romantic irony and the Hegelian rejection of 
it, in the uniquely personal contribution of Socrates to the foundation of the dialectical 
imagination. 
Kierkegaard found in Socrates, as has a more recent academic commentator, 'a man 
who is full of paradox'. 21 Socrates was an individual who was apparently driven by the 
most passionate commitment to right conduct while, at the same time, admitting that he 
could not know, unambiguously and certainly, in what such conduct must necessarily 
exist. Confronted with the painful difficulty of finding a right path, 'it appeared to me 
as if one ought to seek refuge in the Logoi, and perceive through them the true nature of 
being'. 22 Yet, to suppose this were possible is to admit that 'above this world of being 
towers that which is beyond everything and, therefore, cannot be grasped even by the 
Logoi'. 23 The Socratic paradox - that the Logoi are the only keys to that which is 
ineffably beyond being and which, therefore, remain incommunicable through the Logoff 
- is seized upon by Kierkegaard as paradigmatic of the human need for, but inability 
fully to realize, spontaneous and direct communication. 
The paradox is made misleadingly more acute by the modern tendency to interpret 
Logos as abstract, rational and systematic thought. For Socrates, however, as 
Friedländer has made clear, the Logos is the permanent representation of the eidos - the 
intuited plastic forms of reality in its most comprehensive sense - and has not yet been 
crystallized into a self-sufficient realm of concepts. 24 'Ideas' are, for Socrates, a species 
of 'vision' connected with the bodily function of seeing. They represent a general 
human power to sense the presence, within the transience of things which pass away, a 
permanent reality of form: 
Precisely because it has an intuitive origin we must not begin by defining 
conceptually what the Idea is: for Plato himself, the Idea, though the highest object 
of knowledge is never entirely definable in conceptual terms. 25 
The Socratic pursuit of 'knowledge', urgent and apparently futile, is not then so 
paradoxical as it might at first appear Zeller, many years ago, made the point clearly; 
for Socrates 'knowledge' did not mean 
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a purely theoretical knowledge which needed only to be learnt, but an unshakeable 
conviction based on the deepest insight into and realisation of what is really 
valuable in life, a conviction such as he himself possessed. The opposite of this 
26 'knowledge' of the good is therefore not error but self-deception. 
Kierkegaard grasped the nature of this inner conviction very well. It was a conviction 
which he longed to possess and defend as steadfastly as had Socrates, and despaired of 
doing so. 
Socrates had been called 'ironic' primarily because he had seemed never to take 
anyone seriously, or, more precisely, because he had been able to undermine every 
other person's claims to seriousness. In seeking the meaning of 'justice', or 'goodness', 
for example, he did not pretend to possess any positive knowledge of such things, but 
professed only a critical method of asking questions which revealed the vacuousness and 
pretension of the 'knowledge' claimed by others. This does not mean, as the 
commentators cited above have made clear, that Socrates believed such questions were 
meaningless, or that it was a practical impossibility to realize any positive value. His 
dialectical questioning, in fact, was aimed primarily at the Sophists, at teachers who 
made a living from the pretence of being able to impart such valuable knowledge. It 
was not simply a matter of exposing their error and ignorance, but amounted to a 
demonstration of the inappropriateness of conceiving of practical values within the 
sphere of abstraction at all. It is not a matter of 'knowledge' but of the determination 
within practical life to act in accordance with values. And values, the plastic forms of 
an ineffable reality, are bodied forth in a 'cured soul', rather than acted out as a kind of 
application of some external and universal norm. 
'The concept of irony makes its entry into the world through Socrates', claims 
Kierkegaard, and significantly it does so as an ethical impulse. 27 In its original 
meaning, therefore, irony cannot be identified with the modern Romantic preoccupation 
with 'aesthetic' freedom, but reveals, rather, an inherent human demand for self- 
determination and self-limitation. 28 In Socrates' persistent dialectical questioning the 
sharpest contrast is drawn between the outer appearance of human actions, and their 
inner meaning; 'the outer was not at all in harmony with the inner', but more than that, 
the outer 'continually pointed to something other and beyond'. 29 The very generality of 
this division allowed Socrates to take any 'accidental' observation as his point of 
departure. A dialogue could begin with a casual observation, there was 'no 
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phenomenon too humble a point of departure from which to work oneself up into the 
sphere of thought'. 30 
The ironic mode of inquiry, as distinct from any speculative investigation, 
presupposes the emptiness of the human subject and assimilates it to a purely formal 
relation. Where a speculative understanding of human subjectivity continually fills out 
this relation with a content of its own, imputing to it a manifold of tendencies, instincts, 
values and drives which fall neatly into naturally ordered categories, an ironic 
understanding succeeds in stripping away all such positive content to leave exposed the 
'divine infinity' of the human soul. The true character of human subjectivity can be 
reached only by the path of negation, by a progressive casting off of its appearance; 'It 
is Socratic to disparage all actuality and to direct man to a recollection that continually 
retreats further and further back towards a past that itself retreats'. 31 In the Symposium, 
for example, the aim of life is projected back to its fictive starting point, and 
subjectivity is endowed with an inner directionality such that it is 'always wanting to go 
back into the nebulosity from which the soul emerged or, more correctly, into a 
formless infinite transparency. In this view 'life is the incomplete, and the formless 
is that towards which longing aspires'. 33 
Irony is self-propelling and restless. Every positive content which offers it some 
resistance is swept aside; it is a position that continually cancels itself; it is a 
nothing that devours everything, and a something one can never grasp hold of, 
something that is and is not at the same time. (Irony, p. 131) 
Kierkegaard seems as inspired as Hoffmann or Kleist with 'the poetic infinity and 
heedlessness of irony'. 34 
In the course of his analysis Kierkegaard, ironically commenting on academic 
seriousness, extends to Aristophanes an authority he withholds from every other 
commentator on Socrates. Clouds is chronologically closer to the life of Socrates than is 
either the earlier dialogues of Plato, or Xenophon's memoir. 35 And it is the comic 
genius of Aristophanes, rather than the incipient abstraction of Plato, or the 
conventional moralising of Xenophon, that is the more appropriate medium for 
representing the truth grasped by Socrates. In Clouds, a satire on the Sophists with 
whom Socrates is, in fact, wrongly associated, the philosopher makes his entrance 
suspended above the stage in a basket. This literal 'hovering above existence' is a 
theme that was more fully developed in Either/Or, and is, he argues, a supremely apt 
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representation of the power of abstract reasoning which somehow floats above the 
multiplicity of concrete determinants which constitute a living person. 36 
The negative dialectic of irony does however issue in a positive result; the 
emergence of the personality as distinct from the concepts and virtues through which it 
had become conventionally represented. For all its lightness and continuous readiness 
for metamorphosis, irony remains essentially a 'qualification of the personality', rather 
than a form of thought. It is, therefore, the person of Socrates, rather than any concept, 
or theory, or argument, which makes an impact on those he questions. And however 
much his individuality might be no more than 'an abbreviation of a complete 
personality'; 37 it is as a personality 'infinitely in suspension', 38 that his endlessly ironic 
questioning carries with it the imprint of a uniquely human reality. 
The Religious Tendency of Irony 
Irony emerges, in Kierkegaard's text, as a specific form of human reflexivity. It is, 
on the one hand, the tendency towards abstraction, the dissolving power of thought over 
any 'position', and, on the other, the origin of authentic personality. It exercises over 
its practitioner a strange fascination. In relation to the apparent simplicity of an ironic 
interrogation every positive statement represents no more than a temporary respite fated 
to dissolve into ignorance. The dialectic of irony grips human subjectivity with a 
demonic power, insinuating itself into self-consciousness in such a way as to appear to 
be an external and ineluctable force. It has a 'weight' of its own, a power to 'absorb' 
the individual personality and preserve it, so to speak, in a frozen state; irony 'is a 
holding back from an engagement with existence'. 39 There is nothing rhetorical, 
therefore, in the Socratic profession of ignorance. It is, rather, a uniquely authentic 
expression for an inward truth, or, rather, of the truth of inwardness. Ignorance, thus, 
is the first form in which human subjectivity frees itself from the complacent 
substantiality of god or nature and claims a territory of its own. In attempting to define 
the boundaries of such a territory Socrates 'infinitely circumnavigated existence'. 40 
It is clear that, far from being a speculative point of view, the truth of existence 
was, for Socrates, bound up with his own personality, and that his personality was in 
turn hound up in some way with relations that transcended his immediate experience of 
the world. Thus, despite his purely individual and limited existence, he was called upon 
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to convince others of this very truth, to communicate the terrifying depth of his own 
inwardness; 'He had come not to save the world but to judge it' . 
41 The 'eternal unrest' 
of his own soul showed itself in every challenging encounter, and undermined his own, 
as well as others, comfortable certainty in received wisdom. This 'unrest' cannot be felt 
as an intention, or as some aspect of a rational purpose. Though it is felt from within, it 
nonetheless constitutes an alien and even crippling force; a demonic impulse, that is 
perpetually antagonistic to the claims of actuality. It is this force which communicates 
itself as irony, which in turn makes people aware in a new way of something 'higher', 
and brings them to a consciousness of themselves as spirit. 
The incipient religiosity of Socrates, and therefore of irony as an existential 
'category', lies primarily in this restless negativity, and not in the presumption of some 
'higher' realm within which it receives a positive meaning. Indeed, the proclaimed 
agnosticism of Socrates amounts almost to evidence of his genuine religious inwardness. 
In an unreligious age (the age of antique sophistication as much as the age of modern 
scepticism), authentic religiosity hides itself in dialectical forms, in ironic detachment, 
in insistent, subversive questioning, and in morally dangerous conduct. 42 
In the context of Kierkegaard's own times, however, there is something deeply 
ambivalent in this fascination with the figure of Socrates. It might be seen more 
obviously as an open declaration of modern secularism than as a veiled identification 
with the original spiritual genius of western culture. By linking himself so closely with 
Socrates, and himself making ironic comments about all those modern writers who 
claim to have 'gone beyond' Socrates (his borrowing from Hegel, even at this stage, 
was not uncritical), he might be seen as reaching back, beyond Christian religious 
consciousness to an original and intellectually more potent form of secular self- 
reflection. 
Such a view, however, depends largely on interpreting The Concept of Irony in the 
light of Kierkegaard's subsequent works in which the sharpest distinction is drawn 
between speculative dialectic and properly religious categories. It was just this 
'development' in fact which prompted Kierkegaard's own harsh judgement on his early 
work. Now, while the theme of Irony plays a continuous and significant part in 
Kierkegaard's development as a writer, it does not do so in the form of a fixed and 
completed 'theory. Thus, even from the point of view of his later writing, the Socratic 
method, which Kierkegaard identifies with irony, is not without religious implications, 
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and it cannot, therefore, be assimilated to the Hegelian speculative system. Socrates 
inaugurated, that is to say, an existential dialectic which should not be confused with the 
tradition of abstract dialectical thought. 43 Even more significantly, Kierkegaard's 
infatuation with Socrates is linked with an equally compelling identification with the 
person of Jesus. Thus one of the fundamental tensions in the western tradition - the 
relation between Greek rationalism and Christian faith - is approached initially by 
Kierkegaard through a double personal identification. The remarkable feature of his 
work on irony, therefore, is that he finds in it a point of 'mediation' between Socrates 
and Jesus, and, therefore, a link between philosophy and religion. 44 Irony is an 
expression of an intuition of the transcendental structure of human existence from which 
springs both reason and faith. Kierkegaard, without rejecting this insight, was soon to 
take up the issue of the subsequent development of philosophical and religious 
consciousness in which each not only established itself independently of the other, but 
were increasingly and necessarily thrown into conflict. 
This sharp opposition, if present at all, was latent in his early works. Thus while 
writing on irony 'with constant reference to Socrates', he was simultaneously compiling 
From the Letters of One Still Living, which, while not religious in content, betrays his 
personal identification with Christ. 45 He became a writer only after (unexpectedly) 
surviving the symbolic age of Christ. Yet, at this age, having altogether failed to make 
of such an identification anything more than a fantasy, he simultaneously saw himself as 
a Socratic gadfly, and hoped perhaps that the urge to write was a species of daemonia 
which, in gripping him, as it had gripped his master, was the first stirring of the 
religious spirit which Christianity was to introduce more generally into the world. The 
Greek 'anticipation' of Christian spirituality was seen, therefore, less in terms of the 
established speculative system - of the divine logos given rational form as philosophy - 
than as the irrational freedom of Socratic questioning. 
Irony in Modern Culture 
Irony is essentially and inherently a spiritual phenomenon. Arising from it 
Christianity and philosophy are united in their infinite capacity for negation, and in their 
endless power of self-destruction. The difficulty with both is the tendency to draw out 
from the pure nothingness upon which they are founded elaborate and self-sustaining 
positive doctrines. Kierkegaard, a modern Socrates, sought to return philosophy and 
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religion to their starting points, to empty them of all positive content (moral law, 
dogmatics etc. ) and to grasp the infinite human inwardness which is this starting point. 
Kierkegaard found in the divine 'frenzy' of Giordano Bruno and the equally divine 
'folly' of Erasmus the source of a distinctively modern form of the Socratic spirit. 46 
This represented for him, in many ways, an alternative source of the modern age in 
general. He looked to the roots of Romanticism, as well as to the Reformation, and to 
Cartesian intellectual doubt, for the distinctive innovation of the modern religious spirit; 
a spirit which preserved (just as had Socrates in relation to Sophistic speculation and 
natural science), the corrosive power of a genuine and primordial religious inwardness 
in the face of either dogmatic simplification or philosophical abstraction. 
This brings irony into the closest relationship to doubt, and therefore, to the first of 
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings. To doubt everything is, from one point of view 
simply another formulation of the universality of irony. 47 The privilege of irony over 
doubt, however, is that it is an existential 'category' rather than a conceptual term or 
relation. And typically Kierkegaard introduces philosophical reflections on Cartesian 
doubt with the personal 'story' of Johannes Climacus rather than with its conceptual 
analysis'. ' 48 
Irony, however, for all its negativity, is also an affirmation of life, an expression of 
the liveliness of life. Irony is essentially playful, and, influenced by Schiller and the 
radical interpretation of Kantian aesthetics, Kierkegaard seeks in this unrestrained 
freedom a point in existence which, so to speak, escapes from all the limiting 
determinants of everyday life. 49 There is something infinite in irony, and therefore, 
something positive in its negativity. It is a direct expression of human freedom and, 
thus, of the Romantic longing for 'infinite inward freedom'. If religion is an expression 
of the infinite within the finite of human being, irony, no less surely, points continually 
away from itself, and ascends effortlessly from the particular to the general before 
ultimately losing itself in the infinite. Unlike doubt, irony soars within existence 
without being 'volatilized' beyond it. 
To seize the ultimate reality of human existence, that is the first task of the 
religious life. This means that the inescapable transcendence of actual existence should 
not be denied or transmuted into an unreal representation of itself. Religious life is life; 
life itself. But when its transcending character is grasped in a purely abstract fashion, 
as a philosophical principle, or is subsumed within a body of binding rules, then a 
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misleadingly 'positive' religion results. 50 But the ironic is not yet the religious, it is the 
evidence of human self-understanding as a potential for religiosity, a kind of embryonic 
religious consciousness. 
The problem facing Kierkegaard, therefore, was to discover how this spirituality 
might be preserved, and how it might be drawn into a form which was, so to speak, 
made for religion proper. Existing forms of religious life are spiritually dead. This 
was the inevitable outcome of the breakdown of the medieval world view, and the 
reconstruction of human being as an interior cosmos. The Leibnizian response to this 
situation (that each individual has preserved within it a perfect copy of the cosmological 
order), or the Spinozist denial of individuality as such, were not even considered by 
Kierkegaard. Both resolve the difficulty by abstractly cancelling out the fact of the 
modern world, and thus fail to confront the actual character of human existence. But if 
this existence is taken as a starting point (and it is his insistence that it must which 
makes Kierkegaard the supreme spiritual spokesman of modernity), then religious life 
must find for itself a form from within the world of presently existing social relations. 
Neither Hegel nor the Romantics disclose such a form. The Romantic fusion of the 
infinite and finite as sensuous feeling has been replaced by the Hegelian conceptual 
fusion of the infinite and finite as abstract concepts, but neither succeed in preserving 
the 'actuality' of human existence and thus make of religion an unreal fantasy. 
At this stage Kierkegaard makes no attempt to define such a form; he is content 
with extolling the virtue of irony. Irony has shaken human beings loose, made them 
aware of their precarious relation to the cosmos, and rendered the immediate world of 
experience something shadowy and insubstantial. In 'hovering above existence' irony 
in fact creates for itself a more interesting world than the one from which it has 
departed. But it is a strange world; a world of 'infinite inward negativity', without 
foundation and without aim, a ceaseless flux of denial and counter-denial. The human 
subject expands within this world and becomes co-extensive with its own infinitizing 
power. Irony flees the world and, looking back upon it, discovers it was already bereft 
of meaning; it reflects, rather than reflects upon, melancholy. 
How might the human subject be given back its substance, regain a content without 
denying itself, without rejecting its hard-won freedom, and without negating its own 
spirit? This is, for Kierkegaard, the fundamental problem of religion in modern life. 
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Irony and Religious Psychology 
The two ages of irony - periods when its presence in the world was genuinely 
characteristic of an entire culture and way of life - were in the Athens of Socrates, and 
in the Germany of the Romantics. This is no literary coincidence, but points, in 
Kierkegaard's view, to something fundamental about the human reality of those two 
epochs. Kierkegaard's lifelong flirtation with irony is an aspect of his fascination with 
(and almost dread of), those great spiritual turning points, historically in relation to 
entire societies as well as in individual life, which he believed it indicated. Irony is, 
firstly, the self-conscious birth of the spirit, and, secondly, its liberation after a 
protracted history in association with the development of the Christian church into the 
ideally individuated and personal categories of the modern world. 
The negative starting point for the entire dialectical process, in both its existential 
and its philosophical aspects, is taken into the self and gives birth to the modern idea of 
personality as self-generating spirit. Irony finally gains its positive character in the 
solipsistic personality of the individual; a character anticipated in the uniqueness of 
Socrates which stands, in Kierkegaard's mind, for the individual personality as such. 
Thomas Mann, almost a century after Kierkegaard wrote his dissertation, called 
irony 'the most alluring problem of all'. It captures something fundamental in the 
nature of modern life, and at the same time makes it clear that this something cannot, 
any more than it could in previously religious ages, be captured in a formula or 
expressed as a system of ideas. The shameless negativity of the spirit symbolised in 
irony endlessly renews itself, escaping all positive determination. 
The Maieutic Art 
Kierkegaard renounced irony, or tried to. In time he drew back from the 'infinite 
absolute negativity' which was in so many ways the clearest and most 'obvious' vehicle 
for melancholic self-expression. The abyss of irony proved to be a temporary and 
inadequate relief of melancholy, whose conquest required a more radical renewal of 
subjectivity. 51 But he did not renounce the 'maieutic art' which he had learned from 
Socrates and made peculiarly his own. Yet the maieutic art itself remained an aspect of 
irony; it is founded on the impossibility of directly communicating a positive human 
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truth. The truth of individual experience can only be suggested, and if it is to be 
conveyed to another it must borrow objective and conventional forms which are, in fact, 
inimical to its real nature. Here there is no alternative to artistry, and no means of 
preserving and conveying the truth other than by its initial falsification. 
It is, in part, as a continuation of his analysis of irony, therefore, that Kierkegaard 
adopted a series of pseudonyms. This device not only preserved the many-sidedness of 
human experience, it distanced Kierkegaard from the temptation of a 'positive' 
philosophy, and guarded against the possibility of being read as an 'authority'. 
Significantly a continuation of the insights gained from writing The Concept of Irony 
can also be found in the series of Upbuilding Discourses which he wrote under his own 
name and published in conjunction with the pseudonymous, aesthetic, works. These 
essays were neither doctrinal works, nor were they, eschewing as they did all 
conventional expressions of piety, sermons in any usual sense. They were, rather, free 
literary creations aimed at arousing the subjectivity of the reader to the recognition of 
his or her own inner truth. 
The religious aim of the maieutic art is also behind Kierkegaard's final and 
somewhat reluctant acceptance of Hegel's criticism of Romanticism as egoism. In 
viewing everything as an adjunct to the ego, rather than in terms of a much more 
comprehensive conception of human subjectivity, the essential definiteness and 
concreteness of the individual is lost. Actuality is 'volatilized' by the ego, which is a 
personal form of irony in modern life. The 'misty' and 'cloudy' consciousness of the 
romantic writer is absolutely typical of this lack of distinctness which was antithetical to 
Kierkegaard's entire vocation as a writer. 52 His task was to define, for the modern age, 
the nature of religion, and to clarify the character of Christianity, in precise and lucid 
terms. And it became increasingly obvious to him that, in the modern world at least, 
Christianity could not merge with consciousness itself, or with the 'life' which was a 
typically romantic epithet for the all-inclusive indifference which was, in fact, the death 
of real feeling. Interestingly, for the ancient world, prior to Socrates, this separation of 
life and spirit had not yet taken place; 'For the ancients the divine was continually 
53 merged with the world; therefore no irony'. 
For all its stress on the 'ego', the Romantics, following Fichte, were in fact imbued 
with a 'mystical' and 'oriental' spirit of self-negation which Kierkegaard viewed as 
inimical to the entire development of Christianity. Far more than was the case with 
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Socrates the Romantic temper was 'always wanting to go back into the nebulosity from 
which the soul emerged or, more correctly, into a formless, infinite transparency'. 54 To 
'romanticize' is nothing more than to mystify. Novalis, thus defines his ambition, 
The world must be romanticized. Thus will its original meaning be rediscovered... 
This operation is still quite unknown. When I endow the vulgar with a noble 
meaning, the common with a mysterious appearance, the known with the dignity of 
the unknown, the finite with the semblance of infinitude, I romanticize... the 
philistine and prosaic perception of the world must give way to marvel and wonder 
at its mysterious magnificence. As a correlate, we ought to infuse everyday life 
ss with our sense of the distant, strange, and higher. 
Indeed, the all-encompassing subjectivity of the Romantic, the most fully developed 
form of irony, was not far removed, according to Kierkegaard, from oriental mysticism, 
in which; 
whatever dying away (Hendoen) is to be found there consists in a relaxation of the 
soul's muscular strength, of the tension that constitutes consciousness, in a 
disintegration and melancholic relapsing lethargy, whereby one is not volatilized 
but is chaotically scrambled and then moves with vague motions in a thick fog. 
(Irony, p. 66) 
The mystical /romantic ideal is for the 'vegetative still life of the plant instead of 
locomotion. It is wishing for the foggy, drowsy wallowing that an opiate can procure 
rather than for the sky of thought'. The heady sense of the infinite is without effect. 
Thus, 'the ironist is conservative' and in the end Kierkegaard is decisive in his rejection 
of any romanticized image of religious life. 56 In sharp contrast he argues that the 
religious spirit is born under the 'Grecian sky' and 'does not want to be soaked to 
softness in vague qualifications but to be stretched more and more'. 57 According to 
Kierkegaard, therefore, Goethe, the most complete Romantic, 'exhausts himself 
poetically'. 58 Rather than reflecting the subject back into the determinants of a unique 
personality, Romantic irony removes the indifferent spectator to such a remote distance 
that individuality loses itself. Within the modern cosmological picture irony is fiercely 
'infinitized'; there is no 'relative' detachment, no observational 'platform', and the 
observer is either at one with his or her own observations, or loses all contact with the 
observable. In this sense irony 'seems to be a withdrawal of the subject, indeed a void'. 
Irony is a 'hollowing out' of the person, who 'actually becomes nothingness'. 59 The 
'infinitely delicate play with nothingness', could hardly end differently. 60 
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The Concept of Irony is in a very real sense not only the beginning of 
Kierkegaard's prodigious literary production, it represents an 'abbreviation' of what 
was to be dramatically unfolded in the works that succeeded it. 
Yet, even while composing his dissertation, Kierkegaard was in the process of 
changing his personality and view of life, or, rather, a personality implying a more 
definite and positive view of life, was in process of formation within him. These 
changes left their mark on his book on irony and, possibly, account for its relative 
neglect. From it we do not receive, as we do from virtually any of his other works, an 
immediate and compelling sense of Kierkegaard as an individual. His analysis, indeed, 
appears inconclusive and even contradictory. Irony appears to be both an implicit 
affirmation and an explicit rejection of a religious life; both an intuition and an 
avoidance of reality; both a means and an obstacle to the realization of human freedom. 
This is certainly not the result of intellectual confusion on Kierkegaard's part, but, 
rather, an indication of the undifferentiated character of irony itself. Representing as it 
does all the spiritual forces at work in human consciousness it cannot furnish a clear 
model of the spiritual possibilities open to modern individuals. The irony perspective is 
superseded in Kierkegaard's work, therefore, with a series of differing but related 
points of view. 
The clearest continuity with The Concept of Irony, can be found, thus, in the first 
volume, and its firmest rejection in the second volume, of Either/Or. Irony is an 
insufficient starting point for an understanding of modern life, and is blind to the 
spiritual potentialities it contains. Irony fails to distinguish properly between the 
negative and the positive starting points of religion, nor does it clearly separate 
intellectual speculation from existential despair. This is true not only of Kierkegaard's 
analysis, but, more importantly, of the phenomenon itself. It is, perhaps, for this very 
reason that irony has become a kind of second nature for so many modern writers. 
Irony is less used now as a means of self-flattery (though this no doubt attracts its less 
talented exponents), than as a technique of 'synthesis'. The ironic viewpoint draws 
everything together, and imparts to it a certain sense of wholeness by virtue of 
withholding any positive value or meaning from any part or instance. While still 
deeply influenced by Hegel, Kierkegaard also strove for a literary/ philosophical/ 
psychological form of expression for the intuition of the wholeness, unity and synthetic 
plasticity of human subjectivity. He found this first in irony, but in exploring this form, 
became increasingly dissatisfied with its capacity to grasp (and not simply signify) such 
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a unity, and, more profoundly, he became less convinced of the intuition of psychic 
coherence upon which it rested 
Kierkegaard, felt compelled to begin again; not because he thought his analysis of 
irony incomplete or misleading, but because he had discovered in it, rather than a 
genuine starting point for a religious psychology of modern life, a premature and false 
synthesis of the separate perspectives essential to such a project. 
Kierkegaard's analysis of irony, while providing a vehicle for passing criticism of 
Romantic subjectivism, and Hegelian rationalism, remained inconclusive. The relations 
between irony and melancholy are so multifarious and complex that the reality of the 
latter cannot be explored through an investigation of the former. But melancholy was 
already Kierkegaard's real problem. Irony does not cure melancholy, it ignores it. So 
that melancholy is just as liable to crush an ironist as it is to deflate a philosopher. 
Melancholy interrupts the interminable Socratic dialogue, just as it stops the systematic 
philosopher in his tracks, and chokes off the wellsprings of feeling. The loss of interest 
in the world leaves the melancholic untouched by thought, will or feeling. All those 
modern enthusiasts, who claim for reason, or the will, or for the realm of feeling, the 
privilege of an uninterrupted presence, are, therefore mistaken. And it is just this 
unacknowledged assumption of continuity which is used to justify their extravagant 
claims, that once, as it were, properly attached to the self-expanding and autonomous 
development of reason, or will, or feeling, melancholy will be overcome to be replaced, 
ultimately, by the reinstatement of a condition of primordial happiness, as absolute 
knowledge, self-determination and autonomy. 
But melancholy is not overcome. It is uncaused sorrow, and wrecks every hope in 
which the Enlightenment placed its trust. That Kierkegaard launched a fierce attack on 
the claims of the Hegelian philosophy is well known, what is less often recognized, 
though it is clearly stated, is his equally determined opposition to any idea that either a 
permanent refuge from melancholy, or a temporary condition symmetrical with it (this 
might provisionally be called faith), can be 'reached' (spatial metaphors remain 
unavoidable) by either 'giving way to' or 'educating' or 'developing' the will or the 
feelings. All such views begin by disjointing the human subject who, in the fully 
articulated synthesis of a person and not as an isolated thought, or feeling or action, is 
crushed by melancholy. 61 
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Irony is a weapon against all such optimism, and Kierkegaard's thesis, in one 
sense, is an attempt to restore irony to the task of critical self-awareness, and to rescue 
it from its modern mesalliances. But irony, or a 'theory' of irony, does not offer itself 
to the kind of psychological investigation which Kierkegaard needed to perform to 
clarify the real possibilities inherent in modern life. To do this required, not that he 
detach himself from his own experience, or the reported experience of other people, 
but, quite the reverse, that he identify himself as closely as possible with actuality in all 
its diversity. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REFLECTION : ON THE SURFACE OF MODERNITY 
Her eyes are formed of emptiness and shade. 
Her skull, with flowers so deftly decked about, 
Upon her dainty vertebrae is swayed. 
Oh what a charm when nullity tricks out! 
Charles Baudelaire - The Dance of Death 
Existence is a small surface agitation... 
Jean-Paul Sartre - 'The Singular Universal' 1 
Modern society emerges as the 'surface' of life, a boundary between melancholy and 
irony. 'Sorrow without cause' became assimilated to a sense of cosmological 
dislocation and loss which, though it could not explain the persistence of melancholy, 
provided it with a modern form. Adrift in boundless space the human subject, 
withdrawing into itself, discovered a symmetrical infinite inwardness, which, rather 
than 'ground' the personality in new determinants, casts it into ironic insecurity. 
Melancholy is a movement inwards, a retreat from the void of external space. Irony 
seems to be an opposite movement, into the void. But the 'boundary' of human 
existence is permeable to both melancholy and irony which, as it were, threaten directly 
to connect 'inner' and 'outer' space. Irony seems to 'raise' itself above existence, while 
melancholy 'sinks' beneath it. The movement of neither melancholy nor of irony takes 
notice of 'real existence', and even lay claim to a certain arrogance in 'seeing through' 
every merely human particular. And, in passing through, rather than being reflected 
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from, the surface of modern life, each, thus, discovers the other. The two intermingle 
and, at times, become, indistinguishable. Thomas Mann, thus, can talk of the typical 
'melancholy, ironic way' of looking 'through' the modern world. 2 
When both external and internal 'space' is infinized the qualitative dividing line 
between them, the dangerously permeable surface to which human life clings, itself 
becomes boundless. Rather than conceive a world of fixed and enclosed objects 
confronting a world of equally fixed and enclosed subjects, both object and subject 
opened on to an inconceivable vastness. The realm of the human cannot, in that case, 
curl back on itself and 'contain' as 'inwardness' the plenitude of its own subjectivity. 
More like a sensitive filament than a microcosmic structure, it extends itself as the 
distinction between two kinds of space. The 'actuality' of modern life is opened out, 
unbounded, reduced to a flimsy and insubstantial surface which, at any moment, may 
become transparent. 
Kierkegaard, aware of the close kinship between the life-destroying potential of his 
own melancholy, and the corrosive power of modern irony, sought to 'thicken' and 
solidify 'actuality' which is, or ought to be, the dividing line between them. Once the 
implications of the 'Copernican Revolution' in human self-understanding and the 
understanding of the world become more clearly articulated, it is evident that 'actuality' 
is sustained primarily by the strength of social conventions. Indeed, being created from 
nothing other than the act of distinction itself, actuality is both the foundational 
convention of modern society, upon which all other distinctions depend, and the 
emergent reality which is, in turn, supported by the vitality of all these other 
distinctions. 3 
Kierkegaard focuses on 'the individual' as the point at which actuality can become 
more substantial. It is clear that, in the context of his writings as a whole, an analysis 
of the 'individual' results in a specifically modern understanding of society, and a 
decisively social understanding of modernity. Indeed, contrary to a widely held 
misunderstanding, the 'individual' is, for Kierkegaard, pre-eminently a social category. 
Certainly the notion of the 'individual' has an equivocal position in Kierkegaard's 
writings, and this for two main reasons. Firstly, as characterised by a number of 
pseudonyms, the individual is portrayed in terms of illusory life-views typical of the 
'superficial' character of modern society. And, secondly, as the 'single one' of his 
religious writings the individual is portrayed as an authentic but as yet unrealised 
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potentiality trapped within the insubstantial melancholy of the Present Age. The 'single 
one' is a rejection of all those social arrangements which support modern 
'individualism', but in neither case is the 'individual' viewed as a 'non-social' being. In 
either sense the 'individual' is realistically viewed as a social relation. 4 
Kierkegaard's understanding of the character of modern society is, in fact, fundamental 
to his writing as a whole. Before turning to the 'critique of melancholy' through which 
a series of Kierkegaardian pseudonyms offer an exploration and account of modern 
'actuality', it is helpful to consider the plain 'criticism' of modern society and culture 
which Kierkegaard advanced in a number of journalistic works not all of which are 
usually considered to fall within the 'authorship'. His critical attitude towards modern 
culture and the possibilities for human experience inherent within it, his antipathy to 
both conservative and radical political tendencies in Danish society, and his final 
uncompromising attack on the Danish Church, are best viewed as parallel with, rather 
than as an addendum to, his pseudonymous and direct 'authorship'. The fundamental 
question of that authorship - how is it possible to become a Christian? - also animates 
his literary and polemical journalism. 
Indeed, just as it is his commentary on his own melancholy, and his academic 
dissertation, that can be used more easily than his major works themselves, to locate 
Kierkegaard within an appropriate intellectual and historical context, so his journalistic 
writing provides, as it were, a preliminary statement of the 'theory of society' which 
informs his religious psychology. 
It would be quite misleading to read Two Ages, or the various pamphlets issued 
under the title of The Instant, as 'occasional' pieces, tangential to Kierkegaard's major 
preoccupations and of little significance in themselves. The much discussed issue of the 
'coherence' of Kierkegaard's writing, for example, has been concerned exclusively with 
his 'serious' works, and usually, in fact, with the pseudonymous works. 5 It is in his 
journalistic work, however, that Kierkegaard's criticism of modernity is most sharply 
reflected. The apparent 'superficiality' of these works is a literary device adapted to the 
conditions of the present. Modern social life is itself 'superficial', so that, quite apart 
from any interest in gaining a wide readership, and irrespective of any difficult issues 
surrounding the method of 'indirect communication' and the conditions under which its 
restrictions might be lifted, Kierkegaard adopted a 'popular' tone to express, in terms 
most appropriate to it, the fact that contemporary life (in contrast to the depth of his 
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own melancholy, and the distance of his irony) was nothing but a surface upon which 
was reflected the ceaseless flux of 'public opinion. Read in this way these works 
themselves become symptomatic of the condition which they analyse, and thus preserve, 
in a different way, the hidden identity of their elusive author. More significantly they 
reveal the importance of a criticism of modern culture to the entirety of the authorship. 
Deception and Public Opinion 
The story of Soren Kierkegaard's broken engagement to Regine Olsen has frequently 
been cited as the occasion, if not as the cause, of the 'authorship' proper. Certainly it 
was not an isolated event. The period of the engagement was also the period of 
mourning over the death of his father, and his academic father-figure, Poul Moller, and 
it was his relationship to his father which, in all probability, underlay his rejection of 
marriage. The engagement, whatever it reveals of the 'depth' of Kierkegaard's inner- 
life, serves to dramatize his polemical relationship to the superficiality of modern 
'public opinion'. 
In September 1840 Kierkegaard, then aged twenty-seven became engaged to Regine 
Olsen, a girl ten years his junior whom he had met over three years earlier at the house 
of Bolette Rordam, who may in fact have been his first love. 6 Almost at once he 
realized he could never marry her. The difficulty apparently centred on the 
incompatibility of his view of marriage as an absolutely open relationship, and the 
secret which bound him to his dead father. Inconclusive speculation as to the nature of 
this secret - that his father, as a child, had despaired and cursed God, that he had begun 
an affair with his housekeeper, who later became his second wife, while his first wife as 
still alive, that Soren had himself fathered an illegitimate child - is less significant than 
the known details of the extraordinary way in which he engineered the dissolution of the 
engagement. Believing that Regine would have been heartbroken if he had simply 
terminated the engagement, and that her reputation would suffer to the extent to which 
she might have appeared a less attractive future bride to any properly bourgeois 
potential suitor, Kierkegaard preferred to play the role of heartless deceiver who had 
cynically toyed with her affections without ever intending to go through with the 
marriage. To create the desired impression he adopted the role of 'playboy'. 
Copenhagen was a city whose bourgeois social life was conducted within the strict 
limits of conventions of 'respectability'. It was relatively easy to create the impression 
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of scandal; the smallness of the Copenhagen bourgeoisie, as well as its newness, meant 
that gossip was still a basic form of communication and social control. Kierkegaard 
exploited this 'pre-modern' aspect of Copenhagen city life. Later he complained that it 
had been his misfortune to live in a 'market town', which is usually taken to be a 
complaint against Danish provincialism, and, consequently of his own lack of 
international recognition. Equally, however, it was this semi-rural backwardness that 
provided him with the possibility of deceiving Regine, her family and the respectable 
'public'. Had he lived in the larger and more anonymous milieu of Berlin, or Paris, he 
would not have been tempted to break the engagement in this way. Indeed, he might 
have felt himself free of these conventions which, intellectually he rejected as an aspect 
of 'bourgeois-philistinism', but, in his own life, presented an obstacle to his marriage. 
The engagement and its dissolution, in other words, involved Kierkegaard in a 
rather complex interaction with 'the public. He created a false impression within 
respectable society, not, as had Rousseau, to protect himself from its misunderstanding 
and create a place apart within which to reconstruct his own world, but, rather, as a 
shield with which to protect Regine from the truth. Much in his authorship has been 
interpreted as a highly sophisticated covert message, addressed to the public but 
intended privately for Regine to inform her, nonetheless, of the truth of their broken 
relationship. In fact neither the relationship itself, nor Kierkegaard's literary 'working 
through' of its themes, fully account for the pseudonymous production, but, both reveal 
a deeply ambivalent attitude to the conventions of bourgeois respectability. His 
rejection of marriage, like his later, and equally tortured refusal to take up an official 
position in the church, was associated with a clear understanding of respectability and 
its public and domestic institutions as 'bourgeosi-philistinism'. Particularly in relation 
to the engagement he played the part of a literary romantic hero, in solitary revolt 
against the expectations of public opinion. 
During the period immediately after the publication of Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, and extending through 1846 to 1847, when Kierkegaard's 'second 
authorship' gathered momentum, his critical relationship to the modern public became 
an important theme in both his religious and his aesthetic writings. He was 
preoccupied throughout this period with the possibility of becoming a rural parson and 
this interlude might be regarded as a second engagement crisis, which he ended in the 
same way as the first, by refusing to commit himself to the established institution. In 
part, perhaps, to delay any decision over his own future, and to make it more difficult 
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for himself to leave Copenahgen, he engineered a 'collision' with the public through the 
pages of the popular satirical journal, The Corsair. 
Modern journalism represented, for Kierkegaard, the worst aspects of the public, 
and The Corsair, a satirical magazine that was scandalous for its day, specialized in the 
worst type of modern journalism. The Corsair polemic, therefore, in which he invited a 
journalistic attack upon his work, appears at first sight to be a perverse distraction from 
the central design of the authorship. Why should he become involved in a form of 
literary activity that he so clearly despised? 
The immediate occasion for his involvement was a critical, or rather a satirical, 
review of Stages in Life's Way by P. L. Moller, printed not in fact in The Corsair, but 
in Gaea, a literary periodical edited by Moller. 7 The pseudonym, Frater Taciturnus, 
replied in the newspaper Faedrelandet, in which Kierkegaard had previously claimed 
(with literary correctness! ), that he was not responsible for the pseudonymous writings. 
Frater Taciturnus ends his article by directly linking Moller, who may have been an 
original model for Johannes the Seducer in Either/Or, with The Corsair, and challenges 
The Corsair to attack the author of the pseudonymous works; 
Would that I might get into The Corsair soon. It is really bad for a poor author to 
be so singled out in Danish literature that he (assuming that we pseudonyms are 
one) is the only one who is not abused here ... ubi P. L. Moller, 
ibi The Corsair. 
(Corsair, p. 46) 
Moller's connection with The Corsair was already known in literary circles (as was 
Kierkegaard's authorship), but open publicity of this sort was still damaging to an 
academic with ambitions to succeed to the Chair of Aesthetics at Copenhagen 
University. 
The editor of The Corsair, Meir Goldschmidt, and Kierkegaard mutually respected 
and admired each other, but, as anticipated, The Corsair responded with a series of 
satirical attacks and caricatures, identifying Kierkegaard as the author of the 
pseudonymous works. 8 
Kierkegaard claimed that 'it is not true that I got into all this by a rash step'. 9 In 
some ways it was a carefully engineered 'collision' with the public, or with the 
representatives of the most corrupting tendencies of the public. It was also an effort to 
'rescue' Goldschmidt and his unfulfilled literary talent from Moller and The Corsair. In 
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this latter ambition he was successful. Moller left Copenhagen, never to return, and 
Goldschmidt, after a lengthy trip abroad returned to more serious literary endeavours. 
This entanglement in the lives and careers of others sits uneasily in the midst of an 
authorship dedicated to the single individual, and which, at the period of its greatest 
intensity, magisterially proclaimed the impossibility of one individual helping, or being 
helped by, another; 'the sufferer must help himself'. 10 
The Corsair affair ought, perhaps, to be seen as an attempt by Kierkegaard to 'test' 
his indifference to the crowd, rather than as an effort to 'intervene' against Moller on 
what he took to be Godlschmidt's behalf. His provocation of the public confirmed, 
psychologically if not logically, his own more exalted status as the 'single individual'; 
as the sole reader of his own books. Towards the close of 'Purity of Heart', therefore, 
he warns his reader (himself) that perseverance in the spiritual discipline of 'to will one 
thing', far from bringing any secular benefits, 'will make your life more taxing, and 
frequently perhaps wearisome ... it may make you the target of ridicule'. But, viewed 
correctly, 'Ridicule will even be a help to you ... For the judgment of the crowd has its 
significance'. 11 
Indeed, a collision with the public was implicit in the entire authorship from the 
beginning. The deceptive method of the aesthetic works, once their true authorship and 
purpose were revealed, was bound to cause offense. More significantly, however, the 
reduplication of the Upbuilding Discourses, was a self-conscious 'working against the 
self' which had as its preconception the corruption of established public values, and thus 
of the superficially socialized personal identity of the 'first self'. 12 
The entire incident, nonetheless, marks an important development in Kierkegaard's 
conception of himself as a writer; 
From that moment on, my idea of what it is to be an author changed. Now I 
believed that I ought to keep on as long as it was in any way possible; to be an 
author now, to be here, was such a burden to me that there was more asceticism in 
this than in going out in the country. (Journals, 6: 6843) 
In this regard it bears on the production of the 'religious' works in much the same way 
as the Regine 'affair' had a bearing on the 'aesthetic' works. And where the first phase 
of his work had dealt with the self-generating illusions of the aesthetic and the 
philosophical, the latter phase was preoccupied with a systematic critique of the 
established order as a barrier to the realization of religious values. 
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Regine had made him a poet. In that particular case an involuntary relationship 
created so many psychological difficulties that, to dissolve it, he let himself appear to 
the public as a seducer. He used public opinion to deceive Regine, and everyone else, 
about himself. And this served as a practical prototype for the aesthetic writers' 
maieutic art. She had to be deceived into the truth - that they could not marry - because 
Kierkegaard's reasons for believing this truth were wholly private, and the fact that he 
had any wholly private reservations was, in itself, a reason not to marry. An indirect 
method, further, would liberate Regine from the thought of him, and would leave her 
without any cause for self-reproach. 
In The Corsair affair he engineered another public attack upon himself, this time 
with the ostensible purpose of 'disengaging' Goldschmidt from Moller, who was the 
actual seducer Kierkegaard had once pretended to be. On this occasion, however, he 
told the truth about himself - that he was the creator of the pseudonyms - so that he 
would be ridiculed. Furthermore, he revealed another person's secret - Moller's 
connection with The Corsair - in order to ensure that the attack would take place. 
In the first case he sought to protect another by falsely representing himself as 
guilty. And in the second case he represented himself truthfully in order to make 
himself appear ridiculous. This 'repetition' is no doubt related to a pathological 
melancholy, to a highly developed need for isolation, and to an unassuaged longing for 
martyrdom. Neither situation, however, whether taken separately or together, 
'explains' the pseudonymous or signed writings to which, in part, they gave rise. The 
essential element in both lay, in fact, in Kierkegaard's genius for turning his own 
experience into 'an epigram of the age'. 
The provocation of the public through The Corsair is associated with a well defined 
second stage in his authorship. His writing is resumed in the broader context of a 
critique of the conventional bourgeois values of respectable society; a society which too 
loudly proclaimed itself to be Christian. Rather than focus on ways of achieving 
individuality within the context of a given actuality, the renewed authorship describes 
the given world of social relations as itself the source of all those self-deceptions which 
are obstacles to the realization of a deeper, Christian selfhood. It would be misleading 
to view this development as if it were a 'transition' from the aesthetic to the religious. 
The Upbuilding Discourses are simultaneous with the aesthetic works just to prevent 
(or, at least, try to prevent) such a misreading. Nor is the earlier series 'indirect' while 
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the later writings are 'direct'; the Upbullding is essentially indirect. The difference lies, 
rather more simply, in the gradual emergence, after the Postscript, and in part by way 
of The Corsair, of a clearer conception that the critical task of the authorship remained 
incomplete. 
In one of his Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, in spite of being addressed 
to the 'single individual', Kierkegaard reflected somewhat bitterly on the damaging 
psychological and spiritual effects of the 'crowd' in modern society: 
The same persons, who singly, as solitary individuals are able to will the Good, are 
immediately seduced as soon as they associate themselves and become a crowd. 
(Purity, p. 144) 
Indeed, the whole conception of 'double-mindedness' is a sustained attack on the 
peculiarly modern phenomenon of 'public opinion'. And in Consider the Lilies he said 
of the person who turns in despair towards the crowd that he 'makes of himself but a 
number, he belongs like an animal ... to the multitude. 
The Church and Bourgeois Respectability 
Kierkegaard's polemical attitude towards the modern public, particularly as it was 
represented in journalist literature, was never a straightforward antagonism. He had a 
dread of the public, a 'sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy' which, no 
doubt, absorbed and reflected, among much else, his ambivalence towards his father. 14 
Thus, the withering attacks he directed at bourgeois institutions culminated in contempt 
for the hypocrisy and 'double-mindedness' of conventional respectability which utterly 
failed to embody the real bourgeois values with which Kierkegaard identified himself. 
He condemned the superficiality, the lack of seriousness, the inconsistency and 
'lightness' of respectability; above all he was outraged by the sentimental piety and 
complacency of the class which, without himself being sentimental or complacent, his 
father had so clearly represented. 
The physiognomy of the present age failed to express the inner consistency of its 
values, and significantly Kierkegaard did not reject bourgeois values in themselves. 
Enlightened rationality, moral individualism, and a liberal constitution, he realized, 
were in tune with the modern age; they were, in fact, the modern age, that lay, partially 
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obscured, within the superficial flux of the Present Age. Kierkegaard attempted to 
bring to the surface and make visible these values, and had no intention of rejecting 
what he took to be the real character of modernity in favour of its inexpressive mask. 15 
Kierkegaard's commitment to the underlying values of bourgeois modernity, 
throughout the intensifying attack on bourgeois-philistinism, is thrown into sharper 
relief by his simultaneous rejection of those intellectual, social and religious movements 
which had their roots in the pre-modern age. 
His powerful attack on Hegelianism, thus, is at the same time a rejection of 
Copenhagen's outmoded aristocratic culture associated with the court. Hegel's 
philosophy was introduced into Danish intellectual life through the varied literary and 
theatrical activities of Heiberg. His celebrity, his aristocratic style of life, and his 
unchallenged position as the arbiter of Danish high culture associated Hegel with a 
romantic 'golden age' which had already passed. Kierkegaard, thus, first encountering 
Hegel through Danish spokesmen (Heiberg and Martensen) saw him, rather oddly, as 
expressive of aristocratic values. After a brief flirtation with Heiberg's circle, into 
which he had little chance of being accepted, Kierkegaard turned his back on the 
trappings of court life, and became the most sophisticated critic of Hegelianism. 16 
Equally he rejected Grundtvig's ecclesiastical populism, rooted as it was in a pre- 
modern rural idyll. 17 Grundtvig attempted to merge Christianity with Scandinavian 
mythology, and attracted a large following in rural areas neglected by the late, and 
rapid, modernization of Copenhagen; 
when one regards the world of the spirit with Norse eyes in the light of 
Christianity, one gets the impression of a universal historical development of art 
and learning that embraces the whole life of man, with all its energies, conditions 
and achievements. '8 
Not that rural religious and social life was directly anti-bourgeois. Throughout the 
eighteenth century Pietism had taken root in the countryside, and a tradition of religious 
emotionalism, in opposition to both the more formal aspects of orthodox Lutheranism 
and secular Enlightenment culture. Pietism, integrating religious ideas with a strictly 
moral conception of everyday life also stressed the religious significance of individual 
conversion and its heightened emotional state, and might be viewed as a form of 
'ecstatic religion'. Their meetings were imbued with a 'sultry and almost sensuous 
atmosphere'. 19 But, at the same time, like English Puritanism 'it was essentially a 
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bourgeois religion'. 20 Indeed, the agrarian reforms dating from the second half of the 
eighteenth century had created, by the time of Kierkegaard's youth, a 'kind of rural 
bourgeoisie, in place of the pre-modern peasantry. 21 Anti-conventicle legislation in the 
mid-eighteenth century and the growing liberalism of the established Lutheran church 
helped to create, as a reaction to it, a significant revivalist movement of which 
Grundtvig became the articulate spokesman. Kierkegaard's elder brother, Peter 
Christian Kierkegaard, himself a rural priest, became a supporter of Grundtvig's 
revivalist movement, and, in contrasting his brother's 'practically ecstatic' writings to 
the 'sober-minded' orthodoxy of the leading academic theologian, Martensen, hinted 
that Soren was at least a sympathiser with their cause. Kierkegaard, however, in spite 
of his fierce attack on the Danish Church, had no interest in reforming its liturgy or 
organization. And as for the idiosyncrasy of his own writings he argued that 'the 
peculiar characteristic of my ecstasy is that it is borne by a sober-mindedness of equal 
dimensions'. 22 
For Kierkegaard, that is to say, modern religious life, whether as a liberal elitist 
church open to every enlightened secular tendency, or as the popular revivalism that 
reflected national feeling, like all other aspects of modern culture, lay on the surface of 
23 the 'Present Age'. 
Kierkegaard's distrust of the public, his theatrical management of his own public 
image, and his rejection of contemporary political and religious positions as superficial, 
constitute a kind of preliminary statement of the more penetrating critique of modernity 
offered in the authorship itself. It would be misleading to regard his journalistic work 
as 'social' and 'political' as opposed to the 'aesthetic', 'philosophical' and 'religious' 
dimensions of reality explored by the pseudonyms and the 'upbuilding' works. These 
latter works are also, and not merely by implication, critical commentaries on the 
Present Age. The fundamental difference between the journalistic writings and the 
'authorship' is that the former addressed the experience of modernity in its own terms. 
They are, after all, pieces of journalism, and, therefore, part of the 'reflective' process 
through which the Present Age views itself. The 'authorship', however, anatomised 
modernity from a series of eccentric viewpoints. 
The serious import of these writings is most easily appreciated, then, by connecting 
them with those major figures in the development of modern thought who most clearly 
announced the 'break' between the modern age and everything which lay in the past, 
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and, even more clearly, in terms of the way in which the distinction between 'reality' 
and 'appearance' came to be understood by them as a conditioning limitation on the 
experience of 'selfhood'. This can be indicated briefly in relation to views originating 
with Rousseau and Kant who, themselves located on the edge of the Enlightenment 
tradition, inspire both the Romantic Movement, and development of German Idealism 
which together form such an important point of departure for Kierkegaard's most 
'serious' works. 
The Mask of Modern Selfhood 
Modern secular psychology, whether as materialist metaphysics or as utilitarian social 
thought, could not, any more than could the formalism of the natural sciences, 'reach' 
its proper object. The 'self' eluded the grasp of ego psychology, just as 'nature' 
continued to evade its mastery by physics. Neither failure was taken seriously. The 
overwhelming tendency of the 'moral sciences', as of the 'natural sciences', in the 
century after the publication of Pascal's fundamental insights was a determined 
commitment to empiricism. At the same time, however, a 'secular theology' of nature 
and of the self developed, utilising new scientific language to point to an ineffable 
'spirit' as the inner truth of their design. 24 
Secular critics of utilitarianism in ethics and of sensationalism in psychology, while 
remaining anticlerical, sought a deeper level of reality to account for the otherwise 
fortuitous coherence of experience. Rousseau, as one of the most unrelenting of 
eighteenth century critics of rationalism, and, like Pascal, impatient of all pious, 
moralising and sentimental religiosity, provides perhaps the most comprehensive secular 
equivalent to the new religious psychology of melancholy. In doing so he dwells on the 
modern experience of the self, and throws into sharp relief just those features of it 
which were central to Pascal's religious reflections, and were also to become of crucial 
significance for Kierkegaard. 
Rousseau begins his analysis of personal experience in modern society with what is 
for him the glaring discrepancy between conventional morality and the actual conduct of 
everyday life. 'We no longer dare seem what we really are', he complains. 25 Everyone 
appears in society as if performing on a stage, and, thus, 'we never know with whom 
we are to deal', and as a result there is no certain means of divining other people's 
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intentions or feelings. 26 The heart, heavy with melancholy, remains locked up in itself. 
We become painfully conscious that 
Jealousy, suspicion, fear, coldness, reserve, hatred, and fraud lie constantly 
concealed under the uniform and deceitful veil of politeness. 27 
The superficial world of appearances, which ought to depend upon, and grow naturally 
out of a deeper and more rational ordering of, social relations had somehow 'escaped' 
from the supporting medium of these relations to form an illusory realm of its own. 
And it is the very work of enlightenment that has produced this 'veil of politeness'. The 
'boasted candour and urbanity, for which we are indebted to the enlightened spirit of 
this age' is nothing but a conventional mask, a kind of secular piety emptied of all 
human content. 28 
It was the 'scandal of deceit' that was Rousseau's initial target. He wished to free 
himself from all those conventions of social discourse which had become separated 
from, and thus obscured, the inward truth of human existence. For a genuine secular 
morality, as well as for any modern religious sensibility, the duty to unmask and unveil, 
to strip the world of appearances and of its claims to autonomy, was an urgent task. It 
was a duty that required, first and foremost, that the writer unveil himself. In writing 
about himself, therefore, and even more in living, or trying to live, in conformity with 
the image of himself portrayed in his writings, Rousseau became the first romantic hero 
of the bourgeois psyche. In attempting to bring into the open the hidden and secret 
parts of himself Rousseau was acting with fearless honesty. His fault, which was in 
turn to ruin every 'serious' individual within the bourgeois world, was integrity. He 
tried to become that very person he believed he ought to be; the sovereign individual 
proclaimed as the universal phenomenon of bourgeois society. But, in fact, bourgeois 
society preferred its 'individuals' to be images of each other rather than expressions of a 
unique inner selfhood. 
Rousseau, thus, complains bitterly of public opinion and the hold it has over 
people's conceptions of themselves and of their conduct. He rejects all complacent, 
half-hearted, and hypocritical restraint, and 'sought to break the shackles of opinion and 
to do with courage what seemed to me good, without giving the slightest thought to the 
judgment of others'. 29 
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Solitude, in the sense of inner autonomy if not of actual isolation, is, for the 
modern world, the most basic of all ethical demands; it is the insistence on 'being free 
and virtuous, superior to fortune and man's opinion, and independent of all 
circumstances'. 30 We should disregard the opinion of others, even when (especially 
when) it seems to coincide with our own immediate inclinations. We must be wary, 
above all, of virtue. Where Montaigne and Burton had condemned an over zealous 
conscience as a cause of melancholy, Rousseau goes further, and neatly subverting 
puritan ethics boldly declares that 'conscience is the vice of the soul'. 31 
To pierce the veil of conventional morality it is necessary only to recollect the 
history of the self; to observe the 'train of secret emotions' which formed the soul into 
the condition in which it now finds itself. Rousseau's Confessions is the first genuinely 
modern autobiographical work; in it the journey towards self-knowledge becomes 
identical with the narrative of his inner life. He traces the path through which he 
himself emerges and becomes real, but the recounting of this story, with its wealth of 
circumstantial detail, ought not to obscure for its reader the genuinely creative act of 
recollection which precedes and accompanies it. 
As if following an unbroken sequence of effects to their efficient causes, he allows 
his recollection to recede to its most distant point. There he finds an innocent primal 
world, a paradise of original experience unclouded by the deceit of society. 32 The 
unrestrained inner freedom of this world, its magical intersubjective unity, and its 
'transparency' to thought affected him deeply. Our entire later life, spent in false and 
wasteful diversion, is nothing more than a series of failed attempts to recover this lost 
paradise. The real object of the search instituted in the disclosure of the disparity 
between appearance and reality, is the enraptured primal world. 'True joy defies 
description', but as the intuition of happiness primal innocence is lodged in our heart 
and continues to exercises a teleological fascination over all our recollection, and is the 
real transcending goal of the ego's hectic and misdirected adventures. 33 
Rousseau, thus, absorbs the religious mythology of the Fall into his own 
biographical history and gives it a purely personal significance. At the origin of his 
moral history stands the recollection of injustice. He had been falsely accused of 
breaking a comb. His protestations of innocence were to no avail, he was not believed. 
Worse than that, as, according to an adult assessment of the 'evidence' he was guilty, 
accusations of lying followed and his reluctance to 'confess' was treated as more 
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reprehensible than the original offence.. The transparent world of childhood, in which 
the inner truth of the heart is directly communicable, became clouded with adult, 
'rational', expectations. 34 Thereafter Rousseau found himself drawn into a web of 
deceit. The Fall is reinterpreted as a defensive retreat out of nature. It is experienced 
primarily in the birth of pride, and the growing power of reflection and self-deception. 
Thereafter actions become self-regarding in the narrow sense of supporting the pride 
which feeds upon the expectations and approbation of others. 'Selfishness perverts 
innocent love of self (amour de soi-meme as opposed to amour-propre), vice is born, 
and society takes shape'. 35 
It is subordination to appearances (society) which created within him a host of 
artificial desires: 
For his own advantage he had to make himself appear other than he really was. 
Appearance and reality became two entirely different things, and from this 
distinction arose insolent ostentation, deceitful cunning, and all the vices that 
follow in their train. 36 
It is this distinction, and the subsequent growth of pride that 'explains not only the inner 
division of civilized man but also his subjugation to limitless desires'. 37 The endless 
renewal of want is a social artifice which has no counterpart in nature; 'Desire is not a 
physical need; it is not true that it is a need at all'. 38 
Rousseau espouses the immediacy of the primal world against the mediation 
(reflection and desire) of society. To inculcate its value in others he withdrew from 
society to lead a life of exemplary solitude. As society was the negation of authentic 
selfhood, Jean-Jacques freely abandoned society in order to reclaim the primal world 
which took precedence over it. He 'made himself a stranger to men in order to protest 
against the alienation that makes men strangers to one another -a paradox for which he 
is still critcized'. 39 But it was only after he had freed himself from the 'mournful train' 
of social passions that he was able to rediscover nature 'in all her charm'. 
All that remains of the primal world is the intuition of happiness that lies in the 
bewildering melancholy of restless passions; a vague unease that is the consciousness of 
its loss, and the unconscious longing for its return. 
Everything is in constant flux on the earth. Nothing keeps the same unchanging 
shape, and our affections, being attached to things outside us, necessarily change 
and pass away as they do... Thus our earthly joys are almost without exception the 
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creatures of the moment... And how can we give the name of happiness to a 
fleeting state which leaves our hearts still empty and anxious, either regretting 
something that is past or desiring something that is yet to come. 40 
What in fact we seek in each fleeting pleasure is that deeper and unchanging state of 
happiness that remains within us as a faint recollection of our first, uncorrupted, 
experience of the world. For Rousseau there is no original sin, and Happiness is 
consequently a humanly attainable goal. This goal is obstructed by the way we live. 
While he lived in society 'my entire being was in things that were foreign to me, and in 
the continual agitation of my heart I felt all the instability of human life'. 41 But in his 
retreat from society, on the Island of Saint-Pierre, undisturbed by the spectacle of 
society, he could find 
a state where the soul can find a resting-place secure enough to establish itself and 
concentrate its entire being there... where time is nothing to it... and no other 
feeling of deprivation or enjoyment, pleasure or pain, desire or fear than the simple 
feeling of existence, a feeling that fills our soul entirely. 42 
In his solitary 'reveries' (literally also 'ravings'), he felt himself to be 'full' of being, 
'self-sufficient like God', his heart finally at peace, 'its calm untroubled by any 
passion'. 43 
'Salvation', that is to say, depends neither upon theological reflection nor 
conventional virtue, both of which belong to the estranged world of society, but rests 
simply upon 'giving way' to the prompting of the heart. This is, in fact, more difficult 
to accomplish than obedience to the strictest rule for life. Everything tends to obstruct 
such self-surrender. The heart, once joined to the ceaseless flow of secular passions, is 
never known directly. In patient solitude and reverie, however, the ego is gradually 
divested of its spurious affections. He claims, thus, that while rigorous conceptual 
thinking, which is a fully socialized activity, 'has always been for me a disagreeable and 
thankless occupation', in reveries 'my soul roams and soars through the universe on 
wings of imagination, in ecstasies which surpass all other pleasures. 44 In this state of 
'blissful self-abandonment' the individual 'loses himself in the intensity of the beautiful 
order, with which he feels himself at one'. 45 The contemplation of nature's primordial 
simplicity, is really a merging with and participation in its unity in which 'all individual 
objects escape him; he sees and feels nothing but the unity of all things', and is quite 
distinct from any deliberative act of conceptualization, which separates and divides 
consciousness from the world. 46 In blissful indifference 'my ideas are hardly more than 
86 
sensations, and my understanding cannot transcend the objects which form my 
surroundings'. 47 
The exemplary solitude of Christ is, for Rousseau, a decisive argument against all 
theological sophistry. Christ's words are one with his entire being which directly 
affects the heart, and Christ's presence, unlike the dogmatic works of his modern 
philosophical 'followers', is effortlessly illuminating. 'The essence of Christianity', he 
claims 'lies in the preaching of a truth that is rmmediate'. 48 
The Consequences of Copernicanism 
Modernity is a form, or forms, of consciousness inherent in the transformation of 
society, out of the Christian feudal west and towards the liberated world of a civil 
society apparently bound together by bonds of mutual self-interest. That such a view is 
itself 'superficial' does not mean that it is not an accurate characterisation of the 
experience of modernity. Whatever 'else' might be invoked as a 'necessary being' 
underlying the coherence of modern society as its 'precondition' must remain a 
theoretical reconstruction of an unconscious mechanism. In terms of 'immediacy' the 
modern world remains centred on the ego as its undeniably 'given' reality. Indeed, it is 
the experience of the world from the perspective of the 'ego' which is superficial that 
fuelled the Romantic longing for self-transcendence, and was the foundation for new 
aesthetic as well as new religious movements through which the 'deeper' or 'higher' 
reality of being could, in some fashion, enter consciousness as a direct experience. 49 
A gulf was opened between the experience of the self as an 'ego', and the world of 
'objects' which the ego could disclose to the inner world of experience exclusively as 
'pictures' of a 'reality' from which it had itself become detached. The soul no longer 
penetrated the world of nature, as it had within the medieval cosmos, but stood apart as 
a spectator. And it is just the suspicion that such a separation has occurred that 
provoked new understandings of melancholy and irony in terms of a uniquely modern 
encounter between the isolated self and the incomprehensible otherness of the rest of 
creation. The one was rationalized as a form of mourning over the loss of an original 
and fuller experience of creation, while the other was glorified a seemingly divine 
capacity for detachment consequent upon this loss. 
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A self-sufficient domain of subjectivity confronted a world of equally self-sufficient 
objectivity. The relation between the two remained incomprehensible. But the 
consequences of Copernicanism went further than that. 50 Kant's revolution in 
philosophy brought into focus many of the central difficulties in reflecting upon the 
emergence of modernity. 51 What proved to be most significant, for those who followed 
him and more directly influenced Kierkegaard, can be briefly summarized. 
Rather than clearing the way for a new understanding, and a new form, of religious 
faith established from the ruins of Hume's attacks, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was 
often taken to be an affirmative 'Concluding Postscript' to modern scepticism. The 
fundamental insight, that all human knowledge was confined to a 'sphere' of 
representation from which the 'thing in itself' had been banished, was taken as an 
authoritative point of departure for a restrained view of philosophical reflection as a 
'theory of knowledge', or, more generally, a 'theory of representation'. Inasmuch as 
religion was characterised as a species of 'belief' or a form of 'knowledge' (which Kant 
had refused to do) this had the effect of undermining the 'certainty' with such beliefs 
were held as 'faith'. 
In the present context, however, the more important implication of Kant's 
philosophy centred on the possibilities of 'self-knowledge'. The self is hidden from the 
ego, and remains as unknown to it, as does the rest of creation. 'Knowledge' of 
ourselves is no more perfect than our knowledge of the world. The subject is 
partitioned, so to speak, between the immediacy of the ego, and the 'secret springs of 
action' without which the ego could not make its appearance. It is this division which 
makes all knowledge of the self precarious, and leaves us open to self-deception, vanity 
and flattery; 
We like then to flatter ourselves by falsely taking credit for a more noble motive; 
whereas in fact we can never, even by the strictest examination, get completely 
behind the secret springs of action; since when the question is of moral worth, it is 
not with the actions which we see that we are concerned, but with those inward 
principles of them which we do not see. 52 
And, again, although Kant's intention was to establish from this insight the 
autonomy of practical reason and its moral sense, it was often borrowed in support of 
either revolutionary libertarianism, or conservative authoritarianism. 53 In either event 
social life became the continuous interplay of appearances, floating, so to speak, on the 
surface of reality, or, rather, the surface which was actuality. 
88 
Even as to himself, a man cannot pretend to know what he is in himself from the 
knowledge he has by internal sensation... For as he does not come by the 
conception of himself ä priori but empirically, it naturally follows that he can 
obtain his knowledge of himself only by the inner sense, and consequently only 
through the appearance of his nature and the way in which his consciousness is 
affected. 54 
As a social being an individual became self-aware exclusively as a 'subject made of 
mere appearances'. The immediate unity of the self, thus, if it exists at all cannot be 
conceptualized. Kant, in attempting nonetheless to grasp the inner reality of selfhood, 
is driven to a near paradoxical formulation. 'Beneath' the incoherence of appearances 
the self is constituted as an act of will, directed by the autonomy of freely chosen but 
non-arbitrary moral principles. 55 This, in effect, only emphasises the surface of 
selfhood, its shape rather than its depth or inner structure. In a somewhat different way 
in exercising aesthetic judgements, the individual gave expression, in matters of taste, to 
the social character of selfhood and thus to the conspiracy of appearances, but in 
confronting the melancholic distance of the sublime, the ego experiences itself as an 
empty vessel, or as a mirror into which it reflects an infinite, and thus invisible, depth. 
The ego is a surface aware of itself as a dividing line or boundary between two 
qualitatively different 'spheres'. But as it is an infinity which, so to speak, extends in 
either direction, outwards and inwards, it can experience itself only as a surface; a 
surface which, trying to close on itself hopes to exclude from itself the entire cosmos of 
extended matter, bound to itself through necessary laws, and include within itself the 
infinite freedom of subjectivity. Neither are conceivable. The 'depth' and 'weight' of 
melancholy, the infinitude of irony, are alternative expressions which throw into 
sharper relief, therefore, the literally superficial character of modern life. 
Kant describes this superficiality (which is itself a consequence of an unlimited and 
therefore inconceivable depth) as boredom. Boredom is 'disgust with our own 
existence', a melancholic condition in which 'we also feel weighed down by inertia'. 56 
And more particularly boredom is emptiness; a kind of inner subjective equivalent of the 
infinite extension of space; 
For boredom means that a man who is used to changing sensations sees a void of 
sensations in himself, and strains his vital force to fill it up with something or 
other. 57 
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This 'oppressive, even frightening burden' is not simply the tedium in which 'nothing 
happens', but is associated, rather, with an ever changing present, with a flux of 
appearances, that seem unconnected to any inner-experience of 'depth'. As life is 
contained on a depthless filament, is itself just a surface, its ever changing physiognomy 
cannot be interpreted as an expression of some 'deep' process. Kant feels an acute 
revulsion against this loss of depth, and thus of meaning, and mounts through his 
critical philosophy a heroic effort to retrieve for consciousness, some link with a 
structured inner world. But every effort fails, and serves only to disclose the 
powerlessness of thought to penetrate beneath the surface which has closed off from 
itself either the sublime indifference of the object, or the authentic inwardness of the 
subject. For Kant the problem of thought is that it remains too closely bound to life's 
surface, it can never really detach itself from everyday conventions and overcome the 
remoteness of the object or the subject. 
The self, laminated upon itself, for ever reflecting itself, and others in itself, and 
itself in others, cannot escape the boredom of the modern age and is reduced to the 
experience of meaningless duration. And though 'we equate anything that shortens time 
with enjoyment' each distraction serves only to make more evident the void which 
presses in upon us from either 'side'. 
The void of sensations we perceive in ourselves arouses horror (horror vacui) and, 
as it were, the presentiment of a slow death, which we find more painful than 
having fate cut the thread of life quickly. 58 
Reflections of the Present 
In 1846, having completed a major work whose title Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
hinted that it was to be his last, Kierkegaard wrote a long review of a novel, Two Ages, 
that he wrongly believed to have been written by J. L. Heiberg, Denmark's leading 
literary critic and aesthetician. This wonderfully ironic deception (it was in fact written 
by Heiberg's mother Thomasine Gyllembourg-Ehrensvard and Heiberg's claim to 
having been involved in a limited editorial capacity was perfectly accurate), provided 
Kierkegaard with the occasion to renew his authorship under the pretence of writing 
reviews rather than books. 59 
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It also provided Kierkegaard with an opportunity to renew, through the medium of 
literary criticism, the more general analysis of modern culture which he had begun in 
his student days. The interval between From the Papers of One Still Living (1838) and 
Two Ages (1846) is marked not only by a significant intellectual maturation but, even 
more significantly, by a completely different conception of his task as a writer. The 
earlier work deals primarily with Hans Andersen as a novelist, an activity for which 
Kierkegaard believed he (Andersen) had no real vocation. In attempting to write 
novels, or at least the novel Only a Fiddler which Kierkegaard considered in some 
detail, he argued Andersen could not really develop himself as a person and his work 
consequently lacked inner coherence. His writing is episodic, and depends upon the 
gratuitous creation of a variety of incidental poetic moods which lack inner connection 
with each other, with the characters in his stories, or with any deeper 'life-view' which 
the author might, and indeed should, wish to express. 60 This 'inner emptiness under 
motley pictures' becomes in Two Ages the general characteristic of modern culture as 
such. In Thomasine Gyllembourg's short novel, and even more clearly in her earlier, 
longer and better known work A Story of Everyday Life, Kierkegaard finds reflected the 
characteristic formlessness of contemporary life. The lack of a coherent 'world view' is 
no longer seen as evidence of the artistic shortcomings of the author, but is viewed 
rather as itself a sign of novelistic genius in portraying the real conditions of life. 
His review turns into a general comparison between the contrasting 'cultures' of an 
'Age of Revolution', which 'is essentially passionate, and therefore it essentially has 
form' 
, 
61 and of the 'Present Age', which 'is essentially a sensible, reflecting age'. 62 
There is, in fact, nothing particularly historical in this contrast. He refers to no 
particular period as an 'Age of Revolution', and when, two years later, Denmark's 
belated bourgeois revolution did take place he did not feel compelled to alter his 
judgement of the tendencies of the 'Present Age'. The European-wide social upheavals 
of 1848, indeed, were typical of the age which contained, rather than was transformed, 
by them; 'flaring up in superficial short-lived enthusiasms and prudentially relaxing in 
indolence'. 63 
The 'Present Age' has become an age of publicity, in which nothing real happens. 
An age of ceaseless chatter and exhibitionism in which members of the public are caught 
up in perpetually renewed and quite meaningless anticipation of events which never 
actually occur. In terms reminiscent of his celebrated contemporary Alexis de 
Tocqueville he draws attention to the levelling tendencies of the 'Present Age'. 64 It is, 
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above all, an age of abstraction in which medium the 'single individual' cannot live; he 
'has not fomented enough passion in himself to tear himself out of the web of reflection 
and the seductive ambiguity of reflection'. 65 It is clear from Kierkegaard's admittedly 
rather general discussion that he conceives his ideal 'single individual' as in some way 
'defined' through passion; 
So also in the world of individuals. If the essential passion is taken away, the one 
motivation, and everything becomes meaningless externality, devoid of character, 
then the spring of ideality stops flowing and life together becomes stagnant water - 
this is crudeness. (Two Ages, p. 62) 
It is equally clear that his notion of 'passion' is quite distinct from either empiricist, or 
metaphysical, traditions in psychology. Where, for the former, passion was viewed 
almost exclusively as a disturbing element within a rationally conceived and intentional 
'ego', and for the latter passion was conceived in terms of an 'absence' within the 'ego' 
- and thus as a stimulating desire to possess something that would 'complete' and thus 
express the self - Kierkegaard regards passion as the multiplicity of differences which 
give structure and form to human experience. But in the 'Present Age', we might say, 
nothing makes a difference. No distinctions can withstand the dissolving tendencies of 
abstraction. The inner-tension and 'colour' is drained from individual experience and, 
therefore, from social relations: 
The coiled springs of life-relationships, which are what they are only because of 
qualitatively distinguishing passion, lose their resilience; the qualitative expression 
of difference between opposites is no longer the law for the relation of inwardness 
to each other in the relation. Inwardness is lacking, and to that extent the relation 
does not exist or the relation is an inert cohesion. (Two Ages, p. 78) 
The citizen of the Present Age 'does not relate himself in the relation but is a spectator'. 
Everything in consequence is trivialised; 'Not even a suicide these days does away with 
himself in desperation but deliberates on this step so long and so sensibly that he is 
strangled by calculation'. 66 Where a passionate age is united through 'enthusiasm', 
' envy becomes the negatively unifying principle in a passionless and very reflective 
age. '67 Envy, indeed, is a novel and ingenious means of preserving order, 'Reflection's 
envy holds the will and energy in a kind of captivity'. But in 'holding the individual 
and the age in a prison' reflective envy is a self-suppression which has no need of 
'tyrants and secret police, nor the clergy and aristocracy. 68 
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The Present Age annuls passion and the 'contradictions' essential to passion. It is 
preoccupied with 'chatter', which is the annulled passionate distinction between being 
silent and speaking. Where silence and speaking are linked in their essential relation to 
the person 'chattering gets ahead of essential speaking' and merely 'reflects' 
inconsequential events; it is nothing but 'the caricaturing externalization of 
inwardness'. 69 And as 'loquacity' the modern thinker, in hastily announcing a new 
philosophy, too easily elides the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity By the 
same token it is an age of 'principle', annulling the distinction between form and content 
in a high-minded insistence on acting ethically.. But 'one can do anything and 
everything on principle', because the principle lies outside the person, who may 
'personally be a non-human nonentity'. 70 It is specifically an age of 'superficiality', 
which, as the annulled passionate distinction between hiddeness and revelation is 'a 
revelation of emptiness'. This superficiality manifests itself most clearly in an 
'exhibitionist tendency' which is caught up in 'the self-infatuation of the conceit of 
reflection'. 71 The extensive and ever-changing surface of modern life is nothing but a 
kaleidoscope of reflections: 
And eventually human speech will become just like the public: pure abstraction - 
there will no longer be anyone who speaks, but objective reflection will gradually 
deposit a kind of atmosphere, an abstract noise that will render human speech 
superfluous, just as machines make workers superfluous. (Two Ages, p. 104) 
Also in 1846 Kierkegaard worked on a much larger work addressed to the 'the 
confusion of the Present Age'. Unpublished in his own lifetime 'The Book on Adler', 
as he referred to the manuscript, develops his distinctive understanding of the 
72 'superficiality' of modern bourgeois culture as an aspect of passionless 'reflection'. 
Adler was a young country minister (a role Kierkegaard struggled, but failed, to accept 
for himself) who prefaced a book of sermons he published in 1843 with the claim that 
they had been directly inspired by a revelation. Kierkegaard views Adler as a 
phenomena of the age; loquacious and deluded he has mistaken the arcane abstractness 
of Hegelian dialectics for a vision of the Absolute. 
The ceaseless and pointless movement of the present is exemplified in Adler's wild 
flights of fancy. In becoming an author Adler makes use of the very 'sickness of our 
age', he lives in and through arbitrary 'premises', which he can turn into books which 
are 'precisely what the age demands'. 73 An age of 'reflection and intelligence' is all too 
easily duped by such 'premise-authors' who lack real inner-consistency and seek to 
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create a big effect on the basis of appearing to be clever. And as every truth can exist 
only as a reflection on the surface of life, becoming an image or shadow drained of 
passion and essential qualities, it is understandable that 'nowadays one takes for a 
revelation any sort of strong impression'. 74 If the essential difference between 
revelation and madness has been abolished, then, for the Present Age, no differences are 
essential, and everything becomes 'characterless'. 75 Thus 'triumphant argumentation' is 
able to transform 'eternal truth into a hypothesis'. 76 As 'a transparent medium for 
seeing the confusion of our age', Adler serves as a warning sign, an anticipation of the 
consequences of living superficially. He has become too responsive to the age, buoyant 
on its volatile and chaotic turbulence, and as a result has lost 'touch' with actuality. But 
Adler's madness is the lunacy of the age, which is reflected in him with fearful clarity. 
The Present Age has no 'depth. From Two Ages to 'The Book on Adler' 
Kierkegaard traces a series of connections linking together apparently isolated aspects of 
modern culture as equivalent 'reflections' on the surface of life. And through the 
medium of 'reflection' the most disparate of human contents, from the conventions of 
everyday behaviour to the latest philosophical craze, are reduced to a characterless flux 
of essentially identical elements. Once 'flattened' into a thin surface, a boundary 
between the infinities of object and subject, actuality is all too readily pierced. Living 
images are not reflected back into existence, filling it out so to speak with a real 
content, but drain themselves into fantastic and empty concepts, and, like water on a hot 
surface, are 'volatilized' out of existence. 
Many of these remarks now seem astonishingly prescient and make yet more 
remarkable the enigma of Kierkegaard's authorship; one of the least likely places, 
perhaps, in which to have discovered a premature critique of the 'condition of 
postmodernism'. 77 
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PART TWO 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MODERN SOCIETY 
My pseudonymity or polyonymity has not had an accidental basis in my person... 
but an essential basis in the production itself ... Thus 
in the pseudonymous books 
there is not a single word by me. 
Soren Kierkegaard - 'A First and Last Explanation' 
appended to Postscript 
Poetry is not the imitation of a reality which already exists prior to it; nor is it the 
adornment of truths or spiritual meanings which could have been expressed 
independently. The aesthetic capacity is a creative power for the production of a 
meaning that transcends reality and that could never be found in abstract thought. 
Indeed, it is a way or mode of viewing the world. 
Wilhelm Dilthey - Poetry and Experience 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REVOLUTION OF THE SPHERES: A TOPOLOGICAL FANTASY 
Sceptical self-consciousness... is in fact nothing but a purely casual, confused 
medley, the dizziness of a perpetually self-engendered disorder. It is itself aware 
of this; for itself maintains and creates this restless confusion. 
G. W. F. Hegel - The Phenomenology of Spirit 
The 'authorship' proper begins with a 'topological' analysis of the characteristic forms 
of personal experience in modern society. Its starting point, that is to say, is with 
aspects of the 'Present Age' rather than with the pretension of an 'unthematized' or 
' universal' human nature. It might be suspected that such an apparently modest 
descriptive programme would amount to little more than an apologetics of 'bourgeois- 
philistinism'. But Kierkegaard's intention is explicitly critical. Without departing from 
the 'surface' of modern life, or, rather from the surface that is modern life, he outlines 
the possibilities for unified and coherent personal experience immanent within its 
chaotic appearance. 
In several senses this approach is 'aesthetic'. Firstly, many of these works bear the 
unmistakable mark of a highly developed literary art. To appreciate the distinctive 
features of life's current 'possibilities', each must be recreated as a fully embodied 
character into whose life-view the reader can enter imaginatively in a way that would be 
impossible in relation to any purely conceptual representation. To this end Kierkegaard 
indulged a prodigious literary talent, inventing a whole series of 'young men' and a 
coterie of their somewhat older companions. The deliberate evocation of a literary 
work, rather than a philosophical or theological treatise, served a double purpose. It 
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created an 'aesthetic distance' between the 'real' author, Soren Kierkegaard, and the 
many books he issued under a variety of pseudonyms. This was, in fact, implied in his 
initial conviction that 'life-views' could be articulated only through the 'medium' of 
personal existence. Thus, even if there were only one such view Kierkegaard could not 
directly express its 'inner-nature', as, in conveying its fullness he would, in effect, 
rather as Marcel Proust was to do in relation to his own 'Narrator', recreate, and thus in 
an important sense misrepresent, himself as a fiction. And, as he believed there were 
several such 'possibilities' he could not even claim to be the author of each of its 
personae without appearing to be insincere. None, in fact, expressed Kierkegaard's 
own 'position', and his aesthetic 'method' aimed above all at representing the 
independence and internal completeness of each of his 'characters'. Significantly it was 
just this distance and independence which made each character accessible to the reader. 
In spite of the welter of pseudonyms, however, and Kierkegaard's insistence that 'in the 
pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me' the aesthetic works are most 
frequently read, or rather miss-read, 'as if they were directly written by him and, thus, 
express 'positions' which at one time or another were his own. 1 
Secondly, for modern life, in which all 'depth' and 'distance' had been infinitized, 
religious thought, which previously had been connected with a structural model of both 
cosmos and psyche, lost its inner-coherence as an immediately graspable picture or 
narrative. If religion still 'dealt' with the mysteries of the universe and of the human 
soul, it could do so only by proclaiming the incomprehensibility of both. And as it was 
'Reason' which had dissolved this structural model, it was itself powerless to 
reconstruct a meaningful totality from the fragments into which it had cast reality. By 
the close of the eighteenth century Art alone seemed capable of offering to the 
bewildered observer of modern life a form-giving structure into which its chaotic but 
finite content could be poured. Art, as Schiller, Lessing and the Romantics insisted, 
provided a new mode of unification for modern experience. The aesthetic provided, in 
this sense, an 'immediate' unity through which life could be grasped and shaped. 
Kierkegaard's 'aesthetics' is an extended ironic comment on this premature optimism. 
Thirdly, Kierkegaard's reconstructions might be viewed as an aesthetic 'critique' of 
actuality, as well as a criticism of (illusory) aesthetics. In a Kantian sense the 
pseudonyms might be viewed as the living 'categories' through which experience, in the 
sense of consistent life-views, becomes possible. These possibilities, or 'spheres' 
represent the most far reaching implications of the 'Copernican Revolution' ; they are 
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forms dignified by self-adhering 'gravity' and their own inner movement of 'self- 
actualization'. They are part of 'actuality', while at the same time being the 'ground' 
upon which actuality is based. As the pseudonyms multiply the reader becomes more 
acutely conscious that actuality may be constituted in a number of mutually exclusive 
ways. The pseudonyms, by establishing their own life-view as possible forms of 
existence in modern life, generate powerful relativizing tendencies which expose, more 
clearly than could any transcendental critique, the entirely conventional character of 
both modern society and the forms of personal experience it harboured. 
The 'aesthetic' works present a 'topology' of modern life-forms. This is not a 
description of the whole of 'actuality', but an exploration of the variety of consistent 
modes of being which can be found, chaotically intermingled, within it. The aesthetic 
writers present a series of 'stages' or 'spheres' of existence in which the promiscuous 
disorder of the Present Age is painstakingly recombined in a number of different ways. 
Each represents, thus, a 'pure' form, an example of personal existence consistently 
developed from a simple underlying principle. The relation among the pseudonyms 
almost irresistibly suggests spatial divisions of some sort; hence 'spheres' or 'stages'. 
But in an important sense this is misleading. Each, in fact, exhausts actuality in its own 
particular way. They do not co-exist by dividing up, so to speak, the 'space' of human 
experience, each claiming for itself a specific territory. One might imagine, rather than 
a juxtaposition in space, a succession in time. The 'surface' of modern life might then 
be represented as the limited number of 'states', each characterized by its specific 
'tension', into which its primitive material can be formed. 
There is, indeed, a significant sense in which simply by resorting to the deception 
of their own authorship, the pseudonyms produce only aesthetic works. Their carefully 
contrived subterfuge places an awkward question mark over the interpretation of many 
of the works. Thus, to cite only one of the most obvious difficulties, among the best 
known of 'Kierkegaardian' themes is the qualitative differentiation of 'aesthetic', 
'ethical' and 'religious' spheres or stages in human existence. Yet, as usually 
presented, and in terms of the most frequently cited texts illustrating such distinctions, 
each ought more properly to be regarded as 'aesthetic' categories. The 'ethical' and the 
'religious' viewed from an 'aesthetic' standpoint - and their characterisation in terms of 
pseudonyms is such a standpoint - may turn out to be rather different from the 'ethical' 
or 'religious' view of the same distinction, if such a distinction even exists for an 
authentically 'ethical' or 'religious' view. 
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The topological perspective, that is to say, is essentially 'aesthetic' however many 
'non-aesthetic' 'stages' or 'spheres' are introduced to complicate the picture. And as a 
result it contains both less and more than is usually included in expositions of the 
'Kierkegaardian' theory of the 'stages'. 2 Less in that it contains only different versions 
of the aesthetic, and more in according to the aesthetic a more positive and flexible role 
in the formation of self-identity than most commentators have cared to admit. 
The Aesthetic 
The starting point for Kierkegaard's exploration of modern culture is through a 
description of the 'aesthetic' sphere or stage of existence, as a developed 'position' in 
contrast to either a primordial pre-conceptual unity, or a purely empirical description of 
the chaotic present. The point of departure for the authorship proper, is to be found, 
therefore, in the melancholia and refined sensitivity of the 'young man' who is the 
purported author of Either. 
Kierkegaard, indeed, begins with the most sophisticated and advanced of 
'positions' within modern culture. And in exchanging a singular philosophical starting 
point for systematic reflection for a multiplicity of 'actual' subjects Kierkegaard was 
forced to abandon the framework of The Concept of Irony. Either deals with what he 
terms 'immediacy', but what is 'immediate' to the 'young man' cannot be the same as it 
was for either Socrates or an average member of the 'crowd'. It is neither singular nor 
unchanging; however much it intrudes into our experience as something external, 
natural, and changeless, 'immediacy' has a long and tortured history. 
What is equally clear is that the 'immediate' is not a purely sensuous category. 
The aesthetic sphere is organized around the distinction between pleasure and 
unpleasure, but 'pleasure' is a complex of physical and psychic satisfaction which 
cannot be reduced to any merely organic imperative. 
Kierkegaard's topography of modern existence begins, then, from an already 
developed position; from the immediate as melancholy. 3 The subject matter of Either 
is, in consequence, no hastily compiled stereotype whose purpose is to flatter the more 
mature life-view of Or, and initiate an insubstantial argument the outcome of which, 
from the very beginning, the reader could not be in any doubt. Kierkegaard's method, 
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and talent, is more subtle. He present the 'aesthetic' sphere of existence in its most 
attractive, refined, and alluring form. Through the somewhat baffling diversity of its 
contents we glimpse the putative author of Either, a 'young man' who is not only a 
highly gifted and sensitive person, but, in Kierkegaard's beautifully written pages, 
exercises a certain power of attraction, a fascination for and over any moderately 
sympathetic reader. 
In Either the romantic hero of Goethe, Tieck, Novalis, Hoffmann and countless 
lesser writers steps, fully formed, into the midst of contemporary life and tries to grasp 
it in all its disillusioned immediacy. 4 Kierkegaard refuses the temptation of beginning 
'without presuppositions', because only 'speculation' and 'abstraction' (the 
characteristic features of the 'Present Age') begin with nothing. 5 The 'aesthetic' youth 
is no straw man seeking pleasure in the artificial decoration of reality, or the vain 
pursuit of some fantastic conception of 'the beautiful'. Aesthetic immediacy means 
quite the reverse and is grounded in an acceptance of the world as it is. Rather than 
distancing himself from the reality of life he is determined to find pleasure in its 
incomprehensible succession of appearances. The 'deeper' meaning of reality for the 
romantic hero, therefore, does not lie in interpreting appearances through a network of 
profound 'ideas', so much as to discover within it the private destiny of erotic love. 
This represents, for the modern world, the first possibility for the secular conquest of 
melancholy. 
Either is made up of a number of seemingly separate essays, reviews, 
psychological excursions, aphorisms and fictions, varying greatly in length and style. 
This deliberate fragmentation, however, (the entire work is subtitled 'A Fragment of 
Life') does not obscure its central themes. From the isolated 'Diapsalmata' with which 
it opens, to the concluding (and immediately sensationalized) 'A Seducer's Diary', the 
interplay of melancholy and erotic love is plainly visible. 
The opening aphorisms to Either, indeed, could almost be read as a brief and 
modernized 'anatomy' of melancholy. They convey a complete detachment from, and 
indifference to, the world. Momentarily interested in the inexplicable succession of his 
own inner-states, he discovers a universal apathy in respect of them all. 
I don't feel like doing anything. I don't feel like riding - the motion is too 
powerful; I don't feel like walking - it is too tiring. I don't feel like lying down, 
for either I would have to stay down, and I don't feel like doing that, or I would 
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have to get up again, and I don't feel like doing that, either. Summa Summarunv I 
don't feel like doing anything. (Either, p. 20) 
Overcome by 'a strange, sad mood', he is at once indifferent to everything and 
tormented by restlessness; 'How sterile my soul and my mind are, and yet constantly 
tormented by empty voluptuous and excruciating labor pains! '. For him 'time stands 
still', and his entire existence is a twilight state between sleeping and dreaming. He is 
self-absorbed, 'My soul is so heavy that no thought can carry it any longer', yet, at the 
same time he feels his life, and himself, to be 'empty and meaningless'. Everything is 
'dreadfully boring'; nothing makes a difference. He is bound by a 'chain formed of 
gloomy fancies, of alarming dreams, of troubled thoughts, of fearful presentiments, of 
inexplicable anxieties'; a chain that is 'soft as silk'. 
The 'Fragment of Life' begins in the most fragmentary of ways, with the simple 
juxtaposition of melancholic observations. Yet this is not a romantic work in the style 
of Friedrich Schlegel. Here the 'fragment' does not contain, either as a miniature copy 
or as a condensed symbol, the entirety of the work. 6 The fragmentariness of Either, 
and the particular arrangements of its parts becomes more comprehensible in the light 
of the long essay 'The Immediate Stages of the Erotic or the Musical Erotic' which 
immediately follows the melancholic 'Diapsalmata'. In a coherently argued and 
systematically ordered argument the 'young man' claims (in spite of the admission, 'I 
am well aware that I do not understand music')7 a natural affinity between music and the 
sensuous-erotic. He insists, in fact, that 'sensuousness in its elemental originality is the 
absolute theme of music' "8 This, given the author's romantic credentials, might 
be seen 
as an extension of Lessing's aesthetics. 9 Mozart's Don Giovanni he thinks, therefore, 
the most perfect of musical compositions just because its content and form are perfectly 
suited to each other, it is the immediate expression of sensuousness. Through it 
sensuousness is, so to speak, directly communicated, and in it music is revealed as 
sensuousness. Of course many other things can be communicated musically, but the 
sensuous-erotic is here revealed to be its 'absolute theme'. 10 
The 'young man's' text, the book called Either, cannot aspire to this perfection, 
but it can imitate it, by adopting an analogically musical form of composition. The 
'Diapsalmata' constitute a kind of 'overture' to the main theme which is developed in 
his essay on Mozart, and transformed in a series of virtuoso variations before receiving 
its climactic restatement as 'A Seducer's Diary'. The separate fragments are thus linked 
without forming a whole, or developing towards any sense of completeness or totality. 
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Of course it might well be argued that Mozart's musical structures are aesthetically 
valuable just because they do express such a totality. The central issue, however, is not 
Mozart's music, or even the reasonableness of the 'young man's' aesthetic theory of 
Mozart's music, so much as the relevance of the latter to a reading of the 'young man's' 
text. I l And the fragmented text is the appropriate form through which to represent an 
aesthetic existence; it aspires to a consistency of view and, to that extent, avoids the 
arbitrariness and merely fortuitous combination of elements we might imagine typical of 
an unreflective consciousness of the Present Age, and at the same time it eschews the 
systematic interconnection of its parts according to some logical rule or principle. 
The sensuous appears first as a 'still quiescence', marked 'not by delight and joy 
but by deep melancholy'. 12 And adopting at least the mask of the romanticism the 
'young man' develops an appropriately idealist psychology of desire through which to 
describe the immanent development of sensuousness. In this initial stage desire is 'only 
a presentiment of itself', it lacks an object, or rather, the relation between object and 
longing subject that is felt as desire has not yet been formed. 13 Desire is contained here 
in 'a quiet ever-present longing, absorbed in contemplation'. 14 It is just this 
contradiction that we feel as melancholy; as aimless and objectless longing, a self- 
absorbed restlessness. The 'young man' is the very archetype of the romantic youth, a 
second Werther. 15 But a second stage supervenes, apparently by some inner 
developmental necessity. Desire is then 'torn out of its substantial repose in itself', and 
loses itself in multiplicity. The second stage of the sensuous-erotic is thus seeking 
rather than dreaming, and is overtaken by a fully developed third stage of desiring 
proper, in which a specific object of longing is defined and possessed. 
The elaboration this trinity with its 'advanced' Hegelian terminology is liable 
to mislead the reader, who, forgetting the ' Diapsalmata' might think he has stumbled 
upon a psychological treatise. This is not, however, an abstract philosophical system, 
but, rather, an original application of Romantic psychological assumptions to an 
individual drawn with novelistic persuasiveness. The entire armoury of post-Kantian 
terms, therefore, must first be transferred back to the real world (from which they 
originated) if its limitations and deficiencies are to be revealed. And in the real world 
things never go smoothly. The dialectic is no sooner under way, therefore, than it is 
interrupted by extraneous and fortuitous lines of thought. The reader is, thus, abruptly 
thrust into a new chapter, a consideration of the tragic which is characteristically viewed 
from the vantage point of the 'young man's' own melancholic isolation. Melancholy 
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emerges, in fact, as a variety of suffering that lies between fate (ancient tragedy) and 
guilt (modern tragedy). 
In retrospect it becomes clear that Don Juan, in fact, is no seducer. There is no 
element here, as there is so prominently in, for example, the fictions of Richardson or 
Laclos, of craftiness and unscrupulous planning. 16 His endless conquests are the 
effortless result of the primal force of which he is possessed; 'that by which he deceives 
is the sensuous in its elemental originality, of which he is, as it were, the incarnation'. 1 7 
His spirit has not liberated itself, and he remains bound to the 'pure' spiritless 
sensuousness which is 'the most abstract idea conceivable'. 18 He remains, in being 
possessed by an uncontrollable 'frenzy', melancholic in the original Platonic sense. 
But, added to this, and fundamentally redefining its entire nature, is a new Christian 
determination of sensuousness, and, therefore, of melancholy. It is in Christianity, 
according to the author, that sensuousness is first posited as a principle and, thus, 
brought to awareness as 'a specific realm of being'. He claims, paradoxically, that 
'Christianity brought sensuality into the world', and at the same time it is Christianity 
that has 'driven sensuality out of the world'. By distinguishing spirit as a 'higher' mode 
of being 'sensuality was placed under the qualification of spirit first by Christianity'. 19 
There is no suggestion here that Christianity is a universal 'cure' for melancholy. 
The 'young man' of Either is a decidedly 'spiritual', if not a decisively Christian, being. 
He is no Don Juan, his melancholy is not the insistent tug of an unconscious creaturely 
instinct, but is itself 'qualified' as spirit. He is seduced by his own sorrow, and comes 
to love solitude. He speculates, for example, that; 
Perhaps nothing ennobles a person so much as keeping a secret. It gives a person's 
whole life a significance, which it has, of course, only for himself; it saves a 
person from all futile consideration of the surrounding world. 20 (Either, p. 157) 
The connection between erotic love and the 'reflective sorrow' which is 
'unceasingly reserved, silent, solitary, and seeks to return into itself is taken up in the 
following section 'Silhouettes' which, reverting to a fragmented style, is described as a 
'Psychological Diversion'. Here the 'young man' uses his sorrow to illuminate 'the 
subtle interior picture' of 'unhappy love' which never shows itself directly on the faces 
of deceived lovers. 21 In Marie Beaumarchais, a character from a story of a broken 
engagement by Goethe, deception turns the 'incorruptible essence of a quiet spirit', into 
the 'barren busyness of a restless spirit'. 22 This is the reflective sorrow of inverted 
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eroticism, an inner restlessness which is never betrayed in expressive movements but 
remains perpetually 'enclosed' and melancholic. The world, for her, becomes 
meaningless, remote, indifferent. In Donna Elvira, one of Don Giovanni's innumerable 
conquests, deception throws her into an 'endless introspection' over his love. And in 
Margaret, seduced by Faust, we are left wondering if her secret sorrow might not be the 
instigator of a real deepening of her personality and inwardness. Faust (possibly) 
deceives her out of her bourgeois complacency. It is her innocence and childlike 
transparency that is irresistible to Faust, the master-doubter who has seen through 
existence to its very depths. His striving can rest momentarily in the erotic; 'what he is 
seeking, therefore, is not only the pleasure of the sensuous, but the immediacy of the 
spirit... whereby he will be rejuvenated and strengthened'. 23 
These ingenious, and insightful, psychological considerations might be regarded as 
an investigation into the aesthetics of deception, even as an aesthetic defence of 
deception. The root of Kierkegaard's own melancholy in 'dreaming sensuousness' and 
its possible consequences (for both Regine and himself of the deception through which 
he broke their engagement) lie fairly close to the surface of the text. The result, 
however, is inconclusive less because Kierkegaard is unclear in his own mind (he had 
already formulated a more convincing defence of deception as the 'maieutic art'), than 
because the actual author, the 'young man', lives exclusively within aesthetic 
determinants. 
Melancholy is a kind of inwardness, and can impart through its indifference to the 
world, something that might be mistaken for a spiritual glow. What is in reality a 
reflective sorrow, which, like a toothache, he cannot let alone seems to him more 
immediate than the entire world of actuality that stands opposed to it. He is consumed 
by his own melancholy, which colours his every relation. He remains 'locked-up' 
within himself, an object of his own psychological curiosity. It is without self-pity, 
therefore, that he can discuss the 'Unhappiest One', which (writing as the 'young man') 
is a kind of self portrait. 'The unhappy one is the person who is always absent from 
himself, never present to himself', he writes, fascinated by his own fugitive nature. 24 If 
he is not present to himself where is he? How does he live? His own answer is that he 
exists either for the future, as hope, or for the past, as recollection. His relation to the 
normal 'flow' of events has been disturbed. He hopes (hopelessly) for what should be 
recollected, that is he imagines the past to be changed even when he knows this to be 
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impossible; or recollects what should really be hoped for. He 'lives', that is to say, 
either in the past, or in the future, and finds in the present only boredom. 
This analysis is continued in an essay on 'The Rotation of Crops' which represents 
a new level of aesthetic self-awareness, and a fresh effort to throw off melancholy. The 
present is oddly elusive. Immediacy, which seemed the least demanding of realities, has 
somehow slipped through his fingers. Immediacy, in reality, is nothing but boredom, 
that is to say nothing at all. 'Boredom is the demonic pantheism', he proclaims and 
falls into the trap of arguing that 'it is annulled by amusing oneself'. 25 But the error is 
quickly rectified, 'amusement' is only another form of boredom in a world of hectic and 
meaningless activity, 'mistaken, generally eccentric diversion has boredom within 
itself'. 26 He regards boredom, as had Pascal, as neither inactivity, nor repetition of the 
same task, but meaninglessness. On this point it is worth quoting the young man's 
insight into his own condition at greater length: 
Boredom rests upon nothing that interlaces existence; its dizziness is infinite, like 
that which comes from looking down into a bottomless abyss. That the eccentric 
diversion sounds without resonance, simply because in nothing there is not even 
enough to make an echo possible. (Either, p. 291) 
The vulgar notion of wrecking boredom 'upon the boundless infinity of change', 
where change is understood extensively as alterations in the external environment, is 
abandoned in favour of an aesthetic conception of variety; as a continuous internal 
modulation of the soul. This openness to variety depends upon mastering the art of 
forgetting, literally of forgetting who one is. One must 'continually vary oneself'. 27 
He therefore advises against friendship, marriage and opening official post. And he is 
at least half-serious in doing so (as an aesthetic individual he resists becoming wholly 
serious). 'Arbitrariness is the whole secret', he says finally. In living aesthetically 'one 
enjoys something totally accidental'. 28 In this way 'everything in life is regarded as a 
wager'. 29 The young man holds himself in a continuous state of expectation, ready 'if 
something should come up'. 
It is in this spirit of arbitrariness, and from a readiness (which in no way annuls his 
deep and secret melancholy) to utilise whatever 'turns up' in the quest to experience 
diverse moods, that he interrupts what might otherwise develop into a dangerously 
systematic psychology of sorrow with a review of The First Love, a play by Augustin 
Scribe. Though he devotes considerable space to a description of the comic character of 
this work, which in one sense balances and completes his essay on modern tragedy, its 
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fortuitous inclusion in Either is emphasised by the excessively elaborate reconstruction 
of the 'occasion' of its writing which precedes the review proper. The 'young man' 
makes of the occasion an opportunity to analyse the 'occasional' as such. 30 In 
additional to inspiration, he argues, the production of a work of art requires quite 
specific circumstances which are not artistically reflected in the work itself, but remain 
external and accidental to it. Every work of art represents in this sense a paradox in 
that 'the accidental is absolutely just as necessary as the necessary'. 31 Without the 
occasion inspiration remains a movement of the imagination alone; 'the occasion is the 
final category, the essential category of transition from the sphere of the idea to 
actuality' . 
32 
An aesthetic conception of erotic love (and properly understood there can be no 
other valid conception of erotic love), accentuates the arbitrary, occasional and 
accidental. 'The Seducer's Diary' provides a 'running commentary' on a love affair 
conceived in just this fashion. 33 The fundamental preoccupation of the seducer is to 
realize his love as an 'interesting' moment. Victor Eremita, as the editor of these 
papers, understands this very well and alerts the reader to it in an introduction to the 
'Diary'. This is neither a Don Juan nor a Faust, but a peculiarly modern seducer, for 
whom 'individuals were merely for stimulation'. 34 He grasps the specific nature of the 
aesthete: 
His life has been an attempt to accomplish the task of living poetically. With a 
sharply developed organ for discovering the interesting in life, he has known how 
to find it and after having found it has continually reproduced his experiences half 
poetically. (Either, p. 304) 
Actuality is reflected in him poetically, so that he is never really present to the 
immediacy he had consecrated as his goal; 'he continually ran lightly over it, but even 
when he abandoned himself to it, he was beyond it' . 
35 Conscience, which was only a 
kind of 'sterile restlessness' within him was no obstacle to his quest for interesting love. 
Yet it is love and not sensuous gratification which is his aim. And the search for 
love begins in the street, in chance encounters, in the anonymous mass of the public. 
His falling in love is an accidental occurrence, he simply waits for the 'sensuous jolt' to 
announce its decision. Thereafter he pursues the loved one with the utmost care and 
circumspection. He finds a way of being introduced, and approaches her with the 
greatest restraint, as an interesting companion, thus 'neutralizing her womanhood'. He 
encourages the infatuation of a younger admirer and, while her feelings are aroused and 
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confused, engineers an engagement. This is, in terms of the constraints of bourgeois 
civility, an essential prelude to the seduction. There is, additionally, an aesthetic 
piquancy to an engagement which, for a time, he relishes: 
Under the aesthetic sky, everything is buoyant, beautiful, transient; when ethics 
arrives on the scene, everything becomes harsh, angular, infinitely langweiligt 
(boring). But in the strictest sense an engagement does not have ethical validity 
(Realitet) such as marriage has... (Either, p. 367) 
His well practised deception (he hints at previous affairs) is full of artful half- 
truths. He does, after all, love her , at 
least 'in the aesthetic sense, and surely this 
should mean something'. 36 Indeed he thinks he can succeed only because his love is 
real; 'She will believe me, partly because I rely on artistry, and partly because at the 
bottom of what I am doing there is truth'. 37 
The incommensurability of love and deception - which may have been at the heart 
of Kierkegaard's own failure to marry - is of no consequence to the genuine aestheticist. 
'I am not afraid of contradicting myself', he boasts, 'if only she does not detect it and I 
achieve what I wish. Let it be the ambition of learned doctoral candidates to avoid 
every contradiction'. He is more realistic than the philosopher 'a young girl's life is too 
38 abundant to have no contradictions and consequently makes contradictions inevitable'. 
In the 'Diapsalmata' which introduce Either, the author had boasted, 'My life is 
utterly meaningless'. 39 He wishes only to give way to his wishes, to live playfully, 
absorbed by the most insignificant as well as the most sublime life-elements, each 'to an 
equally high degree the momentary passion of the soul' . 
40 But, remaining melancholic, 
rather than being absorbed by nothing, nothing absorbs him. But there is an internal 
development within Either, movement expressed in the two Danish terms normally 
translated by the English term melancholy. The Diapsalmata and the initial 'dreaming' 
stage of the musical-erotic are filled with Melancholia, the obscure 'blackness' of the 
Greek medical and philosophical traditions, while the later stages, and more 
particularly the 'Diary of a Seducer' give way to the lucidity of Tungsind, the 
transparent 'heaviness' typical of modern life. 41 
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The Ethical 
Or, which is apparently the work of an older friend of the 'young man', Judge 
William, consists in three letters written in response to Either. Two are extremely long 
and, their author admits, would amount to treatises if it were not for the more 
'admonishing and urgent tone appropriate to the epistolary form', in which they are 
deliberately written. This formal stylistic matter is of some importance. The 'ethical' 
is described in response to the 'aesthetic', and as a complaint against it. The two halves 
of the argument (if argument it is) are not strictly equivalent. While the 'young man' 
describes 'aesthetic' existence by acting as a kind of searchlight of its evanescent forms, 
catching first one and then another of its changing moods in the reflective brilliance of 
his own experience, Judge William does not similarly act as a sounding board of the 
'ethical'. Judge William's own experience of life is relevant primarily as a point of 
reference, which is for the most part discreetly hidden from the reader, and from which 
he offers a comprehensive critique of Either. 
Kierkegaard's mastery of these stylistic shifts allows the various 'collisions' within 
and between 'existence-spheres' to be explored with great sensitivity and depth. Judge 
William does not exist 'immediately' but within the universal categories of good and 
evil. And what is offered in Or is ostensibly an 'ethical' conception of the 'aesthetic' to 
place alongside the 'aesthetic' conception of itself. 
Thus, although Judge William can understand in an intellectual sense, the subject 
matter of Either, he cannot immediately enter into its content and he describes the 
'young man's' life, in fact, at the cost of transforming it. The assumption of a new 
point of view lends an entirely different colour to the 'young man's' aesthetic 
experiments. The aspiration towards playful innocence has gone. 'You love the 
accidental', he writes, quite accurately, but his words are an accusation, not an 
affirmation. He goes on at once to accuse his young friend of 'aimless fantasy', and 'a 
hypochondriacal inquisitiveness'. 42 He is intellectually 'loose jointed', a person whose 
'life disintegrates into nothing but interesting details'. 43 This collector of beautiful 
moments is the 'epitome of every possibility'. 44 What is at issue here is clearly not a 
simple misunderstanding, but the incompatibility of two entirely different conceptions of 
life's central value. When Judge William describes the life-technique of Either as 
'atomistically losing oneself in life's social hordes', the 'young man' would no doubt 
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applaud his critical acumen and, at the same time, lament the stuffiness of his implied 
criticism. 45 
Judge William, to show that the pleasure in love which the 'young man' has so 
ardently, and vainly, sought within immediacy is only attainable when the immediate is 
itself ethically transformed, undertakes to demonstrate the 'aesthetic validity' of 
marriage. According to his older friend, the 'young man' has refused, through his 
attachment to a wholly fantastic vision of romantic love, 'to let love transfigure itself in 
a higher sphere'. " And what makes his conception of romantic love so fantastical is its 
isolation from the ethical seriousness of life. 
This does not mean, of course, that Judge William is defending a calculative or 
utilitarian conception of marriage, in which there has to be some 'reason' for marriage 
other than love itself. Far from it, his argument is just that marriage is a means of 
preserving the love which is its only foundation. 'Marital love' is, in one sense, no 
different from 'romantic love', it 'feels' the same. 'In order to be aesthetic and 
religious', he argues, marriage 'must have no finite "why", but this was precisely the 
aesthetic in the first love. 47 47 The difference is that in existing within ethical 
determinants, it is protected from the disintegrating moment in which the 'young man' 
despairingly seeks its consummation. Marriage is an ethical form, the form best 
adapted, in fact, to the expression and preservation of erotic love. We can see Judge 
William's argument at this point as an ethical rejoinder to the 'young man's' brilliant 
analysis of the 'musical erotic'. Just as Mozart's Don Giovanni - an opera about erotic 
love - is held to be an aesthetic triumph just because it perfectly integrates form and 
content, so marriage is an ethical value of the first order because it is the legitimate 
form within which eroticism can overcome the endlessly dying moment of its aesthetic 
existence. 
Having asserted that the 'first love' is perpetuated in marriage, Judge William goes 
on to argue that it is, in fact, only within ethical determinants that the 'poetic' can be 
realized at all. Romantic love is illusory, it lacks any relation to time. Properly 
considered the 'moment' is an endless transition which contains nothing. Thus; 
'romantic love continually remains abstract in itself... its eternity is illusory'. 48 Marital 
love, on the contrary, gains the solidity of 'an inner history', and in persisting, 
transforms immediacy into an eternal relation. It is not the institution of marriage 
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which carries within it, so to speak, the scent of eternity; it is rather the spontaneous 
force of love, expressed in this relation, which transfigures existence in its entirety. 
The genuinely aesthetic can only be experienced, therefore, within the ethical 
sphere, where it persists in a new way. This persistence, which the 'young man' views 
as the most appalling boredom, is, from the standpoint of ethical existence, a continuing 
and ever-varied source of pleasure. From the aesthetic standpoint this inner-life and 
variety remains invisible. 'Marital love does not come with external signs', and so, for 
the person who is 'outside himself, it seems to be a characterless and indifferent state 
of mutual toleration. And marriage is just one, though in the present context the most 
decisive, example of the impenetrability of the ethical life for anyone so wholly devoted 
to a purely aesthetic sensibility; 'You believe that only a restless spirit is alive. For 
you, a turbulent sea is a symbol of life; for me it is the quiet, deep water. '49 Judge 
William would have us believe that while the 'young man' is transparent to him, he, on 
the contrary, remains opaque to his younger friend. 
In his second, even longer, letter 'On the Balance Between the Aesthetic and the 
Ethical in the Development of the Personality', Judge William presents a more general, 
analytic account of the difference between himself and the 'young man'. 
The protagonist of Either had expressed his life-view most generally in the 
'Diapsalmata', and Judge William replies directly to the melancholic refrain, 'do it or 
do not do it, you will regret it'. Such a statement is, for him, so contradictory that he 
can only interpret it as an affectation. It could not have been intended 'seriously', 
because to be serious (by definition) is not to regard existence so lightly. Judge William 
believes he has outmanoeuvred his opponent, and takes his sardonic remarks as 
evidence that he does not 'really' want to end 'with the disintegration of your essence in 
a multiplicity' . 
50 There is about his young friend a hidden earnestness which he cannot 
wholly conceal in melancholy. 
The 'young man' had reduced his life to a series of disconnected moments, and 
each moment appears to be an arbitrary choice from a more or less extended set of 
possibilities. But none of these choices really 'matter' to him, so that he remains 
indifferent to the outcome; indeed it is his indifference, and not the specific outcome, 
which he regrets. 'Your choice is an aesthetic choice', he points out, 'but an aesthetic 
choice is no choice'. 51 Ethical choice is quite another matter; 'For me, the moment of 
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choosing is very earnest'. 52 In this 'earnestness' the personality becomes more 
concrete, more fully determined and more sure of itself: 
The choice itself is crucial for the content of the personality: through the choice the 
personality submerges itself in that which is being chosen, and when it does not 
choose, it withers away in atrophy. (Or, p. 163) 
The 'young man's' personality is thus undeveloped because either he does not choose at 
all but plunges unreflectively into immediacy, or he chooses only by 'deliberation', 
holding each possibility away from himself, reviewing each as if it were an external 
object of indeterminate worth, before 'deciding' upon what appears to be the most 
advantageous. But real choice, ethical choice, 'does not depend so much upon 
deliberation as on the baptism of the will' . 
53 
The fundamental ethical choice is not that of good over evil, but the choice 'by 
which one chooses good and evil or rules them out'. In linking the notion of personality 
directly to the act of choosing 'seriously', Judge William makes the personality the first 
fruit of an ethical life. It is the peculiar nature of this activity which he argues is the 
foundation of his claim that the ethical 'contains' the aesthetic; indeed that only in 
relation to the ethical is the aesthetic possible at all. In a somewhat Hegelian 
formulation he writes: 
In choosing itself, the personality chooses itself ethically and absolutely excludes 
the aesthetic; but since he nevertheless chooses himself and does not become 
another being by choosing himself but becomes himself, all the aesthetic returns in 
its relativity. (Or, p. 177) 
This seems to imply that all the particular characteristics that we recognize in ourselves 
and others as comprising their 'personality' are essentially relative and therefore 
aesthetic contents. In being internally related as 'personality' however, these 
characteristics are established through a form which has a universal validity. This is a 
generalisation, in other words, of his argument about marriage. And if the example of 
marriage lacked persuasiveness, this more general formulation will surely catch the 
'young man's' wandering attention. 
The melancholy which is such a feature of the 'young man's' experience is now 
revealed to be a hidden but wilful obstruction to the development of his personality, and 
is a kind of repressed expression of this personality. Indeed, since he seeks enjoyment 
in the transitory and makes of his own life nothing more than a series of 'moments', he 
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continually acts against himself, 'hollowing himself out'. Whether he knows it or not, 
whether he accepts it or not, the 'young man' is in despair, because, quite generally, 
'every aesthetic view of life is despair'. 54 Thus, however exalted his intellectual and 
artistic achievements, he remains undeveloped as a person: 
You continually hover above yourself, but the higher atmosphere, the more refined 
sublimate, into which you are vaporized, is the nothing of despair, and you see 
down below you a multiplicity of subjects, insights, studies, and observations that 
nonetheless have no reality for you but which you very whimsically utilize and 
combine to decorate as tastefully as you can the sumptuous intellectual palace in 
which you occasionally reside. (Or, p. 198) 
In being occasionally absorbed in trifles he is displaying a genuinely aesthetic 
disregard for the reality of his personality. It is not that his melancholic mask 
occasionally slips and his hidden self temporarily makes contact with actual life, it is 
simply that the occasionally 'interesting' is one possibility among every other and so, 
from time to time, may be 'chosen'. 
Yet this despair is already beyond the purely aesthetic, and is therefore, in a sense 
already beyond despair. It is commonplace to despair over some particular 
circumstance, but the 'young man' is already deeper in despair than that, and his friend 
advises him to 'choose despair, then, because despair itself is a choice'. 55 In choosing 
despair, which is 'an expression of the total personality' he will choose himself as a 
personality, or at least as a potential personality, 'in its eternal validity'. 56 A profound 
despair of this kind can become the foundation for an ethical choice of the self, and 
hence of an inner transfiguration of the personality. The 'young man' has advanced to 
the point where his despair lies wholly within himself, his sorrow no longer depends (as 
historically it had in Paganism) upon external conditions. If he were to become 
conscious of choosing this despair, of grasping it ethically, then his potential and hidden 
selthood would, so to speak, rise to the surface and the rich world of actuality would be 
restored to him. And rather than existing 'like a ghost, among the ruins of a world that 
is lost to you anyway', he would become a fully active individual. This choice, 
'penetrates everything and changes it'. 57 It is, again, not a choice of something in 
58 particular, but 'it is the total aesthetic self that is chosen ethically'. 
The ethical self is, unlike the romantic ego, quite specific and individuated. 
Gaining the universal does not mean a loss of specificity. Once again it is only in the 
transfiguration of the aesthetic as an ethical choice that the self comes into full 
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possession of its inner qualifications. He becomes conscious 'as this specific individual 
with these capacities, these inclinations, these drives, these passions, influenced by this 
specific social mileu, as this specific product of a specific environment'. 59 The choice 
of the self, that is to say, is not in the least asocial, it does not isolate the personality in 
some ideal and insubstantial space, but is, rather, the choice of the self in all its 
complex, immediate relations to the world. 'He chooses himself as a product', and as a 
product 'he is squeezed into the forms of actuality', but at the same time the choice 
'transforms everything exterior into interiority'. 60 The self is chosen, finally, as a task, 
as a duty, and actuality becomes a goal as well as a condition of life. 
The fundamental difference between the aesthetic and the ethical , 
'the crux of the 
matter', he claims, 'is that the ethical individual is transparent to himself'. 61 This 
assertion, however, is far from convincingly demonstrated in Judge William's text. 
One of the most striking features of his book-length letters is their 'constant reference' 
to the religious. Nowhere does the ethical stand on its own. Every attempt to establish 
the universal character of the ethical - marriage, personality, connection with the social 
world - leads him directly to the religious as an 'ultimate' source of authority for the 
categories of good and evil. It is clear that he conceives of an unbroken continuity here, 
an 'ethico-religious' rather than a wholly autonomous ethical sphere. His favourite 
expression for the despairing choice of the self - to repent the self - in fact takes a 
religious form. 
We might well imagine the 'young man's' reaction to his friend's heartfelt advice 
(we are told he did not reply in writing or verbally). That as the ethical cannot stand on 
its own but is only a kind of civic arm of the religious, it cannot, in fact, be the 
universal. Nor, of course, can it be interesting, so he will happily ignore all these 
lengthy remarks. He might even argue that as Judge William depends for everything 
upon the religious, then his supposedly more mature conception of reality must be 
equally as fantastic as the aesthetic. 
It must, in fact, be borne in mind that while Or represents a direct communication 
between Judge William and the 'young man', it is something rather different in terms of 
the relation of the reader to either the imagined editor, Victor Eremita, or the actual but 
hidden author, Soren Kierkegaard. However much Or appears to be an ethical view of 
the relation between the aesthetic and the ethical, it remains, from another perspective 
(if we keep Kierkegaard's distant personality in mind), an aesthetic presentation of this 
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same relation. The literary fiction of the pseudonym transposes this internal division 
into a differentiation within the 'aesthetic' sphere. Kierkegaard, in other words, does 
not claim the advantage of occupying some 'neutral' place somehow outside the 
'aesthetic' or the 'ethical' from which vantage point he can 'objectively' describe and 
compare the characteristic experience of life within each. 62 Rather, by adopting two 
pseudonyms, he presents both a view of the aesthetic, and of the difference between the 
aesthetic and the ethical, but does so 'aesthetically'. The 'ethical' as an independent 
category does not really exist within Either/Or, and though an initial reading might 
suggest Judge William's 'views' are supposed to take precedence over the 'young 
man's', the elaborate staging of the encounter, in the end, guarantees that 'the last 
word' lies with the aesthetic. 63 
Exceptional Individuals 
In May of 1843 Kierkegaard left Copenhagen for Berlin. It was his second visit 
there, the first had been in October 1841, when he had stayed for several months to 
attend Schelling's lectures, and where he had written the bulk of Either/Or. The 
'repetition' of this visit coincided with the possibility of an emotional 'repetition' of his 
relation with Regine (one day she had nodded affectionately towards him in church, 
indicating, he believed, a wish for reconciliation). Kierkegaard, again taking literary 
advantage of the occasion, thus bestowed upon another of his 'marionette theatre' of 
pseudonyms, Constantin Constantius, the task of illuminating the psychology of 
repetition. 64 
The existing form of Either/Or lent itself to this purpose. This time a 'young 
man', poetically charged with unhappy love, is the letter writer, and Constantin 
provides a narrative context and analytic framework for their reading. The reader is this 
time provided, at the outset, with the ethical life-view towards which he had struggled 
in the reading of Either/Or. And whereas that earlier work had tried to define as clearly 
as possible two mutually exclusive 'spheres' of existence, Repetition, is focused on the 
transition between them. 
Constantius begins with the claim that '... repetition is a crucial expression for what 
"recollection" was to the Greeks'. 65 Thus, just as Plato had taught that all knowing is a 
recollecting of ideal forms, modern philosophy will teach that all life is a 'repetition'. 66 
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The 'possibility' of experience had emerged in modern philosophy, particularly in 
Hume's scepticism and in Kant's reaction to it, as directly linked to the coherence and 
continuity of the 'self' as a perceiving and active subject. But this continuity itself 
remained mysterious and 'baseless'. The unity of perception seemed to depend on a 
kind of spiritual buoyancy which miraculously kept the 'self' afloat, as it were, on the 
'stream' of time. This hidden act of self-assertion is continually threatened, however, 
by processes of 'atomisation' which break up and fragment all forms of continuity. 67 In 
the Present Age these processes have reached into the innermost aspects of human 
individuality and threaten to break time itself into atomistically conceived 'moments' 
between which the 'self' might simply 'fall' into an abyss of nothingness. The 
possibility of experience depends, then, upon a continually renewed 'leap' from moment 
to moment; balancing, as it were, on the stepping-stones of existence. The 'self is, 
thus, a continuous and inexplicable 'repetition' of itself. This conception of the 
continuity of life in its actuality as a 'repetition' is directly and polemically linked to the 
fashionable nihilism of the modern age. 'What would life be if there were no 
repetition? ', asks Constantin, and answers with a rhetorical flourish, 'Who could want 
to be susceptible to every fleeting thing, the novel, which always enervatingly diverts 
the soul anew? ' 68 The reader of Eitier/Or, of course, is only too well aware that this is 
no rhetorical figure, but the real question mark hanging over modern existence. There 
is nothing 'necessary' in repetition; it is not a 'natural' but a 'spiritual' category and it 
is perfectly conceivable, therefore, that human existence might dissolve into nothing. 
'Aesthetic' immediacy must, at some level, and in spite of its infatuation with the 
fragmented appearance of modern life, undergo its own unconscious form of 
'repetition' . 
The universal, but inexplicable, process of 'repetition' offers, for the 
pseudonymous aesthete a model for the possibility of more strenuous and radical 'leaps' 
of 'self-development'. Aesthetic immediacy, that is to say, contrary to Judge William's 
ill considered strictures, does possess its own thoughtless form of inner-continuity. 
And, therefore, without departing from the aesthetic 'sphere' the individual personality 
might be able to generate a series of less mundane 'repetitions' through which he is 
brought into contact with 'higher' forms of life. This is the foundation for Constantin's 
'poetic' vocation. Like Novalis he views poetry as a form of spiritual 'heightening', 
with which to counteract the 'levelling' tendencies of modern culture. 69 
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The narrative content of Repetition is an imaginative reworking of Kierkegaard's 
engagement story, designed in part perhaps to offer Regine an alternative 'confession' 
of his behaviour. In some sense he wanted to undo the deception of 'The Seducer's 
Diary' which had seemingly confirmed him in his persona as an unscrupulous deceiver, 
and offer a new 'either/or'; either the aesthetic 'exception' of Repetition, or the ethical 
'exception' of Fear and Trembling. 
Constantin befriends another 'young man' who, having fallen passionately in love, 
becomes engaged, and then, almost at once, as a result of his 'melancholic absorption' 
realises that he cannot commit himself to marriage. Constantin advises him to break 
with her by the subterfuge which Kierkegaard had himself adopted. The parallel, 
however, as always, is inexact. Constantin understands that (contrary to Kierkegaard's 
case), 'the young girl was not his beloved: she was the occasion that awakened the 
poetic in him and made him a poet'. 70 And the young man, realizing the real truth of 
their relationship, cannot go through with the ingenious scheme of deception; his soul 
'lacked the elasticity of irony' required of such deception. 7' 
Constantin was convinced by this case that 'repetition' was not possible, that every 
effort to grasp reality, in drawing out new aspects of ourselves, changes us, cancels our 
original intentions, and that, consequently, all existence is really a form of despairing 
recollection. As if to 'prove' his conviction he departs for Berlin in replication of a 
previous visit. He stays in the same lodgings, goes to the same restaurant, and has an 
evening out at the theatre to see again a farce which had greatly amused him on his 
previous visit. But he found that 'the only repetition was the impossibility of a 
repetition. '72 Everything disappoints him, his recollection cannot be relived. 
This is, of course, an aesthetically false conception of 'repetition', and we are not 
meant to be persuaded by Constantin's comic narrative. It is just in providing such an 
obviously fallacious view of his own doctrine that the reader is led to formulate, on his 
own behalf, a more persuasive conception. There is, in fact, nothing didactic in 
Repetition, which is one of Kierkegaard's most alluring maieutic works. The reader 
cannot be a neutral observer, simply eavesdropping on the exchanges between 
Constantin and the 'young man'. It is the reader who constitutes, in his or her own 
reaction to the work, the ethical counterpoint to the aesthetics of repetition. Neither 
Constantin nor the young man have the inner strength to make a repetition, to confront 
actuality in terms of ethical categories, and by doing so regain the 'lost time' of 
123 
immediacy; 'I can circumnavigate myself, proclaims Constantin, 'but I cannot rise 
above myself. I cannot find the Archimedean point. '73 
The young man, plunged into unhappy love, becomes a poet, and from one point of 
view this is certainly a decisive change. It is not, however, a change of the type 
advocated by Judge William. It is experienced as an affliction and not as a self- 
generated transformation. 'Has something happened to me, is not all this something 
that has befallen me? ', he asks in bewilderment, 'Could I anticipate that my whole being 
would undergo a change, that I would become another person'. 74 And the feeling of 
guilt which the incident engenders in him seems more connected with his own self-doubt 
than with any sense of responsibility for the consequences of his actions. The poet 
represents, therefore, a break within, rather than with, the aesthetic. The poetic is just 
another melancholic disguise that in the end fails to disguise melancholy, and what is 
reinforced for the reader is the conviction that this starting point, though not arbitrary, 
is certainly not typical, and that 'beneath' the poetic a whole series of simpler, less 
reflective, and less imaginatively taxing, aesthetic forms characterize modern life. What 
is also reinforced is the inconclusive nature of the exchange in Either/Or. Whatever the 
reader is meant to think, the argument between the young man and Judge William, has 
not been settled. This young man answers back: 
Eventually one grows weary of the incessant chatter about the universal and the 
universal repeated to the point of the most boring insipidity. There are exceptions. 
If they cannot be explained, then the universal cannot be explained either. 
Generally, the difficulty is not noticed because one thinks the universal not with 
passion but with a comfortable superficiality. (Repetition, p. 227) 
Kierkegaard had planned a different ending to Repetition. In his poetic despair at 
being unable to marry the young man commits suicide. But then he received news of 
Regine's marriage to Johan Schlegel, and allowed the young man, if not himself, to 
declare 'I am myself again'. But he is restored to himself fortuitously; a kind of 
accidental salvation, the only kind to which the aesthetic individual, who lives at the 
mercy of chance, leaves himself open. 
The reader is left, not to draw a conclusion, but to sense the power of repetition 
within himself or herself. More than Constantin or the young man, the reader occupies 
a position of continuity and stability. And it is the reader, thus, who is the real focal 
point of this eccentric literary work. Only the reader can grasp 'actuality and the 
earnestness of existence', as a repetition; as a continuous process in which they are 
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vitally implicated. 75 He suggests, in fact, that 'repetition proper is what has mistakenly 
been called mediation. 76 76 Repetition is a 'category' of existence, not of thought alone, 
and although existence does not form itself into a neatly self-enclosed system of 
categories, it does possess a glue-like continuity which, when it becomes part of our 
own experience, he terms repetition. The notion of repetition, at once more 
philosophical and less moralistic than the central ethical category of 'choice' which had 
been Judge William's only dialectical weapon, presents a somewhat different view of 
the boundaries of the aesthetic. The possibility of a 'leap' from the aesthetic to the 
religious, by implication at least, is considered. Constantin's love affair would not have 
turned out differently had he summoned the will to live earnestly and accepted universal 
categories. Rather, in being transformed into a poet, the possibility of another, saving, 
transformation beyond that (independently of all ethical 'development), is tentatively 
raised: 'If he had had a deeper religious background, he would not have become a poet', 
Constantin assures us, 'then everything would have gained a religious meaning' . 
7" But 
such a possibility seems, for the time being, to be closed off. Even as it is, however, 
the poet represents an 'exception', not simply as a type within the aesthetic sphere, but, 
more significantly, is an exception to the ethical sphere as such. 
While Repetition deals with the 'exception' from an aesthetic standpoint, the idea 
of an 'exception' viewed ethically is the central theme of Fear and Trembling, which 
was published simultaneously with Repetition. 
The central issue of this work is the possibility of a 'teleological suspension of the 
ethical'. Can there be, beyond the ethical, a new and higher immediacy? The ethical is 
viewed by Judge William as the human universal, a social morality. And Johannes de 
Silentio, the author of Fear and Trembling, agrees with him in accepting that, in 
relation to the aesthetic, the task of the individual is to annul his or her private and 
personal wishes, and realize themselves more fully within universal categories. 
However, if there were nothing 'higher' than this social morality, then all spiritual 
categories would be included in or deducible from, Greek philosophy. But if 
Christianity has introduced something of real spiritual worth into the world then it 
cannot be expressed in terms of this merely social morality. Nor can it be 
comprehended in terms of universal, rational concepts. 78 
Johannes de Silentio illustrates his central idea by an extended discussion of the 
story of Abraham. His willingness to sacrifice his son is a terrifying example of faith. 
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'I cannot think myself into Abraham', declares the author. 79 There is something 
incommensurable between such a faith and any humanly rational or moral concept. 
From a human point of view Abraham's action, or rather the preparation for his action, 
is wholly unjustifiable. The incomprehensibility of Abraham brings the reader 'to an 
awareness of the dialectical struggle of faith and its gigantic passion'. 80 Abraham's 
faith saves him; through it he regains his original world, but in order to have his son 
restored to him he has to be willing to lose him, willing himself to kill him. This 
destroys any cosy image of religious faith as a consoling and comfortable companion to 
life's smaller problems. And the author, though capable of the 'infinite resignation' 
which precedes it, admits that, personally, he cannot 'make the movement of faith', he 
cannot 'shut my eyes and plunge confidently into the absurd'. 81 Faith is no 'aesthetic 
emotion', it is not 'the spontaneous inclination of the heart but the paradox of 
existence'. 82 
We cannot learn from Abraham's example, we can only be bewildered, and it 
would be foolish to attempt to 'suck worldly wisdom out of the paradox'. 83 The 
understanding is helpless just because, properly speaking, it belongs to the ethical 
sphere. It is a human universal, and cannot make sense of the exception. Yet the 
'knight of faith' does not strike anyone as a peculiar, or eccentric individual, in the way 
in which they might be struck by an aesthetically exceptional individual. The knight of 
faith, in regaining immediacy in the higher form of faith, 'enjoys everything he sees', 
and everything he does is 'with the assiduousness that marks the worldly man who is 
attached to such things'. 84 
The ethical is the universal, but faith is the paradox 'that the single individual is 
higher than the universal'. 85 Abraham acts 'by virtue of the absurd', and neither from 
calculation, or in conformity to a universally binding norm. It is not that he claims a 
'higher' ethical duty, and legitimates his action, or intention, by reference to this, 
secret, obligation. Abraham himself recognises his action puts him outside of the 
universal and ethical, and places him in a position of terrifying solitariness. We should 
not be misled by the outcome of the story, that Isaac was restored to him, does not draw 
him hack, so to speak, into the ethical. For Johannes de Silentio the central point of the 
story is the anxiety, the suffering, the terrible isolation, of Abraham's faith. There is 
no one to advise him, and 'no one understands him'. 
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Fear and Trembling is, thus, a compelling rejection of the basic tendency of 
modern ethical thought from Kant to Hegel. The progressive absorption of the notion 
of human obligation within a universal moral order destroys the specific character of 
religious life as faith. In this sense the young man of Either is a spiritually more lively 
figure than Judge William of Or. The latter is so stuck in a rational social ethics that, 
finding it is not a self-supporting edifice, he draws religion into its mundane 
qualification rather than drawing himself out into faith. 
Johanne de Silentio advances an important distinction between the universal and the 
absolute. While in faith there is an absolute duty to the absolute, in the ethical there is 
an absolute duty to the universal. The first wholly involves the person's specificity as 
an individual, the latter involves the person's universality as a human being. This is a 
distinction which his religiously more mature pseudonymous colleagues were to develop 
at some length. Yet however different Repetition and Fear and Trembling appear to be, 
they share a common aesthetic form, and remain essentially 'aesthetic' works. Just as, 
for the aesthetic, the ethical can have no real existence, so for both Constantin 
Constantius and Johannes de Silentio religion is represented aesthetically, and appears 
fantastic. 
The Spheres of Existence 
The inter-related elements of the pseudonymous works can be more clearly grasped 
by going forward to the comprehensive (but still highly allusive) work, Stages On Life's 
way. 
This collection of 'Studies by Various Persons' is an even more fragmented work 
than Either/Or. Kierkegaard contrives to introduce additional pseudonymous authors, 
varies the method of 'psychological construction' (experimenting), with more 
conventional ethical discourses, and narrative sections, interrupting both with digressive 
commentaries attributed to yet other writers. In form at least it is wholly an aesthetic 
work, modelled in part on Plato's Symposium But just as, in some respects, Repetition 
can be seen as the young man's response to Or, so the Stages develops in a different 
way and to a dizzying point of refinement, a series of 'replies' to Constantin 
Constantius's 'new category' of repetition. 
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The problem with living aesthetically has by this point resolved itself into the 
impossibility of gaining a repetition. To live immediately is, in fact, to thrust 
immediacy into the inaccessible regions of recollection. The continuity of actuality is 
fragmented and arbitrarily restructured according to a whim, only to break down and 
reform itself according to a succeeding whim. The narrator of the first major section of 
Stages, William Afham, is not convinced by this. He remains a staunch defender of 
'recollection', which is, he claims, a kind of spiritual power that has very little to do 
with the functionally operating memory. The memory merely preserves events so that 
they might 'receive the consecration of recollection'. 86 Recollection, far more 
significantly, preserves the sense of unity which is fundamental to personal experience. 
For him the idea of repetition is unconvincing just because this unity cannot find itself 
in the immediate unfolding of events, but must be retrospectively constructed; 
'Recollection wants to maintain for a person the eternal continuity in life and assure him 
that his earthly existence maintains uno Lenore (uninterrupted), one breath, and 
expressible in one breath'. 87 Thus, while memory is accidental, 'only the essential can 
be recollected', and the essential is the hidden inwardness of personality, the conditions 
for which ethical writers had wrongly believed to be their unique discovery. 88 
This is an altogether more highly 'developed' form of the aesthetic. By making 
recollection, rather than immediacy, its essential category Afham hopes to reclaim 
personal existence for the aesthetic, and rescue it from the priggishness of Judge 
William. His task is not to grasp the present in its immediacy, but, in order to become 
' contemporaneous' with its actuality, to 'conjure away the present'. 89 To demonstrate 
his thesis, that actuality can be aesthetically preserved (and only aesthetically 
preserved), he organizes a banquet, which he afterwards recollects and reports to his 
readers. 
What he recollects, however, is a caricature, or a series of caricatures, ostensibly 
offered by each of his guests in turn as they are asked to talk on the nature of erotic 
love. Each chooses an aesthetic category through which to 'represent' woman. For the 
'young man' (presumably the author of Either) it is contradiction, the incommensurable 
antithesis between reflective thought and the irrational 'choice' of love. The choice of 
love is genuinely incomprehensible, and from this he claims that 'love is just an 
imaginary construction'. 90 Worse, it is 'essentially nothing at all, for not a single 
antecedent criterion can be stated' . 
91 And as, for him, thought is everything he falls 
into the self-delusion of believing he can simply renounce love. Constantin, having 
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abandoned the quest for repetition, regards woman under the category of jest, which he 
claims to be an 'embryonic ethical category'. 92 Pretending to ethical earnestness he 
argues that as man exists 'absolutely' and to express the 'absolute', while woman exists 
in finite and changing forms, there is no possibility of a genuine relation between them. 
Woman is an incomplete man to which man ties himself; and in subordinating himself to 
her whims, denies his own nature. Victor Eremita, the editor of Either/Or, describes 
woman as a mixed and 'fantastic' creature, as 'giddiness'. She is, like the age in which 
she lives, 'an abstraction that means everything', in relation to which he prefers to be a 
'concretion that means something'. 93 These previously encountered aesthetic authors 
are joined by a Fashion Designer, who confirms the contemporary relevance of women 
to the aesthetic sphere of existence, and seeks to exploit it; 'if woman has reduced 
everything to fashion, then I will use fashion to prostitute her as she deserves' . 
94 The 
final speaker is Johannes the Seducer who claims that 'trying to conceive the idea of 
woman is like gazing into a sea of misty shapes continually forming and reforming... 
only a workshop of possibilities'. 95 But, of course, 'for the devotee of erotic love this 
possibility is the eternal source of infatuation'. 96 
These terse and varied aesthetic exaggerations, a kind of misogynistic embodiment, 
each more perfect than the last, of all the reflective tendencies of the Present Age, 
creates a somewhat different effect to the literary fireworks of Either. Not only are a 
variety of aesthetic views exemplified (rather than one aesthetic view exemplified by 
variety), but, as if anticipating the ethical rebuttal, each portrays 'woman' and the 
possibilities of romantic love inherent in relation to her, as a self-created image. 
Immediacy begins to take on the character of a previously chosen 'self', and the 
aesthetic sphere rather than exist only as the mirror to fortuitous and changing 
circumstances, is posited as a freely chosen possibility expressive, in some sense, of a 
consistent inner selfhood. 
The rebuttal, by 'A Married Man', however, does not simply repeat Judge 
William's aesthetic defence of marriage. That earlier argument is included here, but is 
superseded by a rather different and a more general position. 
Just as the exponents of the aesthetic, in conformity with the tendencies of the age, 
have developed a progressively more 'inward' view of themselves, so the 'Married 
Man' transfers the external and institutional aspects of Judge Williams defence, into the 
subjectivity of 'resolution'. Marriage, thus, takes up the erotic and preserves its 
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immediacy in the decisive resoluteness of a new relation; 'the most immediate of all 
immediacies must also be the fiercest resolution'. 97 And resolution is not simply a 
consequence or an aspect of erotic love, but must be formed simultaneously with love's 
proper development. Marriage, thus, is 'a synthesis of love and resolution'. 98 
The intense resoluteness that is required to hold on to erotic love and thereby gain 
the 'immediacy that carries a person through life' is not the same as ethical earnestness. 
Resolution is itself a synthesis, a synthesis of reflection and passion, 'without passion 
one never arrives at any resolution'. 99 And it is passion which grasps and preserves 
immediacy. Where Judge William had been obliged to call upon the authority of the 
religious to support the universality of his ethical categories, the 'Married Man' 
acknowledges that the fundamental truth of marriage is that it is an expression of 
passion, which is in itself a 'higher' form of immediacy. In this perspective religion 
becomes a 'new immediacy', rather than a continuation or development of an ethical 
life-view. And marriage becomes just one form in which it may be expressed. The 
ethical, thus, becomes a kind of intermediary, within which forms of life are ideally 
organized according to a rational and universal order, and receive their life-giving 
energy from both the aesthetic sphere 'beneath' it and the religious sphere 'above' it. 
Kierkegaard is still writing within an essentially aesthetic (pseudonymous) mode allows 
the Married Man to speculate that marriage may not be, after all, the highest form of 
life. Following the aesthetic theory outlined in relation to Mozart's Don Giovanni, he 
points out that 'to find the true concretion for the religious is not easy'. loo Could there 
be a form of life, in other words, which as perfectly expresses the higher immediacy of 
the religious, as Mozart's opera captures everything that is essential to music? 
Whatever the answer might be, and the issue is left for the moment unresolved, the 
weakness of a purely ethical view has been admitted. All fundamental issues seem to 
amount to a conflict between an aesthetic and a religious view of life. 
This opens the way for yet another reworking of the broken engagement theme. In 
another manuscript 'discovered' by Frater Taciturnus a third 'young man' ponders the 
causes of his unhappy love. And while he titles his reflections 'Guilty' /'Not Guilty', 
this is clearly not an ethical discourse. 'I was no fantasizer', he tells us, distinguishing 
himself from the 'young man' of Either. He could not believe that his life depended 
upon her becoming his, 'I had too many religious presuppositions for that'. He states 
his dilemma with the brevity of the 'Diapsalmata'; 'I marry her, or I do not marry at 
all' 101 
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The obstacle to marriage, shorn of all aesthetic self-deception, turns upon his own 
'primordial depression'. Melancholy has made him deceptive, and he can say in all 
truthfulness, 'I am never entirely who I am'. He is capable of astonishing feats of self- 
concealment; 'My cunning is that I am able to hide my depression; my deception is just 
as cunning as my depression is deep. '102 There is, he acknowledges, a certain pride in 
this 'deep and secret sorrow', but as he is unable to overcome this pride, and free 
103 himself of it, he cannot 'destroy by initiating her into my sufferings'. 
This story of 'quiet despair' is perhaps the most perfect expression Kierkegaard 
was able to give to his own 'inclosing reserve'. It is a despair he now recognises to be 
an inextricable element of his relationship to his father. This unhappy love could not 
have been resolved by a more determined effort of the will, as it might have been for the 
first 'young man'. He is convinced he could not have acted differently, for everything 
had flowed from 'the interior truth of my passion'. 104 The failed love, in this instance, 
precipitates a profound 'collision' with the religious sphere. A year after the 
engagement he writes; 'I do not recognise myself... it is not with Eros that I must 
los struggle. It is religious crises that are gathering over me'. 
The religious stands before him as a possibility. But while his loved one can, with 
unaffected simplicity, effortlessly grasp the religious he is plagued by a truly Faustian 
gift for reflectiveness. Truly an 'epigram of the age' in him reflection, 'is utterly 
inexhaustible', and the unquenched longing of thought continually rises as a barrier 
between himself and the faith within which the terrible contradictions of his existence 
could be borne. He is forced to admit that 'I am really no religious individuality; I am 
just a regular and perfectly constructed possibility of such a person'. 106 He cannot 
emulate either her naive religiosity or the exceptional faith of Abraham: 
As possibility, I am all right, but when at the turning point I want to appropriate 
the religious prototype (Fforbilleder), I encounter a philosophical doubt that I 
would not express to one single person ... I cannot understand the paradigm at all. (Stages, P. 258) 
Yet he will not console himself with the thought that his inability to marry is connected 
with some reckless and radical impulse infecting his mind. 
This psychologically impasse is finally broken by his devaluation of his loved one, 
'the trouble is that she has no religious presuppositions at all'. 107 She is 'absorbed in 
her illusion' and, therefore, unreachable. He conceives of her, instead, as a kind of 
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spiritual trial essential to his own inner development. He argues that 'when God speaks 
he uses the person to whom he is speaking, he speaks to the person through the person 
himself. 108 The extremity of the aesthetic is finally reached in this purely aesthetic 
conception of the religious, in which all self-awareness becomes a secret conversation 
with God, and all external relations are reduced to being the medium of this empty 
dialogue; 'God uses the very dialectical power of the person involved precisely against 
this person himself'. 1°9 
From this lofty aestheticism he can declare with perfect equanimity that 'the world 
wants to be deceived'. I 10 He has reached the conclusion that 'I benefit a person most by 
deceiving him'. III Yet, just as he cannot pierce the veil of his own dialectical skill and 
gain the religious, he cannot sustain the isolation of this radical aestheticism. 'I have 
become a prisoner in the appearance I wanted to conjure up', he complains, admitting 
his continuing need for others, 'whatever I do -I cannot make myself comprehensible 
to any human being'. 112 Rather than make the 'progression' from the aesthetic to the 
ethical and thence to the religious; he has never really left the aesthetic and as a result 
has become more and more detached from actuality: 
My idea was to structure my life ethically in my innermost being and to conceal 
this inwardness in the form of deception. Now I am forced even further back into 
myself; my life is religiously structured and is so far back in inwardness that I have 
difficulty in making my way to actuality. (Stages, p. 351) 
Frater Taciturnus in his 'Letter to the Reader' comments on the young man's 
manuscript rather as Judge William had on Either. This serves to reinforce the doctrine 
of despair. But this obstacle to happiness, when rightly grasped, becomes the unique 
opportunity to gain happiness. His inclosing reserve, therefore, 'is neither more nor 
less than the condensed anticipation of the religious subjectivity'. If, that is to say, 
melancholy is 'uncaused sorrow', can it not be transformed inwardly into 'senseless 
happiness'? 
Taciturnus provides a clear summary statement, not simply of the variety of the 
Stages On Life's Way, but of the entire structure of the aesthetic writings: 
There are three existence-spheres: the aesthetic, the ethical, the religious. The 
metaphysical is abstraction, and there is no human being who exists 
metaphysically. The metaphysical, the ontological, is (er), but it does not exist (er 
ikke till), for when it exists it does so in the aesthetic, in the ethical, in the 
religious, and when it is, it is the abstraction from or a prius (something prior) to 
the aesthetic, the ethical, the religious. The ethical sphere is only a transition 
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sphere, and therefore its highest expression is repentance as a negative action. The 
aesthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of requirement 
(and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt), the 
religious the sphere of fulfilment, but, please note, not a fulfilment such as when 
one fills an alms box or a sack with gold, for repentance has specifically created a 
boundless space, and as a consequence the religious contradiction: simultaneously 
to be out on 70,000 fathoms of water and yet be joyful. (Stages, pp. 350-51) 
If the 'theory of the stages' is identified as 'Kierkegaard's thought', rather than the 
complex of relations generated within the aesthetic, then it is difficult to avoid turning 
Kierkegaard into a Hegelian. The 'spheres' then become ordered according to a 
developmental scheme, driven by a process of aufheben, in which the lower is preserved 
in being elevated into a new higher relation. Then, however much the irreducible 
freedom of the 'leap' is stressed, the pseudonymous writings, on this view, appear to be 
a psychological recasting of Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit. 113 But, if their 
pseudonymity is seen as central to their meaning, then these same works can be read as 
demonstrating the modern tendency towards the progressive 'aestheticization' of 
experience. It is aesthetic immediacy, undergoing a series of self-generated internal 
transformations, which creates the illusion of 'movement' into 'higher' and more 
developed stages. 114 But all stages, in reality, remain aesthetic stages, and the aesthetic 
pseudonyms become trapped in a process of 'experimenting' in which they are in fact 
drawn farther and farther away from 'actuality'. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BETWEEN EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE: 
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIGRESSION 
The method of beginning with doubt in order to philosophize seems as appropriate 
as having a soldier slouch in order to get him to stand erect. 
Soren Kierkegaard - Journals, 1: 775 
As a new expression, anxiety is to designate basically the discrimen (ambiguity) of 
soft subjectivity. 
Soren Kierkegaard - Journals, 1: 98 
The aesthetic works presented a formidable diversity of character types, who, in terms 
of the inner consistency of their respective life-views, communicated the distinctive 
features of the possible 'existence-spheres' open to the citizen of the Present Age. The 
'aesthetic', conceiving of life as nothing other than a pursuit of pleasure, and the 
' ethical', which subordinates all immediacy to pursuit of the good, seemed to be 
profoundly different, and even incompatible forms of personal existence. But neither 
position is stable, and neither includes within itself a self-propelling means of 
transcending its own limitations. Every aesthetic possibility quickly loses its tension 
and returns the 'young men' who are its exponents, to a state of boredom, and equally, 
each ethical endeavour ends in the consciousness of failure and guilt. 
From outside itself each 'sphere' might appear to be filled with an alluring 
plenitude of human potentiality. The 'ethical' may seem to be a lofty and ideal 
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existence for the despairing but sensitive aesthete, and for the genuinely ethical 
individual, the aesthetic beckons as a world of limitless, satisfying possibilities. 
Curiously, it is when viewed exclusively within the perspective of their own spheres 
that each in turn is rendered unreal, insubstantial and evanescent. The aesthetic 
'moment' vanishes before the hand that reaches out to grasp the pleasure it seemed to 
promise, and the ideal, in the act of self-realization, loses itself in the vagueness of 
undefined religious categories or falls back into just another, arbitrary, and thus 
aesthetic, choice. 
Beyond this Either/Or the presence of a 'religious' sphere makes itself known, 
firstly as a somewhat vague intuition that the renounced aesthetic might be recovered in 
a 'higher immediacy', and then as 'the absolute' which lies at the heart of any real 
ethical decision. But there is no 'short-cut' out of melancholy; we cannot move directly 
into the religious sphere. Indeed it is the persistence of melancholy which is the most 
convincing sign that we have not yet left the 'aesthetic'. The 'leap' into the ethical 
discloses only another version of the aesthetic. Subordination of life under ethical 
categories is just one of the possibilities contained within the aesthetic. If the 'religious' 
sphere were to be elaborated by the pseudonyms simply by extension, by a 'repetition' 
of a qualitatively similar 'leap' to that bridging the aesthetic and the ethical, we would, 
once again, fall back into the aesthetic. The 'religious sphere' must be approached 
from a different perspective. The religious is nothing other than a 'transition' itself, so 
that it cannot be surmounted in a single, if endlessly repeated, 'leap', but consists in the 
interstitial 'non-moment' of repetition itself. The 'transition' becomes, as it were, a 
'stage' or 'sphere' of existence in its own right. It does not, therefore, have the 
'finished' appearance of the aesthetic or the ethical spheres, but remains a continuously 
undisclosed striving. 
Dimensions of Actuality 
In order to grasp, both reflectively and practically, the 'actuality' of this transition 
personal existence must be viewed as a simultaneous movement along two separate 
dimensions. The aesthetic works, and their ethical after-image, describe the 
possibilities of movement along what might be termed the 'horizontal' axis of existence; 
they are concerned with the progressive discovery of differences inherent in the 
fragmented and illusory character of the Present Age. But as the aesthetic takes the 
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Present Age as 'given' it generates an illusory sequence of unreal changes rather than a 
development within 'actuality' itself. Even where it appears to 'escape' the restrictive 
'bourgeois-philistinism' of everyday conventions, it constructs for itself a variety of 
unreal self-possibilities which are, in fact, so many fantastic 'potentiations' of that very 
same 'bourgeois-philistinism'. To grasp 'actuality', the actual must in fact be 
transformed. And to establish the 'self' depends upon 'departing' from the given 
elements of immediacy in such a way that, in returning to them, they become 
reconstructed, illuminating previously obscured possibilities. To 'grasp' actuality is, 
simultaneously, to undergo a 'repetition' in which the 'inner-world' of the self and the 
' outer-world' of the Present Age become mutually developed. However, in the context 
of the Present Age all 'departures' from the surface of modern life must be in one of 
two directions; 'outwards' towards the infinite world of 'objects', or 'inwards' towards 
the inexhaustibly replenished interior of the human 'subject'. Thus, in spite of its 
'levelling' an adequate understanding of modern life requires a consideration of the 
'vertical' as well as the 'horizontal' dimensions of experience. 
This consideration further complicates the theory of the 'stages'. Thus, quite apart 
from the independent validity or otherwise of the 'ethical' and the 'religious', some of 
the pseudonyms disclose different 'levels' of reality which accompany and surround 
each stage with a ghostly shadow. This penumbra of existence, though falling outside 
of the sphere of 'actuality' is perfectly 'real' and qualifies every available possibility of 
selfhood. 
The 'aesthetic' writers conflate these 'non-existence' spheres with 'actuality' itself. 
This is, in fact, typical of the Present Age, which is both 'reflective' and 'romantic'. 
An insufficiently critical position in relation to the contemporary world, that is to say, 
leads to the 'aesthetic' illusions typical of the first pseudonymous phase of the 
authorship. In some respects these 'young men' seem to be characteristic of either 
Romanticism or Hegelianism. But both Romantics and Hegelians, in different ways, 
sought to unite 'object' and 'subject' in an infinitude or in an absolute that lay, by 
definition, wholly outside of actuality. They sought, that is, to escape the 'shallowness' 
of modernity by acts of self-elevation. But the pseudonyms, though rejecting the 
'bourgeois-philistinism' of the crowd, sought, above all, to preserve actuality in all its 
immediate relations. Yet, in attempting to 'purify' their aesthetic visions they 
inadvertently 'escaped' the determinateness of any 'existence-sphere'. In place of the 
deceptive imagery of 'object' and 'subject' a number of pseudonyms introduced a 
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modern version of traditional Christian anthropology in which 'actuality' appears as the 
middle term between what are in effect two 'non-existence spheres'. Thus, 'hovering' 
above actuality is a realm of 'pure' thought, and 'sunk' beneath it a domain of 'pure' 
sensuousness. 
In order to follow the development of the 'non-existence' spheres in the 
pseudonyms it is helpful to draw on one of the later formulations of 'actuality' as 
'selfhood'; that provided by Anti-Climacus in The Sickness Unto Death. This author 
describes the self a synthesis; a synthesis of time and eternity, finite and infinite, 
necessity and possibility. Those disparate terms taken together define two 'non- 
existence' spheres which might be spatially represented as a vertical structure extending 
both 'above' and 'below' the synthesized elements which make up the content of 
immediate experience. Anti-Climacus has, in effect, rejected all forms of dualism, in 
which 'mind' and 'body' must remain hermetically sealed off from each other, in favour 
of a more flexible, and realistic, 'body-soul-spirit' schema. 
The infinite/eternal/possible is the sphere of 'pure' thought, and more particularly, 
for the pseudonyms it is represented by the philosophical system of Hegel. Speculative 
metaphysics, which is itself the culmination of a long tradition of western thought which 
began with the misrepresentation of Socratic irony as a form of abstraction, appears to 
have 'escaped' from the constraints of actuality, and to have been liberated into an 
ethereal realm in which it can freely and indefinitely expand in conformity with an 
autonomous and inner principle of its own. The content of this realm is made up 
entirely of abstract concepts, and pure relations, detached as it were from empirical 
contingencies. Each term becomes defined, then, in terms of its position within a 
system of similar, and similarly abstract, concepts or 'categories'. The 'system' once 
complete is self-perpetuating and internally self-referential. Its inner principle is 
'mediation'. That is to say there are no discrete breaks or 'gaps' in its internal 
relations. From any arbitrarily chosen starting point the mind can be led to any other 
concept within the system through the repeated application of a limited number of 
simple rules. There is in principle no 'other' category within the system, no alien 
'substance' lurking so to speak, in an out-of-the-way-corner closed off from immediate 
inspection. If the aim of philosophy is the construction of such a system of pure 
categories then, for the pseudonyms, this has been Hegel's great achievement. ' 
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'Beneath' actuality there lies another 'non-existence' sphere constituted by the 
finite/necessary/temporal. This might be termed the realm of 'pure' sensuousness. At 
first sight this seems to play a far less prominent role in the thought in the 
pseudonymous writings. Compared to the extensive writings of both Johannes 
Climacus and his philosophical twin Anti-Climacus which bear directly on the domain 
of abstraction, only one work The Concept of Anxiety is related directly to the domain of 
pure sensuousness. However, just as, throughout the aesthetic and ethical writings 
abstraction is continually present as a limiting condition of actuality, so sensuousness 
makes its brooding presence felt as a perpetual undertow to the entire pseudonymous 
production. 
The sensuous, like abstraction, is continuous and undivided. It is a world of 
material forms continually flowing into and out of each other. Its inner principle is, 
ultimately, death; the monistic telos of all organic transformation. But, immediately, it 
is vibrant with metamorphoses, and with appetite. The continuous restless movement of 
the sensuous is a sign of its inner incompleteness, its perpetual want, continually 
renewed, which flows through the entire diversity of its forms. Sensuousness is 
perpetual and aimless movement; its inner divisions meaningless transformations of the 
same underlying insufficiency of substance. 
Johannes might be seen as reworking the traditionally conceived Christian tripartite 
division, of soul, flesh (body), and spirit, in an effort to combat modern philosophical 
trends which seek to dissolve reality into the abstraction of pure thought , or the equally 
abstract non-existence of 'matter' or 'substance'. Of course anthropological 
assumptions had been central to the development of the Christian tradition without there 
emerging any very clear consensus as to the meaning and proper usage of its basic 
terms. And within the pseudonymous works themselves, the usage of these terms, as 
with all others, varies with the 'point of view of the author'. In particular, from an 
aesthetic standpoint, both the ideality of pure thought, and the 'romance' of 
sensuousness are ennobled to a greater 'reality' than existence itself. Furthermore, a 
specifically Christian anthropology had, from the beginning interacted with Aristotelian, 
Platonic and Judaic variants of each of its main components. However, although no 
orthodoxy had been established, a broad distinction between religious/theological 
'tripartite' and secular/philosophical 'dualistic' anthropological assumptions can be 
made. The fundamental difference, for the philosophically most sophisticated of the 
pseudonyms, Anti-Climacus, between the two traditions lies in the fact that for the 
147 
'tripartite' theory human existence is not simply a relation between two fundamentally 
different kinds of reality (mind and body, or soul and body), but is a 'relation that 
relates itself to itself'. 2 And this 'third term' constitutes a fundamentally new reality 
whose characteristics cannot simply be deduced from the nature of elements brought 
together in the initial synthesis. 
In this view, in particular, the Cartesian distinction of mind and body is not a 
sufficient foundation for the description of any meaningful human experience. 3 In fact 
Descartes' project of 'pure thought' turned modern philosophers away from that portion 
of reality which comes to life in the actuality of a living person. All modern 
metaphysical systems, and more generally all modern secular thought which embodies 
within it the conceit of reason, is not so much mistaken, as, by virtue of suppressing all 
personal qualifications of thought, simply uninteresting. Descartes, thus, reports in the 
'first meditation' that he only began to philosophize when he could withdraw himself 
from the normal cares of life. 4 Reason, in the sense of a system of concepts which 
serves as a medium for reflection, can be perfectly harmonious, non-contradictory, and 
exhaustive of itself; but it can be so only by pretense of deserting its 'natural' home; by 
ignoring the limitations and contradictions of the actuality which makes up all human 
existence, including itself. Similarly all modern materialism, though Johannes Climacus 
seems to think this hardly worth discussing, falls beneath the interesting and is a kind of 
perverse representation of sensuousness as an ideal and universal system of causes. 
Spinoza, rather than Hobbes, might be taken in this context as the exemplary exponent 
of a strict monism of substance. The variety of inner forms is reduced to being aspects 
of a single substance, which can be mirrored in thought as a simple category from 
which all others can be generated at will (or rather generate themselves however much 
we might wish to put a to stop them). 5 
Idea and substance mirror each other in their perfection, their purity, and in their 
non-involvement with the humanly interesting realm of actuality. We cannot experience 
'pure ideality' or 'pure sensuousness'. The 'young man' of Either admitted as much in 
viewing music as the only immediately available form of the 'sensuous-erotic'. Both 
ideality and sensuousness are wholly 'abstract', and the process of 'departing' from 
actuality is referred to by the pseudonyms as a process of 'abstraction'. It is 
commonplace to view thought as a process of 'abstraction', but pure sensuousness, it is 
important to note, is just as far removed from the possibility of immediate experience. 
In a text neglected by the pseudonyms (they are frequently too polemical to give their 
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opponents a fair hearing) Hegel also draws attention to this; for him also sensuousness 
only has human significance when it is formed and penetrated by spirit. Art, thus, 'by 
means of its representations, while remaining within the sensuous sphere, liberates man 
at the same time from the power of sensuousness. ' 6 And what is required for artistic 
representation is, for the pseudonyms, required for actuality in general, a 'sensuous 
presence which indeed should remain sensuous, but liberated from the scaffolding of its 
purely material nature'. 7 
Yet actual human existence is composed of nothing but such 'abstractions', 
qualified and synthesized as 'spirit'. For Johannes Climacus, then, the specific 
character of actuality is its mode of integration of idea and substance, which otherwise 
fall apart into diverse and opposed realms. 'Spirit' combines ideas and substance in 
particular ways, and holds them together, to form that particular segment of being we 
call personal experience. 
To find more specific ways of relating forms of 'non-existence' to the sphere of 
actuality is the particular concern of Johannes Climacus and Vigilius Haufniensis. Once 
again, however, the way is barred, or at least forces the reader through numerous 
diversions. Neither 'pure' thought nor 'pure' sensuousness are of interest to Johannes 
Climacus or his colleagues. The authorship, on this at least, is united. The many 
polemical remarks aimed at Hegel's philosophy, and more especially at its Danish 
theological practitioners, should not mislead the reader into believing that the 
Philosophical Fragments, or the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, is a philosophical 
work, if by philosophy is meant any general system of concepts through which 'reality', 
in its entirety, might be represented. We are presented, rather, with a highly self- 
conscious criticism of such philosophical ambitions. And while most philosophers 
begin by denouncing the entire western tradition of philosophy only to reconstruct it in 
their own terms, Climacus has no ambition to incorporate or assimilate previous 
philosophical endeavours to his own point of view. In fact his point of view does not 
depend upon arriving at speculative, or logical 'conclusions'. He renounces 
metaphysics, therefore, not as a preparatory device, or piece of self-aggrandisement, but 
as part of a serious effort to recover from philosophy what rightly belongs to life. 
He begins with doubt, therefore, not in the Cartesian sense, or in the sense in 
which Descartes most frequently interpreted, as the beginning of a speculative dialectic, 
but as an active and practical reflection upon experience. He cannot renounce thought, 
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but neither should thought renounce experience. In doubt, he sees 'actual' thought, 
rather than empty abstraction. Doubt refers to a kind of indeterminate, intermediary 
'zone', between a determinate state of actuality and the absolute freedom of abstraction. 
In doubt there is a kind of continuous oscillation into and out of actuality. It has an 
elastic quality of resistance, and a lack of transparency which is quite unlike the perfect 
fluidity of pure thought. Doubt departs from actuality only to return to it, enriching it 
with fresh qualifications. 
Similarly, beneath actuality, sensuousness transforms itself in mute 
incomprehensible self-absorption. We cannot directly experience 'sensuousness' any 
more than we can directly experience any other pure category. That is why it cannot be 
readily represented, and why the pure ideality of thought and the pure materiality of 
sensuousness, though absolutely distinct, can frequently 'stand-for' one another. 
Where experience is oriented towards the sensuous (rather than the ideal), dipping into 
the sensuous and returning to itself, we experience anxiety (as distinct from doubt), or 
as an earlier translation of Vigilius Haufniensis' work expressed it, dread. 
Doubt and dread are the penumbra of existence, the soft and muffled intermediary 
zones between existence and non-existence. The 'vertical' division of reality is thus 
marked by a distinctive 'logic' of its own. There is, even more clearly than in the 
divisions into horizontal 'spheres', no hierarchical ordering involved here. The norm of 
existence is, so to speak, the middle term rather than the extremes which depart from it 
in either direction. Even more significantly, the boundaries along this dimension are 
much less precise. There is no void or abyss dividing them. The blurring and merging 
of boundaries (so unexpected in the light of everything that is well known of 
Kierkegaard) denotes a continuous interchange; a perpetual traffic from one zone to 
another. Yet the task of existence is to set and maintain distinctions, and to reject as 
invalid incursions into the sphere of actuality. Actuality, that is to say, in becoming 
itself, in establishing itself as actual, draws into itself the elements of non-existence 
which lie on either side of its specific 'range', while simultaneously resisting the 
temptation to empty itself into either of its component elements. And the task of 
existence is to develop, through the continuous assimilation of what lies beyond it, the 
specific characteristics of individuality. The discontinuous leaps of the personality, the 
real growth of individuality, expands the sphere of actuality by successively 
incorporating more and more of non-existence into itself. The 'aesthetic' individual is, 
thus, an insubstantial creature in whom doubt and dread touch and intermingle as 
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melancholy. The ethical individual succeeds in distinguishing and pushing apart these 
dangerously entangled elements, opening up a larger and more expansive area of inner- 
freedom. Where Hegel had seen this entirely in terms of an immanent dialectic of 
selfhood, the pseudonymous writers bring into the sharpest possible focus the 
discontinuities in this process, and point to the incomprehensible breaks which make it 
possible. The aim of individuality - the conquest of despair which becomes identical 
with the task of becoming a Christian - involves a fuller expansion of the sphere of 
existence, pushing doubt and despair ever farther apart by transforming and 
incorporating into experience the alien pure forms which lie beyond its boundary zone. 
Turning to Either/Or in the light of the specific nature of the 'vertical' divisions of 
existence (which is fully elaborated only much later in Sickness Unto Death), a new and 
rich content of reflection is revealed. There is not simply a movement between pleasure 
and unpleasure, the despair of boredom and the melancholic eroticism of the moment, 
but, all these characteristic expressions become so many evanescent attempts to establish 
a space, to prise apart and open up the dimensionality of the actual, and thus prevent 
doubt and despair touching and entangling the person in an impenetrable psychic fog. 
In Either/Or, the starting point is the impoverished inwardness of melancholy, the 'quiet 
despair' in which sensuousness and abstraction meet without penetrating each other. 
And the twin motifs of, on the one hand, Romantic enthusiasm for ideality, and on the 
other, the continuously inventive presence of the erotic, becomes more significant. The 
'young man' is not only in danger of 'volatilizing' himself out of existence, he is 
equally at risk of sinking into a state of turbid eroticism. He is not only 'infinitized' in 
the direction of pure ideas, an abstraction of his real self, he is also 'finitized' in the 
direction of pure sensuousness; and composed in equal measure of dread and doubt. 
The interaction between these two fundamental dimensions of existence, their 
separate logics, different boundary conditions and transitional forms, gives rise to an 
extremely intricate and realistic dynamic psychology. And as many of the pseudonyms, 
remain ignorant of the work of their colleagues, the reader is forced to make a long 
journey through the entire range of modern forms of selfhood. 
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Doubt 
Johannes Climacus, the personification of 'Kierkegaardian' doubt, makes his appearance 
in the authorship at an early date. During the latter part of 1842 and early 1843 
Kierkegaard began, but did not complete, a work entitled Johannes Climacus, or De 
Omnibus Dubltandum Est. Significantly it was designated a Narrative, emphasising that 
the personal element was to remain at the centre of the most sophisticated of reflections. 
Johannes, another in the retinue of 'young men', is its hero rather than its author. 8 
Its author, indeed, is quick to draw attention to his departure from modern 
conventions of philosophical discourse. Academic philosophers, he admits, will 'think 
it strange, affected, and scandalous that I choose the narrative form'. 9 But he is equally 
quick to defend himself; the narrative form places a specific person, Johannes Climacus, 
at the centre of the work, and makes his existence the central focus of everything that is 
to follow. It is by this means that he seeks 'to counteract the detestable untruth that 
characterizes recent philosophy'; which, he declares, 'has never been so eccentric as 
now, never so confused'. 10 
Johannes, more markedly than any of his pseudonymous colleagues, is in love with 
thinking. For him, sensuousness has lost any relation to existence, and, however 
romanticized and idealized it might become, he remains untouched by the erotic. His is 
an ideal nature, and even his body 'delicate and ethereal, almost transparent' seems 
designed for reflection. I1 He is, for all that, another in the series of 'enclosed natures' 
who knows melancholy too well; but rather than hope to be drawn out from the narrow 
focus of his inner preoccupations by erotic attraction, he turns at once to the promise of 
the immense, the infinite, liberation of pure thought. 
He is a 'stranger in the world', for the world itself is not composed of thought, nor 
does it, as it had for the medieval philosopher, exist as part, or symbol, of a fixed 
cosmological structure. 12 Yet an echo of that older cosmological picture persists in 
Johannes" 'hierarchical conception of the realm of pure thought as a scala paradisi; ' it 
was his delight to begin with a single thought', we are told, and 'by way of coherent 
thinking, to climb step by step to a higher one... when he arrived at the higher thought, 
it was an indescribable joy'. 13 The original of the pseudonym, John Scholasticus, a 
monk living around the turn of the seventh century, wrote an influential devotional 
handbook, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, that was noted for its psychological insight and 
aphoristic style. 14 For the pseudonym, however, there is no graded sequence of 
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spiritual exercises bridging the gulf between the human and the divine. The modern 
Scala paradisi is a purely conceptual realm which, conceiving itself to be independent of 
all actuality, represents, for the thinker caught up in its interconnections, both a domain 
of absolute freedom, and a 'model' of reality as a whole. 15 The thought of Johannes 
Climacus is driven by admiration for the completeness of purely internal connections 
among thoughts themselves; an admiration mixed with a pronounced erotic satisfaction 
'sublimated' into this 'higher' realm. The pleasure he takes in thought is a purely 
personal pleasure, a kind of passive excitement at being carried off into the farthest 
realms of abstraction, helpless before the continuous unfolding of ideal inner- 
connections. It was, thus, an equally 'passionate pleasure, for him to plunge headfirst 
down', back to his arbitrary starting point. 16 He is an essentially 'aesthetic' thinker, for 
whom 'this up-and-down and down-and-up of thought was an unparalleled joy,. 17 He 
delights in the spectacle of thought itself, 'the result was not important - only the 
process interested him' and he longs, not so much for the attainment of the 'highest' 
thought, as the image of a completed sequence of reflections. '8 He thus becomes 
troubled by the prospect of incomplete or interrupted thoughts, and worries over the 
instability of the entire ideal edifice. He is 'anxious lest one single coherent thought 
slip out, for then the whole thing would collapse'. 19 
Thus, although the development of his mind 'deprived him of a sense of empirical 
actuality', it did not leave him untroubled. His nervousness over the fate of systematic 
thought, that, like an insecure house of cards, might at any moment topple to the ground 
betrays the fact that he has not after all wholly deserted the sphere of actuality. This 
nervousness he interprets as an intuitive doubt, and takes comfort from the discovery 
that doubt has indeed become the starting point of modern philosophy. After all the 
fundamental thesis of modern philosophy is simply that everything must be doubted, 
except the existence of the thinker, which, as it lies outside the sphere of pure thought, 
is of no philosophical interest. This raises in Johannes' mind a number of related 
questions, centred on the problem of defining a newbeginning for philosophy. If 
philosophy deals with eternal and universal truths how can it have a new starting point? 
And why should its old starting point be abandoned? Has philosophy in some way 
changed its nature, in spite of being essentially related to the eternal? These questions 
are raised rather than answered - the work was never completed - but in the course of 
elaborating their meaning 'doubt' takes on a rather different meaning. 
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For the Cartesian (and Johannes is writing against contemporary Cartesians but in 
support of what he takes to be the original spirit of Descartes), doubt is a stimulus to 
thought. Doubt once admitted as a starting point is taken into the sphere of thought 
itself and extends itself to infinity. Doubt is the inner principle of movement of 
thought; it is doubt which forces the thinker from one thought to the next in a connected 
sequence. Doubt, thus, does not undermine thought; in fact it propels the thinker into 
the midst of systematic reflection. But Johannes' doubt is of a rather different sort. He 
does not doubt the truth, or the reality, of thought. His doubt is really the tension of a 
nervous spectator, in trepidation that the incomparable image unfolding before his eyes 
might never reach completion or end in something ugly and ill formed. This doubt is 
not only, or even primarily, an intellectual mechanism -a principle of 'mediation' or 
'transformation' - so much as a recalcitrant hanging on to the incompleteness and 
messiness of actuality itself. A lumpy piece of existence is taken up, so to speak, into 
the realm of thought and thought cannot dissolve it; if it could Johannes would no 
longer be a spectator because there would be no 'place' from which to spectate. He 
would cease to exist and become part of the abstract system which - just because he 
cannot become part of it - he enjoys so much. Indeed, it is this longing to be absorbed in 
thought that Johannes claims to be characteristic of modern philosophy. But doubt, for 
Johannes, is a continuous reminder of his non-ideal existence; 
so long as he could not question, thought twined itself alarmingly around him, but 
as soon as he began to question, he was happy and extricated himself from thought 
inasmuch as thought developed for him in dialogue. (Climacus, p. 147) 
Johannes, therefore, draws an important distinction between reflection, or reflective 
doubt, which is a disinterested and abstract relation within thought itself, and doubt 
proper, which is always an interested and is, therefore, always a 'mixed' relation. 
Schematically, it might be said that reflection is the movement from actuality into 
thought, while doubt is the movement back from thought into actuality. 
When Johannes begins to think on his own behalf, therefore, he asks what it is 
about existence that makes doubt (rather than reflection) possible. He fixes on doubt as 
a means of anchoring thought in existence rather than, as among the Cartesians, and 
even more strikingly among the Hegelians, as a means of giving wings to thought so 
that it might become wholly liberated from the constraints of existence. 
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It might be argued that Johannes is still too philosophical for his own good. He 
has discovered existential doubt before he has accumulated the wealth of immediate 
experience upon which it might work to enrich his personality and give it depth. His 
existence is too thin - he is almost 'transparent' - for doubt to work positively. In this 
respect he is a shadow, or rather a 'silhouette' of Kierkegaard's original plan to write on 
the much more substantial and complex Faust figure as the prototype of existential 
doubt. Johannes is not just a simplification, he is a one-sided simplification of that 
original plan. Faust is composed of both doubt and dread. He is genuinely demonic 
personality, driven by insatiable desire for knowledge of the secrets of nature, a desire 
'desublimated' into erotic longing for Margaret. The sensuous and the ideal are 
inextricably bound together in his personality. One reason, perhaps, why his plan was 
never brought to fruition is just because of the internal complexity in such a personality. 
And just as irony had proved to be a false starting point because it contained too much, 
coalescing and compounding the distinctions the pseudonymous authors were to 
establish in their exploration of existence, so Faust, as an intermingling of doubt and 
dread, could not serve the analytic purpose to which Kierkegaard put Johannes 
Climacus. 
It is worth noting at this point that, by way of his pseudonyms, Kierkegaard is 
indeed engaged in a process of careful analysis here. His strictures against the 'system', 
the project of 'pure thought', and 'mediation' should not be taken as a wholesale denial 
of the significance of any form of analytic thinking whatever. 20 Johannes is a thinker, 
but in doubting he is drawn more closely into the web of existence, and brings his 
thoughts with him, adding fresh qualifications to the relations of actuality. 
Doubt, in the sense of systematic doubt - reflection - is a specifically modern 
phenomenon. Ancient philosophy had begun with wonder, which is a form of 
immediacy. Doubt, however, introduces a fundamental dichotomy into existence, and 
creates a distance between the person and his thought world. The peculiarity of 
Johannes is that he maintains an immediate relation to doubt, that he can use it as a 
support for, rather than the subversion of, actuality. Doubt, for Johannes, is always 
something interesting. 
The possibility of both reflective doubt and doubt proper can be traced to the 
condition of modernity which has fostered the emergence of new forms of 
individualism. The specifically modern form of individualism had, in turn, encouraged 
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a false conception of universality as a directly inaccessible realm of abstraction to which 
thought was joined as a kind of bridge. In this context reflective doubt was a way of 
'negating' the specific and particular qualification of the individual that tied him or her 
to a specific situation and a particular thought. Johannes, alternatively, practises a kind 
of interested doubt which seeks to idealise, rather than to abolish, the moment. He 
moves abruptly between a contingent and particular starting point to a conceptual 
universal. Doubt carries him 'up', and elevates him into a sphere of non-existence, only 
to drag him back again, and almost at once, to an existence he cannot forget, and which 
can never wholly be mastered conceptually. 
The 'aesthetic' young men lived in recollection, concentrating their energies in an 
attempt to rehearse experience, and thus to preserve and magnify the moment. 
Johannes, equally reluctant to 'forget himself' in pure thought, discovers in the 
immediacy of doubt a means of self-elevation; a way, so to speak, of carrying himself 
over the threshold into the infinite freedom of thought. 
Anxiety 
Doubt, for Johannes, is not a purely intellectual process; indeed its possibility is rooted 
in the fact that he cannot wholly rid himself of the encumbrance of actuality. Doubt 
might be viewed as the unintegrated presence of actuality within the ideal, while the 
'interesting' is the equally unrelated presence of ideality within the sphere of existence. 
This double 'misrelation' marks the fuzzy boundary between actuality and abstract 
thought, an imprecise demarcation zone between existence and non-existence. And 
because this is an intermediary zone doubt can be both 'felt' as dizziness, and 'thought' 
as incredulity. 
A symmetrical boundary zone between actuality and sensuousness is productive of 
a different set of 'qualifications' of existence. The tendency of actuality to 'slip 
beneath' existence is, of course, a staple of the tradition of Christian anthropology, and 
a continuous refrain within the homiletic literature. The primary spiritual danger, in 
almost all the ages of the Christian tradition, has been seen as the temptation of 
sensuousness. Certainly, from time to time, Christian leaders and reformers have 
warned against the mortification of the flesh, excessive penitential asceticism, or any 
attempt to deny the creaturely nature of human beings, but more frequently, and with 
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greater insistence, they have warned against insufficient effort of self-mastery over the 
promptings of a merely instinctual life. 21 
Another pseudonymous author, Vigilius Haufniensis, refers to this continuous 
undertow of sensuousness as dread, or, as it is now more commonly translated, anxiety. 
As erotic melancholy, however, it had already made its appearance in the opening pages 
of Either/Or, and played an unanalyzed but significant part in the entire aesthetic 
production. Beginning from the 'aesthetic sphere', that mode of existence in which 
actuality is most 'compressed' between doubt and anxiety, there are two symmetrical 
sets of relations between existence and non-existence. Doubt and interest are reciprocal 
relations between actuality and ideality; while anxiety and the erotic are reciprocal 
relations between actuality and sensuousness. Thus, for all his distrust of the 'system', 
Kierkegaard, through the interconnected pseudonymous works, develops, so far as is 
possible, an orderly and coherent account of existence; and while he resists the 
temptation of solipsistic reflexivity and refuses to close his categories back upon 
themselves, it is clear that the distinctions he draws and develops are conditioned not 
only by the demands of existence itself, but simultaneously by an 'aesthetic' 
requirement for symmetry. Then, as if reluctant to draw attention to such formalism, 
this symmetry is concealed, firstly by the disproportionate space allotted to the 
discussion of certain specific relations, and secondly by the multiplication of 
pseudonymous authors and forms of presentation through which they are 'analysed'. 
The formal aspects of his account become more apparent, however, when the notion of 
anxiety is examined in relation to the existing, but at the time unpublished, discussion of 
doubt. 
Like a later work, The Sickness unto Death, to which it is closely related in terms 
of content, The Concept of Anxiety is didactic rather than narrative in form. This is not 
because Kierkegaard believes he can approach the issues he raises here in a clearer or a 
more 'logical' fashion than was the case with the major 'aesthetic' works. It is, more 
significantly, because he is beginning here with sensuousness, rather than with actuality. 
Subsequently, when he dealt with the relation between existence and ideality from the 
side, so to speak, of ideality, he again adopted a more conventional philosophical form 
of discourse. The realm of actuality, as he never tires of demonstrating, is the sphere of 
individuation, and must always be represented through the medium of a personality. 
Sensuousness, however, which is just another form of abstraction, is a domain of 
depersonalized relations and can, therefore, be discussed 'systematically'. 
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It is also a domain which is peculiarly recalcitrant of representation. It is, to put it 
simply, difficult to talk about; as soon as it is 'expressed' in words it loses its real 
quality of sensuousness and all too easily 'disappears' into some other abstract form. 22 
This difficulty, however, is not fundamentally different from that embedded in any 
discourse about something 'other' than the rules of discourse itself. Words are equally 
removed from all the 'ideal forms' which the philosopher seeks to represent through 
them, they are only signs of another reality from which they remain forever divorced. 
Words are part of our experience, and cling to actuality by their very nature. We have 
come to imagine, however, that, as used by the philosopher at least, they do not simply 
represent, but actually are, eternal and abstract forms of reason. Kierkegaard is well 
aware of the difficulty and his mode of presentation, always sensitive to the inner- 
character of the world he hopes to represent, becomes compressed, dense, and obscure, 
(where in his more philosophical works he becomes expansive, aerial and lucid, and in 
his descriptions of existence, personal, ambiguous and contradictory). 
Anxiety is, then, first of all, a weighty presentiment. As early as 1839 
Kierkegaard had confided to his Journal that 'all existence makes me anxious'. 23 And 
an even earlier entry talks, as had Pascal, of the 'anxiety over the possibility of being 
alone in the world, forgotten by God'. 24 But while such feelings of isolation and inner- 
loneliness are, doubtless, commonplace, and have a special significance for the 
experience of modern life which is predicated on an 'anticosmic' infinitization of space 
and time, Haufniensis, when he came to write The Concept of Anxiety saw in the 
phenomenon of 'groundless fear' something universally and inescapably present in 
human experience. 
Anxiety, as a relation to sensuousness, is not only the presentiment of 'otherness', 
or the fear of undergoing some sort of regression to a wholly undifferentiated mode of 
being (though it may include such fears), so much as the form through which 
sensuousness can, so to speak, represent itself within human life as an independent and 
autonomous 'spirit'. The 'otherness' of nature, as the 'otherness' of abstract thought, 
does not really belong to existence and cannot ever become actual. Sensuousness can 
enter into the personal dimension of actuality, therefore, only in disguise; as a 
'demonic' force which grips the will and bends it to its own hidden purpose. 25 
Thus, just as doubt represented the uncomfortable 'otherness' of the thought-world, 
so anxiety, or dread, represent the individual's impotence in the face of the 'force of 
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nature' acting within him. Both abstraction, and sensuousness, thus, have about them a 
quality of necessity, a compulsive and ineluctable interconnectedness which sweeps 
people up and, so to speak, carries them away. In this view of sensuousness 
Haufniensis makes a step away from the romantic naturphilosophie towards 
Schopenhaur's pessimism. Even so his conception of sensuousness remains aloof from 
the tradition of modern materialism and positivism. By sensuousness he refers always 
to sensuous spirit, to an embodied form of spirit, to which human being might have, 
indeed must have, some sort of relation. 
'Pure sensuousness', like 'pure thought' can never be experienced. It is in a 
relative form that we conspire with these antithetical forms of nothingness to create 
within ourselves the double movement of doubt and anxiety, interest and desire. Both 
anxiety and doubt stem ultimately, that is to say, from undetected tendencies within 
ourselves, from inner spiritual transformations or a kind of inner splitting, through 
which we can represent to ourselves the unreachable world of pure forms. 26 The two 
tendencies away from actuality, a depersonalized abstractedness, and an equally 
depersonalized concreteness, thus constitute the two fundamental forms of unconscious 
self-destruction, which, grasped religiously, is sin. 
'Anxiety is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy', writes 
Haufniensis, it is nothing and the fear of nothing; the fascination of freedom represented 
to ourselves as its opposite. 27 The experience of anxiety is of a bewildering, 
indeterminate fear, literally a fear of nothing; it is groundless. We imagine it must be 
related to something outside ourselves, to have some 'objective' point of reference. We 
do not know what this object is but, as an unknown, it both attracts and repels. 
Anxiety, a 'heavy spiritedness' is a fascination with an unknown but presumed reality. 28 
The author interprets this 'something' to be our own nature, to be the freedom of 
possibility; but it is a freedom 'entangled in itself'. 29 
There emerges in this discussion two distinct notions of 'nothing'. Firstly anxiety 
'contains' nothing in the sense that it is an immediate relation to the sensuousness 
which, lacking spirit, is, humanly speaking, nothing. More precisely, it is related to the 
lower form of spirit given in sensuousness. In a passage closely related to both the 
opening sentences of The Sickness Unto Death, and to the first section of the essay on 
the musical erotic in Either/Or, he writes: 
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Man is a synthesis of the psychical and the physical; however, a synthesis is 
unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is spirit. In innocence, 
man is not merely animal, for if he were at any moment of his life merely animal, 
he would never become man. So spirit is present, but as immediate, as dreaming. 
Inasmuch as it is now present, it is in a sense a hostile power, for it constantly 
disturbs the relation between soul and body. 30 (Anxiety, p. 43) 
Secondly, in a formulation more closely related to the writings of Johannes 
Climacus, anxiety is conceived as a relation to the nothing of possibility; 'In the 
moment actuality is posited, possibility walks by its side as a nothing that entices every 
thoughtless man' . 
31 In this latter sense it is part of actuality, rather than a relation 
between existence and non-existence. These two rather different senses of 'anxiety' are 
distinguished by Vigilius, and it is usually apparent from the context which sense is 
being used, but he does not feel obliged to designate these two meanings by separate 
terms. He clearly feels these two senses are so closely related as to be two aspects of a 
single relation. While the first meaning encompasses all the possibilities of non- 
existence, the second refers specifically to the possibilities within existence itself; the 
first is an anxiety implicit in the 'vertical' structure of being, the latter is immanent in 
its 'horizontal' extension. 
Dizziness 
These spatial metaphors draw upon phenomenological evidence to which 
Kierkegaard later refers in an important Journal entry written in 1848. Both doubt and 
anxiety can be felt as 'dizziness'. And, though he illustrates this notion primarily in 
relation to the specific boundary experience of anxiety, it is precisely dizziness which 
marks the limits of actuality in general: 
The possibility of dizziness lies in the composite of the psychical and the physical, 
an ambiguous joint boundary between the psychical and the physical... Thus 
dizziness is an interplay between the psychical and the physical, even where it is 
easier to decide which is primarily active, although in many cases it is very 
difficult to decide. (Journals, 1,749) 
Kierkegaard likens despair, which is a 'developed' and 'spiritual' form of melancholy to 
this dizziness. But the more 'expanded' and differentiated form of melancholy retains 
the essential characteristics of the original: 
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A person thus afflicted often complains that something has fallen upon him, that it 
is as if he had a weight to bear etc. This pressure, this weight, is not anything 
external; it is, as one says of an optical or acoustical delusion, it is an inverse 
reflection of something external. (Journals, 1,749) 
Doubt and anxiety are specific forms of melancholy in which an individual is seized 
with an inexplicable 'weight' and disorientation, a fear of falling. 
Equally, however, it is a weightless 'indefiniteness', a fantastic self-expansion into 
the infinite. Johannes Climacus, later associates both the ideal and the sensuous forms 
of dizziness with the typically modern and fantastic conception of God, which 'as in a 
dream' combines the infinite with 'the disintegration of a sensual, soft despair'. 32 And 
in his unpublished study of Adler, Kierkegaard makes much of this 'lack of focus' as it 
affects the writings of this 'deranged genius'. Adler is completely carried away in 
dizziness: 
The dizzy is the wide, the endless, the unlimited, the boundless; and dizziness itself 
is the boundlessness of the senses. The indefinite is the ground of dizziness, but it 
is also a temptation to abandon oneself to it... The dialectics of dizziness has thus 
in itself the contradiction of willing what one does not will, what one shudders at, 
whereas this shudder nevertheless frightens only ... temptingly. (Adler, p. 128) 
The boundlessness of sheer abstraction is dizziness, but this can take an ideal form, as 
in Adler, or, more commonly, it might appear as a kind of sensuous undertow that 
continually threatens our sense of 'balance'. Indeed, it might be argued that the more 
common form of dizziness, is more common as a result of the long western prejudice in 
favour of the 'spiritual' over the 'earthly'; looking 'down' is more likely to make us 
dizzy than looking 'up'. And it might be argued, elaborating somewhat on the implicit 
contrast between the doubt of Johannes Climacus and the anxiety of Vigilius 
Haufniensis, that one of the novel characteristics of melancholy in modern society is 
that it gives rise to both 'ascending' and 'descending' form of dizziness. The fact that 
the pseudonyms do not clearly distinguish these opposing 'directions' has the 
unexpected benefit of 'equating' the 'sensuous' with the 'ideal' as forms of abstraction, 
and, thereby effecting an overdue revaluation of the sensuous. As the 'ideal' is 
frequently (if wrongly) viewed as a 'means' to self-development, the sensuous, by 
analogy, might also provide its own potential for spiritual growth; a supposition other 
pseudonyms were to take quite seriously. 
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Anxiety is a state of panic stricken suspension and inactivity; at once attracted and 
repelled, the individual is 'frozen', as if on the edge of an abyss, fearful of the next 
moment, as of the end of time itself. 33 But there is less of the ideal in anxiety which is 
'felt' in the stomach, as nausea, an inner emptying, as if the insides of the body were in 
the process of dissolving. Anxiety is a visceral dizziness, whereas doubt, which is 
'located' in the head, is a kind of ideal vertigo. It is a disorientation in, or of, space and 
time; a feeling of being 'lost' and simultaneously moving in all directions. Both are 
characteristically modern forms of experience but draw on and adapt much older body- 
images. Anxiety, as nausea, links the ancient obscurity of 'black bile' with the modern 
preoccupation with 'heaviness', while doubt, as dizziness, exhibits an element of 
demonic 'light-headedness', or frenzy, as well as a peculiarly modern transparency. 
These bodily metaphors are instructive. The associations to which the authors 
allude, between bodily states, inner feelings and the ontological structure of existence 
are very general features of the western tradition. 34 Their significance here, apart from 
tying their thought directly to the immediate features of experience, lies in his covert 
but pronounced revaluation of anxiety (and therefore of sensuousness), as a positive, or 
at least potentially positive, aspect of that experience. The, implicit, linking of doubt 
and anxiety, as dizziness, follows from viewing both as the fluid boundaries between 
actuality and 'abstraction'. It is important to note that these boundaries are fluid, and 
that the pseudonyms do not claim that actuality can be preserved undialectically, as it 
were, by simply avoiding these vague states. The individual cannot help but become 
'entangled' in abstraction, to withdraw into the 'safe' centre ground of the actual is 
merely to 'shrink' the sphere of personal existence. The individual would find only the 
refuge of melancholy, in which doubt and anxiety touch and intermingle. We have no 
option but to live 'on the edge' of existence. 
In addition to anxiety over 'falling' into abstraction (what lies 'above' or 'below' 
actuality) Haufniensis introduces consideration of a somewhat different kind; anxiety 
over the future (what is not yet actual). The peculiarly intimate connection between 
anxiety and the formation of a new selfhood is taken up by Anti-Climacus in Practice in 
Christianity, and Sickness Unto Death, and became one of the most characteristic 
themes of the last of the pseudonymous authors. 
It is in discussing the intricacies of anxiety that Vigilius completes the formal 
presentation of the structure of selfhood that was to be contained in The Sickness Unto 
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Death. The 'misrelation' of finite and infinite, necessity and possibility are dealt with 
there in some detail, but it is in The Concept of Anxiety that the relation of time and 
eternity within the structure of the self is more fully considered. This synthesis cannot 
be understood in terms of the 'aesthetic' conception of time as infinitely divisible 
succession. In a brief but precise analysis Vigilius argues that any such conception 
annuls the present and relies on the purely metaphorical suggestiveness of a spatial 
image of past and future. Time for the existing self, however, must be actual. 
Actuality, in this context, can be conceived of as annulled succession - the present - and 
in this sense is the presence of the eternal. The actual present thus becomes the 
synthesis of the self, of the temporal and the eternal; and 'thus understood, the moment 
is not properly an atom of time but an atom of eternity'. 35 There is a fundamental 
difference between this 'first attempt, as it were, at stopping time', and the aesthetic 
pursuit of the vanishing moment. 36 The former introduces a new form of existence, it is 
the positing of spirit as spirit, and begins the development of religious subjectivity. 
Significantly, in the Christian tradition, 'the fullness of time' describes the inner 
transformation of a religious subjectivity, it is 'the moment as the eternal'. The eternal 
touches the self, and flows, as it were, into actuality. The duration of the self, the 
earnest self-determination of the ethicist, is once again revealed as a 'stage' rather than a 
completed unity, however extended and enduring it cannot place itself beyond the 
relentless subversion of succession. 
Thus, just as the development of the ideal, through doubt, returns the subject to 
actuality at a 'higher' point than his point of departure from it, so anxiety contains 
within itself the potential for spiritual development. The development through doubt is 
a kind of unlooked for consolation that comes after the apparent failure of thought to 
reach its goal in the ideal, sinking back into actuality it finds itself again in an altered 
and enriched form. Development through anxiety is equally an unconscious process, 
which seems, in fact, to run counter to the consciousness of the subject. Anxiety brings 
the subject into a much more intimate relation to sin, an intimacy from which faith 
might be born. 
Paradox 
Johannes' doubt is a barrier to the self-affirmation in absolute freedom for which he 
might have wished, but, at the same time it betrays a love of truth essential to any 
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genuinely thoughtful existence. In fact he is drawn apart equally by the claims of 
actuality and the claims of pure thought. He can neither integrate and harmonise these 
demands, nor forget either one of them. He could not abandon his thesis - universal 
doubt - and 'it seemed as if a mysterious power held him to it'. 37 He has neither 
mastered doubt nor has he actualized himself in an 'existence-sphere'. The limbo of 
doubt is mirrored in the purgatory of anxiety in which the person is held motionless 
before the dual possibility of either realizing the self in a more developed actuality, or 
of falling into the sensuous as an independent and immanent power (the demonic). The 
careful separation of these symmetrical relations can be seen as an essential part of the 
pseudonyms elaboration of a Christian anthropology in place of an exclusive reliance on 
Socratic self-knowledge. Socrates had been unable to separate doubt from anxiety, so 
that his intellectual questioning was eroticized, and his sensuousness was 
intellectualized, both held together in a captivating immediacy. The Socratic 
entanglement is only another form, in fact, of the false 'projection' of the ideal and the 
sensuous, their expulsion from actuality into fantastic self-determining domains of their 
own. For the Socratic viewpoint either immediacy is everything, or part of the 
immediate must be broken off and represented as something other than itself. In neither 
case can actuality itself be conceived as 'containing' its own possibilities of inner- 
development and transcendence; 
In the Socratic view, every human being is himself the midpoint, and the whole 
world focuses only on him because his self-knowledge is God-knowledge. 
(Fragments, p. 11) 
Four days before the publication of The Concept ofAnxlety, Kierkegaard, under the 
name of Johannes Climacus, published Philosophical Fragments, which might have 
been termed 'the concept of actuality'. In this work, Johannes develops the theme of 
doubt to its furthest extremity in order to return it, so to speak, to the world of 
existence. In its monumental Postscript Johannes comments that the Fragments 'took its 
point of departure in paganism in order by imaginatively constructing to discover an 
understanding of existence that truly could be said to go beyond paganism'. 38 
Johannes has moved beyond his initial doubt and seeks in this work 'of almost 
bottomless dialectical complexity' to circumscribe existence philosophically. 39 He 
insists it is a 'fragment' and is to remain a fragment. There is no ambition to provide 
the point of departure of some new metaphysical 'system'. The aim is neither to 
'purify' thought of the corruption of actuality, nor to set out some logically binding a 
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priori categories of experience, but, in returning thought to the domain of actuality, find 
ways of describing more precisely the peculiar character of existence itself. To this end 
his return to Socrates is not historical but what he terms 'algebraic'; an effort to clarify 
at least one form of actuality. 
In the Fragments Johannes Climacus finally asks aloud a question which has 
implicitly connected the pseudonyms whose works he himself comments upon, 'What is 
the change of coming into existence? '. 40 Johannes Climacus and Vigilius Haufniensis 
had answered that question with respect to the coming into existence of the self as a 
synthesis that 'relates itself to itself ,a synthesis of soul and body through the 'medium' 
of spirit. Further, body has been identified as sensuousness, with the finite, temporal 
and necessary, while the soul has been defined as the mind's abstraction, as the infinite, 
eternal and free. Actuality, therefore, is at once a compound and a derived category, 
'temporal and spatial being'. 41 Now 'coming into existence' is a change in being, not in 
essence, and while all existence is being, all being is not existence. In particular 
necessary being, or necessity, cannot come into existence; 
Precisely by coming into existence, everything that comes into existence 
demonstrates that it is not necessary, for the only thing that cannot come into 
existence is the necessary, because the necessary is. (Fragments, p. 74) 
Hence, 'necessity stands all by itself' and is immune to the changing qualification 
of existence. 'Nothing whatever comes into existence by way of necessity', he asserts 
with some vehemence, ' no more than necessity comes into existence or anything in 
coming into existence becomes the necessary'. And, conversely, 'all coming into 
existence occurs in freedom'. 42 And although he is particularly interested in the 
manner in which human being comes into existence, these remarks apply in principle to 
the whole realm of nature, whose sequence of efficient causes can be followed back to a 
freely acting cause. In the realm of human history, however, there is a 'redoubling' of 
this freedom in that its sequence of efficient causes is itself composed of freely acting 
43 
agents. The historical thus has in itself 'the illusiveness of coming into existence'. 
The change of 'coming into existence' is the realization of a possibility, not the 
determination of necessity. It is a movement from the possible to the actual, in which 
necessity plays no part whatever. This argument has important and wide-ranging 
consequences, indeed it takes Johannes Climacus, and Anti-Climacus, an imposing 
volume each to set out the major philosophical and religious implications of this insight. 
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It is sufficient at this point to note the historical context of such an argument, 
which is apparently directed against the whole tendency of modern thought towards a 
conception of truth as, on the one hand, nature, viewed as a self-moving mechanism of 
efficient causes, or, on the other, as a realm of freely constructed concepts, unified as a 
network of 'necessary' logical relations. In particular Leibniz's version of ideal 
rationalism, had been interpreted by some of his eighteenth century followers, most 
notably Lessing, as a 'model' for Christian truth. The inner spiritual coherence of 
religious truth, that is to say, was conceived as analogous to (if not identical with), the 
consistency and systematic completeness of a perfected system of rational concepts. It 
is Leibniz indeed, rather than Hegel, that might be seen as the main target of Johannes' 
polemic. 44 
The Enlightenment understanding of belief as 'knowledge' and doubt as 
'scepticism', even if they are adequate in relation to a 'system' of natural or of ideal 
categories, cannot in, Johannes' view, be directly applied to any human reality. The 
difficulty arises from a failure to separate the 'vertical' from the 'horizontal' dimensions 
of existence. In terms of actuality, which is a continuous 'coming into existence', for 
example, doubt and belief are opposites, but not by virtue of their relation to an 
objective fact or truth; 
Belief and doubt are not two kinds of knowledge that can be defined in continuity 
with each other, for neither of them is a cognitive act, and they are opposite 
passions. Belief is a sense for coming into existence, and doubt is a protest against 
any conclusion that wants to go beyond immediate sensation and immediate 
knowledge. (Fragments, p. 84) 
Doubt and belief as relations within existence, are opposing dispositions to possibilities 
which have yet to come into existence. The difference is a distinction within the sphere 
of actuality, rather than between existence and non-existence. The movement from 
doubt to belief, therefore, even if it were a matter of some limited empirical 'coming 
into existence', could not be effected by the demonstrative power of a train of reason. 
Inasmuch as both doubt and belief encourage 'thought', it is of thought permeated 
by existence, and both tend ultimately towards the affirmation - the most stringent 
criticism is also an affirmation - of this existence. Both are opposed, then, to the 
certainty which expresses itself in the abstraction of 'pure' thought. Uncertain thoughts 
- doubt and belief - remain embedded 
in existence and for this reason cannot perfect 
themselves as holistic images. The thought of actuality, and actual thought, do not lead 
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to certainty but to the paradox. In a characteristically vivid and complex passage 
Johannes describes the paradox: 
But one must not think ill of the paradox, for the paradox is the passion of thought, 
and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion: a mediocre 
fellow. But the ultimate potentiation of every passion is always to will its own 
downfall, and so it is also the ultimate passion of the understanding (Forstanc) to 
will the collision, although in one way or another the collision must become its 
downfall. This, then, is the ultimate paradox of thought: to want to discover 
something that thought cannot think. This passion of thought is fundamentally 
present everywhere in thought, also in the single individual's thought insofar as he, 
thinking, is not merely himself. (Fragments, p. 37) 
A self-willed destructiveness is given to thought by passion, by its resolute clinging 
to existence. And it can be observed wherever passion is evident: 
It is the same with the paradox of erotic love. A person lives undisturbed in 
himself, and then awakens the paradox of self-love as love for another, for one 
missing... Just as the lover is changed by this paradox of love so that he almost 
does not recognize himself any more... so also that intimated paradox of the 
understanding reacts upon a person and upon his self-knowledge in such a way that 
he who believed that he knew himself now no longer is sure whether he perhaps is 
a more curiously complex animal... (Fragments, p. 39) 
Passion is an expansive movement of existence, which is continually colliding with 
an unknown, and the paradox is the perpetually renewed encounter with this unknown: 
What, then, is the unknown? It is the frontier that is continually arrived at, and 
therefore when the category of motion is replaced by the category of rest it is the 
different, the absolutely different. (Fragments, p. 44) 
The understanding, however, can grasp only those differences which are contained 
within it, and the paradox 'is the absolutely different in which there is no distinguishing 
mark'. 45 The paradox cannot be thought at all, it is a limit to thought, not a category 
within it; 'Defined as the absolutely different, it seems to be at the point of being 
disclosed, but not so, because the understanding cannot even think the absolutely 
different'. 46 This being the case the 'absolutely different' is often assimilated to other 
forms of difference, and represented, or rather misrepresented, as the 'fantastic', the 
'prodigious', the 'ridiculous', and so on. 
The boundary, or 'frontier' as Johannes terms their point of contact, between the 
understanding and the paradox, is unlike all other boundaries which define the 
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pseudonm's topography of existence in all its complexity. The boundary between the 
'spheres' of the aesthetic and the ethical (and by implication, in this perspective, 
between the ethical and the religious) is a spaceless void, while the boundaries between 
actuality, and both ideality and sensuousness, are regions of fluid ambiguity. The 
collision of the understanding with the paradox is topologically unique, and productive 
of new and yet more allusive forms of experience. 
There is nothing abstract and ideal about the transition of doubt into paradox. It 
must be conceived, rather, as another aspect of the transitions of despair; the 
melancholic defence against melancholy, which is the emergent structure of personal 
experience in the Present Age. But it would be quite misleading to imagine Kierkegaard 
has little regard for the significance of 'thought' for human self-development. Quite the 
contrary; doubt impels the subject towards the limits of its existence sphere, and once 
this existence is grasped ethically, transforms itself into the paradox from which the 
understanding shrinks back in bewilderment. While Johannes is firm in his rejection of 
systematic metaphysics, he nonetheless presents a view of thought as a privileged 
relation within actuality. It is in thought that an immanent principle of self-development 
is planted. And while thought, which for Johannes is never 'pure thought', cannot 
'leap' the abyss between one existence-sphere and another, it introduces into actuality a 
dynamic and independent inner principle of development, or, more circumspectly, it 
might be said that such an inner-principle manifests itself more clearly in the aspect of 
thought than in any other actual relation. 
Sin 
From the 'inclosed reserve' of melancholy the pseudonyms trace two movements 
through which the 'self-relating self' emerges and expands. Each movement carries 
within it the possibility of a 'misrelation', a one-sided development the leads away from 
actuality into the non-existence of idealist thought or mute sensuousness. From 
melancholy springs both doubt and anxiety. The paradox is the potentiation of doubt as 
it passes through the earnestness of the ethical. It points beyond any aesthetic view of 
the ethical towards the construction of a religious form of actuality. In a symmetrical 
development, the demonic is conceived as the freely chosen self-development or 
potentiation, of anxiety, and the demonic, as sin, also brings the subject to the boundary 
of the religious. 
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Anti- Climacus, in The Sickness Unto Death, calls despair a sin, and Vigilius 
Haufniensis investigated anxiety primarily as an 'orienting deliberation' on the problem 
of sin. The movement towards the religious, therefore, is not straightforward; it may 
involve a confrontation with sin, rather than, or as well as, an encounter with the 
paradox. The aesthetic works had exposed any 'direct' seizure of the religious as a self- 
delusion. From the starting point of melancholy, it seems, the extremities of the 
paradox and of sin have to be intimately 'worked through' if the individual is to be 
liberated from the fragmentation of modern life. In another sense, these extremities 
condition every life-possibility, and play a hidden part, therefore, in the development of 
the least troubled of individuals. Anti-Climacus himself points out that the vast 
majority of people go through life unaware of such dialectical difficulties; 
Most men are characterized by a dialectic of indifference and live a life so far 
removed from the good (faith) that it is almost too spiritless to be called sin - 
indeed almost too spiritless to be called despair. (Sickness, p. 101) 
There is a 'dialectical frontier' between despair and sin which is revealed in the 
most developed form of aesthetic 'poet-existence'. A poetic longing for God itself 
becomes an element in despair, and, therefore, an attractive illusion obscuring the 
genuinely religious. Such a poetic individual 'loves God above all, God who is his only 
consolation in his secret anguish, and yet he loves the anguish and will not give it up' . 
47 
Despair is transformed into sin when the despairing self is defined in relation to a self- 
generated, sentimental, illusion of God. The ideal and the sensuous in this self- 
deception are, once again, closely related: 
He becomes a poet of the religious as one who became a poet through an unhappy 
love affair and blissfully celebrates the happiness of erotic love... Yet this poet's 
description of the religious - just like that other poet's description of erotic love - 
has a charm, a lyrical verve that no married man's and no His Reverence's 
presentations have. (Sickness, p. 78) 
Sin is a new 'qualification' of despair, and not simply the intensification of a 
previous state or condition, it is a genuine transition. Now while Anti-Climacus admits 
that 'there is nothing meritorious in being in despair to a higher degree' and, from an 
ethical standpoint 'the more intensive form of despair is further from salvation than the 
lesser form', it is difficult to escape the impression that (spiritually) he considers the 
extremity of sin to be a religiously terrifying (and, therefore, a religiously valuable), 
position. 48 As Johannes de Silentio had illustrated, religious categories (including sin) 
cannot be comprehended within universal moral rules. Such rules are ultimately 
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conventions of human behaviour, and the difference between sin and despair is precisely 
that it is a movement beyond ethical categories towards the intuition of a religious truth. 
Sin also is a leap; an unprecedented form of existence which unpredictably breaks free 
of despair just at the point where it seems to have become despair's most profound 
possibility. 
The contradiction which is at the root of sin is to will not to be the self. In one 
sense this is a general formula of despair, as the 'expanded form' of melancholy, but in 
sin the will has developed through the existence-sphere to a point where, implicitly, it 
recognises its own inner-freedom, and yet negates it. The remote Augustinian tone of 
Johannes' discourse - the conception of will as implying spirit, the insistence on the 
freedom of the will, and the notion of despair as primarily a weakness of the will - is 
given a darker and more distinctly modern tone in the idea of a demonic and self- 
destructively defiant subjectivity as an alluring spiritual possibility. 49 
How can such a possibility be understood? Certainly it cannot be grasped 
intellectually, as a pure thought, or as part of a system of dogmatic categories. It must 
be accepted as an aspect of the Paradox, as a boundary against which existence 
continually pushes and continually falls back. Nonetheless Vigilius Haufniensis 
attempts to clarify the psychological presuppositions of such a view. Anxiety, properly 
understood, then becomes a psychical 'representative' of sin's possibility. 
Anxiety is the intuition of sin, but sin breaks free of anxiety by a leap. Sin, that is 
to say, has a quality of its own, a quality which is not contained within any aesthetically 
constituted sphere of existence. The dogmatic problem of original sin, thus, cannot be 
'understood' as if it were the natural consequence of a human act of misdirected will. 
The 'first sin' was sin in the sense that it opened up an entirely new world; 'The new 
quality appears with the first, with the leap, with the suddenness of the enigmatic'. so 
Thus, 'through the first sin, sin came into the world', and nothing 'caused' this first sin, 
so we can only say that 'sin came into the world by a sin'. 51 Rather than say that 
Adam's action, however motivated, brought sin into the world - which is really a failed 
attempt to 'explain' sin - we should say that 'by the first sin, sinfulness came into 
Adam'. 52 And, notes Kierkegaard, 'the sexual is not sin; when I first posit sin, I also 
posit the sexual as sinfulness'. 53 The Fall is a continually original qualitative leap. 
This remains true for every subsequent sin, which is free of the determination of both 
logical necessity and efficient causality; 'sinfulness is not an epidemic that spreads like 
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cowpox' Vigilius acutely remarks. 54 Nor is sin a one-sided temptation to evil. This is a 
confusion of religious and 'ethical' forms of being. Just as faith cannot be assimilated 
to the good, sin is not the same as evil. Indeed, there is a powerful temptation to the 
good, which, as much as the tendency to evil, proves to be an obstacle to the religious 
life. Inner spiritual freedom, that is to say, may be subordinated under some falsely 
projected ethical norm; 'The bondage of sin is an unfree relation to the evil, but the 
demonic is an unfree relation to the good'. 55 Sin, if not a religious category in its own 
right, thus refers to transitional forms through which actuality is transformed. 
The religious 'sphere' is also an existence-sphere; it is the most determinate of 
actualities, but it is determined 'before God', rather than in terms of finite human values 
and relations. Sin is a religious category in just this sense; it exists not in the nature of 
a specific act, but in the qualification of the individual's inner-personality as formed 
'absolutely', that is 'before God'. The discovery of sin is at once a realization of this 
absolute inwardness and the consciousness of the absolute difference between man and 
God: 
Sin is the one and only predication about a human being that in no way, either via 
negations (by denial) or via eminentiae (by idealization), can be stated of God... 
As sinner man is separated from God by the most chasmal qualitative abyss. 
(Sickness, p. 122) 
Sin discloses, in relation to the Absolute Paradox, the purely human character of the 
human. That sin is a qualification of the personality, rather than an intellectual 
construct, or a form of self-understanding, is shown in its bewildering possibility as 
both the consciousness of sin, and the sin which is the absence of the consciousness of 
sin. 
The mysterious relation between anxiety and sin raises, in a different way, a 
problem central to the thought of Johannes Climacus. What is the relation of individual 
experience given in its 'topological structure', on the one hand, and the history of 
human experience, on the other. The issue had been raised initially by the claim that 
philosophy now begins with doubt, rather than in wonder. Philosophy, which deals 
with the universal, seems to have changed, implying that human being has, in some 
profound way, also changed. The problem is not resolved at that point by Johannes, 
who subsequently raises it in a yet more acute form, in the claim that the possibility of 
the religious is inherent in the structure of our experience. In a similar fashion Vigilius 
insists that 'every human life is religiously designed'; that actuality discloses to us, the 
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possibility of the religious, even if it cannot open a way for its immediate occupation. 56 
Both faith and sin, however, seem to have some specific historical point of origin in the 
history of the world. 
By two distinct routes, then, the reader has been brought back to actuality; to a 
new existence charged with the possibilities of religious transformation. The 
'oscillations' of doubt and dread, whether or not they are taken to the extremities of the 
Paradox and the consciousness of sin, more certainly than any aesthetic 'leap' gather 
together and coalesce the elements of experience and form them into a developing 
selfhood. The 'self' emerges in this process as a kind of spatial extension of actuality, 
and casts the originally intermixed elements of melancholy into two distinct realms of 
non-existence. Sensuousness, thus, takes up the singular 'heaviness' of melancholy, and 
represents its lethargic and undignified immobility as sunk 'beneath' existence, while 
abstraction projects its dislocated 'dizziness' into a domain that hovers 'above', 
actuality. The ethical dissolves under the impact of a double oscillation. Its movement 
into abstraction collapses on contact with the Paradox; and its movement into 
sensuousness is repelled by the discovery of sin. By neither route, however, is the self 
wholly freed from the guilt-consciousness which is the common legacy of the ethical 
'stage', and each brings the individual to a second and more fearful abyss. 
These issues are dealt with by Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus in, 
respectively, Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Practice in Christianity. And they 
are addressed in a somewhat changed context. Where Sickness Unto Death and The 
Concept of Anxiety deal with the 'negative' side of human existence (and do not wholly 
escape a certain aesthetic fascination with their extremities) and Philosophical 
Fragments advertise the dangers of thought (without even disguising the author's 
infatuation with the dialectic), these two major works approach the central questions of 
existence in a more positive light. The focus is shifted away from the universal 
'misrelations', in the synthesis of the self (despair) towards the real possibilities 
(passion) inherent in actuality. Despair is the disintegrative processes of modernity at 
work in the individual personality, passion, though it is all but absent from the Present 
Age, remains its positive counterpart. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RELIGION OF INWARDNESS: AN OFFENSIVE PHILOSOPHY 
Faith is not a work of reason and therefore cannot succumb to any attack by 
reason, because believing happens as little by means of reason as tasting and 
seeing. 
J. G. Hamann - Socra tic Memorabilia 
Conflict and distress, sin and death, the devil and hell make up the reality of 
religion. So far from releasing man from guilt and destiny, it brings man under 
their sway. Religion possesses no solution of the problem of life, rather it makes 
of the problem a wholly insoluble enigma. 
Karl Barth - The Epistle to the Romans 
The transition to the religious, unlike the transitions within the aesthetic, is filled with 
innumerable intermediate forms; and from the viewpoint of philosophy the religious is 
this transition. Johannes Climacus, in Philosophical Fragments undermined the 
foundations of the conventional, ethical view of religion. In doing so, he had not 
claimed any special intimacy with the religious. He had not claimed to be an 
'exceptional individual' who, by virtue of a personal command, freed himself from the 
constraints of ethical demands. Neither did he pose as an 'ordinary' religious 
individual, naively questioning the tenets of his own faith. His distinctively 
philosophical approach towards the religious, like Vigilius Haufniensis' parallel 
approach through sin, leads to the disclosure of new and extreme forms of 
individuation, but does not yet bestow upon him the prize of religious subjectivity. He 
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can clearly visualise the possibility of the religious, but it remains, for him, a frustrating 
truth outside of himself and to which (in spite of his strictures against the System) he 
can relate himself only through the mediation of dialectical reflection. The religious 
seems to retreat before this dual approach, and, like a mountaineer exhausted by effort 
and disappointment as each new peak is scaled only to reveal the final goal to be a yet 
more distant and inaccessible pinnacle, the reader begins to wonder at the resilience and 
folly of those who persevere in an apparently fruitless task. 
Throughout the pseudonymous work each new 'position' is not simply a discrete 
objective possibility for existence, but an entire subjective world placed within existence 
and related to, but not coincidental with, any other position. To represent the transition 
to the religious, therefore, demands a further prodigious creative effort on 
Kierkegaard's part. Climacus, in taking up the challenge of describing the transition, 
produces a far bulkier work than the Fragments which bad established its possibility. In 
the Postscript the religious is not a contentless leap from which the subject awakens, so 
to speak, as a new person in the midst of a transformed world. The transformation 
begins, certainly, in a series of discontinuous and unheralded categories, but these have 
to be inter-related and synthesised within the individual. The religious transition does 
not simply 'happen'. Anti-Climacus traces the same ground as Johannes, and describes 
the same transition but, so to speak, from the other side, from a position secured within 
religious categories themselves. Climacus looks forward to the religious, constantly 
turning towards it as the telos of all his reflections, while Anti-Climacus, looking back 
from the religious, redefines these transitional forms from his new point of view. Anti- 
Climacus is 'prior to' or 'before' Johannes Climacus, and less in a temporal or a 
logical, so much as in an ontological sense. ' 
The movement out of and back into the ethical, by way of either doubt or anxiety, 
reveals the possibility of a religious subjectivity which this same movement puts beyond 
the reach of actuality. Both excursions return the subject to actuality; but to an actuality 
of a new sort. The elements of subjectivity, disunited by the departure from existence, 
cannot come together again in immediacy. This further potentiation of despair both 
authors call offense. From the perspective of doubt it is a token of the 'unhappy 
encounter' between the paradox and the understanding; 'If the encounter is not in 
mutual understanding, then the relation is unhappy, and the understanding's unhappy 
love, if I dare call it that ... we could more specifically term offense 
'. 2 And from the 
direction of anxiety 'the sin of despairing of the forgiveness of sins is offense 3 . In 
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both cases, although the subject has a powerful intuition of a new religious existence, he 
or she clings to some conception of the ethical, to the humanly universal demand for 
reason and goodness. The 'natural person' (in the sense of the modern secular 
individual rather than the 'primitive'), is bound to be offended, intellectually and 
morally, by the claim that were the individual freely to trust in a being whose very 
possibility (given his definitional attributes) is contrary to reason, then his or her sins 
would be forgiven. 
Johannes Climacus sets out to resolve this difficulty, or at least to set out what 
would be required for its resolution, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to 
Pbilosopbical Fragments, published in February of 1846. He describes this work as 'a 
renewed attempt in the same vein as the pamphlet, a new approach to the issue of the 
Fragments. '4 It is not initially altogether clear that the Fragments, which raises a host 
of philosophical and psychological issues, is, in fact organized around a single problem. 
The relation between the two works might be expressed, however, by saying that the 
issue of the relationship of individual existence to the truth - or what is truth for an 
individual - is so many-sided that it can be treated only in a fragmentary fashion. But 
once the issue has been clearly raised, in a series of partially connected discourses, it 
can be given a more fundamental and connected treatment. This treatment is possible 
only because the reader has been advanced to a new position from which the underlying 
connectedness of the Fragments can be glimpsed. The issue of what is truth for an 
individual only comes fully to light, that is to say, when the existence of the individual 
itself nears the point of religious realization. The Postscript, it must be remembered, is 
still not a direct work, it conceals its actual author in a characterization, and it cannot be 
read, therefore, as a straightforward philosophical treatise. It is abundantly clear from 
the Fragments, in fact, that neither it nor its Postscript, are to be mistaken for any 
systematic metaphysics. Its dialectic, is the dialectic of existence. So the truth which is 
contained in the writings of Johannes Climacus have to be stored up, as it were, and 
held in abeyance until the reader has reached that stage of preparatory exhaustion in 
which it can be received. The Fragments appears to be the final anticipatory exercise, 
to which the Postscript releases, as a kind of extended exhalation, the entire pent-up 
energy of the pseudonymous authorship. 
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History 
The aesthetic pseudonyms might be viewed as so many failed attempts to provide a 
practical answer to the question 'in the context of the Present Age, how am I to become 
an T'? In Kantian terms, what are the preconditions for the emergence of 
individuality. Some of the pseudonyms had, implicitly, asked 'how might I become an 
I authentic 'I"? In the Fragments the problem of the individual's relation to Truth was 
taken up, 'how am I to I become 'an eternal I''? but had done so in a purely Socratic 
fashion. The Postscript now addresses the question in terms of Christianity; in the 
context of the Present Age 'how am I to become a Christian? '. The concluding pages of 
the Fragments had already raised this question in the form in which it was to first 
appear in the Postscript. Alluding to Lessing's discussion of Reimarus, Johannes 
remarks that 
Christianity is the only historical phenomenon that despite the historical - indeed, 
precisely by means of the historical - has wanted to be the single individual's point 
of departure for his eternal consciousness, has wanted to base his happiness on his 
relation to something historical. (Fragments, p. 109) 
Johannes subjects Lessing's views about the relation between the historical 'evidence' 
for Christianity and the character of contemporary 'belief , to detailed scrutiny. In fact, 
he develops Lessing's criticism in a rigorous fashion, and regards Lessing as fully 
justified in his assertion that the 'accidental truths of history can never become the proof 
of necessary truths of reason'. But where Lessing makes an exception for the 
immediate followers of Christ, who had enjoyed the privilege of direct eye-witness 
I evidence' of the miracles, Johannes takes the view that no empirical events whatever 
can, or could, provide such an evidential basis for Christianity. 5 Johannes goes back, 
through Lessing, to the argument of Reimarus that in the sayings of Jesus 'there were 
no exalted mysteries or points of doctrine which he explains, proves, and proclaims'. 6 
And though he agrees with both that the 'inner-truth' of Christianity is something 
independent of its actual history (and not simply of the contingencies of its recorded 
history), he does not view, as they had, this 'inner-truth' as either a philosophical 
statement or a moral code. 
Empirical evidence is always doubtful, and the process of history itself a series of 
contingencies; 
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with regard to the historical the greatest certainty is only an approximation, and an 
approximation is too little to build his happiness upon and is so unlike an eternal 
happiness that no result can ensue. (Postscript, p. 23) 
In spite of the enormous wealth of scholarly effort 'a little dialectical doubt' will always 
remain. Indeed, the scholar, in investing so much time and labour in trying to 
'establish' the foundational 'facts' of Christianity runs the risk of becoming 'stuck in the 
parenthesis of his labour. 7 The error is to look for certainty where, in principle, none 
could exist. Scholarly endeavour does not lead to faith because 'faith does not result 
from a straightforward scholarly deliberation; nor does it come directly'. 8 
More than this, if objective certainty in the matter of the origins of Christianity 
could be reached, it would be destructive of genuine faith. 'Existing uncertainty', 
Johannes claims to be a 'profitable schoolmaster'. Faith exists for an individual in the 
form of a 'passionate interest' in his or her own happiness, and 'if passion is taken 
away, faith no longer exists'. 9 
Conversely, the critical understanding of scripture can do nothing to undermine 
faith. Schleiermacher's Speeches had made similar arguments well known, and had 
already freed critical historical scholarship from the demands of faith. Johannes, 
however, wants to go much further. These arguments are merely the prelude to an 
assault on the central problem of the relation between faith and history. As a 
conclusion that springs directly from his conception of Christianity, the 'objective' route 
to faith is dismissed; 
Christianity is spirit; spirit is inwardness; inwardness is subjectivity; subjectivity is 
essentially passion, and at its maximum an infinite, personally interested interest 
for one's eternal happiness. (Postscript, p. 33) 
Christianity is not an 'objective' doctrine or 'sum of propositions' whose 
credibility depends on the likelihood that specific historical events have been accurately 
recorded. Nor, equally, is it 'proved' by the mere persistence of a community of 
believers. 10 And it is just this apparent lack of historical foundation that has made a 
speculative viewpoint appealing to modern 'enlightened' individuals. The problem of 
the truth of Christianity has, thus, been wrenched from any historical context and turned 
into a contemporary metaphysical encounter; 
The question of its truth therefore becomes a matter of permeating it with thought 
in such a way that finally Christianity itself is the eternal thought. 
(Postscript, p. 50) 
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The speculative approach, however, is equally objective in its method. Christianity 
is defined through it as a reality external to the observing subject. But Johannes 
wonders, rhetorically, if such a method can penetrate Christianity at all, or is rather a 
way of concealing its reality in thoughtful illusions, 'what if objective indifference 
cannot come to know anything whatever? ', he asks. Or if, indeed, 'like is understood 
only by the like', and that 'Christianity is indeed subjectivity, is inward deepening'. 
Then any objective method, historical or speculative, will succeed only in 
misrepresenting its truth, and diverting attention towards religiously irrelevant 
philosophical problems. " 
The thinker who wishes to grasp Christianity - that is to say wishes to relate 
himself intellectually rather than religiously to Christianity - must, in fact, be genuinely 
'interested' in its inwardness. The originality of Johannes' claim, therefore, is not so 
much that Christianity, as an authentic religion, can exist only in a specific form of 
inwardness, but that a proper understanding of this depends upon the philosopher's 
direct experience of this form. There can be no such thing as 'objective knowledge' of 
Christianity; 
In all knowing in which it holds true that the object of cognition is the inwardness 
of the subjective individual himself, it holds true that the knower must be in that 
state. But the expression for the utmost exertion of subjectivity is the infinitely 
passionate interest in its eternal happiness. (Postscript, p. 53) 
The philosopher who claims to be a believer becomes comic when he makes his 
eternal happiness hinge on the outcome of his speculation; he both religiously and 
philosophically misconstrues the issue of the truth of Christianity. This truth lies in the 
'recessive self-feeling of the subject', so that the philosophical task of elucidating 
Christianity (which is an essential task for some people only), must begin with the 
subject. 
It is just in this context that Johannes praises Lessing, whose real significance, he 
claims, lies in the dynamic and plastic character of his thought. In Lessing thought is 
always an aspect of existence, to which, as a process of becoming, it is continually 
adapted; so that 'his thought must correspond to the form of existence'. 12 And as an 
'existing thinker' or an 'existence-thinker' Lessing must resort to forms of 'indirect 
communication'. The more his thought grasps and penetrates existence, the more it 
becomes 'absorbed' in existence, the less it can take on the role of a 'medium' of 
communication. And in existing in his thought, 'he becomes more and more 
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subjectively isolated'. 13 And 'while the elusiveness of existence isolates me whenever I 
apprehend it', the need for self-expression is forced into indirect paths. 
While finding a justification for the method of indirect communication in Lessing, 
Johannes fails to find a satisfactory resolution of the difficulty of relating the 'inner- 
truth' of Christianity to history. Lessing's error, he argues, lies in his residual hope 
that historical certainty about the origins of Christianity RVgbt, at some future date, be 
achieved and,, with it, the elucidation of the necessityof Christian truth. Johannes, 
however, has rejected such a possibility, and with it any route to Christianity other than 
the self-confirming leap. 
According to Johannes, however, this does not mean that Christianity has been 
freed from any relation to its own history, or to the history of the societies within which 
it has developed. This is just another instance of the fundamental character of Christian 
truth as paradox; 'the basis of the paradox of Christianity is that it continually uses time 
and the historical in relation to the eternal'. 14 Incomprehensibly Christianity requires an 
historical point of departure, and must maintain, throughout its development, a constant 
relation to the historical. This, indeed, is one of the central arguments of Johannes' 
complex book, and can best be understood as an aspect of his most fundamental 
contention - that Christianity, because it is a form of actuality, rather than an idea or a 
sensuous form,, has within it all the characteristics of existence, namely becoming, 
subjectivity and passion. Christianity does not, therefore, unite history and belief in 
some exalted ideal state of mind; rather it holds them apart, generating through the 
tension of their difference the very passion in which they are nonetheless bound 
together. 
The Subjective Thinker 
Johannes concludes that while a logical system is possible, an existential system is an 
impossible contradiction. Hegel is charged, consequently, not so much with departing 
from actuality into speculation, but with attempting to carry actuality up into the ether 
of pure thought. His fundamental error (and at the same time his fundamental insight 
into the true character of contemporaneous existence) lies in his effort to introduce 
motion into logic. But a logical system must exclude all existential 'qualifications', and 
movement (in the sense of purpose or intention) belongs uniquely to the spirit of 
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actuality. 15 Hegel, furthermore, begins not with immediacy, as he claims, but with 
reflection through which he tries (and fails) to reach the immediate. 16 
System and existence cannot be merged; 'system and conclusiveness correspond to 
each other, but existence is the very opposite... Existence is the spacing that holds 
17 apart; the systematic is the conclusiveness that combines'. The incompleteness of 
existence cannot be properly represented, far less explained, as a 'category' within any 
system. The modern idea of reason has traversed an enormous distance from Descartes 
to Hegel, yet the speculative system is immanent in its birth as a project of 'pure' 
thought. The ideal of detachment, objectivity and logical coherence ends in a formalism 
which cannot even mirror the world from which it has detached itself. Even so,, non- 
existent illusion that it is, the system has come to disguise and dominate people's 
conceptions of themselves; unnecessarily constraining the possibilities of actuality left 
open to them. Johannes draws attention to this false idealism which the Enlightenment 
has bequeathed to the contemporary world; 
To be a human being has been abolished, and every speculative thinker confuses 
himself with humankind, whereby he becomes something infinitely great and 
nothing at all. (Postscript, p. 124) 
If Christianity is made an 'object of knowledge', and part, therefore, of an 
'external' reality, it is destroyed. And to approach it 'religiously' in this light is even 
more fundamentally mistaken; 'an objective acceptance of Christianity (sit venia verbo) 
is paganism or thoughtlessness'. 18 Christianity is not an 'object' which, external to the 
subject, can be known in its detachment, it is not a 'thing' which can be understood in 
that way at all; 
Christianity, therefore, protests against all objectivity; it wants the subject to be 
infinitely concerned about himself. What it asks about is the subjectivity; the truth 
of Christianity, if it is at all, is only in this; objectively, it is not at all. 
(Postscript, p. 
130) 
Christianity is wholly inward, all its apparently outward forms are no more than 
attempts at indirect communication - attempts which have themselves been absorbed into 
an historical process through which they become misrepresented as authoritative 
statements. 
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The theory of the spheres, when combined with the anthropology of doubt and 
anxiety, provide a precise means of charting the possibilities of subjectivity within 
modem life. The aesthetic is an initial form of subjectivity, but one shrunken and 
crushed by melancholy. What the pseudonymous author's describe is a series of 
developments of subjectivity itself. Inwardness is expanded, becomes more highly 
differentiated and complex, and contains a wider variety of content. This process, 
though at points discontinuous, seems to chart the underlying development towards a 
'natural religion'. But it does not 'unfold' as a consequence of rational thought and 
reflection, or of the slow and unconscious evolution of nature itself; its possibilities are 
given - in relation to the conditions of modem life - and have the appearance, at least, of 
an immanent structure. There is, that is to say, nothing necessary in this 'structure', 
which is nothing more than the arrangement of the pseudonyms into a 'developmental' 
sequence. The reader is free to accept or reject any position. These 'natural' positions, 
however, do not exhaust the possibilities of subjectivity. Johannes assures us that 'faith 
is indeed the highest passion of subjectivity'. 19 And faith lies outside the realm of 
'natural' possibilities, in the passionate embrace of the paradox. 
Christianity is the highest form of subjectivity; it is pure inwardness, rather than 
pure thought. Johannes, as a 'subjective thinker' tries to grasp the character of 
Christianity by developing the contrast between an objective and a subjective thinker. 
The importance of his effort lies not simply in demonstrating (if such a demonstration 
were really required), that, his polemical stance in relation to the philosophy of his own 
day notwithstanding, thought which is tied to existence is fundamental to the proper 
understanding of life, but, more importantly, that such thought is a crucial lever upon 
existence itself, and a way through which the subject may develop in inwardness. 
His famous dictum, therefore, that 'truth is subjectivity' does not mean that 
'knowledge of the world' is a matter of subjective whim, nor does it mean that 
subjectivity is always valid 'in itself'. He is referr ing exclusively to his own approach 
to Christianity. The truth of Christianity is subjectivity, and this is not to be confused 
with the many 'objective truths' in relation to the external world of nature and history 
which Johannes is perfectly willing to concede exist (though they cannot be known with 
certainty). And, as the other pseudonyms had amply demonstrated the possibility of the 
personality losing itself in provisional, undeveloped, illusory and false self-images, it is 
clear that not all forms of subjectivity are truthful. 
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In relation to the exclusive focus on the truth of Christianity Johannes feels let 
down by current metaphysical orthodoxies. Empiricism declares that an underlying 
conformity of thought and being guarantees our knowledge of the world; while idealism 
maintains that a conformity of being with thought defines the world. But if being is 
understood as empirical being then; 
truth itself is transformed into a desideratum, and everything is placed in the 
process of becoming (Vorden), because the empirical object is not finished, and the 
existing knowing spirit is itself in the process of becoming. Thus truth is an 
approximating whose beginning cannot be established absolutely, because there is 
no conclusion that has retroactive power. (Postscript, p. 189) 
'Knowledge' is not to be confused with 'truth', and it is only the latter which interests 
Johannes. And efforts to conflate the two, as in Fichte's influential Romanticism of the 
ego, are wholly misguided. The Tam-l' is sheer fantasy, and is reached only by a 
process of abstraction in which every statement is emptied of any actual content. The 
conformity of thought and being is realized uniquely in God, 'but it is not that way for 
any existing spirit, because this spirit, itself existing, is in the process of becoming'. 20 
Thus, for any existing individual, thought and being are kept apart, and truth must be 
quite distinct from a relation of identity. In this context Johannes distinguishes two 
forms of truth for the existing individual; 
To objective reflection, truth becomes something objective, an object, and the point 
is to disregard the subject. To subjective reflection, truth becomes appropriation, 
inwardness,, subjectivity, and the point is to immerse oneself, existing in 
subjectivity. (Postscript, p. 192) 
Objective reflection, it is again worth emphasising, is not regarded by Johannes, or 
any other of the pseudonyms, as false. Rather, its validity is held to be limited to 
specific circumstances. It leads to mathematical or logical truth which is wholly 
independent of the subject, and of value for precisely that reason. Thus, 
the way to the objective truth goes away from the subject, and while the subject 
and subjectivity become indifferent (figegyldig), the truth also becomes indifferent, 
and that is precisely its objective validity. (Postscript, p. 193) 
Equally, subjectivity is no guarantee of truth, for we have in the beautiful example 
of Don Quixote 'the prototype of the subjective lunacy in which the passion of 
inwardness grasps a particular fixed finite idea'. 21 Finite things must be understood 
objectively, but infinite things must be understood subjectively, that is to say they 
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cannot be understood through abstraction. To confuse the two is characteristic of the 
modem age; 
Of what help is it to explain how the eternal truth is to be understood eternally 
when the one to use the explanation is prevented from understanding it in this way 
because he is existing and is merely a fantast if he fancies himself to be sub specie 
a eterni. (Postscript, p. 192) 
Rather, it is the case that, 
he must avail himself precisely of the explanation of how the eternal truth is to be 
understood in the category of time by someone who by existing is himself in time, 
something the honoured professor himself admits, if not always, then every three 
months when he draws his salary. (Postscript, p. 192) 
The philosophical demand for unity, for the identity of subject and object, cannot 
be the basis of actual life. To become aware of the truth means to exist inwardly and, 
therefore, to be conscious of the self a process of becoming which is unrealizable as an 
I Pf . 
Yet, from time to time, 'this instant is the moment of passion'. The modem 
philosopher, therefore, is wrong to condemn passion, which, far from obscuring truth 
'for the existing person is existence at its very highest'. Johannes pleads eloquently on 
behalf of passion, in which 'the existing subject is infinitized in the eternity of 
imagination and yet is also most definitely himself . 
22 A critical reader might think him 
too eloquent, and ask if there is any difference between the passionate 'eternity of 
imagination" and an 'abstraction' of the mind? But this unsystematic unity is just the 
paradox that sets his reflection apart from Hegel's; 
The fantastical I-I is not infinitude and finitude in identity, since neither the one nor 
the other is actual; it is a fantastical union with a cloud, an unfruitful embrace, and 
the relation of the individual Ito this mirage is never stated. (Postscript, p. 197) 
The essential relation in the knowledge which interest Johannes is not that between 
subject and object, but that between knowledge and the knower. 23 'All ethical and 
ethico-religious knowledge', he writes, 'has an essential relationship to the existence of 
the knower'. Thus, Socrates (unlike Hegel), for all his profession of ignorance, is 
essentially related to the truth. His ignorance (which is a species of knowledge) is held 
24 with 'infinite inward passion'. 
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From his beginning with the burden of doubt, and the obstacle of uncertainty, 
Johannes moves relentlessly towards a new point of view from which 'objective 
uncertainty' becomes a precondition for the existing individual's appropriation of 
Christian truth. Truth is 'an objective uncertainty held fast, through appropriation %4th 
the mostpassionate inwardness'. It is precisely 'the daring venture of choosing the 
objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite' And it is just this uncertainty 
25 which 'intensifies the infinite passion of inwardness. 
This conception of truth is 'an equivalent expression of faith', and Johannes, thus, 
takes the view that faith is essentially linked to uncertainty. Doubt, therefore, is a 
fundamental element of faith, and without it, faith is accepted naively as an objective 
doctrine. 'Without risk there is no faith', he concludes pointedly, and in a passage 
resonant of Pascal writes; 
I observe nature in order to find God, and I do indeed see omnipotence and 
wisdom, but I also see much that troubles and disturbs. The summa summa rum of 
this is an objective uncertainty, but the inwardness is so very great, precisely 
because it grasps this objective uncertainty with all the passion of the infinite. 
(Postscript, p. 204) 
Faith is a contradiction, rather than a mediation; 'the contradiction between the infinite 
passion of inwardness and the objective uncertainty'. 26 It is not necessarily the case that 
the 'eternal essential truth' is in itself a paradox, but in relationship to an existing 
individual it must appear so. For Socrates this relationship was incompletely 
interiorized as 'ignorance, which is a kind of 'analogue of faith' which maintains, so to 
speak, one foot in objective reflection. The more developed Christian form is the 
'absurd% which, having no natural or objective equivalent, rests entirely within the 
subject. 
Not only, therefore, is uncertainty a precondition of faith, it must be continually 
present within it; 
Faith has, namely, two tasks: to watch for and at every moment to make the 
discovery of improbability, the paradox, in order then to hold it fast with the 
passion of inwardness. 
(Postscript, p. 233) 
The temptation to construe God's necessity from the 'evidence' of nature, ought, 
therefore, to be resisted. Any view which proclaims a direct and immediate relation to 
God, is viewed by Johannes as paganism, for, while 'nature is certainly the work of 
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God, only the work is directly present, not God'. 27 And Johannes derives from the 
anticosmological vision of the deus absconditus his most powerful argument in favour 
of the indirect communication of Christian truth; 
No anonymous author can more slyly hide himself, and no maieutic can more 
carefully recede from a direct relation than God can. (Postscript, p. 243) 
In concluding that 'every direct communication with regard to truth as inwardness is a 
misunderstanding', Johannes is drawn towards the 'contemporary effort in Danish 
literature', which most conspicuously adopts an indirect approach. 28 He discusses the 
previously published pseudonymous works, placing them in the context of his now 
clearly defined philosophical question; what does it mean for an existing individual to 
be a Christian? The earlier pseudonyms had, in fact, already asked the question in a 
less philosophical fashion; what does it mean for an individual to exist in the modern 
world? Johannes claims that neither question can be answered by 'objective reflection', 
and that adopting the method of 'subjective reflection' already contains an implicit 
answer to both; 
My main thought was that, because of the copiousness of knowledge, people in our 
day have forgotten what it means to e, ýdst, and that inwardness is, and that the 
misunderstanding between speculative thought and Christianity could be explained 
by that. (Postscript, p, 249) 
Existence 
Christian truth is the truth of existence; a truth which, in contrast to the tempting 
certainties of idealism and materialism, can be realized in actuality, and only in 
actuality. Johannes never tires of making this point. Abstract speculation serves only 
to 'elevate' the whole of existence into a tensionless void of non-existence. It grants a 
kind of salvation 'by killing me as a particular existing individual and then making me 
immortal'. 29 But this 'facile deification of pure thought' cannot even succeed in its own 
terms, As the abstract thinker remains an existing individual 'in one way or another he 
must be absentminded'. 30 The speculative philosopher cannot cease being an existing 
individual, even in the moment of his most rarefied thought, and is thus drawn into a 
contradiction. And as this contradiction is itself a sign of existence there is a sense in 
which the speculative system, for all its distortions, nonetheless grasps an element of 
31 truth. 
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Compared to the thin and distorted vision of existence offered by philosophy 
Christianity grasps and holds on to the full meaning of actuality. Johannes exemplifies 
the existential concern of Christianity first of all by elaborating a point that, implicit in 
the earlier aesthetic production (particularly in Repetition), was raised explicitly in the 
Fragments, Existence is not a changeless state, but a continuous 'coming into 
existence', so that actuality is always moving forward, always disclosing itself in new 
forms of being, and this fundamental condition is reflected in Christianity; 
when I join eternity and becoming, I do not gain rest but the future. Certainly this 
is why Christianity has proclaimed the eternal as the future, because it was 
proclaimed to existing persons, and this is why it also assumes an absolute autlaut. 
(Postscript, 307) 
Existence is full of contradictions, it is incomplete and unfinished. It appears so 
'thoughtless' as to resist conceptual ization. Yet thought is, and remains, part of 
existence, penetrating its particularity with reflective categories; 
Existence, like motion, is a very difficult matter to handle. If I think it, I cancel it, 
and then I do not think it. It would seem correct to say that there is something that 
cannot be thought - namely, existing. But again there is the difficulty that 
existence puts it together in this way: the one who is thinking is existing. 
(Postscript, p. 308-9) 
This remains a fundamental problem of representation; existence in its entirety can be 
represented only by part of itself, and we always run the risk of mistaking the internal 
relations of the system of representation for the entirety of what it represents. 
Johannes' complaint is not that 'thought' is in some sense unreal, but that it cannot 
replicate all the characteristics of the reality we have to think about. The difficulty is 
made worse when, in an effort to clarify the 'rules of the system', we ignore existence 
altogether; 
Now, whereas pure thinking summarily cancels all motion, or meaninglessly 
introduces it into logic, the difficulty for the existing person is to give existence the 
continuity without which everything just disappears. (Postscript, p. 312) 
It is precisely this difficulty which is addressed by Christianity, whose subjective 
truth perpetuates itself in the passion of 'momentary certainty'. In Christian truth 
thought interpenetrates and qualifies existence. This is felt as passion, which is an 
intellectual and an emotional category. Passion is a primordial awareness of existence 
such that 'for an existing person it is impossible to think about existence without 
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becoming passionate'. 32 Indeed, 'all existence-issues are passionate, because existence, 
33 if one becomes conscious of it, involves passion'. 
The central problem of the aesthetic writings is now placed in a deeper and more 
systematic context. The problem of 'despair', of 'becoming oneself', becomes identical 
with a proper understanding of the problem of appropriating Christian truth, 'except 
1 34 that this self has received much richer and much more profound qualifications . 
Johannes has no time for the 'dizzy pantheistic haze' of philosophical piety. Christian 
truth, subjective thought and personal identity, for him, come together in the 
clarification of existence as a process of self-actualization. And this process of 
becoming a Christian, which 'really is the most difficult of all human tasks' is made 
more difficult rather than less so by Johannes' subjective reflection. He warns that 
The introduction that I take upon myself consists, by repelling, in making it 
difficult to become a Christian and understands Christianity not as a doctrine but as 
an existence-contradiction and existence-communication. (Postscript, p. 383) 
It is, at least, equally difficult for all, since 'when faith requires that he relinquish his 
understanding, then to have faith becomes just as difficult for the most intelligent person 
as it is for the person with the most limited intelligence', and, thus, the task 'varies in 
35 relation to the capabilities of the respective individuals'. 
Pathos 
The task of the individual is to deepen and expand the actuality of existence, to fill it out 
with his or her own 'self'. This, ultimately, is the task of becoming a Christian, in the 
sense of relating the self to the truth of Christianity, of inwardly appropriating this truth 
as a living force. Once this task is seen in the context of the subjective thinker, 
however, the individual is seen as oddly powerless to accomplish it. The 'leap' from 
the aesthetic to the ethical can be seen, from one perspective at least, as a willed 
movement; but between the ethical the religious lies a gulf too deep for the will. In the 
consciousness of sin, and in the face of the Paradox,, the individual cannot will a 
transcending leap to a sphere 'beyond' their aggravating limitations and particularities. 
The task becomes, rather, one of acceptance and of resignation. 'In relation to an 
eternal happiness as the absolute good', Johannes points out, 'pathos does not mean 
words but that this idea transforms the whole existence of the existing person'. 36 
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The 'absolute good' must be willed unconditionally and for its own sake, but no act 
of will can grasp the religious as a positive value. Thus, for Johannes and in sharp 
contrast to the earlier aesthetic pseudonyms, the ethical has a central place in the 
formation of a new religious possibility. The religious emerges firstly as the ethical 
chosen absolutely, as opposed to the acceptance of an ethical determination as a matter 
of social convenience, moral training, or rational reflection. This is, in fact, a 
consequence of Johannes' insight into the religious as the paradox which, as it is 
inconceivable, must remain outside the determination of the will. 
The pathos of the religious is an incommunicable otherness, which inwardly 
transforms existence. Thus, while the task of existence is that of self-actualization,, its 
highest development, as the religious form of Christian self-appropriation, so 
transforms the inner world of experience, that the self seems no longer itself. This is 
the happy dialectic of religious inwardness. Where objective thinking takes the thinker 
'out of himself' in a 'sceptical freedom from affections', the subjective thinker, in 
passion, is reunited with existence. Passion annihilates the particular and momentary 
elements of experience, but it does not launch the individual into a void for, 'it is in the 
very moment of passion that he gains the momentum to exist. 137 
Johannes' use of the term 'pathos' here is significant, and alludes to an earlier 
discussion of passion in the Fragments. There, in opposition to all rationalistic modem 
psychologies, Johannes had maintained that passion is essentially a passive affliction, a 
form of SUffering. 38 The passionate shock of erotic love, for example, even if its force 
of attraction is 'explained' by an ingenious observer, is felt inwardly as if it were 
something imposed from without. The subtle dialectic of willing and suffering is all the 
more evident in the pathos of the religious transition, where the self is related absolutely 
to an absolute good, rather than relatively to a relative good. 
The 'essential expression' of the existential pathos of religion, therefore, is 
suffering, and Johannes does not hesitate to maintain that 'the distinguishing mark of 
religious action is suffering'. Action, in the aesthetic sphere, leaves the individual 
untransformed, while within the ethical it develops the self through a relation of striving 
towards a goal. Religious action uniquely and paradoxically transforms the self through 
resignation. The aesthetic individual regards suffering as a contingent misfortune, but 
religiously speaking it is essential to existence. The religious individual 'wants 
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suffering in the same sense as the immediate person wants good fortune, and wants and 
has suffering even if the misfortune is not present externally'. 39 
The pathos of the religious integrates suffering into existence and makes it essential 
to it. Johannes argues that humour, which similarly recognizes suffering as essential to 
existence, lies on the boundary of the religious. But where religion lies, pathetically, in 
acceptance of this suffering, humour is an effort to annul it. A religious discourse does 
not avoid existence with a jest, but reconciles the individual to suffering, and in so 
doing triumphs over it. This calm acceptance is quite distinct, Johannes claims, from 
the perverse excitement of aestheticized suffering; it is, rather, an indirect joy at 
grasping, in and through pathos, an absolute relationship to the absolute. 
In a more general sense suffering 'is the expression for the relationship with 
God'. 40 This relationship, viewed from the limited and constraining side of the human, 
is bound to appear as the intuition of something unconditional and absolute, and at the 
same time as a separation from, and loss of, this absolute. The God-relationship, 
arrived at in the philosophical fashion of the subjective thinker, that is, accentuates the 
wretchedness of human existence. Religious suffering, Johannes affirms with Pascalian 
rigour, is the highest form of human misery to which we are condemned by existence. 
But suffering is the hope of the subjective thinker, who 
in his joy over the significance of this suffering as relationship, cannot be beyond 
the suffering, because the suffering pertains specifically to his being separated from 
the joy, but also indicates the relationship, so that to be without suffering indicates 
that one is not religious. (Postscript, p. 453) 
1? 43, 
Religion, is the ultimate confirmation of human actuality, but does not confer 
complacent satisfaction upon the existing individual. Johannes goes further, in a yet 
darker moment he claims that 'poetry is illusion before understanding, religiousness 
illusion after understanding, and 'between poetry and religiousness, worldly wisdom 
41 about life performs its vaudeville'. 
Are we to understand from this that there can be no transition 'into' the religious 
sphere, as if the religious were simply a 'higher' form of existence to be placed in a 
developmental sequence after the aesthetic and the ethical? The impenetrable 
'otherness' of God places the religious 'sphere' beyond all dialectical cunning. The 
religious consists, therefore, in a continuous transition, and inasmuch as this transition 
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is then represented in specific social and cultural forms as if it were completed, it is an 
illusion. 
The authorial ambiguity of indirect communication, in this context, is given further 
justification simply as a consequence of the real relationship of the existing individual to 
the Absolute. And 
right there is the deep suffering of true religiousness, the deepest imaginable: to 
relate oneself to God absolutely decisively and to be unable to have any decisive 
outward expression for it. (Postscript, p. 492) 
The Christian truth discovered by the subjective thinker is a religion of 'hidden 
inwardness', and Johannes aspires, therefore, to the 'incognito' of ordinariness. In 
spite of his complaint that modern life lacks passion, the passion of religion cannot 
show itself in the world, and the religious rejection of modern secular life has in fact the 
appearance of its tolerant acceptance. The subjective thinker embodies an odd 
contradiction, that, 'with all this inwardness hidden within him, with this pregnancy of 
suffering and benediction in his inner being, looks just like the others. '42 
Towards the end of the Postscript Johannes admits that 'my intention is to make it 
difficult to become a Christian'. 43 Inasmuch as he has made the religion of inwardness 
'the passionate qualification of the incomprehensible', and forced it deep into 'the 
vanishing point' of subjectivity, it might well be argued that he has surpassed his 
ambition and made it impossible. 44 Johannes distinguishes, as a final dialectical 
flourish, a religion of immanence, Religion A, which has been the main subject matter 
of the Postscript, from a religion of transcendence, Religion B, which was the implicit 
subject matter of the Fragments, and the telos towards which 7he Sickness Unto Death 
and 7he Concept ofAwdety were turned. Religion A is a 'natural religion' in the sense 
that a 'subjective thinker' may arrive at the Paradox through a sustained and passionate 
encounter with existence, whereas Religion B develops in response to a special 
revelation of God's divine presence. Johannes had just argued, however, that God's 
presence was incommunicable, so that the notion of Revelation is a further 'logical 
absurdity' in the schema of faith. 
What Johannes has tried to demonstrate is not so much a 'Postscript' to the outline 
of Religion B offered in the Fragments as a 'Preface' to its possibility. It is not the 
dialectically 'offensive' character of transcendence which makes Religion B the more 
difficult to attain, but rather that it is the impossibility, even when wholly tied to the 
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'straitjacket of existence', of the dialectic ever surmounting the Absolute Paradox which 
is Religion A which makes Religion B the only hope of ridding actuality of its 
melancholy. 
It has to be borne in mind that Johannes' magnificent writings are no more 
Kierkegaard's than are the productions of the other pseudonyms. The reader becomes 
so entangled in the elaborate joke that the whole production is seen and talked about as 
if it were completely 'serious'. Johannes Climacus has become invisibly merged with 
the historical image of Soren Kierkegaard. The attack on the System, the 
characterization of the 'subjective thinker', the defense of passion, have subsequently, 
and doubtless with some justification, been seen as typically 'Kierkegaardian' positions. 
Yet, for all that, the Postscript gives expression to a point of view which Kierkegaard 
himself claims to have struggled against. It defines a problem, how to exist in the 
modern world, and claims there is an answer, to become a Christian; then annuls the 
answer by demonstrating that it cannot be reached, and substitutes for it a secret religion 
of passionate inwardness. Johannes seems to trap himself into a kind of inversion of the 
ontological argument. Because God cannot be thought, He (though supremely real) 
does not exist and religion, as the hidden inwardness of a God-relation, cannot be 
expressed, and cannot find its way into actuality. This supreme effort to outwit 
melancholy ends by once again confirming its presence; the only presence is the 
presence of nothing. 
But this is just the prelude. In comparison to the dialectical difficulty of 'natural 
religion', the religion of transcendence, which begins with an unprovoked 'leap' into 
history, appears surrealistically logical. Johannes, however, cannot make this leap and 
continually falls back into the same existence from which he sprang with such 
passionate hope. He falls back into guilt, rather than stumbling forward into sin. To 
make a superficially ethical paradox, he is too good for religion, his heart is too pure, 
his spirit, untouched by anxiety, is too light. Like Kierkegaard, he is sufficiently 
melancholic to break free of the superficial ways in which melancholy is present in the 
Present Age; but unlike Kierkegaard (perhaps), he is insufficiently melancholic to invest 
contemporary existence with that sorrow through which existence itself is transformed 
and melancholy dispelled. The highest potentiation of doubt excludes him from all 
conventionally acceptable forms of the natural religion of immanence, and protects 
him, also, from the consciousness of sin, in which the real possibility of the religion of 
transcendence is announced. 
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Offense 
Johannes Climacus attempted to become a Christian through subjective reflection. And 
even though he was conscious of the dangers of 'objective' thought, the temptation of 
the System and the risk of abstraction, all of which he scrupulously avoided, he could 
not succeed. He penetrated his own existence with thought, with universal categories 
that left him clinging to an essentially ethical view of life. In fact his life exemplifies 
the ethical in its fullest and most complete development. Thus, although 'the essential 
consciousness of guilt is the greatest possible immersion in existence' it cannot, by its 
own self-determination, move itself beyond guilt-consciousness. 45 The category of 
'self-determination' belongs to the ethical, the 'will' is and remains an ethical category. 
Thus, just as the aesthetic personality cannot 'lift' itself into the ethical by the use of an 
aesthetic determinant (pleasure, excitement, 'the moment') but requires the aid of the 
ethical itself (will), so the ethical individual cannot break free of the ethical by an act of 
will alone, but requires the aid of an essentially religious category. Johannes cannot 
accept such 'external' assistance. His quest is bound up with a purely ethical self- 
preoccupation. Consequently, as 'the guilt-consciousness that still lies essentially in 
immanence is different from the consciousness of sin', he remains gUilty. 46 
There is no philosophical bridge between the ethical and the religious. Johannes 
has deepened and enriched the ethical with the astonishing range of his insight, stretched 
thought to its breaking point, and, in the end, failed to become a Christian. He has 
failed where his literary double, Anti-Climacus, has succeeded in making the inner- 
movement of faith. Anti-Climacus, therefore describes the same transitional phenomena 
as Johannes, but from a wholly new perspective. 
Kierkegaard wrote two books attributed to Anti-Climacus during 1848, the year he 
described as 'beyond all comparison the richest and most fruitful I have experienced as 
47 an author'. But neither 7he Sickness unto Deatbl nor Practice in Cbristianity, were 
published immediately. After the Postscript, which he had intended to be genuinely 
'Concluding' (though not, of course, conclusive), Kierkegaard toyed with the idea of 
becoming a country minister. The matter (as with so much else), caused him 
considerable anguish before he finally decided against the plan, but it was during this 
period of intensified inner struggle that he composed the works of Anti-Climacus. 
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Unlike the earlier pseudonymous works, which were conceived and written from points 
of view that, without ever identifying himself wholly with them, he understood and had 
in the past partially shared, these new works were written under the direct inspiration of 
an inner vision of life he felt to be entirely his own. It was only later, as they were 
about to be published, that he once again drew back from any open declaration or 
commitment. The new pseudonym he declares to be 'above' the others; 'is higher than I 
am myself'. 48 This new authorial position is not only productive of a fresh set of 
existential categories, it creates new interpretive difficulties for the reader. 
The aesthetic works can be regarded as works of recollection, expressing forms of 
inwardness with which Kierkegaard was actually acquainted. The novelistic realism of 
his characterization derive, in some measure, from his own experience, or the 
imaginative construction of experiences formally similar to his own. The writings of 
Johannes Climacus, similarly, are eccentrically autobiographical and express 
Kierkegaard's more 'mature' position on many central philosophical and existential 
questions. But if Anti-Climacus represents a more 'advanced' position than 
Kierkegaard's own, how could his books have come to be written? Johannes Climacus 
had already demonstrated the impotence of reflection, even properly subjective 
reflection, to penetrate the religious sphere. For Johannes, therefore, religion is only an 
ideal possibility, or rather an ideal impossibility. The imagination, that is to say, can 
only construct alternative characterizations of life at the same 'level' as the author's own 
direct experience. The fact that Kierkegaard was able to write Training in Christianity, 
which he found to be 'the most perfect and the truest thing I have written, implies that, 
while writing it at least, he was able, in actuality, to live as Anti-Climacus. 49 It was 
only in its aftermath that he felt equivocal, and found it necessary to provide himself 
once again with an aesthetic disguise. 
Clearly Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus are closely related. Anti-Climacus 
comes after, as well as standing 'before', Johannes and differs from his philosophical 
twin in two important respects. Firstly, having direct experience of the religious he can 
name the relations with which Johannes had to deal in circumlocutions. The Paradox is 
Christ, an 'infinite interest in one's eternal happiness' is salvation, and so on. And 
secondly, although dialecitcally gifted, Anti-Climacus approaches the religious 
primarily in terms of offense, rather than in terms of intellectual passion. Johannes 
Climacus, it is true, had already introduced the notion of offense in the Fragments, but 
there had defined it intellectually as the 'misrelation' between the Paradox and the 
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understanding. This remains important for Anti-Climacus, but he broadens the category 
considerably, and, as he has access to a direct experience of Christianity, can express 
this inclusive meaning more directly. 
Offense is, 
' 
first of all, 'That an individual human being is God, that is, claims to 
be God'; this quite simply 'conflicts with all (human) reason'. 50 Anti-Climacus, as 
perceptively as Johannes, but in confidence rather than bewilderment, points out that 
'He has no doctrine, no system: basically he knows nothing'. 51 And, equally, 'we can 
learn nothing from history about him inasmuch as there is nothing at all that can be 
"known" about him'. 52 The stress, however, now lies on the personal nature of the 
Paradox, 'He is the paradox that history can never digest or convert into an ordinary 
SyllogiSMI. 53 
There is something more deeply unsettling than logical contradiction in the 
Paradox. It is the Absolute, and in relation to it all human judgement and valuation 
falters. In relation to human sympathy, for example, divine compassion is offensive; 
Divine compassion, however, the unlimited reckfessness in concerning oneself only 
with the suffering, not in the least with oneself, and of unconditionally recklessly 
concerning oneself with each sufferer - people can interpret this only as a kind of 
madness over which we are not sure whether we should laugh or cry. 
(Practice, p. 58) 
Then, even worse, to abolish all distinction between himself and the suffering people, to 
identify completely with suffering, and still to be completely free of all feelings of 
human superiority, gratitude or sentimental generosity, is 'too much' for people; 
Humanly speaking it is something downright cruel... something shocking, 
something over which one could become so embittered that one could have the urge 
to kill the man - to invite the poor and sick and suffering to come - and then to be 
able to do nothing for them, but instead of that promise them the forgiveness of 
sins. (Practice, p. 61) 
Anti-Climacus is uncompromising in his insistence that the Paradox cannot be 
assimilated to human feelings, any more than it can be harmonised with human thought. 
It remains utterly alien to our immediate sympathies, 'Christianity', he declares, 'did 
not come into the world as a showpiece of gentle comfort... but as the absolute. 54 And 
it is just this uncompromising absoluteness that has been eroded by modern life; 'all the 
vitality and energy was distilled out of Christianity; the paradox was slackened, one 
became a Christian without noticing it and without detecting the slightest possibility of 
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offense'. 55 So that, for the modern age, 'the sign of offense and the object of faith has 
56 become the most fabulous of all fabulous characters, a divine Mr. Goodman'. 
The task of becoming a Christian has now become that of 'introducing Christianity 
into Christendom'. And this cannot be done speculatively, or dogmatically, but only 
paradoxically, by being 'contemporary with Christ'. That is to say, Christ is an actual 
person, with whom the individual must become 'contemporary', rather than an 
historical or mythological character. The paradox which appears in the work of 
Johannes Climacus - that the possibility of eternal happiness rests on a fact which is 
both historical and certain - is given a fresh definition in terms of 'being contemporary 
with Christ'. The absolute cannot become part of history, even if it is revealed, at some 
point, in the historical process. The appropriation of religious truth ought not to be 
conceived as some enormous effort of 'going beyond' ordinary relations, but, rather, as 
an encounter with the absolute as if it were an ordinary relation. It is just this 
ordinariness in relation to the absolute which is offensive and terrifying. God has 
willed 'not to be transformed by human beings into a cozy -a human God; he wills to 
transform human beings, and he wills it out of love'. 57 He does not need to do anything 
to effect such a transformation; it is quite sufficient to reveal himself as the absolute. 
This is by no means a charitable act of enlightenment; 
There is an infinite chasmic difference between God and man, and therefore it 
became clear in the situation of contemporaneity that to become Christian (to be 
transformed into likeness with God) is, humanly speaking, an even greater torment 
and misery and pain than the greatest human torment, and in addition a crime in the 
eyes of one's contemporaries. (Practice, p. 63) 
And if to be a Christian 'is something so terrifying and appalling', it is hardly 
surprising that Anti-Climacus is forced to wonder 'how in the world can anyone think of 
accepting Christianity? ' It is, he argues, only the consciousness of sin which 'can force 
one ... into this horror'. But at the 'very same moment the essentially Christian 
transforms itself into and is sheer leniency, grace, love, mercy'. Considered in any 
other way, apart from the consciousness of sin, 'Christianity is and must be a kind of 
madness or the greatest horror'. 58 In the light of the essentially religious character of 
offense and of its centrality to any religious psychology of modern life, Anti-Climacus 
reflects on the significance of Christ's words, 'Blessed is he who is not offended at 
59 me'. 
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Offense stems from the incomprehensible unity in Christ of God and man. The 
'infinite chasmic difference' between God and man is somehow held together in the 
unity of Christ. And it follows from this that there can be two basic forms of offense. 
An offense of loftiness, at the outrageous presumption that an individual speaks or acts 
as if he were God; and an offense of lowliness, at God's astonishing self-abasement in 
accepting the limitations of an individual existence. 
In early Christianity the offense was subverted by the suppression of one or other 
side of this unity. Christ was 'conceptualized' as a being of pure divinity, or of pure 
humanity. 60 The modern confusion, which has succeeded in 'going beyond' these 
historic errors consists in propounding a fabulous speculative unity between the two, or 
an absorption of both into a notion of pure being. Most generally of all, Christ is 
simply ignored in favour of his 'teaching', and Christianity is reduced to an inoffensive 
form of direct communication. 
But in Christianity, Anti-Climacus insists, 'Christ is infinitely more important than 
his teaching'. 61 Christianity, that is to say, is a form of indirect communication, in 
which Christ acts exclusively as a sign. Indeed, the God-man is a 'sign of contradiction' 
in that, as a man, not only is He not immediately what he appears to be, but he appears 
to be wholly other than He is. This 'infinitely qualitative contradiction' between being 
God and a man imposes upon Christ the 'impenetrable unrecognizability' of the 'most 
profound incognito'. 62 Christ, for Anti-Climacus, as for Kierkegaard, is the prototype 
of non-melancholic inwardness. 
Christ's perfect inwardness is, from a human viewpoint, offensive because it 
conceals even those human qualities which would make Him admirable. It is to make 
Himself onl an object of faith that he must avoid arousing human admiration; y 
He is love,, and yet at every moment he exists he must crucify, so to speak, all 
human compassion and solicitude - for he can become only the object of faith. But 
everything called purely human compassion is related to direct recognizability. 
(Practice, p. 137) 
The modern age, however, has forgotten the 'infinite qualitative difference between man 
and God' and has, in consequence, reduced faith in Christ to purely human compassion; 
63 'it has been made into a pleasant, a sentimental paganism'. 
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The Absolute 
'What is Christianity, then, and what is it good forT, asks Anti-Climacus in all 
seriousness. 64 If Johannes Climacus had made Christianity difficult, or indeed 
impossible, Anti-Climacus now reveals it to be something profoundly disagreeable. Not 
only is Christianity, in his eyes, wholly incomprehensible, but the wish to become a 
Christian appears foolish. The premise of the argument in both the Postscript and in 
Practise in Christianity appears somewhat different at the end than at the beginning of 
those works. At first both seem to take the desire to become a Christian for granted and 
place in its path, so to speak, the formidable obstacle of living in Christendom. In 
uncovering a more profound meaning for Christianity, however, they place a question 
mark over the initial ambition itself. Why should anyone entertain the hope of 
becoming a Christian when it brings nothing but suffering? 65 The question is a 
perfectly real one, and Anti-Climacus goes to considerable lengths to define more 
precisely the nature of this suffering; 
To suffer in a way akin to Christ's suffering is not to put up patiently with the 
inescapable, but it is to suffer evil at the hands of people because as a Christian or 
in being a Christian one wills and endeavours to do the good. (Practice, p. 173) 
And not the good defined in terms of relative human values, but as defined absolutely in 
terms of an absolute value. It is this absolute relation which is incomprehensible, 
cannot be communicated, and generates a unique form of suffering which is quite 
distinct from secular tribulations. 
But to ask of the absolute 'what good is iff makes no sense, and the question can 
only be rhetorical and contradictory. The pseudonyms strive towards Christianity 
because they are bound to do so, because such a striving is inherent in the reality of 
human existence. Becoming a Christian, that is to say, is another term for the urge 
towards self-actualization. And self-actualization means 'synthesizing' the elements of 
experience and bringing them into relation with the absolute. But the 'self' is not 
wholly self-moving. Any conception of a purely immanent process of self-development 
ends in aestheticism, - which 
is, in fact, the common form of self-denial, or despair. The 
root of melancholy lies in the denial of reality to anything lying 'beyond' the 'surface' 
of the self, a denial which, through its characteristic wretchedness, simultaneously 
expresses a perverse conviction that reality can never be wholly superficial. The 
genuine self can generate itself only through contact with what lies outside it, as 
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absolutely free and independent being. This contact is expressed religiously, in aLY 
Christianity, as contemporaneity with the Christ-man. 
To move beyond despair the self must transform itself in relation to the absolute; it 
is 'drawn' towards the absolute. Anti-Climacus here insists on the biblical expression 
that 'From on high He will draw all to Himself . 
66 This is a corollary to both Christ's 
absolute being and to the method of indirect communication implicit in His 'hidden 
inwardness'. There can be no deception or seduction in Christ's practice of the maieutic 
art. To be 'drawn' into selfhood is to be drawn towards something more elevated than 
the self which is yet still only the self, and nothing fantastically 'beyond' the self, 'to 
draw to itself means first to help it truly to become itself in order then to draw it to 
itself, or it means in and through drawing it to itself to help it become itself'. 67 
This process of being 'drawn' into selfhood is akin to subjective thinking, but does 
not use reflection as the single medium of 'reduplication'; 
The being of truth is not the direct redoubling of being in relation to thinking, 
which gives only thought-being... No, the being of truth is the redoubling of truth 
within yourself. (Practice, p. 205) 
The self's encounter with the absolute is a process of existential -reflection, rather 
than thought reflection. But reflection requires a mirror, a reflecting surface upon 
which the subject can focus the self. This is, from a psychological viewpoint, just the 
meaning of the 'sign of contradiction'. A contradiction 'attracts attention' to itself; 
There is a something that makes it impossible not to look - and look, as one is 
looking one sees as in a mirror, one comes to see oneself... A contradiction placed 
squarely in front of a person... is a mirror. (Practice, pp. 126-27) 
The metaphor of the mirror is both instructive and potentially misleading. In 
medieval theology the metaphor of the mirror had stood for the central location of man 
in the divine cosmological plan. In the human soul was a model of the entire cosmic 
structure which man, as a microcosm, reflected internally. But Anti-Climacus has a 
very different notion of 'reflection' here. His is a religion of 'hidden inwardness' in a 
a cosmos from which the human subject has become detached. There is no longer any 
separation between the mirror, the observer, and the reflection. The peculiar uniformity 
and dullness of the modern world is here given a specifically religious development; the 
'compressed' subjectivity of melancholy is rediscovered in the most 'advanced' of the 
pseudonyms. Anti-Climacus expresses the notion in the language of Ekber, 'The 
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contradiction confronts him with a choice, and as he is choosing, together with what he 
chooses, he himself is disclosed'. 68 
The absolute, that is to say, does not need to do anything in order the 'draw' the 
self towards itself. The transformative power of the absolute lies simply in its being 
absolute, and this is the fundamental reason for Christianity's paucity of positive 
doctrine. The absolute defines the boundary of existence, which is simultaneously a 
boundary within existence; a mirror. The relation of selfhood, which is the paradoxical 
'contaim-nent' of the absolute within the self, and simultaneously the annihilation of the 
self in the absolute, is quite distinct from any self-generating psyche. The self does not 
'posit' the absolute as the 'other' and then relate itself to this projective image of itself, 
nor does it simply define itself as self-identity. The absolute may be discovered by the 
self as a necessary condition of its own existence. And if it is thus discovered it is by 
way of despair, and not by way of speculation or reason. Anti-Climacus in 7he 
Sickness Unto Death provides a systematic analysis of the forms of despair from a 
reflective-aesthetic perspective. But this is just a prelude to his defense of despair as 
sin, and of sin as, ultimately, the only route to religious subjectivity. There is a curious 
dialectic here. Strictly speaking sin is a rarity, as an essentially Christian category, it 
plays no part in the pagan world, and in the modern age, has been all but abolished 
along with Christianity itself. The universality of sin is, in fact, a Christian 'idea' the 
truth of which awaits the development of Christianity itself. 
Anti-Climacus claims not to be proposing for sin an elevated spiritual status. His 
argument is an extension of Judge William's. The majority of people are in despair, but 
remain unconscious of their condition, yet to despair 'seriously', even though it is a 
prelude to a leap into the ethical, is farther from, rather than nearer to, salvation. 
Similarly, 
Most men are characterized by a dialectic of indifference and live a life so far from 
the good (faith) that it is almost too spiritless to be called sin - indeed, almost too 
spiritless to be called despair. (Sickness, p. 101) 
Just as evil is opposed to the good, but also to the whole of the aesthetic, so sin is 
opposed both to faith and the whole of the aesthetic and ethical spheres. It is, therefore, 
both nearer and farther than the ethical from Christianity. The central difference 
between the consciousness of sin and purely ethical guilt-consciousness is that 'the 
earnestness of sin is its actuality in the single individual'. Hence the 'dialectic of sin is 
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diametrically contrary to that of speculation', and it is just here that Christianity begins; 
'with the teaching about sin, and thereby with the single individual'. 69 And as the 
consciousness of sin is a direct expression that 'man is separated from God by the most 
chasmal qualitative abyss', it is simultaneously an expression of offense. An active, 
voluntaristic element comes to the surface here. Offense is 'taken', it is a qualification 
of the single individual in which the single individual is aroused against something, and 
defines itself absolutely against something absolute; 'offense is the most decisive 
qualification of subjectivity, of the single individual, that is possible'. 70 
The Self 
The relation between despair and selfhood is given a more open and didactic treatment 
by Anti-Climacus in 7he Sickness Unto Death, which was published, after a year of 
prevarication, in July 1849. Its 'dialectical algebra' was published in the context of the 
appearance of a second edition of Either/Or and is, in one sense, a completion of the 
'anthropological contemplation' inaugurated by the earlier book. In completing the 
inner development of the aesthetic pseudonyms Anti-Climacus also links his work to his 
own earlier productions, and to those of his alter ego, Johannes Climacus. 
Two important ideas may serve as guides to this challenging text. Firstly he 
openly declares his opposition to the aesthetic writers' melancholic sentimentality; for 
him 'despair is interpreted as a sickness, not as a cure' . 
71 True the possibility of 
despair (which is despair itself) is a mark of humanity, and man's advantage over the 
beasts. But properly understood this privilege is a miserable condition from which all 
should seek relief. Secondly, in 7he Sickness Unto Deatb, the 'true concretion for the 
religious', the nature of which had baffled the 'Married Man' in Stages, is established 
as the self Briefly stated, then, the argument of the book is that the religious sphere of 
existence is the self, and that despair is to be other than the self. 
Anti-Climacus accepts the traditional presupposition of any religious anthropology, 
that 'a human being is spirit'. But his understanding of 'spirit' is distinctively modern, 
'spirit is the Self'. 72 What, then, is the selP His answer at first appears to be 
unfortunately opaque; 
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The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to 
itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to 
itself'. (Sickness, p. 13) 
One thing, at least, is clear from this statement, the self is to be considered as a 
'relation' rather than as an 'object'. It does not exist in some sort of primitive unity, 
but 'emerges' in some way from more basic elements of human nature. This relation, 
Anti-Climacus goes on at once to inform us, forms (ideally) a rather complex unity; 'a 
human being is a synthesis of the infinite and finite, of the temporal and eternal, of 
freedom and necessity'. 73 This synthesis is not, in itself, a self; it is merely the relation 
between the sensuous and the psychical. The self emerges from this relation, and is a 
kind of reflection of and upon this relation. The distinction is similar to that which 
Hegel makes in the Phenomenology between consciousness, and self-consciousness. 
Here, however, (and the difference is fundamental) the self's 'relating itself to itself' 
does not mean that the self constitutes a realm of absolute inner freedom. Such a 
radical, romantic, view - as exemplified particularly by Fichte - is rejected by Anti- 
Climacus on the grounds that if the self were genuinely a groundless self-creation there 
could be no despair of the form 'in despair to will to be oneself , and this is just the 
form of which the author has an especially intimate knowledge. The self-relation, 
therefore, 'has been established by another', and its gradual emergence is in conformity 
to an absolutely given structure. The self may indeed fail to emerge, or emerge as a 
fmisrelation' - and this is despair - but in any instance where it does succeed in 
establishing itself, then, 'in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self 
rests transparently in the power that established it'. 74 
Despair is thus a universal sickness, the peculiar character of the wretchedness that 
Pascal had made the centre of his religious consciousness. The fact that most people go 
through life without becoming properly aware of their own despair does not mean that it 
is not just this despair which binds them to particular types of behaviour and blinds 
them to their own potentialities. Commonly people despair over something in 
particular, but 'in despairing over sornething, he really despaired over himself and now 
he wants to be rid of himself'. 75 Despair, in this sense, is a kind of spiritual 
assertiveness, even when it asserts itself as the denial of man's spiritual character. 
Despair manifests itself in a variety of forms which flow directly from the nature of 
the synthesis through which the self ought to be established. In the synthesis of 
finitiude and infinitude, thus, the predominance of one term of the relation is a specific 
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form of despair. Infinitude's despair is the lack of finitude, 'the fantastic, the 
unlimited'. The imagination is 'the medium for the process of infinitizing', and where 
this process is unchecked by any concrete limiting conditions it 'leads a person out into 
76 the infinite in such a way that it only leads him away from himself'. This expresses 
itself as the 'abstract sentimentality' of care for a 'humanity' that 'inhumanly belongs to 
no human being', to abstract knowledge in which the self is squandered, and to the 
abstraction of the will, divorced from any present action. The excess of infinitude is a 
despair that afflicts an individual in any sphere of existence. It is not a purely aesthetic 
complaint. In some individuals, thus, there is a kind of 'religious intoxication' which is 
just as despairing as the wildest fantasy of any romantic 'young man'. Equally, 
however, finitude's despair is the lack of finitude, a 'despairing reductionism, 
narrowness'. In this case the individual 'finds it hazardous to be himself', and prefers 
77 'to be like the others, to become a copy, a number, a mass man'. 
In terms of the synthesis of possibility and necessity, there is a similar twofold 
classification of despair. Probability's despair is the lack of necessity. The self has to 
be actualized as a necessity, and not simply played with as an abstract possibility. 
When it is not anchored in necessity the self 'flounders around in possibility', reduced 
to a series of images of itself, until finally 'these phantasmagoria follow one another in 
such rapid succession that it seems as if everything were possible', and the individual 
'becomes a mirage'. 78 What is missing here is 'the power to obey, to submit to the 
necessity of one's life, to what may be called one's limitationS'. 79 Necessity's despair, 
on the other hand, is to lose possibility, which is essentially to lose faith; 'The believer 
has the ever infallible antidote for despair - possibility - because for God everything is 
possible at every moment'. 80 To lack possibility may take the form of everything 
seeming to be absolute, necessary and fixed, by some external power, or - more 
commonly - that everything has become trivial. This latter is the typically 'philistine- 
bourgeois mentality' of the Present Age, and denotes a complete loss of imagination. 
The synthesis of the temporal and the eternal is not discussed further at this point, 
having served, in fact, as the primary mode of distinguishing the 'aesthetic' from the 
I ethical'. The exaggerations of life conceived as the 'moment, or life equally devoid of 
content by representing itself as onlythe eternal, had already been profusely illustrated 
throughout the aesthetic works, and had been taken up in a systematic fashion by 
Vigilius Haufniensis in his Concept ofAnxiety. 
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The psychology of the aesthetic which the pseudonyms had developed at 
considerable length in their 'imaginary psychological constructions' is here given a 
systematic and even a scholastic form. We can thus move through a series of 
'potentiations' familiar from the earlier works. The first form is the despair of 
ignorance at having a self. The simplest and lowest form of despair is that in which the 
self is not recognised as spirit at all, and the 'sickness' of despair goes unnoticed. Of 
the more 'advanced' or conscious forms there comes first the despair of weakness; in 
despair not to will to be a self. Here despair is passive suffering, usually over external 
events, though in its most developed form it is despair over the person's own weakness, 
which is a specifically spiritual development of an 'inclosing reserve' and depends upon 
a recognition of the eternal in the self. Finally there is the despair of strength rather 
than of weakness; defiance. This is 'the despairing misuse of the eternal within the self 
to will in despair to be oneself'. 81 Here despair is a self-consciously inflicted action, a 
kind of negative image of the self to which the self clings, unable to 'lose itself' in the 
eternal so that it might regain itself in a non despairing form. 
The synthesis which is the 'self' is described by Anti-Climacus in terms of 
progressive determinants. In becoming more and more 'itself' it differentiates itself as 
an 'individual'. But this is by no means an 'asocial' conception. It does not represent a 
'withdrawal' from the world, but an increasing inclusiveness and enrichment of 
actuality qualified in terms of a personal 'point of view'. The pseudonyms, whatever 
their illusory understanding of themselves, distinguished themselves from the spiritless 
indifference of the modern crowd. The very conception and possibility of individualism, 
from a somewhat different perspective, is itself a social institution; a specific form in 
terms of which modern society is constructed, and in terms of which its characteristic 
tendencies are experienced. The consistent and at times extreme 'individualism' of the 
pseudonyms can be viewed as part of their bourgeois critique of modernity. The 
distortions of character which they vividly bring to life exemplify the elaboration of a 
variety of 'first selves' which, in a more sophisticated way than the bourgeois- 
philistinism of the crowd, represent the perversity of asocial individualism. The 
pseudonyms, though ridding themselves of many of the more obvious forms of vanity 
and envy which dominate the psychology of the crowd, are in fact under the sway of 
specific aspects of 'public opinion'. The actualization of despair is a type of 'self- 
activity' which remains wrapped up in itself. It is an illusory form of action because it 
assimilates as its content the illusions of the age. But to actualize the self in a non- 
despairing form is simultaneously to challenge and transform the actuality of social life. 
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The 'single one' is not only a social category, depending as it does on a relational 
network with others as a means to its own differentiation, it is a radical demand to 
overcome all those relations productive of illusory, despairing selfhood. In taking the 
claims of bourgeois liberalism seriously the pseudonyms turn bourgeois ideology 
against itself. The conventional requirement for self-actualization, in their hands, turns 
into an unsatisfied demand for the transformation of actuality. 
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PART THREE 
TOWARDS A THEOMORPHIC DISCOURSE 
In order for human finitude to be seen and expressed, a moment that surpasses it 
must be inherent in the situation, condition, or state of being finite... The complete 
discourse on finitude is a discourse on the finitude and the infinitude of man. 
Paul Ricoeur - Fallible Alan 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
UPBUILDING: THE ARCHITECTURE OF HAPPINESS 
All human speech, even the divine speech of the Holy Scriptures about spiritual 
matters, - 
is essentially metaphorical. 
S. Kierkegaard - Works ofLove 
The pseudonymous works, whether written from aesthetic, ethical or philosophical 
viewpoints, are all indirect in form. In being attributed to different authors they appear 
before the public in a disguised form. The connection, one with another, is deliberately 
obscured; each is made to appear more independent than it is, and none bears the 
responsibility of expressing Kierkegaard's own views. Kierkegaard goes to 
extraordinary lengths to deny himself that outdated sense of godlike omnipotence over 
his creations which remains, in spite of everything, the enabling assumption of most 
modern forms of literary activity. I Kierkegaard, rather,, like God in relation to the 
modern world, hides in his books, appearing only fugitively as an editorial assistant to 
other people's efforts. But there is something paradoxical in this reticence. In his 
directly written autobiographical study 7he Point of View for My Work as an Author, 
unpublished during his lifetime, he declares clearly enough that the entire meaning of 
his authorship is summed up in the problem of how to become a Christian, and that he 
conceives the solution to this problem as lying in the emergence of the most precise and 
highly developed form of individualism. But if, in the modern world, to become a 
Christian is synonymous with becoming an individual (or if the latter is viewed at least 
as a necessary precondition of the former), why should Kierkegaard have insisted upon 
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the puzzling fragmentation of himself in his work? Would his position not have been 
made more definite by the assumption of authorial responsibility; by demonstrating his 
individuality and earnestness as the singular creator standing behind the protean mass of 
words? 
Kierkegaard's understanding of modem existence, however, makes of any such 
direct authorship a deeper and more damaging paradox than its alternative. 
Christianity, in the sense Kierkegaard wishes to attach to that term, is a hidden and 
potential reality within the non-Christian actuality of the Present Age. His aim as a 
writer is not to describe this hidden reality, but to provoke its coming into existence in 
his readers. It is not an intellectual appreciation of Christianity, but a reduplication of 
existence into Christian categories, which is the purpose of his writing. His method is 
firstly to present a series of 'thought experiments', through which the spiritual potential 
of the present age can be tested and explored. These aesthetic adventures capture the 
reader and, through a ruthless relativizing of each possible 'existence sphere', confront 
the individual with the melancholic despair of secular life. The illusion of actuality, 
rather than depending on the authority of a single viewpoint, is communicated by 
sacrificing the privilege of authorship to a multiplicity of pseudonymous spokesmen. 
This is a dangerous method. Most obviously it runs the risk of allowing, and even 
encouraging, a purely aesthetic reading of the works. 2 Ideally a reader should 'work 
through' every position, bringing to life each successive form of despair before being 
guided (though making each transition only by an inexplicably activated leap), to the 
most radical of possibilities latent in human existence. To counteract the self-enclosed 
charm of each aesthetic position, therefore, each work is composed from more than one 
viewpoint, and is deliberately left incomplete. 
Even allowing that the aesthetic works will intensify the experience of despair, 
which is the general characteristic of secular life, Kierkegaard, in giving up all 
pretensions to authorial supremacy, cannot defend himself against misreading. 
Either/Or achieved an immediate notoriety. It captivated the reader for just the wrong 
reasons, the very reasons (sensationalism, confession, literary brilliance, critical 
originality) that Kierkegaard recognized were the common aesthetic motives for 
reading. The difficulty was to spring the trap. The warning subtitle, A Fragment of 
Dfe,, was easily ignored, and the carefully organized structure through which actuality 
might extend itself in the Present Age remained as hidden in the pseudonymous works 
as it did in life itself. It is not his maieutic deceptiveness, therefore, but Kierkegaard's 
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fidelity to the truth that ultimately limits the effectiveness of the pseudonymous 
authorship. His obligation to portray actualiy in all its psychological complexity is 
possible only because he has himself penetrated this reality and rejected as illusory the 
very charms to which the pseudonyms remained bound. The truth of the aesthetic 
works is the truth of the Present Age, the truth of despair, and the pseudonyms - as they 
must - represent the contemporary allure of melancholy. 
Kierkegaard, thus, remains hidden in the aesthetic works primarily because a more 
fundamental truth is hidden in the contemporary world. It seems that the author can 
reveal himself only at the expense of distortion and misconception. Though the aim of 
the authorship is to present the reader with fresh and unexpected possibilities of inner- 
transformation the only means at its disposal is the imaginary reconstruction of actuality 
itself. The reader is, therefore, seduced by just those illusions which, characteristically 
3 for modern life, traps the individual in despair. 
Reconstructive Reading 
Concurrently with the aesthetic production Kierkegaard published a series of short 
works under his own name. These Upbuilding Discourses are usually viewed as 'direct' 
religious works, and evidence for Kierkegaard's own claim that the entire authorship 
was guided from the beginning by a religious goal. The maieutic insincerity of the 
aesthetic works - 'my task is to get persons deceived... into religious commitment' - is, 
apparently, balanced by a parallel series of direct professions of a sincere, and perhaps 
even orthodox, Christianity. 4 The 'duplexity' of the authorship, however, is somewhat 
more complicated. If the aesthetic and philosophical works, on the basis of the 
experiences recounted by the pseudonymous writers themselves, cannot succeed in 
I making men aware', the reader must be deeply suspicious of the seriousness of any 
'direct' appeal. In what sense can their author claim these discourses to be 'upbuilding' 
or 'edifying'? The readers of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, with its revised 
theory of irony, and its evident admiration for the comic, might be forgiven the 
uncomfortable feeling that they have become the butt of some obscure joke. A feeling 
likely to be reinforced by a glance at the opening 'Preface' to the first of the Upbuilding 
Discourses which was published just a few weeks after Eitherl0r. Firstly we are told it 
is a discourse rather than a sermon because it 'lacks authority', and, even more 
obscurely, that, lacking any didactic purpose, it is an upbuilding discourse, and not a 
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discourse for upbuilding. In fact it 'wishes to be only what it is, a superfluity, and 
desires only to remain in hiding, just as it came into existence in concealment'. 5 This 
seems anything but straightforward; is S. Kierkegaard, perhaps, just a pseudonym for 
Victor EreMita? 6 
With minor variations this self-deprecating preface is repeated in each volume of 
the Upbuilding Discourses. Each is addressed to 'that single individual (hiin Enkelte) 
7 whom I with joy and gratitude call my reader'. Yet it is not directedtowards this 
reader, who remains invisibly suspended within the public to which the pseudonymous 
authors, decked out in spectacular literary refinement, had directly appealed. All such 
efforts to find a reader, any reader, let alone an appropriate reader, are rigorously 
eschewed, and the entire business of communication between author and reader is left to 
chance. These discourses must simply wait upon their adventitious discovery by that 
favourably disposed person who reads aloud to himself what I write in stillness, 
who with his voice ... summons forth what the mute letters have on their lips, as it 
were, but are unable to express without great effort... (and) rescues the captive 
thoughts that long for release. (Discourses, p. 49) 
The pseudonymous works are conventional to the extent that they are written for an 
audience, and are intended to be read. The Upbuilding Discourses, it seems, are 
artificially preserved speeches, which ought to be listened to, rather than read, but 
listened to, unusually, by oneself. Kierkegaard is, thus, speaking rather than writing. 
He is speaking to himself, and the reader, in listening to his or her own voice 
duplicating this speech, himself or herself becomes the author. The 'real' author once 
again disappears. These are at first sight melancholic texts, each, like the author who 
flees from them 'inclosed in itself',, alone with itself in a void. 8 Kierkegaard can put his 
names to these Discourses because, in being read aloud to oneself, the author is 
forgotten and the text becomes a medium for self-observation. The Upbuilding 
Discourses, thus, should not be viewed as a form of direct communication, but rather as 
a different form of indirect communication. 
Nor can they be distinguished by their subject matter. Both the pseudonymous 
works and the parallel series of Discourses are about religion, in the sense that their 
fundamental theme is the 'awakening' of the individual to his or her own obscured 
actuality (becoming Christian). And in both series the activity of writing is put to the 
service of transforming actuality, of uncovering its obscured potentiality for 
authentically Christian experience. 
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Equally, however, these Discourses cannot be assimilated to the (other) 
pseudonymous works. Their formally different characteristics are in fact reliable signs 
of a fundamental shift in perspective. Kierkegaard refers to the pseudonyms as works 
offered with 'the left hand' and the UpbuiIding Discourses as those offered with 'the 
right hand', and his ideal reader as one who 'with the right hand accepts what is offered 
with the right hand'. 9 And what is offered is a 'reduplication' of the actuality bodied 
forth in the pseudonyms. The pseudonyms provide aesthetic and philosophical 
standpoints from which to view, and indeed construct, actuality. These shifting 
perspective can all be more or less readily accommodated within the topological 
structure of the existence-spheres (aesthetic/ethical/religious), and the non-existence 
voids (ideality /sensuousness). For the pseudonymous writers this structure, depending 
upon their position within it, is only partially revealed. On closer examination the 
'ethical' tends to be absorbed by the religious or dissolved into abstraction, giving rise 
to a new uncompromising either/or; either - the aesthetic, or - the religious. All the 
pseudonyms choose 'either'. Even in their most refined philosophical reflections (the 
works of Anti-Climacus) they e, ýdst aesthetically, and construct the distinction between 
the aesthetic and the religious as a 'thought-experiment'. Religion exists for all the 
pseudonyms, as a possibility. Editorial remarks to the effect that Anti-Climacus is a 
Christian should not obscure the judgement that he is a 'philosophical' Christian, nor, 
more importantly, that such remarks betray an aestbetic admiration for his 'advanced' 
position. 
In contrast to the entire bulk and variety of aesthetic works required to express 
what still remains a mere 'Fragment of Life', the Discourses compress the entire 
complexity of religiously qualified existence into a meagre series of slender like-titled 
volumes. And where the public had been assailed with every possible literary form, 
with massive volumes replete with the richest and most varied content, by a staggering 
multiplicity which continually suggested its further elaboration and complication; now 
the solitary reader, or rather speaker, overhears a single and monotonous voice: Two 
Upbuilding Discourses (1843), is rapidly followed by 7hree Upbuilding Discourses 
(1843), Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843), Two Upbuilding Discourses (1844), 7hree 
Upbuilding Discourses (1844), Four Upbuilding Discourses (1844). 
But what can it mean to 'upbuild? '. EitberlOr had concluded with an 'Ultimatum' 
in which the perpetual movement of the aesthetic was arrested by deliberating on 'the 
upbuilding that lies in the thought that in relation to God we are always in the wrong'. 10 
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It is, in fact, the first aesthetic work that introduces the notion of upbuilding, 
suggesting, in fact, that too sharp a distinction between the discourses and the 
pseudonymous works should not be drawn. Or had spilled over, so to speak, from the 
temporary refuge of the ethical and ended with an intimation of new religious 
categories. Judge William conceives of the upbuilding by analogy with human love. A 
wronged lover wishes to believe himself or herself to be mistaken; that, in fact, they 
have not been wronged and that their beloved is completely faithful. On a human scale 
this wish to be mistaken, to be in the wrong, involves a contradiction, the wish is 
counterposed by knowledge of the circumstances. Love however, even on a human 
scale, is an 'infinite relationship', and when such a relationship is infinitely potentiated, 
and becomes a relationship with God, then the contradiction is dissolved and we are left 
only with the upbuilding; the thought that in relation to God we are continually in the 
wrong. The upbuilding is love, which acknowledges this truth without 'mental toil'. 
To seek God intellectually, on the other hand, would result in the thought that God is 
always in the right, and, paradoxically, would not be upbuilding, because the 
upbuilding is love, and not thought which succeeds only in confirming the self in its 
own limitations. 
The intimate connection between the upbuilding and love is explored in much 
greater detail in 7he Works oftove, which contains the fullest discussion of the most 
general sense that S. Kierkegaard (rather than Judge William) attaches to this now 
somewhat archaic expression. To upbuild in common language seems to refer to height, 
to growth, to an addition of some kind. But Kierkegaard distinguishes between this 
sense - which is to build on - from its meaning to build up, which is to construct afresh 
from the foundations. The upbuilding means to build 'from scratch'. II And since he is 
addressing his discourses to an already existing, if elusive, individual, the work of 
upbuilding must first of all be the work of dismantling and taking down what has 
previously been poorly constructed. It is a 'rebuilding', a building on firm 
foundation. 12 
This process of 'de construction' cannot be carried out through any aesthetic or 
philosophical form of reflection. The pseudonyms, equally, had held themselves apart 
from any speculative dialectic, and sought instead to trap the reader into a closer contact 
with actuality. The series of pseudonymous works test out the actual, and expand it 
within the consciousness and life of the reader. But actuality is full of illusions, so 
whichever route is chosen - the way of doubt or the way of anxiety - actuality, though it 
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may be 'enlarged', cannot be inwardly transformed. Kierkegaard, as the author of the 
Upbuilding Discourses, assumes such an inward transformation has, in fact, already 
taken place, and seeks to redescribe actuality; to reconstruct it - to build it up - from its 
new foundations. The aim of the author is reduplication rather than reflection; and not 
a reduplication of an existing condition of actuality, but a reduplication of the 
inwardness so well concealed in and obstructed by, every aesthetic and philosophical 
perspective on the world. The pseudonyms, that is to say, start out from some position 
within actuality and explore all the possibilities of inward development inherent in that 
position; the Discourses redefine actuality by considering it exclusively in relation to the 
transcending reality of faith. They do not describe how such a transformation is 
effected (they do not contradict the pseudonyms), but they begin by supposing that such 
a transformation has indeed been effected. They assume, that is to say, that the 
intended reader has confronted the paradox without being offended. 
Paradoxically, therefore, it is the pseudonymous works which display some 
residual homiletic purpose (though admitting their failure in this regard), while the 
explicitly 'upbuilding' works retain no trace of such an ambition. Rarely has 'preaching 
to the converted' been brought to such a refined point of self-awareness. 
The Immediacy of Trust 
The Two Upbuilding Discourses issued shortly after the publication of EitherlOr thus 
extend and complete the comparison between the aesthetic and the ethical, not by 
building on a third, and definitive, category, the religious, but by a reduplication of the 
immediacy within which the 'young man' has trapped himself. 
Rather than contrast the spiritless chaos and melancholy of boredom with the 
ethical 'seriousness' of ideal values, therefore, Kierkegaard redefines the starting point 
of personal existence as the expectation of faiLb. When the immediate is brought into 
relation to the religious, to faith, momentary pleasure is transformed into eternal 
happiness. The good, in other words, is 'potentiated' beyond the rational limits of any 
humanly calculable design. 
Faith, thus, should not be talked about as if it were a good among other possible 
goods, albeit it a greater and inherently more valuable good. The untransformed 
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aesthetic has no conception of a transcending good, and views faith as no more than 'the 
highest' of human goods and, therefore, 'transient and capricious, bestowed only upon 
the chosen few, rarely for the whole of life'. 13 But religiously viewed, faith is 
absolutely different, a good of a different sort to any other, and a good in relation to 
which human life and conduct cannot remain unaltered. It is an infinite good, and as 
such it is infinitely available to all, with equal ease. The good of faith raises no 
difficulties of distributive justice, and, as all can share equally in its benefit, the g4sh to 
possess it does not conflict with any ethical demand for fairness in its distribution. 
Indeed, in sharp contrast to all secular self-regarding desire, 
The person who wishes it for another person wishes it for himself, the person who 
wishes it for himself wishes it for every human being, because that by which 
another person has faith is not that by which he is different from him but is that by 
which he is like him. (Discourses, p. 10) 
Faith simultaneously and paradoxically confers the most specific sense of 
individuality and the most general form of commonality, 'it is the only unfailing good'. 
This qualitative distinction means that in a more profound sense it cannot become the 
object of any rational calculation, or earnest effort. It is a good which cannot be 
sought; 'it can be had only by constantly being acquired and can be acquired only by 
continually being granted'. 14 The reduplicated immediacy of the religious sphere, 
therefore, is found neither in the impotence of the romantic wish in which the self is 
abandoned 'to the anesthetizing dullness of sorrow', 15 nor in the rational earnestness of 
an ethical life which teaches 'that your wishes would not be fulfilled, that your desires 
would not be gratified, your appetites would not be heeded, your cravings would not be 
satisfied'. 16 It is fulfilled, rather, in the eApectancy of faith. Whereas, for the aesthetic, 
the choice of despair is a wilful 'deepening' of melancholy productive of illusory self- 
images, the expectancy of faith, is an effortless and unfounded trust in the authentic 
disclosure of actuality. As an aesthetic or a philosophical transition the religious 
retreats before every struggling advance. But the ediý4ng is an essentially religious 
category; it is already faith itself. 
The aesthetic is preoccupied with the moment, with the vanishing nothingness of 
the present, while the ethical misconceives of itself as a unity extended in time. Both, 
however, are subverted by an unknown and uncontrollable future. 'The future is not' 
and this negativity continually disturbs the aesthetic moment with a disturbing vision of 
empty duration (boredom), and disarms every settled ethical value with its uncertain 
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outcome (guilt). For each individual it 'presents itself externally as the enemy he has to 
encounter'. 17 Unaided the person is defeated by the future, the whole of which remains 
an unfathomable mystery. The expectancy of faith is, therefore, a victory over the 
future. And it is in expectancy of faith that 'the soul is indeed prevented from falling 
out of itself', through doubt or anxiety into sheer abstraction. 18 in contrast to this 
completely unprovoked trust in the future lies all 'wishing, hoping, longing for 
something, craving, coveting', which typifies the aesthetic, as well as the 'deep and 
crafty passion' of reasoned philosophical doubt, or even the concentrated wilfulness of 
the ethical life. 
This is an expectancy which flows from faith itself, if it does not it is merely 
whishfulness. 'The reason we so often go astray', claims the writer, 'is that we seek 
assurance of our expectancy'. But 'the person of faith demands no substantiation of his 
expectancy ... Time can neither substantiate nor refute it, because faith expects an 
eternity'. 19 
Timeless expectation of faith is a new immediacy. Its eternity, which can be 
neither wished for nor willed into existence, is not an object of thought, an intellectual 
construct, but is 'grasped' through love. Religiously transformed immediacy is simply 
the realization of love. But where the aesthetic had sought the ephemeral pleasure of the 
erotic, and the ethical could conceive love only within the form of marriage, Christian 
existence is suff-used with God's agape. And the content of renewed immediacy is this 
changeless and universal love. 
Thus, as distinct from any erotic particularity, he asks, 'What is it that is never changed 
though everything is changed? It is love, and that alone is love, that which never becomes 
something else'. 20 The endless availability of God's love, its unquenchable resourcefulness, 
transforms the egotism of the erotic into a form of self-love which, as it is also love of God, is 
spontaneously universal In its scope. It does not require ethical constraint, it is ethical in itself. 
Christian immediacy always 'bears the mark of God's love, without which it would become 
21 silliness or insipid philandering'. 
The aesthetic, including its ethical self-denials, are wracked by continuous tension, 
by doubt and by dread, by irreconcilable difference. The immediacy of Christian love, 
however, sustains an entire world of inwardness without damaging contradictions. 
Love, thus, seeks out and discovers, it is the immediate awareness of all particularities, 
and, therefore, it 'discovers a multitude of sins. Indeed, free of all self-delusion it 
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discovers sin more readily than does either conventional wisdom or deliberative 
philosophical reflection. Yet, simultaneously and uncomprehendingly it conceals what 
it finds. This is, from a philosophical standpoint, 'simply foolishness', and the author 
asks on behalf of the speaker of the text 'what is love? Is it a dream in the night that one 
has by sleeping? Is it a stupor in which everything is forgottenT. 22 But, he assures his 
specially receptive reader, 'Love is no dream'. Where the dream, we might say, 
characterizes the fluid border between existence and non-existence, and is, consequently 
charged with doubt and dread, love is an antidote to all 'light-minded or heavy-spirited 
anxiety'. 23 
The knowledge gained through love is concerned rather than indifferent, or 
passionate. It is continually focused on actuality, and does not take the thinker away 
from existence because the 'sphere' of love is infinitely inclusive. The reduplication of 
love, in contrast to the reflection of abstract deliberation, is free of all 'doleful self- 
consuming'. The all inclusive immediacy of love is exemplified in 'apostolic speech' 
which, far from being 'thoughtless', is 
concerned, ardent, burning, inflamed, everywhere and always stirred by the forces 
of the new life ... everywhere witnessing to the powerful unrest of the spirit and 
the profound importance of the heart. (Discour, 5es, p. 69) 
Concern, rather than wonder (Socrates), or doubt (Descartes), or desire (Hegel), or 
melancholy (Pseudonyms) sets in motion the process of expansion and differentiation of 
inwardness. It is the inverse of those characteristic forms of modern experience - 'self- 
inclosing reserve' and the frenzy of egotism - which stem from the sense of isolation 
within a void, and marks, therefore, the first genuine break with melancholy. 
The 'inner-strengthening' of concern is an enrichment of the self. Concern does 
not lead the self out of actuality, which conforms itself, so to speak, with the self's own 
growth and development. The boundaries of the self, thus, remain coterminous with 
the boundaries of actuality. The differentiation of trust, expectancy, love, and concern, 
are not separated parts or sections of the self, but, rather, should be viewed as 
interrelated aspects of a single actuality. 
The recalcitrant secular ego, which exists as the illusory separation of appearance 
and reality, and is sustained by the artificiality of contrived passions, cannot easily be 
renounced or overcome. As the activity of 'willing' or 'renouncing' are themselves part 
of the secular integument of the ego, all deliberative endeavours confirm, rather than 
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negate, the illusory objects of desire. This is, religiously viewed, the central problem 
of the Fall. Knowledge, rather than guiding human action, suspends itself in doubt, and 
creates its own fantastic and inhuman realm. Faith is distinct from knowledge not 
because of its irrationality but, primarily, by virtue of its availability as a gift. Faith 
cannot be sought, it can only be received; in one of Kierkegaard's favourite texts fevery 
good and every perfect gift is from above'. 24 
Secular thought, 'distracted by life's confusing distinctions', is then reformed and, 
becoming an aspect of love, reduplicates itself as the 'likeness with God'. In stark 
contrast to the aesthetically conceived 'teleological suspension of the ethical', and its 
'arrogant pride in difference', or the view of religious individuality as the 'exception', 
in religious immediacy 'every externality is discarded as imperfect, and equality is true 
for all'. 25 
Every 'upbuilding' view of life begins with this 'divine equality', which is founded 
in the non-reciprocal God-relation. No human can return the gift which is of ultimate 
value, so that, in the face of this infinite indebtedness all humans gain equality. This 
again is a conception at odds with either an aesthetic pride in distinction, or an ethical 
demand for universal standards of justice. 
Nothing can be done, and nothing needs to be done, to acquire the infinite good of 
God's love. Indeed, trust and expectancy, the reduplication of immediacy, are difficult 
just because we disturb its groundless trust with human calculation and effort. Nor does 
our maintenance in its categories require anything other than patience, which is simply 
another aspect of expectancy. Patience is a form of continuity unknown either to the 
aesthetic (whose only continuity is in boredom), or to the ethical (which is preserved in 
the repetition of wilfulness). The religious is an eternity which is indifferent to the 
human preoccupation with continuity; but the delicate human contact with that which 
absolutely is, can, from the human side, always be disturbed. Religious immediacy, 
therefore, is preserved in patience, and, 'If a person does not use the help of patience, 
he may, with all his effort and diligence, come to preserve nothing else and thereby to 
have lost his Soul 1.26 impatience of any sort is inimical to spiritual growth: 
Not only did he lose his soul who danced the dance of pleasure until the end, but 
also the one who slaved in worry's deliberation and in despair wrung his hands 
night and day. (Discourses, p. 187) 
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Patience is the maintenance the soul within the confines of actuality. It is, in one 
sense, both a form of deliberation and a species of anxiety. But where both doubt and 
anxiety tempt the individual out of himself or herself into abstraction, patience is the 
deliberative and anxious aspect of an all inclusive religious immediacy and is, therefore, 
from a deeper point of view, neither doubtful nor anxious. Patience is continuous with 
the life it preserves. There is nothing ironic or mocking, nothing despairing in its 
persistence. 
It is characteristic of both aesthetic wishfulness and ethical earnestness to conceive 
of life in terms of more or less distant goals, and the satisfactions of life in terms of 
'reaching' these goals. But in sternly abandoning 'the fraudulence of wishes', the 
thought of salvation, which reason assimilates to wishfulness, has become frivolous: 
Eternal salvation seems to have become what the thought of it has become, a loose 
and idle phrase, at times virtually forgotten, or arbitrarily left out of the language, 
or indifferently set aside as an old-fashioned turn of speech no longer used but 
retained only because it is so quaint. (Discourses, p. 254) 
But expectancy and patience 'pertain to a person essentially' and not to some particular 
condition of the world. The continuity of patience, therefore, is neither the 
instantaneous fulfilment of a wish, nor a measurable 'progress' towards a goal. As the 
individual does nothing to gain the goal, 'his innermost life is equally important to him 
at every moment'. 27 
The thought of salvation, the genuine expectancy and the patience in which it is 
held, can never be indifferent. And in religiously transformed immediacy, there is no 
separation between the thought of salvation and salvation itself, both are called 
expectancy. The centrality of expectancy and patience in the Upbuilding Discourses 
manifests a profound shift in perspective. One of the most characteristic thoughts of all 
the pseudonyms (and one too easily attributed to both S. Kierkegaard and Soren 
Kierkegaard), is their insistence upon discontinuity. The existence-spheres are linked 
'developmentally', but between one and another stretches an abyss that cannot be 
f mediated'. The 'movement' from one sphere to another is effected by a nonrational, 
and therefore incomprehensible, leap. Yet in the Discourses there are no sharp 
divisions. Their author tells us directly that 'A sudden transition is a terrible hazard'. 28 
Indeed, the aesthetic authors appear, from the new perspective, to be reckless. Their 
infatuation with the leap is the product of melancholy and provokes only a more 
tenacious form of despair. Expectancy, which is expectancy of salvation, is world 
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transforming but at the same time, rather than bewildering or engrossing, it is infinitely 
consoling. The aesthetic writers are, therefore, wishful rather than expectant: 
It is not the expectancy of the eternal but a superstitious belief in the future ... the 
person does not rest in the trustworthiness of the eternal but dupes himself with the 
possibility of the future, which merely engrosses one as does the solving of riddles. 
(Discourses, p. 259) 
While from an aesthetic viewpoint each existence sphere is characterized by a 
negative and unstable disposition (boredom, guilt, sin), the religious reduplication of 
immediacy as patient expectation is 'the genuine joy of self-denial'. 29 This 'humble 
self-denial remains true to itself', and is at once a process of self-realization and of self- 
annihilation. 30 What is abandoned is the secular ego, what he calls the 'first self , 
which is composed of vain and illusory 'needs', and what is left, expanding as it were to 
take its place, is the 'deeper self' of the genuine 'single one'. 'Self-denial' is the same as 
'self-expression' or 'self-development', and is the only real form of 'self-knowledge'. 
No Socratic questioning can throw the 'deeper self' into relief, its coming into 
existence is an act of worldly self-denial which is the unique possibility of religious 
simplicity and immediacy. 
This bifurcation into a 'first self' and a 'deeper self' allows Kierkegaard to 
establish his position in relation to two important religious traditions. The first is 
mysticism. As early as 7he Concept ofIronyhe had expressed a deep distrust of the 
idea of mystical union as the goal of religious life. 31 The commitment of the 
pseudonyms, including the author of the Discourses, is to a religious transformation of 
actuality rather than any religiously inspired movement 'beyond' actuality. The 
annihilation of the 'first self' should not be conceived, therefore, as the obliteration of 
an individual identity in some 'higher' state of consciousness. Quite the contrary, it is 
only the 'deeper self' which is capable of containing within it the totality of qualitative 
differences of which the individual is actually composed. 32 The 'first self' belongs to 
the world of appearances, and represent, in fact, the most stubborn of actual illusions. 
The second major tradition is that associated with the idea of Christian 'works'. 
As a Lutheran, of course, Kierkegaard insisted upon the fundamental position that grace 
was an unearned gift. But he did not deny, any more than did Luther, the significance 
of 'works' of any sort. The prime example was the work of 'self-denial' as active 
upbuilding, that is, as the tireless breaking-down of the illusions of selthood. The 
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deeper self, however, does not act at all, and in relation to it works are of no 
significance. 
Both these traditions, and Kierkegaard's reaction to them, are central to the 
author's discussion of comfort of 'self-denial'. On the one hand, 
before this comfort can come, you must understand that you yourself are simply 
nothing; you must chop down the bridge of probability that wants to connect wish 
an impatience and desire and expectation with the object wished for, desired, and 
expected; you must renounce the worldly mentality's association with the future; 
you must retreat into yourself ... sinking down into your own nothingness and 
surrendering yourself to grace and disgrace. (Discourses, p. 306-7) 
But, on the other hand, we are advised peremptorily to 'give up wishing; act. We 
normally view action as an attempt to fulfil a wish, so the action referred to here is the 
action of self-denial. The 'first self' is a product of desire, so self-denying action in 
relation to it is the renunciation of desire. The self's entanglement in the vanity of 
appearances stems from the outgoing character of desire. The author is at one with 
Pascal in declaring that 'the eye aims its arrows outward every time passion and desire 
tighten the bowstring'. Self-denying action, therefore is a struggle to free the 'deeper 
33 
self' from being 'an instrument of war in the service of inflexible drives'. 
Real self-knowledge begins with the ascendancy of the 'deeper self'; when it 
'shapes the deceitful flexibility of the surrounding world in such a way that it is no 
longer attractive to that first self'. 34 The first self is not lost, but transformed in a new 
religious immediacy. The consolation of this new religious self-knowledge, which is 
knowledge of God, lies in action rather than in resignation: 
He does not want a person to be spiritually soft and to bathe in the contemplation 
of his glory, but in becoming known by a person he wants to create in him a new 
human being. (Discourses, p. 325) 
The individual, in a deeper sense, becomes aware that 'he is capable of nothing at all'. 
And because of this, whatever the worldly sufferings into which the first self is drawn, 
the deeper self 'has nothing for which to reproach himself', and is for ever fTee of 
gUilt. 15 
The gaining of a specifically Christian immediacy, as the liberation of the 'deeper 
self', can now be seen as a continuous, if not as an actually progressive, development. 
Self-denial, viewed religiously, is a matter of resolution, which is 'waking up to the 
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eternal'. Waking up, that is to say a 'coming to' the self, rather than a wide-awake 
decision is both instantaneous and enduring. Thus, while 'the whole thing takes only a 
moment, just come to a resolution'; equally, resolution 'is a question not of boldly 
leaping out but of saving himself'. 36 
The enduring resolution of Christian inwardness appears, from an ethical 
standpoint, as 'precipitousness, immaturity, and haste'. 37 The cowardliness of the first 
38 But the un ustified and self 'has won sagacity over to its side', and teaches caution. i 
reckless foolishness of the deeper self is 'foolishness with regard to something in which 
there is nothing at all to win if one does not stake everything'. 39 The religious 
transformation, thus, is a transformation in the form, as well as in the aim, of 
resolution. Aesthetic enthusiasm, and ethical wilfulness, is a 'glittering delusion' in 
which 'resolution itself becomes a seducer and a deceiver instead of a trustworthy 
40 guide'. 
To 'waken up' the deeper self is also to 'venture the truth'. It is both to shake the 
individual free of all aesthetic sleepiness, and at the same time, against any conception 
of ethical seriousness, it is to 'risk everything'. 
A Religion of the Heart 
During 1846 Kierkegaard wrote three longer discourses, Upbuilding Discourses in 
Various Spirits, or as one translator proposes in a Different Spirit, or in a Different 
Vein. 41 They are that is to say, Upbuilding Discourses, in a somewhat different sense to 
those that 'accompanied' the pseudonymous works. Written after the first 'termination' 
of the authorship in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and not immediately published, 
they present an independent (though not direct) statement of the character of modern 
religiosity. 42 
These writings do not seem intended to be read aloud, they are much longer than 
the earlier series of discourses, but they are clearly meant to be read as if they had been 
composed by the reader himself or herself. The author, once again, 'wholly abandons' 
his work to that 'solitary individual ... by whom 
it wishes to be received as if it had 
arisen within his own heart'. 43Where the original series had opposed both aesthetic and 
ethical categories to a new, topologically simple, religious immediacy described through 
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mutually reinforcing and inclusive terms, these later pieces reconsider the relevance of 
differentiated 'stages' to this immediacy. The inward transformation of Christianity, 
that is, bodies forth not simply a new 'totalising' immediacy, but a new 'aesthetic', a 
new 'ethical' and, significantly, a new 'religious' sphere of actuality. These redefined 
spheres, as differentiated aspects of a religion of the heart, are all forms of 'Christian' 
experience. In describing them the old terminology of the pseudonyms is abandoned, 
but, in terms of its interrelated threefold structure, Upbuilding Discourses in Various 
Spirits bears an obvious relation to Stages in Life's Way. 
Rather than begin again with the aesthetic, the first and longest discourse, Purity of 
Heart is to Will One 7hing, might be seen as a new religiously inspired ethiC. 44 Indeed 
it can be seen as a determined and overdue attempt to re-establish the ethical which had 
been assimilated by the earlier pseudonyms to the religious ('ethico-religious'), and, 
though granted a certain distinctiveness in the Upbuilding Discourses had there been 
grouped jointly with the aesthetic against the religious (aesthetico-ethical). Does the 
ethicaL, then, have a genuine place within a religiously transformed actuality? 
In terms of the earlier pseudonymous scheme of existence-spheres the ethical is 
defined through the action of the will, but is recognized primarily in the immediacy of 
guilt which is the inevitable after-effect of intentional acts. The religious form of will is 
introduced, therefore, in the transformation of guilt into remorse and repentance. The 
religious reduplication of remorse is a 'guide' to the emerging ethical consciousness of 
the Christian; 'He is not so quick of foot as the indulgent imagination, which is the 
servant of desire. He is not so strongly built as the victorious intention'. 45 Remorse, as 
all religious forms, is an expression of the eternal within the confines of human 
subjectivity. Its development into repentance, therefore, is a growing awareness of the 
eternal as a continuous human presence. Repentance is not simply a religious 
I expression' for guilt - its translation into a new and arbitrary vocabulary - but, 
simultaneously, its unfailing consolation. Tbus, 'what neither a man's burning wish nor 
his determined resolution may attain to, may be granted unto him in the sorrowing of 
repentance'. 46 Christian ethical consciousness begins in repentance rather than in the 
acknowledgement of any external, or autonomously fashioned, and binding norm; it is 
formed in sorrow rather than from a sense of 'ought'. 
Equally, however, repentance is not to be confused with any form of aesthetic 
immediacy. It demands a maturity of heart, a calm mood, endurance in religious 
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actuality. Superficially viewed repentance 'can easily be confused with its opposite, 
with the momentary feeling of contrition ... with a painful agonizing sorrow after the 
world ... with a desperate feeling of grief in itself, that is, with impatience'. 
47 Sudden 
repentance lacks true inwardness, it is untouched by 'the inner anxiety of the heart' 
which religious immediacy, rather than negating, deepens and consoles. 
It is this 'silent daily anxiety' that also distinguishes the Christian ethical 
consciousness from any socially useful imperative. 'The improvement towards society', 
typical of Judge William's ethical life-view, in other words, is not to be confused with 
'the resigning of himself to God. '48 
The coherence and character of the Christian ethic which emerges in repentance is 
defined both by the qualification of, and by the individual's relation to, the actuality that 
springs from it. Kierkegaard uses a Platonic formulation in discussing the ethical aspect 
of modern Christianity; its ethical actuality is the Good, and Christian repentance 
develops into a 'will to the Good'. But, since the Good is uniquely unity and 
simplicity, this is 'to will one thing'. The earlier Discourses had viewed the 
'upbuilding' as a gradual uncovering of the 'deeper self', a self which cannot properly 
be thought of in terms of 'willing' at all. To 'will one thing'. therefore, is not to will a 
specific good, or the general good, but to wilfully overcome the barriers that lie in the 
way of the spontaneous emergence of the Good in the form of the 'deeper self'. 
Properly to will one thing is to will the Good. To will 'one thing' which is not the 
Good, is to will an illusion of the Good, and is, therefore, to will diversity and 
changeableness. This he calls double-mindedness. In a typically Augustinian analysis 
Kierkegaard strengthens and broadens the earlier pseudonyms' critique of aesthetic 
immediacy. Quite apart from those who despairingly will diversity and 'see themselves 
in the magic mirror of possibility which hope holds before them while the wish flatters 
them'. those who will pleasure as a principle still Will MUltipliCity. 49 And not only to 
will pleasure, but to will honour, riches or power is characteristically double-minded. 
Thus honour, for example, is not one thing, 'worldly honour is a whirlpool, a play of 
confused faces, an illusory moment in the flux of opinions'. Its apparent unity is 'a 
sense deception, as when a swarm of insects at a distance seem to the eye like one 
body'. 50 
The deception of unity itself conceals the more vital illusion that the worldly goal 
has a 'reality' of its own: 
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the worldly goal is not one thing in its essence because it is unreal. Its so-called 
unity is actually nothing but emptiness which is hidden beneath the manyness. In 
the short lived moment of delusion the worldly goal is therefore a multitude of 
things ... in the next moment 
it changes into its opposite. (Purity, pp. 59-60) 
The double-minded, additionally, seeks a 'reason', other than its goodness, to will 
the Good; 'to will the Good for the sake of the reward is, as it were, a symbol of 
double-mindedness'. 51 Equally it is double-minded to will the Good from fear of 
punishment. Here the genuinely ennobling becomes superstitiously confused with the 
merely tempting. 
The 'reward-centred man' is a contemporary commonplace, but the deeper 
deceptiveness of modern life is exemplified in 'the man who wills the Good and wills its 
victory out of self-centred wilfulness'. 52 This is a more subtle and resistant form of 
egotism, a type of impatience which 'effervesces' in the moment, and knows nothing of 
'daily self-forgetfulness'. 53 And it is another typically modern form of egotism which 
limits commitment to the Good with the double-mindedness that 'dwells in the press of 
busyness'. Busyness 'is like a charm' in which the individual becomes entangled in 'the 
mass of connections, stimuli, and hindrances' that 'make it ever more impossible to win 
any deeper knowledge of himself . 
54 Busyness interrupts the time and the quiet in 
which the self can 'win the transparency' of its own deeper nature. 
Religiously viewed, therefore, the ethical demand is continually directed inward, 
not because isolation has any special value of its own, but because 'the crowd' is the 
home of illusion and the source of self-deception. The overriding claim of morality is 
the obligation towards the deeper self, 'there is but one fault, one offense: disloyalty to 
his own self or the denial of his own better self'. 55 This is why the writer of the 
discourse must eschew all literary trickery in presenting his case. The merely clever or 
impressive has no more claim on the 'deeper self' of the reader than has 'busyness' or 
any other form of double-mindedness. The 'exalted earnestness of the eternal' ought 
not to be confused with an aesthetically conceived 'aroused state of consciousness', and 
the genuinely edifying, therefore, requires 'neither the commendation of the majority 
56 nor the commendation of eloquence. 
The upbuilding, therefore, has nothing to do with 'moralising' in the sense of 
urging upon anyone the virtue of some specific 'value' as a guarantor of 'correct' 
conduct. Nor is the ethical, as purity of heart, the only form of the edifying. The 
religious transformation is a total remaking of actuality, so that the Upbuilding 
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Discourses in Various Spirits seeks to make the reader aware of the 'deeper self also in 
relation to renewed aesthetics. Kierkegaard here exploits one of his favourite texts, 
inviting the reader to Consider the LilieS. 57 
This discourse is quite distinct from the long tradition of theologically inspired 
contemplation of nature. It is not the design, nor the impressiveness, nor the beauty, 
nor the sublime incomprehensibility of nature that is the focus of the discourse, but its 
specific capacity to 'distract' the anxious. Where in the earlier pseudonymous works 
the aesthetic is portrayed as a dangerous multiplicity of immediate sensations and 
reflections, the new aesthetic discovers, through the prospect of nature rather than in the 
'busyness' of human life, a positive value in distraction. Thus, where for the 
untransformed inwardness of melancholy distraction is always a self-defeating illusion 
in which melancholy itself is strengthened, the reduplicated 'deeper self' can discover 
itself in every chance encounter with the world. The Gospel suggests specific images 
which, in their symbolic condensation of a human predicament, capture and calm the 
attention of a restless spirit. 
The invitation to Consider Me Lilies is a model for all 'upbuilding' discourses. It 
is addressed to the anxious, and any human intrusion on anxiety, by imposing upon it 
fresh comparisons with lesser or greater anxieties, serves only to reinforce its 
groundless sorrow. The discourse has no power to persuade, but, like 'the lilies of the 
field and the birds of the air' distracts the anxious by holding itself apart from all 
comparisons. In observing (reading) them the anxious are comforted. If 'in his sorrow 
a man really observes the lilies and the birds', then, 'all by himself, unnoticed, from 
them learns something about himself'. 58 
The common 'neglected lily' serves as a symbol of a new religious immediacy; it 
grows effortlessly in its neglect, adorning itself without concern or anxiety over the 
judgement of others. The 'birds of the air', on the other hand, represent untransformed 
immediacy; it is 'the restless thought of comparison, which roams far and wide, 
inconstant and fickle, and acquires an unhealthy knowledge of difference'. 59 Yet 
correctly observed the birds also distract from and soothe anxiety, they teach a person 
'to be content with what it is to be a man, to be content with what it is to be dependant, 
the creature as little capable of sustaining himself as of creating himself. '60 
The double-meaning of 'distraction', and the ambiguity of the natural symbols of 
eternity, follows directly from the characteristic double-mindedness of modern life. For 
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the anxious person, intent upon creating and sustaining himself through artificial 
differences, and 'to be himself his own Providence', distraction strengthens the 'first 
self'. The care of the self becomes misconceived as the constant struggle to satisfy 
externally imposed needs. And the effort, in anxiety, to establish the self as 
autonomous in fact leads to its subordination under appearances. The desire for 
distraction follows from this illusory lack of freedom. For the religiously 'reduplicated' 
individual, however, distraction is a continuous sinking into the 'deeper self'; a 
distraction into, rather than away from, reality. 
The religious contemplation of nature as 'freedom from care', is a consolation for, 
rather than the abolition of, a deeper anxiety. Compared to the lily or the bird, the 
human being is created in the image of God, and to be spirit is 'man's invisible glory. 
The consciousness of this likeness (worship) is a kind of anxiety in which the human 
preserves its superiority over natural creatures. The upbuilding in the vision of nature 
lies', therefore, both in the distraction from artificial differences among people, and in 
the arousal of the genuine and common difference between the human and the natural. 
The flight of the bird, thus, soothes and tranquillizes and in its sight one 'forgets 
imaginary anxiety'. Yet the flight of the bird is an 'imperfect symbol' of faith. Its 
freedom from care only corresponds partially to the human potential for spirituality. 
Human perfection, which resides in a purely spiritual likeness to God, is invisible and 
continually provokes an inner tension in the painful awareness of the continuing 
abysmal difference between man and God. The careless indifference of the bird is an 
'intermediary' between the secular anxiety of the human crowd, and the worshipful 
anxiety in which the individual carefully preserves the difference between the human 
and the divine. 
Consider the Lilies represents an aesthetic essay 'in a new spirit', but, as the new 
Christian immediacy had been the central subject matter of Eighteen Upbuilding 
Discourses, it can be content with a less elaborate development than that provided for 
the 'ethical' discourse that preceded it. The third discourse, 7he Gospel of Sufferings, 
is Kierkegaard's first attempt to describe the 'religious sphere' from a decisively 
Christian standpoint, and completes the transformation of the topological and 
anthropological perspectives introduced by the earlier pseudonyms. 
For the 'aesthetic' writers the 'religious sphere' was conceived as the ultimate 
potentiation' of the possibilities inherent in actuality. Restricted to the 'exceptional 
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individual' the religious was viewed romantically as the endless prolongation of a 
moment of divine pleasure. And for Johannes Climacus, beginning with an 'ethical' 
(universal) conception of actuality, religion appeared before him as the impenetrable 
barrier of the Paradox and Offense. Beginning from either the aesthetic or the ethical, 
religion constituted 'another' sphere, a topologically specific region of reality, to which 
human beings were drawn, but into which, they could not penetrate. Viewed 
anthropologically the pseudonyms saw the specific character of the religious 'sphere' in 
terms of the self-expansion of actuality against the constraining forces of non-existence 
(ideality and sensuousness), and for them Christianity was the conquest of doubt and 
anxiety. But from a religious perspective Kierkegaard had shown these views were all 
deceptions; self-generated illusions embedded in the structure of modern society. 
Religiously viewed the aesthetic becomes 'patient expectation' and 'trust' rather than the 
moment, and the ethical becomes 'self-denial' rather than self-expression. And 
religiously viewed the 'religious sphere' similarly becomes inverted. Rather than 
hoping, in some persistent Hegelian delusion, that the religious will bring an end to the 
Offense, that in it the Paradox will be resolved and the inner tensions of actuality 
somehow transcended, the Upbuilding view is that these painful obstacles to any 
religious transition become, in the transition itself, the sources of a new religious joy. 
For the aesthetic, the ethical and the philosophical pseudonyms, that is to say, the 
religious is a dreamt of sphere within which suffering (however defined) is abolished; 
but for the religiously transformed view of life the religious finds consolation and more 
in these sufferings, which are 'the joyous signs that the right way is being followed'. 61 
And although 'there must be nothing that the follower is not willing to give up' and in a 
sense, 'the greater the suffering the nearer the perfection', this is not to be thought of as 
a unique heroic event, but as a daily pursuit of self-denial. 62 Christianity does not alter 
anything outward; 'Humanly speaking, no new suffering has been added, nor, on the 
other hand, has any old suffering been taken away'. 63 Thus, 'A Christian may have to 
suffer exactly as he suffered before, but yet for a Christian the heavy burden has 
become light'. 64 
The patience of religious immediacy gains depth and inwardness in this 
transformation. Meekness is the religious sentiment commensurate with the burden 
made light, and, as a humanly unrewarded virtue 'is the most distinctive mark of the 
65 Christian'. 
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Religious suffering is upbuilding. Where it is impossible, religiously speaking, for 
one person to help another, suffering is essentially educative. In 'coming to know' 
through suffering human differentiation is not reintroduced, 'it is not a matter of 
aptitude'. 66 Suffering is an aspect of developing self-knowledge, and makes possible 
knowledge of the 'deeper self': 
Suffering directs a man to look within. If it succeeds, the man will not 
despairingly resist, nor seek, for the sake of forgetfulness, to plunge into the 
distractions of the world, into astounding enterprises, into an all-embracing and 
undifferentiated knowledge. (Sufferings, p. 56) 
Suffering teaches the self-knowledge of obedience, and 'there is no obedience apart 
67 from suffering, no faith apart from obedience'. Suffering, that is to say, like 
meekness, and faith, is an aspect of (rather than a topologically distinct region within) 
the religious reduplication of actuality. 
Religiously, r%IrI suffering brings joy rather than despair. For Kierkegaard, as indeed 
for the earlier pseudonyms, it is clear that 'reason cannot comprehend what can be 
gained by suffering. But, from his different perspective, Kierkegaard is aware of a 
deeper connection between this inexplicable mystery and the notion that God is love. 
He distinguishes, thus, between the consequences of 'innocent suffering' which is doubt 
of others (Rousseau), 'guilty suffering' which is the self-doubt contained in the 
consciousness of sin (Anti-Climacus), and the 'religious suffering' which, in continually 
being aware that before God the human is essentially guilty, 'consists in absolute joy f. 
The suffering of the Christian is a voluntary acceptance of what is, in fact, an essential 
relation. The relation, of course, remains the same whether or not the individual 
becomes aware and accepts it. But in remaining unaware, the person is diverted into 
purely human, distractive, forms of suffering. Recognition of the inescapable guiltiness 
of the human before a loving God is the foundation of both religious suffering and the 
joy which it brings. Tribulation is the essential form of a Christian's joyful suffering, 
68 and 'inasmuch as tribulation is the way, doubt perishes'. 
Suffering is a form of self-knowledge, a way (though not a rational means) in 
which the 'deeper self' is revealed. In this religious perspective S. Kierkegaard, as 
distinct from the passionate Johannes Climacus, views genuine self-knowledge as 
disinterestedness. It is, indeed, 
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the most difficult form of disinterestedness, to have no regard to one's own ideas of 
gain, and to the fertile excuses of one's passions, nor yet to the powerful bodings 
of a terror-struck imagination, in the consciousness of sin. (Sufferings, p. 129) 
It is only disinterested, however, because the 'deeper self' is incapable of action and, 
therefore, has no 'interest' beyond itself. Thus, though it is strictly speaking senseless 
to talk in the secular language of calculation, the situation might be 'rationalized' by 
saying that, as God's love is infinite, the tribulations inflicted by the form in which this 
love is accessible (suffering) is 'outweighed' by the 'benefit' of religious reduplication 
which it brings about. Eternity is incommensurate with suffering, but from a human 
point of view it is true that 'the least part of the blessedness of eternity weighs infinitely 
more than the most prolonged earthly suffering'. 69 
A theomorphic reconstruction of actuality is traced in the upbuilding literature. 
Taken together, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, and the Upbuilding Discourses in 
Various Spirits, suggest that such a religious transformation deprives actuality of none 
of its content. The 'aesthetic', the 'ethical', and the 'religious' persist in it, but they 
have been 'deconstructed' into elements and then recombined according to a new 
pattern. Now there are no separated 'spheres', no abysmal 'gaps' in existence, and no 
moments of terrifying transition. The aesthetic, the ethical and the religious now 
coexist as a single totality viewed under different aspects. In a deeper sense, therefore, 
this reconstructed totality is religious through and through. All its organising principles 
and characteristic forms, whether or not they serve the immediate interests of the 
aesthetic or the ethicat, or even of the old 'religious', are religious in a new way. Their 
mode of interconnection, too, is quite new. And as there is now only a single 
'existence-sphere', a topologically uniform simplicity, differentiation takes place in 
terms of temporal succession. 70 Trust, expectation, patience, self-denial, meekness, joy 
in suffering represent both a 'progress' in religious life, a deepening and maturing of 
Christian inwardness, and, equally, they are equivalent transformations each touching 
for a moment the secular life of the individual and remaking it inwardly. The 
individual, thus, should not be pictured as making steady 'progress' through these 
categories towards some 'ultimate' Christian consummation. These are simply the 
forms in which actuality now presents itself, and life becomes a continuous flux within 
them. The fundamental difference between the frenzy of the Present Age and this 
continuous modulation of inwardness, is that all these latter forms, being touched by 
eternity, are equally Christian ways of existing, and, therefore, in a deeper sense, 
confirm the subject's non-melancholic selfhood. 
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It is characteristic of Kierkegaard's description of religious reduplication that all 
the paradoxes of the earlier pseudonyms give way to new forms which, without 
resolving or transcending their differences, contain them. In the Christian reduplication 
of immediacy there is no longer an eitherlor; the aesthetic andthe ethical, andthe 
religious subsist as aspects of the totality of existence reflected in the single individual. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EDIFICATION: THE CONQUEST OF MELANCHOLY 
Whoever seeks mere edification,, and whoever wants to shroud in a mist the 
manifold variety of his earthly existence and of thought, in order to pursue the 
indeterminate enjoyment of this indeterminate divinity, may look where he likes to 
find all this. He will find ample opportunity to dream up something for himself. 
But philosophy must beware of the wish to be edifying. 
G. W. F. Hegel - PbenormnoJogy of Spirit 
... no one can 
have a true conception of God without having a corresponding 
conception of life and of oneself, or a true conception of oneself without a 
corresponding conception of God, or a true conception of life without a 
corresponding conception of oneself. A poetic creative fancy, or a conception at 
the distance of indifferent thought, is not a true conception. Neither does the 
conception of God come as an incidental addendum to that conception of life and of 
oneself. On the contrary, it comes and penetrates and crowns everything and was 
present before it became clear. 
S. Kierkegaard - Aree Discourses on Imagined Occasions 
Christian reduplication dissolves into a single reality the topological distinctness of 
existence-spheres. This reconstructed totality has nothing outside of itself, that is to say 
it has only God outside of itself. Viewed anthropologically the human synthesis 'relates 
itself to itself' and does so 'before God, and religiously reduplicated there are no 
'alien' elements in this synthesis. There is no tendency within religiously reduplicated 
actuality towards either ideality or sensuousness, and, therefore, no 'transition zones' of 
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doubt or anxiety. Actuality becomes 'all of a piece', a network of internal relations, 
which is wholly human in all its aspects. There is no part of actuality which is not 
completely human, and no aspect of the human which is not wholly actual. I 
The Christian freedom from the misplaced doubt and anxiety generated by the 
illusions of the public, is the particular subject of the Christian Discourses which were 
published in 1848. Where Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits describes the 
deconstruction of the original existence-spheres and the reconstruction of a single sphere 
of Christian actuality, Christian Discourses proposes a distinctively Christian 
anthropology. 2 The two longest of its four sections return to themes introduced in 
Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits; namely a further meditation on the 
significance of the 'consider the lilies' text, and a more general discussion of the central 
Christian category of joy. 
The upbuilding significance of the 'lilies and the birds' is now treated more 
comprehensively by way of a three-part comparison of 'natural beings' (the lilies and 
the birds), secular human being (the heathen), and religiously reduplicated being (the 
Christian). Thus, in relation to any particular anxiety, the lilies and the birds remain 
untouched and unaware of its possibility, the heathen suffers it directly, and the 
Christian is 'cured' of it through the continuous 'spiritualization' of existence. 
The bird, for example, 'is not anxious for the lower things which it does not seek, 
but neither does it seek the higher things'. 3 The heathen,, however, is anxious over the 
distribution of every good, and, consequently, fears falling into any form of poverty, 
and, equally, becomes anxious over every abundance. 4 The anxiety of the heathen is 
rooted in the continuous process of comparing what they possess and want with what 
others possess and want to possess. The Christian's lack of anxiety in relation to either 
poverty or abundance is not ignorance of such matters, but the indifference which comes 
from 'the notion that possession is an illusion. Anxiety is transformed into faith; 'the 
5 thought of eternity takes away the thought of possession'. Similarly the bird is not 
anxious over the lowliness or highness of its social status, while the heathen, 'existing 
only before others' is perpetually tormented by the shifting boundaries of social 
6 
valuation, and in 'his inmost being has become pitiless and corroded'. But the 
Christian exists continually 'before God' and thus learns the insignificance of social 
distinctions. 
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The bird is neither a self, nor a potential self, and cannot know the anxiety of self- 
torment. The bird 'is not troubled by dreams', or by 'anxiety for the next day'. The 
bird lives 'in a persistent dream' into which the heathen would like to fall. But the 
heathen cannot shake off the insecurity of 'the next day', which is 'the grappling hook 
7 by which the prodigious hulk of anxiety gets a hold upon the individual's light craft'. 
But for the Christian 'the next day' is non-existent; 'by the help of eternity' he lives 
'absorbed in today'. And 'the more he is eternally absorbed in today, the more 
decisively does he turn his back upon the next day, so that he does not see it at all. ' 8 
The Christian lives as a 'contemporary with himself, in an immediate relation with his 
or her own actuality, and this is not to be confused with the 'care-freeness of the bird', 
which is simply the spiritless 'light-mindedness' of natural being. The more openly 
critical aspect of S. Kierkegaard's writing becomes obvious in the development of this 
complex comparison. The heathen 'develops' aesthetic, ethical, and even 'religious' 
characteristics which, in 'elevating' him above natural being, produce obstacles to 
Christian reduplication. By 'heathen' he does not mean only, or even generally, 
'primitive' or 'undeveloped'; his target lies much closer to home. Thus while 
primitively the heathen tries to negate the next day by 'sensuous absorption in today', 
and may even gain thereby a 'torpid security', the ethical demand which is normative 
for modern society is to live as it were in advance of oneself, to strive towards the 
actualization of the self through the realization of its goals. Hence it is the more refined 
and educated of people in modern society who, in speculative worry over the future, 
forget themselves; 
Most men, in feeling, in imagination, in purpose, in resolution, in wish, in 
apocalyptic vision, in theatrical make-believe, are a hundred thousand miles in 
advance of themselves, or several human generations in advance of themselves. 
(Christian, p. 77) 
The Christian, on the other hand, loves 'to cram today with eternity and not with the 
next day'. 9 
Anxiety stems from the attempt to be wholly self-sufficient and independent; to 
make the 'first self' of the heathen the sole generative power of actuality. But thus 
narrowly conceived human consciousness cannot help but detect 'other' elements in 
actuality and, anxiously and doubtfully, attributes them to an independent and alien 
nature or to a disembodied mind. Christian reduplication, on the other hand, is the 
transformation of both sensuous dread and temporal anxiety into a continuously 
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developing need of God, and 'the Christian knows that a sense of the need of God is 
man's perfection'. 10 
The need of God, like anxiety, is an immediate relation to something outside of 
actuality. But where the heathen's anxiety leads the person out of actuality into the 
spiritless nothingness of nature contiguous to it; the need of God, whose purity of being 
cannot be 'placed' adjacent to the human existence-sphere, serves only to confirm and 
'deepen' actuality. The need of God does not lead the subject out of actuality but 
transforms all the determinants of the human realm. 
In a similar way, where doubt propels the heathen consciousness beyond itself into 
fantastic abstraction, Christian reduplication relates consciousness and reflection 
immediately to itself. Reflection, which is an aspect of the totality of human being 
rather than a discrete activity within it, plunges the individual into his or her own 
existence. Disn2ayrather than doubt is the initial movement of Christian thought, and in 
it actuality gathers itself. Thought cannot conceive the Absolute, and the need of God, 
dismayingly confirms thought in itself. Dismay is a 'falling back on itself', and thus the 
deepening, rather than the illusory extension, of actuality. 
Christian self-understanding, which begins in dismay, is edifying, and thus, 
continually reaffirms the essential relation between a wholly human existence, and God. 
That there is sin is dismaying, that there is forgiveness of sins is edifying. And the 
edifying deepens into faith. The process of deepening, when it is described or in being 
talked about, appears to be the continuous development of a truth immanent in actuality. 
But, in actuality, it is a process which depends at every point on God's undeserved and 
freely offered grace. Even for the Christian, therefore, faith is the potentiation of 
dismay, as well as the acceptance of grace: 
When faith is seen from the one side, the heavenly side, one sees in it only the 
highest reflection of blessedness; but seen from the other side, the merely human 
side, one sees sheer fear and trembling. (Christian, p. 182) 
Faith is the possession of the ultimate good, but cannot be thought of as the 
possession of a 'thing' at all. It is, first of all, the possession of the self as a purely 
human being; 
if a man has faith, truly he has not thereby deprived others of anything ... By 
having faith he expresses the purely human, or that which is the essential 
possibility of every man. (Cbristian, p. 12 1) 
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The good of faith is 'essentially a communication', so that its individual possession is 
both a form of self-expression and a universal social bond. 'Mere is no contradiction, 
as there is in relation to all other goods, between selfish possession and a common 
benefaction. Here, as faith is a communication, possession is also sharing: 
The way, the perfect way of making others rich is to communicate the goods of the 
spirit, being oneself, moreover, solely employed in acquiring and possessing these 
goods. (Christian, p. 125) 
Faith, which is the communication of faith, is a direct communication; 'But with regard 
to the true riches, the nature of which is communication, increase is neither more nor 
less than direct communication and the increase of it'. II This does not mean, however, 
that S. Kierkegaard's Christian Discourses, can be regarded as a 'direct 
communication'. Quite apart from the question of the identity of S, Kierkegaard, the 
author admits at the end of the work that 'All our talk about God is of course human 
talk ... if we would not be completely silent, we must after all employ the 
human 
measuring-rod when we as men talk about God'. 12 And in terms of such a measuring- 
rod Christian faith may be represented as fee and spontaneous communication, in 
contrast to the 'inclosing reserve' of human incommunicativeness typical of the modern 
age. 
In one of his late discourses, Judge for Yourself, S. Kierkegaard develops the 
notion that Christianity is not only in opposition to the 'bourgeois-philistinism' of 
modern secular life, but that, in actuality, it 'contains' a whole series of oppositions. 
Because 'everything essentially Christian is a redoubling', he argues that 'every 
qualification of the essentially Christian is first of all its opposite'. The Christian seems 
to invert the secular order of values. Thus, 'in just a human view, elevation is only 
elevation and nothing more; Christianly it is first of all humiliation. So also with 
inspiration ... 
Christianly, inspiration is first of all becoming sober'. 13 
The secular mentality, which 'deifies sagacity' and submits every possible action to 
the calculation of probabilities, 'considers Christianity to be drunkenness', seeing in it 
nothing but a reckless venture. Christianity, on the other hand, interprets the human 
view of moderation as a melancholic intoxication; moderation is 'stupefying, makes one 
heavy, drowsy, sluggish, and apathetic' . 
14 For Christianity, therefore, 'becoming 
sober' is 'venturing to relinquish probability'. Indeed, 'only by being before God can 
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one totally come to oneself in the transparency of soberness'. 15 Christian soberness is 
an 'intoxicating' abandonment of 'the sensible, sagacious, and levelheaded'; 
this will soon end with your tumbling like a drunk man into actuality, plunging 
yourself recklessly into reckless action without giving the understanding and 
sagacity the time to take into proper consideration what is prudent, what is 
advantageous, what will pay. (Self-ExanVnation, p. 118) 
But if one observed faith in another, a faith which is bound to express itself directly, 
one would see a person 'lost to, alienated from, and dead to all temporal, finite, earthly 
considerations'. Such a person would be 'unbearable - he would appear intoxicated'. 16 
This expression invokes Erasmian Tolly': 'the supreme reward for man is no other than 
a kind of madness'; and through Erasmus to the recovery of a positive religious 
meaning for melancholy. 17 
The Danish term used extensively throughout the religious writings to refer to the 
'happiness' or 'blessedness' of Christian faith is Salighed, from an Anglo-Saxon root 
salig, which, in English, means 'silly' or 'touched', so that the afflicted person becomes 
I weak and helpless'. 18 Just as the anxious and doubtful become 'dizzy', so the Christian 
appears to be sheer 'dizziness' to the secular observer. From any perspective immanent 
within the Present Age 
becoming involved with God, with the infinite - nothing is more certain than that 
this is intoxication,, that it is not so certain that someone staring into the waves 
form a ship or someone gazing down into the depths from a lofty place or from a 
lower place out into an infinite space where nothing limits the eye - that it is not so 
certain that he will become dizzy as the one does who becomes involved with God. 
(Self-ExanVnation, p. 106) 
This understanding forms the basis for a powerful attack on the 'toned-down' 
Christianity of the present age. To become sober means 'to come to oneself', but in the 
present age there are two completely incompatible conceptions of the self. The secular 
life of the ego, and the 'deeper self' of Christian reduplication. Coming to oneself in 
the former sense takes one away from oneself in the latter sense, and vice versa. 
Although the 'deeper self' has become obscured by the exotic whirl of the Present Age, 
its reality has not entirely slipped out of existence. Our melancholy is, after all, 
evidence of its continuing, but 'unknown' presence; the sign of its absence. And though 
our melancholy cannot itself become a means to recover this abandoned selthood, it 
forces us to acknowledge, in the form of occasional 'dizzy spells' the superficiality of 
251 
our 'normal' wretchedness, and the frightening proximity, rather than comforting 
distance, of a genuinely religious existence: 
The truth of the matter is this. All of us human beings are more or less 
intoxicated. But we are like a drunk man who is not completely drunk so that he 
has lost consciousness - no, he is definitely conscious that he is a little drunk and 
for that very reason is careful to conceal it from others, if possible from himself. 
(Self-Exa n2ina tion p. 113) 
We therefore choose to 'walk close to the buildings and walk erect without becoming 
dizzy'. Spiritually, that is to say, at the very point of realising our intoxication 
'sagacity and sensibleness and levelheadedness come to our aid'. 
Again it is important to notice that the 'first self' is not some universal 'natural' 
creature, but is either the embodiment of solid bourgeois virtues of respectability, or 
representatives of contemporary European 'high culture', and neither is the 'deeper self' 
some mystical nothingness in which the individual undergoes an ecstatic annihilation. 
The individual retains all his or her particular qualifications. Reduplication is not the 
abolition of actuality, but its inner transformation in which everything outer remains 
unchanged. In this context it is noticeable that the edifying, which strikingly 'mediates' 
between the pseudonyms, and the first cycle of upbuilding discourses, and even finds a 
way of relating sobriety and drunkenness, also discovers a term between the 
I movement' of the former and the 'stillness' of the latter. The edifjing is restlessness 
but it is a restlessness in which nothing is changed. It is a restlessness 
which has to do with inward deepening. A true love affair is indeed a restless 
thing, but it never enters the lover's head to want to change things as they are. 
(Self-ExanVnation, p. 21) 
Kierkegaard at times, it is true, seems to express a more 'mystical' form of 
Christianity. He talks of worship as being 'lost in God', and of the 'bliss' in 'sensing 
God's strength'. He describes worship in terms of the passive voluptuousness of inner- 
dissolution: 
God and the worshipper, are adapted to one another, happily, blissfully, as never 
were lovers adapted to one another ... the only wish of the whorshipper 
is to 
become weaker and weaker... The whorshipper has lost himself. 
(Christian, pp. 136-37) 
But as Christian reduplication 'contains' (in a new non-contradictory form) all possible 
secular distinctions within it, it contains hotb the conception of a self-annihilating 
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mystical union with God, and the conviction that 'only by being before God can one 
totally come to oneself in the transparency of soberness'. 19 
More generally, however, Kierkegaard maintains a critical attitude towards any 
notion of mystical indifference: 
A being which has no distinction within itself is a very imperfect being, it may be 
an imaginary being, such as the being of a mathematical point. A being which has 
the difference outside itself is an evanescent being ... Eternity, righteousness, has 
the distinction within itself. (Christian, pp. 215-16) 
To be 'nothing before God', therefore, is not to lack all human distinction. 
The Dialectic of 6 Christian Love 
The edifjing, another expression for the upbuilding, is not a discourse about existence 
but a discourse ofexistence given figurative expression in the 'whispering secrecy of the 
metaphorical'. 20 The cosmological ladder to God has been swept aside, so that God's 
presence lies, impenetrably concealed, in the human heart. Theology is thus 
transformed into an anthropology of self-knowledge, and the Christian life becomes a 
continuous struggle to uncover the 'deeper self' which is the heart immediately 
transformed by the Spirit's secret presence. Kierkegaard expresses this transformation, 
the edij5ing, in a number of ways, but suggests two compelling metaphors through 
which it might be 'grasped' in its most general form. 
The first describes reduplication from the perspective of the secular self as 
'drunkenness' or 'madness. Kierkegaard here exploits a long tradition of Christian 
Platonism which had found its most significant modem expression in Erasmus. 21 The 
second suggests the 'qualitative' change of reduplication is experienced as love. 
Significantly Erasmus, explicitly invoking Plato, also links these two notions. Love is a 
kind of delirium in which the lover is 'taken out of' the self- 
For anyone who loves intensely lives not in himself but in the object of his love, 
and the further he can move out of himself into his love, the happier heis. 22 
The most intense happiness, therefore, involves the destruction of that 'first self' which 
clings to transient worldly forms. But, rather than become aware of this as an 
'emptying' of the self, it 'fills out' the self with a new content. 23 
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The association of drunkenness and dizziness with the happiness of salvation and of 
love,, and the clear connection of both with a tradition of Platonism within which 
melancholy was deeply rooted, reveals the ambivalence of sorrow in Kierkegaard's later 
religious writings. 'Pleasure' has connected itself to the surface of life, and the 
aesthetic pseudonyms had demonstrated the ways in which the apparently reasonable 
pursuit of pleasure is self-defeating. But melancholy is not the 'result' of the 
unsuccessful search for pleasure. More significantly melancholy is sorrow over the loss 
of happiness which the pursuit of pleasure itself implies. This sorrow is, for the most 
part, barely conscious, but, insignificant as it might seem, it is this 'sorrow without 
reason' (the reason 'grief over the loss of happiness' is too fantastic to be seriously 
entertained, and is reduced to 'nothing'), upon which the pursuit of pleasure is wrecked. 
Pleasure is no substitute for happiness, and it is this disparity which melancholy 
signifies. Melancholy is recollection, and repetition does not lie within its power. 
This gives to sorrow a positive significance, without claiming for it a positive 
value. The experience of passive suffering, the affliction of passion, is not in itself a 
mode of appropriating religious truth, and S. Kierkegaard (though by no means all of 
his pseudonymous colleagues) sees nothing intrinsically valuable in sorrow and 
suffering. Melancholy 'deepens' and forms the self, but does not do so in terms of 
religious 'inwardness'. The positive significance of melancholy is in terms of its 
incommensurability with any humanly rational category. Try as we might we cannot rid 
ourselves of sorrow. It is the persistence of sorrow which destroys pleasure and the 
rational world of the 'first self'. But the religious life is untouched by melancholy. It is 
the conquest of melancholy, the recovery of happiness without consequential regret over 
the 'loss' of the world. 
The edifying discourses seek to describe this non-melancholic subjectivity. Having 
exhausted a variety of paradoxes, comparisons, and mediations Kierkegaard turns 
finally to love as the central reality of religious experience. 
Just as God's presence is revealed, for faith, only indirectly in signs, so love, 
which 'has an unfathomable connection with the whole of existence', is known only 'by 
its fruits '. 24 The Works ofLove traces the connection among different forms of love and 
finds in them signs of God's love as their common source. But this source cannot itself 
be uncovered. Indeed, it is just the 'impenetrable' and 'unfathomable' character of 
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'love's secret life in the heart' and the various manifestations which justifies its use as a 
religious metaphor: 
As the quiet lake invites you to look at it, but by its dark reflection prevents your 
looking down through it, so the mysterious origins of love in the love of God 
prevents you from seeing its source; if you think you see it, then you are deceived 
by a reflection. (Love, p. 8) 
This is, of course, also a description of melancholy, whose fathomless depths are so 
brilliantly reflected on the surface of modem life, and we are entitled to ask whether S. 
Kierkegaard has not, in fact, deceived himself into another aesthetic illusion. Is not 
'reduplication' simply another 'existence-sphere' and ultimately, therefore, a mode of 
being already 'contained' within the aesthetic magic of 'possibility '? 25 And is not the 
partial concealment of the signature, 'S. ', rather than the personally revealing 'Soren', 
itself a residue of the aesthetic? He confides to his Journal (though why should we 
believe Soren in preference to his other pseudonyms? ) 
For many years my melancholy has prevented me from being on terms of real 
intimacy with myself. In between my melancholy and myself lay a whole world of 
the imagination. That is, in part, what I rid myself of in the pseudonyms. 26 
And in another entry, referring to all his writings, he takes an even more decisive view; 
'I always stand in an altogether poetical relationship to my work, and I am, therefore, 
27 myself a pseudonym'. The edifying works, it seems, reveal the author as another 
pseudonym and, therefore as another form of melancholy. 
The reduplication of Christian love does not deny the reality of melancholy, in fact 
it confirms it as the 'dark ground' which is the presence of God for the human spirit. 
This changes nothing in the sense that the human still exists within an infinite void, yet, 
nonetheless, everything is changed; 'sorrow without cause' is transformed into 
I senseless happiness' and, freed from despair over being free, human subjectivity 
restores to itself the depth and plenitude of its own reality. Melancholy, as an 
impenetrable 'inclosing reserve' is, in fact, an anticipation of religious reduplication, 
rather than an obstacle in the path of its transformative realization. 28 And, where 
melancholy gives rise to 'reflection', its reduplication as love bears the fruits of 
actuality. Works ofLove, is, therefore, called 'Christian reflections', discourses which 
edifý rather than instruct or divert. 29 
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Christian love, like melancholy, springs from a hidden and inexhaustible source, 
and cannot directly reveal itself. Thus, 'as the love itself is invisible, a man must 
therefore believe in it'. 30 No human action 'unconditionally proves the presence of 
love, or unconditionally proves that love is not present'. 31 Earthly love, which is 'the 
beautiful fantasy of the infinite', and finds 'its highest expression in mysterious 
foolishness', is not an unambiguous sign of divine love. 32 The metaphor of earthly love 
is thus effective by way of difference as well as through similarity. This is nowhere 
clearer than in the Christian conception of love as a commandment. The 'divine 
primitives' of 'thou shalt love' is, claims S. Kierkegaard, something foreign to every 
human heart: 
What a difference between the play of the emotions and impulses and inclinations 
and passions ... that glory celebrated in poetry, in smiles, or in tears, in wishing or in need ... and that of eternity, the earnestness of the commandment in spirit and in 
truth, in sincerity and self-denial. (Love, p. 21) 
The obligation to love, from a secular viewpoint, is a contradiction, but in faith it 
expresses the special character of divine love. As duty Christian love is placed beyond 
the changeable corruptibility of immediacy. There is no temptation, within a relation of 
obligation, to 'test' divine love. Love, in this sense, cannot change into hate, or suffer 
jealousy, or the corrosion of habit. 
The Christian is commanded to love the neighbour, and, Kierkegaard argues that it 
is the commandment which itself creates the neighbour. Here Christianity and modern 
romanticism are in striking opposition. The religious obligation to love creates a 
universal community of neighbours, while, for 'the poetic' it is the exclusiveness of 
passionate love which defines the unique character of the beloved. Christian love, thus, 
is not based on impulse, and it is seen as the suppression of a natural inclination only 
because of the fabulous conflation of Christianity and Romanticism. The 'passionate 
particularity' celebrated by the modern poet 'is essentially another form of 
33 
selfishness'. And it is passionate partiality which gives rise to 'the other 1', the 
beloved, as a projection of secular self-love. The exclusive choice of passionate 
partiality is a 'prodigious wilfulness' in which 'arbitrariness is everywhere manifest'. 
Yet, from a secular viewpoint, the highest achievement of earthly love is the 
unrestricted mutuality, the merging, of the immediate I and the reflected I of the 
beloved. But the Christian obligation, which is indifferent to impulse, 'cannot make me 
into one with my neighbour in a united self'. 34 
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The community of neighbours, therefore, is not an undifferentiated mass. The 
commandment is addressed to the individual, to each individual as a whole person, and 
neither to the community in general, nor to some specifically differentiated capacity for 
or principle of 'humanity' fabulously deposited in each person. For the reduplication of 
Christian love, the neighbour 'is the absolutely indistinguishable difference between 
man and man, or is the eternal resemblance before God'. 35 Christianity, that is to say, 
includes all, but 'has not taken away the differences' among people; 'For by being a 
Christian he is not exempt from the differences, but by triumphing over the temptation 
of the differences,, he becomes Christian'. 36 
There is nothing exclusive in Christian love for the neighbour, nor does it 
represent, as does romantic love, a form of selfishness. Thus, while 'to love God is in 
truth to love one's self% it is, simultaneously, to recognize the binding obligation to 
love the neighbour. Equally, to love the neighbour is self-love of a proper kind. 
To love oneself in the right way and to love one's neighbour are absolutely 
analogous concepts, are at bottom one and the same. (Love, p. 19) 
This has nothing to do with human reciprocity, nor does it imply the emergence of a 
community of ends' in which all secular conflicts are resolved. 37 Rather than view 
'humanity' as a spiritual intermediary between the individual and God, God is more 
truthfully seen as the 'mediation' among individuals. Kierkegaard concludes, therefore, 
that 'to love another man is to help him to love God, and to be loved is to be helped to 
love God'. 38 Love, that is to say, accomplishes what no discourse can; it edifies. 
Christian reduplication, the commandment to love, transforms the immediacy of 
love into the immediacy of conscience; 'Christianity transforms every relation between 
men into a conscience-relationship, and thus also into a love relationship. 39 This is not 
to be confused with either sympathy or admiration, both of which spring from purely 
human impulses. It is not the perfections in others that we must love, but others in 
themselves. Thus, while modern romantic love is a consoling fantasy, Christian love 
must; 
renounce all imaginative and overstrained ideas of a dream-world, where the object 
of love would be to seek and to find; that is, one must become sober, gain reality 
and truth by finding and remaining in the world of reality, as the sole appointed 
task. (Love, p. 130) 
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Love, thus, is an inter-personal medium, and not an exclusively personal attribute. It is 
'the exact opposite of mistrust' in which the individual comes wholly to himself or 
herself through existing for others. 
Christian love, in short, is the synthesis of, and the synthesizing power within, 
actuality. And there is nothing 'difficult' or 'obscure' in this. In a direct challenge to 
Johannes Climacus, S. Kierkegaard writes; 
Christianity is not a fairy tale, although the happiness it promises is more glorious 
than that of any fairy tale, nor is it an ingenious chimera which is intended to be 
difficult to understand, and which also requires one single condition, and idle head 
and an empty brain. (Love, p. 58) 
Anti-Climacus, in 7he Sickness Unto Deatb, describes the self as a synthesis 'that 
relates itself to itself'. In the metaphorical language of upbuilding, however, the 'self- 
relating' synthsis of actuality is defined inwardly as Christian love. It is the binding 
obligation to love which breaks the solipsism of a purely self-generated existence- 
sphere. The inner-movement of existence, rather than oscillating between itself and 
non-existence in doubt and anxiety, is then wholly contained within itself- 
What love does, that it is; what it is, that it does - and at one and the same time: at 
the very moment it gives out of itself (the direction outward) it is in itself (the 
direction inward); and at the very moment it is in itself, it thereby goes out of 
itself, so that this outgoing and this return, this return and this outgoing, are 
simultaneously one and the same. (Love, p. 227) 
Love is not philosophical, it is not reflective, and, therefore, it does not grasp 
actuality through an act of conception. In love there is no 'gap' between the conception 
and constitution of actuality. Love's actuality is fully constituted in time; it 'draws 
itself out' as a developing intersubjectivity. It is an endless and effortless repetition. 
Love edifies, claims S. Kierkegaard, and the edifjing is not another abstract term in a 
game of make-believe. In one sense Hegel was perfectly correct, philosophy must 
beware of the ediýdng. But, in another sense, it is only in relation to the edifying, that 
human being comes into its own and 'fills out' actuality; only the edifjoing grasps the 
truth which philosophy seeks in vain. In Kierkegaard, claims his most significant 
I philosophical' successor, 'something has been realized which in fact is not philosophy, 
something for which we as yet have no concept. 140 
258 
Notes and References 
I S. Kierkegaard's upbuilding is thus distinct from the 'faith' of either Johannes Climacus or 
Anti-Chmacus', for both those writers 'faith occupies a peculiar, paradoxical position at once 
within and beyond the field of conflicting interpretations', Smith (1981), p. 41. 
Slok (1954). 
Christian, p. 21. 
Hence Petrarch (199 1) offered secular consolation for 'Fortune, Fair and Foul'. 
Christian, p. 3 1. 
Ibid., pp. 44,60. 
Ibid., pp. 74-5. 
Ibid., p. 76. 
Ibid., p. 78. 
10 Ibid., p. 67. 
II Ibid., p. 125. 
12 Ibid., p. 299. 
13 Self-ExanVnation, p. 98. 
14 Ibid., p. 107. 
15 Ibid., p. 106. 
16 Ibid., p. 113. 
259 
17 Erasmus (1971), p. 206. 
18 Khan (1985), pp. 87-8. 
19 Self-Exanination, p. 106. 
20 Love, p. 169. 
21 Erasmus (1971), p. 206. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Mackey (197 1), p. 124, describes this more generally; 'The world of the Edi#ing Discourses 
might seem to be the world upside down. It IS a world in which every value honored among men 
is subverted, every thought that passes for consequent among men is undermined'. 
24 LAo ve, p. 8. 
25 Westphal, In Connell and Evans eds. (1992), suggests, this amounts to a new existence-sphere, 
a 'Religion C', which, in some sense lies 'beyond', the 'Religion B' of Anti-Chmacus. 
However, the fact that the 'upbuilding' literature is signed, and makes no reference to the 
pseudonymous works, suggests it is better viewed in contrast to the entire pseudonymous 
production, rather than as an addition to it. It is also not uncommon, of course, to misread the 
edi#ing literature as a continuation of Kierkegaard's (Chmacus) 'philosophy, as, e. g. Thomte 
(1948), p. 124. 
26 Dru ed. (1939), 641. 
27 Ibid., 484. 
28 Dupre (1964), p. 35, Price (1963), p. 50. 
29 In his extensive survey Singer (1987), pp. 38-49, reads 'Kierkegaard' directly and non- 
contextually. As a result he stresses the earlier aesthetic works as the more significant 
contribution to an understandmg of modern love. 
30 Love, P. 11. 
260 
31 Ibid., p. 12. 
32 Ibid., p. 16. 
33 Ibid., p. 44. 
34 Ibid., p. 47. 
35 Ibid., p. 56. 
36 Ibid., p. 58. 
37 As suggested by Elrod (1981). 
38 LoVe, p. 99. 
39 Ibid., p. III- 
40 Heidegger (1988), p. 13. 
INCONCLUSIVE POSTSCRIPT: BEYOND DESPAIR 
Childlike simplicity did not observe what an infinite requirement is involved in 
being a Christian; therefore it could believe that this is possible; nowadays it is 
apparent that the requirement for being Christian is so enormous that humanness 
becomes satisfied with a relationship to it, a striving toward it. 
Soren Kierkegaard - Journals, 2: 1792 
I must get hold of my melancholy 
Soren Kierkegaard - Journals, 5: 6043 
Kierkegaard's religious psychology of modem life cannot be readily expressed in terms 
of a few underlying and consistent ideas. The observational richness of his writing is 
itself a barrier to over-simplification. And, more significantly, the fact that he is 
himself part of what he wishes to describe means that there is no privileged 'position' 
from which he can observe and record the human world. Furthermore, although his 
own experience thus becomes an essential medium for gaining knowledge of the world, 
he finds that self-observation issues in deeply ambiguous and shifting 'categories'. The 
observing 'self' is subject to continuous change so that Kierkegaard's psychology is 
'incomplete' as well as 'indirect', and this follows simply from the unfinished character 
of human reality. 
The ethnographic fidelity of Kierkegaard's work is conveyed through two features 
that remain fundamental to all his writing. Firstly, the 'method' of indirect 
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communication protects the provisional and elusive character of all his psychological 
constructs. And, secondly, he describes and orders experience through a series of 
disparate and incompatible 'points of view' which cannot be 'added-up' or harmonized. 
Kierkegaard's own chosen form of simplification, therefore, draws attention to, 
rather than obscures, the irreducible contrariness of actual experience. In particular he 
defines four separate perspectives, which are both the observational framework for, and 
the constitutive structure of, modern life. I These distinctive modes of differentiation 
might be termed, respectively, the topological, anthropological, philosophical and 
tbeoniorphic points of view. 
The topological viewpoint has become the most familiar, and indeed frequently 
appears to be the only, 'Kierkegaardian' framework. However, the differentiation of 
'existence-spheres' - the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious - is itself an aspect of the 
1maieutic art' practised by the earliest pseudonyms and is, therefore, the expression of 
untransformed immediacy. In this perspective the 'ethical' and the 'religious' are 
essentially life-views contained Wthin the 'aesthetic' as its immanent possibilities. The 
pseudonymous writers themselves realise that the tripartite division into 'stages' is, in 
fact, a series of aesthetic self-projections. The ethical, thus, loses all claim to 
autonomy, while the religious is romanticized in the unreality of the 'exceptional 
individual'. In addition to these products of melancholic self-inclosure, the pseudonyms 
detect, through doubt and dread, 'other' realms of being which lie outside the 
immediacy of the existence-spheres. In an antbropological perspective, therefore, 
human experience is described in relation to forms of 'non-existence' which condition 
its content. Actuality, that is to say, is established as the 'space' between sensuousness 
and the ideality of pure concepts. And it is in the dialectical 'expansion' of actuality 
(rather than in any aesthetically conceived leap), that the 'self' emerges as a structured 
unity. This primitive identity of the self, viewed philosophically, wrecks itself in 
passion and offense. It is caught in a continuous process of rising up from, and falling 
back into, actuality; attracted towards, and repulsed by, the Absolute. Described from 
these three different viewpoints, melancholy emerges not only as a common theme for 
the pseudonymous authors, but as the central experience of modern life. Counterposed 
to all of these perspectives, therefore, is a tbeomorphic description of selfhood which is 
actually (and not just imaginatively) 'beyond despair 
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The aim of the authorship is to provoke, and not simply to describe, authentic, 
selfhood. But the complexity of the indirect, pseudonymous method, results in two 
strikingly different views. The pseudonyms present a picture of 'developing' selfbood, 
or, rather, the development of a variety of possible selves, each of which is marked by a 
specific 'tension'. The 'existence -sphere' is stretched between contradictory poles, and 
the 'self' emerges within the midst of these contradictions. In contrast to all such 
aesthetic 'potentiations, the 'last pseudonym' S. Kierkegaard regards tbeofwrpbiC 
selthood as a radical possibility; a possibility for, but not an immanent tendency within, 
actuality. This selfhood 'corresponds' to the traditional Christian promise of happiness. 
It is both the 'highest' form of selfhood, and the form in which Christianity can exist for 
the modern world. The first view is primarily an exploration of modern melancholy, in 
all the inner- richness of its varied forms; the second invokes a structurally and 
topologically distinct non-melancholic selthood. For the first, a series of critical 
psychological studies leads to the view that 'subjectivity is truth', for the latter, 
distrustful of the social passions, 'subjectivity is untruth. 
The Upbuilding Discourses are continuous with the pseudonymous authorship; just 
as the theomorpbic self both co-exists with, and continually transcends, all other 
possibilities of existence. Its possibility, thus, can be detected in all other forms of 
actuality, and this possibility is characteristically expressed within each perspective. 
But it would be misleading to view the pseudonymous description of these forms as 
'leading to' tbeomorphic selfhood. The transcending possibility of Christianity, in other 
words, does not confer upon human existence a 'finished' form. Christianity, for 
Kierkegaard, is life (not doctrine, or conviction) and, therefore, must be continuously 
unstable. Inasmuch as the incompleteness of the self can be viewed melancholically, 
then Christianity is simply the 'highest' form of despair. In Kierkegaard's view, 
however, Christianity, is neither the finished structure of experience, nor a vision of 
totality, wholeness and unity. It is, rather, (philosophically) a continuous transition, 
and (theomorphically) a perpetual deepening of selfhood. 
These two forms of selfhood are discontinuous. Thus, although Kierkegaard 
claims in 7he Point of View for My Work as an Author, that he was, from the beginning, 
a 'religious' writer, Christian faith cannot provide a conditioning norm through which 
the variety of aesthetic possibilities can be reduced to a logical order. The pseudonyms 
are usually read sequentially, and it is difficult to avoid the impression of an internal 
'development' of some kind. Johannes Climacus, it is assumed, is somehow 'nearer' to 
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Christianity and thus to authentic selfhood than is the 'young man'. of Either. However, 
as faith (theomorphic selfhood) is 'uncaused happiness, it is a permanently available 
possibility whose actualization does not depend on any preparatory 'training'. The 
developmental sequence of pseudonymous works is conditioned by aesthetic 
considerations alone, and, in relation to religious faith, the multiplicity of these 
possibilities falls back into the disorder typical of the Present Age. The aesthetic 
writers are not linked 'developmentally', other than in terms of purely secular bourgeois 
(if not 'bourgeois-philistine') conventions, though each consistently develops a 
possibility 'floating' on the surface of modern life. 
Pervasive wretchedness is, for the most part, easily understood; it continuously 
flows from injustice. For the European bourgeoisie there were obvious advantages in 
assimilating the misery consequent on injustice to the 'uncaused sorrow' of melancholy. 
An important strand in the whole development of idealist philosophy after Kant, as well 
as in literary Romanticism, succeeded beyond all expectation in providing such a 
service. The pervasiveness of melancholy, and its apparent pre-adaptation to modern 
life, became the focus, not only of attacks upon Enlightenment optimism, but, more 
significantly, of secular and religious demands for self-actualization. 2 At the same time 
radical implications of these same intellectual and artistic movements became 
increasingly apparent. 3 Kierkegaard can be interpreted in the context of either tradition; 
as, in part, either a romantic conservative, or as a philosophical radical. 
Disillusionment 
This brings the authorship into a closer relation with the ideological ferment of the 
eighteen-forties, the period during which 'Left Hegelians' call for the practical 
'completion' of Hegel's philosophy came into prominence. 4 Exploiting the spiritual 
radicalism of Hegel's own earlier works against the conservatism of his 'official' 
followers after his death, they attempted to reclaim for philosophy the entire territory of 
practical life. 
More significantly, perhaps, striking similarities between the pseudonyms' attack 
on the Hegelian 'system', and the writings of the young Marx, have been pointed out on 
a number of occasions. 5 Neither are content with a simple criticism of Hegel's thought, 
or with a general appeal his forgotten revolutionary spirit, but propose a comprehensive 
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'critique' of the 'German ideology'. What unites them is less an effort to expose the 
error, as to uncover the truth, which is hidden in the 'system'. And for Marx, as well 
as the pseudonyms, that truth is 'existential'; Hegel's philosophy is important for them 
just because it so accurately and profoundly expresses the character of the Modem Age. 
Systematic abstraction is the result of the most rigorous application of human reason to 
the task of analysing the real character of modern experience. It is, indeed, nothing 
other than the emergence of a rational spirit from entanglement with its own history. 
But,, in becoming reflexively conscious of itself, the critics claimed, reason fails to 
grasp its own limitations and expresses its 'findings' as if they were universal truths of 
'spirit'. The historical sensitivity of the Phenomenology gives way to the new 
scholasticism of the Logic, and philosophy becomes 'detached' from the very reality 
from which it sprang. Hegel, creating a limitless and ideal domain of unchallenged 
speculative truth, thus, gives expression to a specifically bourgeois interest in 
misleadingly universal and abstract language, as the realization of a generalized 'human 
spirit'. 
Both Marx and the pseudonyms insist that the 'actuality' of modem life is itself a 
distorted and illusory social form, and Hegel's philosophy is the most consistently 
developed expression of this distortion. It is the Present Age which is the 'real 
foundation' of Hegel's philosophy, and it is, therefore, the transformation of this 
conditioning possibility, rather than the realization of his philosophical vision, which 
confronts the genuinely 'interested' individual as an urgent task. The call for a 
'disillusioned' philosophy, for a critical understanding of actuality which is conditioned 
by the undeveloped 'potentiality' obscured by modern conditions, is at the same time the 
demand for a new way of life. 'Truth', at least humanly interesting truth, is for neither 
an 'objective' and 'indifferent' form of knowledge. Kierkegaard, of course, in terms of 
contemporary political issues, was conservative, if not reactionary. The apparent 'split' 
between Kierkegaard's private views, expressed in letters and Journal entries, and the 
(unconventional) radicalism of the pseudonyms offers further evidence of his 
'dialogical' skill. Efforts to 'harmonize' the pseudonyms with each other and with their 
creator leads here, as elsewhere, to considerable difficulties. It is not necessary, in 
other words, to argue that 'Kierkegaard's' view of modern individualism, coupled with 
his ideological devotion to 'subjectivity', directs any radical tendencies in his work into 
6 
a harmless retreat into inwardness which leaves nothing changed. Quite apart from the 
bitter attack on the Danish Church, the pseudonyms challenge to 'bourgeois- 
philistinism' is perfectly genuine, the disclosure of the 'deeper self' is potentially 
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destructive of all established authority, and the ambition to revitalize actuality with the 
sharpest of spiritual tensions undermines every facile, ecclesiastical or secular, 
apologetics of the Present Age. At the same time the pseudonyms reject contemporary 
political radicalism as simply another symptom of the spiritless crowd's susceptibility to 
the chaotic enthusiasm of a romantic ego. 
Clearly, in spite of their at times parallel attack on Hegel, Kierkegaard and Marx 
are not easily compared. 7 For Marx, it might be suggested, melancholy is inherent in 
the commodity. The modern world is a world of commodities, objects created only to 
be alienated into an impersonal process of exchange. The human 'spirit' is deposited in 
these objects, and then it is lost, transformed into an oppressive and strange world of 
pure objectivity. They are distant, aloof, impenetrable and are qualitatively identical. 
The commodity is set apart, and appears unreal. The commodity is a melancholic object 
because through it we are turned into something 'alien'. It can be owned, which is only 
to say someone has the exclusive right to send it on its way again by selling it, but it 
cannot be possessed. Our desire for objects springs directly from the melancholy 
engendered by their mode of creation. It is the mysterious 'use value' that replenishes 
our desire. In wanting objects we want what they 'contain'; 'the object produced by 
estranged wage-labour is not simply a material thing but the objectification of the 
8 worker's subjectivity. For Marx the problem of modern society is not an issue of 
distributive justice, but one of overcoming 'alienation'. For Marx the entire world of 
modern experience has a melancholic aura because all our needs are met, and can only 
be met, through contact with the 'cold' and inhospitable world of commodities. But for 
Kierkegaard there is no particular set of objects which 'mediate' the melancholy of 
modern life, which is an immediate experience of every aspect of existence. The 
inexplicable sorrow which comes upon us, so like a mournful loss, yet we remain 
unaware of what we have lost, is 'rationalized', but not explained, as the loss of spirit 
which is the 'real' process of modern production. Melancholy is 'objectless' and every 
effort to create an appropriate object in which it might be 'reflected' is to be resisted. 
His melancholy seems to fatally compromise his critique of modernity. 
Kierkegaard's works can appear either as nostalgia for a vanished world of cosmological 
certainty, or as a vanishing inwardness which conceals an uncomfortable apologia for 
the most fundamental conditions of the Present Age which he claimed to despise. The 
persistence of melancholy, in this perspective, is due neither to the appropriation of the 
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essentially human power of labour, nor to the unavoidability of 'external isation' or 
'objectification', and it cannot, therefore, be 'cured' by their reappropriation as either 
fproperty' or as 'things'. 9 Melancholy, rather, in first making the world spiritless, 
turns the commodity into a dead and narrowly useful 'object'. For Kierkegaard the 
world of modern things cannot be the locus of melancholy, which lies in the 
'misrelation' between happiness and pleasure, rather than in a 'misrelation' between 
subject and object. Indeed, 'the world of things is for him neither part of the subject 
nor independent of it. Rather this world is omitted. '10 Critics have frequently noted the 
characteristic 'loss of the world' in his work, and viewed it as representative of his own 
position of social detachment. His writings, then, retain a certain value only because 
they exemplify the new cultural role of fldneur, and express with unmatched vivacity 
and fullness the modern bourgeois int6rieur. II 
But such criticisms do little justice to the care with which the varied authorial 
personae are carefully inter-related. For Kierkegaard it is a philosophically naive 
longing to regain direct participation in the world of things as substance, rather than an 
open acceptance that, for the modern world, the 'thing' can be nothing more than 'the 
existing bearer of many existing yet changeable properties', that might more accurately 
be termed nostalgia. 12 None of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms express any wish to be 
returned to the immediacy of the pre-modern world, in which things directly bodied 
forth distinctive spiritual essences. The 'absence' of the world in the authorship is, in 
fact, a revealing symptom of the literal 'abstraction' of the Present Age. The view that 
'things' can be the real bearers of spiritual values is implicitly dismissed by the 
pseudonyms as a sentimental longing for a premodern, if not a wholly imaginary, 
religious community and world view. Modern things, which are the product of 
spiritless relations, cannot be anything other than secretive and melancholic objects. 
This is not to say that 'melancholy' is a changeless foundation of the human 
condition. Kierkegaard responds, as specifically as Marx, to the conditions of the 
Present Age, and in discovering its melancholy interprets its specific features 
historically. The melancholy of modern life is not the same as premodern melancholy, 
and it cannot be overcome by rational, or at least deliberative, action because 'reason' 
and 'deliberation' are themselves suff-used with its mournful indifference. 13 
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Play 
The self is a spiritual synthesis, and, as such, is 'beyond' despair. But the elements of 
which it is composed, in isolation or as a simple mixture of unconnected parts, are 
experienced as despair. The pseudonyms present a view in which it seems to be that all 
experience other than the experience of individuated selfhood is despair; that the self, 
and only the self, is the synthesis which is beyond despair. Perhaps surprisingly they 
nowhere explicitly discuss the possibility of regarding playas a 'selfless' but non- 
despairing 'existence-sphere. Possibly because of its centrality for the Romantic 
Movement, from which he wanted to decisively distinguish the pseudonyms, 
Kierkegaard denies himself the creation of a wholly playful pseudonym, nor does he 
include play as a 'category' in his more didactic works. 
Yet the entire authorship is playful. The 'maieutic art', whatever else it might be, 
is a game of 'lets pretend'. It is Kierkegaard's favourite game. He adopts first one and 
then another pseudonym; mask succeeds mask at a moment's notice, or with no notice at 
all. And not the least paradoxical aspect of his extraordinary production is that this 
playfulness should be put at the service of a profoundly melancholic pursuit of the 
'single individual'. 
In retrospect, indeed, play, rather than aesthetic immediacy, might seem to be the 
obvious starting point for the authorship; play might be construed as a primordial, and 
undifferentiated 'existence sphere'. Following Rousseau's pioneering recollection of 
childhood, Schiller and others saw play as a privileged mode of human being. In the 
play-world there is no disjunction between appearance and reality; everything is just as 
it seems. 14 There is nothing 'hidden' and 'inward' in play, and, therefore, no 
possibility of deception. It is a transparent world in which each participant is wholly 
absorbed; there is no melancholic distance between the inner-world of the self and an 
external reality, between one self and another self. Schiller viewing modern experience 
as riven between finite 'sensuous drives' and the infinite 'formal drives' of Reason, 
seeks a new aesthetic unity founded upon a preconceptual impulse to play. In play the 
disunited fragments of human existence can be unified: 
it is play alone, which of all man's states and conditions is the one which makes 
him whole and unfolds both sides of his nature at once... man only plays when he 
is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only ftilly a human 
being when he plays. 15 
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While it persists play is an all-embracing and exhaustive reality. There is nothing 
'beyond' it, just as there is nothing hidden within it. In pseudonymous terms play is 
'pure' actuality. In play the ideal and the sensuous interpenetrate each other so 
completely that they 'feel' the same. There is a perfect 'synthesis' which 'relates itself 
to itself . And as this synthesis contains within itself every possible inner- 
transformation, doubt and anxiety remain completely unknown to it. Indeed, if doubt or 
anxiety is introduced into the play-world from the outside (they cannot be generated 
within it), then play is immediately destroyed. 
The fundamental characteristic of play is trust in existence. From the viewpoint of 
play itself, however, this is not an enabling precondition bestowed upon reality by 
potentially suspicious participants, but is, rather, the enfolding actuality of the 
absolute. 16 The play-world simply exists, and exists simply. Nothing 'holds it up, 
because, for it, there is no 'void' into which it might collapse. Play lacks nothing, 
wants nothing, and, therefore, is undisturbed by passion or offense. It is tensionless 
activity; the continuous and effortless movement of insincere wishes. A movement to- 
and-fro, without purpose or intention; a movement that 'renews itself in constant 
repetition'. 17 The error of the pseudonyms, following Schiller, is to invoke the unity of 
the playworld through the differentiated, and thus partial, reality of the aesthetic. The 
modern aesthetic, as the pseudonyms demonstrate, is so impregnated with the character 
of the Present Age, that, in representing human unity and wholeness, it succeeds only in 
furthering its fragmentation. This does not mean that play cannot be considered as an 
originating 'existence-sphere' which, like Anti-Climacus in relation to Johannes 
Climacus stands 'before' the Present Age, and is, therefore 'prior' to any of the 
pseudonymous works. 
Indeed, if play, rather than melancholy, were to be regarded as the initial, and non- 
arbitrary, existence-sphere then it becomes tempting to regard the religious 'sphere' as a 
rediscovered play-world. Play, like faith, is a gift. Neither can be deliberately 
instituted. Neither is sustained by intentional activity. Both are corrupted by social 
passions. Both exist 'in themselves' and remain incommensurable with any autonomous 
human self-image. And Kierkegaard himself points out that 
the increase in inwardness in the relationship to God is indicated by the fact that it 
goes backward for a person... Therefore one does not begin by being a child and 
then become progressively more intimate as he grows older; no, one becomes more 
and more a child. 
(journals, 1,272) 
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And Johannes Climacus claims that Christianity is 'the idea of childlike raised to the 
second power. 18 Christianity restores the playful character of actuality, where the 
aesthetic, makes us more melancholic over its loss. 
If the analogy is pressed, both are impermanent. As neither reason, nor desire can 
'lead' to play or faith; the player or the religious individual, may just as readily find 
themselves, without reason, deprived of their world and plunged into melancholy. 
Children habitually find they cannot play, that they remain stubbornly 'bored', then, 
inexplicably, find themselves once again at play and cannot remember the despairing 
interlude. Similarly, it might be argued, Kierkegaard, in presenting the religious 
interstitially with his many pseudonymous works, suggests that 'faith' is an 
impermanent condition. It is not achieved 'once-for-all' but, like play, 'happens' from 
to time for those who remain open to its unadvertised possibility. 
Its symmetry with faith - before and after melancholy - might even suggest that 
play be favoured as a 'systematic' starting point for Kierkegaard's varied approaches. It 
seems less strained to argue that play, rather than melancholy, is the 'anticipation' of 
Christian faith. Indeed, he almost does begin with play. There is something playful in 
irony, and Socrates, after all, was frequently accused by his Sophist opponents of 
lacking 'seriousness. The limitless freedom of both irony and play subvert any attempt 
to 'fix' their own conceptual boundaries. But if Hegel's 'definition' of irony as 'infinite 
absolute negativity' suggests something of its peculiarity, then play might be viewed as 
'infinite absolute positivity'; as thoughtless trust in, rather than as systematic suspicion 
of, existence. And, for Kierkegaard, it would be as dangerous to begin with play as it 
had been to begin with irony. If we begin with either we can go no further. Play, like 
irony, is 'self-inclosing', and like irony (but unlike melancholy), is free of all inner- 
contradiction. Both play and irony, thus, are 'indifferent' spheres, made up of endlessly 
circulating forms within which no categorical differences can emerge. 
Johannes Climacus, in viewing faith as 'infinite absolute paradox', comes closer 
than any other of the pseudonyms to the completion of a Kierkegaardian 'system'. if 
the rejection of irony and, by implication of play, is borne in mind then this 'system' 
might be represented as a triangle 'enclosing' existence. The points of this triangle are 
internally consistent, exhaustive and mutually exclusive 'reflections' upon existence. 
Each, that is to say, presuppose, and, in different ways, each transcends existence. 
Thus, in addition to the variety of 'points of view' from which existence in relation to 
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its religious possibilities might be described, it might also be analyzed from the 
perspective of the inner potentiality of and for play or irony. Play is the 'innocent', or 
'natural' form of sensuousness,, the recollection of which gives rise to anxious pleasure. 
Irony is the transcending freedom of thought in grasping pure 'forms' of being, which, 
when tied to the limitations of existence, becomes universal doubt. And existence in 
relation to faith becomes despair. Kierkegaard's psychology is centred on despair, 
whereas, it might be suggested, Freud's view of modern life is reconstructed from the 
recollection of the playworld, and Proust's from the intuition of pure forms. Play and 
irony are, thus, 'non-existence' rather than 'existence' spheres, and, for Johannes 
Climacus (if not for S. Kierkegaard) this is true also of faith. Human reality then 
becomes, within this more inclusive 'system' of transcending categories - which cannot 
be directly related one to another -a continuous movement first towards one then 
towards another possible 'apex' of the triangle. From within the triangle, that is to say, 
from within the limitations of actuality, each point of the triangle might appear to be 
'the highest, and human reality can appear so structured as to tend 'naturally' towards 
each in turn. 
The Persistence of Despair 
This 'potentiation' of the pseudonyms' anthropological perspective suggests a 
I postmodern' but non-aesthetic reading of Kierkegaard. The human is continuously 
self-transcending, but is not, by virtue of this natural disposition, essentially a 
I religious' being. There is present in existence, rather, incompatible tendencies towards 
different transcending forms. The endless mobility, contrariness, and incompleteness of 
human self-realization is due, not to human absorption in the limited horizon of 
'secular' life, but to the irreconcilable differences among transcendental forms 
themselves. Or, rather, as transcendental forms must remain humanly unknowable, the 
relation of human ends to transcending forms are bound to appear, from the human side, 
contradictory. 
These considerations give added weight to Johannes Climacus's repeated assertion 
that he wants to make it difficult to become a Christian, to make people aware of just 
how difficult this is. There are two distinct sources of difficulty, and, consequently, 
two distinct 'reasons' for the persistence of despair. Firstly is the incommensurability 
of faith to any human capacity or activity. Faith cannot become the 'end' of human 
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activity, consciously worked for, hoped for, reasoned towards, wished, desired or 
longed for, nor can it be sought in any other way. It resists all human endeavour to 
appropriate its ultimate good. Secondly, however, the human tendency towards play 
and irony reveals (at least) other ways in which the absolute may be present for us, and, 
as we have no means of deciding among these forms, we can only trust first one and 
then another as they 'absorb' us. We are forced into 'the straitjacket of existence', 
waiting on periodic, and unpredictable 'escapes' into religious categories, the poetic 
inspiration of Platonic forms, or the inner freedom of sensuous play. 
Johannes Climacus asks 'what use is Christianity? ' and points out the absurdity of 
such a question. The absolute simply is, and is not 'for' anything, It is, however, 
worth reinforcing the other side of his question and its implied answer. If faith is not 
useful, nor is it pleasant, good, or truthful; yet faith is persistently misrepresented as a 
projection of just these human values. It is in this respect that the pseudonyms' 
perspective is most sharply distinguished from Feuerbach's contemporary 
'anthropological transformation' of the 'religious sphere' into eccentric human self- 
consciousness. Neither,, however, can faith be represented as, unpleasant, evil or 
untruthful and attempts to do so, as for example among the more radical of eighteenth 
century philosophes, are equally inept. If we were to be granted faith as a permanent 
condition would we be happy? Certainly; this is, for the western tradition, the very 
definition of happiness. Equally, however, we would be happy in a perpetual state of 
play, or in inspired contemplation of pure forms. Each transcending reality momentarily 
confers eternity upon the human subject caught in its trance. But we would not, in any 
of these cases, be wracked with pleasure or glow with the inner satisfaction of grasping 
a truth or realizing a good. All human satisfactions stop short of happiness, which is 
qualitatively set aside, as an ungraspable otherness. The human in relation to each 
transcending form is a limitation, or absence, or contradiction; it is despair. And the 
charms of existence, as the 'diapsalmata' have it, are only the anguish of its despair 
viewed from another angle. 
If the consciousness of self-transcendence is melancholy, ought we then to 
renounce religion, and have done with faith, as with play and philosophy? Ivan 
Karamazov's 'Grand Inquisitor', after all, (neatly inverting Kierkegaard's 'Attack upon 
Christendom') has Christ put to death a second time in order to preserve the small 
measure of human comfort the church has secured in the face of God's transcendental 
terrorism. 19 And Nietzsche's madman declares the death of God as a final liberation of 
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humanity. Kierkegaard's response (in advance) to these radical (defiant) proposals is 
twofold. Human pleasure, goodness and truth, as well as despair, is constructed from 
its hidden relation with the absolute. To destroy the absolute would be to destroy the 
good with the evil. And, more significantly, the absolute, as absolute, could not be 
destroyed, or even renounced. Existence is so structured that it forms within us images 
which tend towards its transcending realities. The urge to renounce and destroy these 
images (defiance) is simply one other such tendency which, properly understood, 
constitutes a 'stage' in human existence. Indeed the 'closer' we come to the absolute the 
'deeper' the despair we experience. Thus, boredom is 'almost' play, irony 'almost' 
grasps the plastic reality of pure forms, and sin is 'almost' faith. There is, thus, a 
hidden complicity between melancholy and the 'reduplication' of existence which is its 
conquest. Both are spiritual inversions of the inverted form of existence which is the 
Present Age. And both, therefore, propose themselves as critiques of Modernity. 
Melancholy persists as the 'normal' state of the human heart . 
20 But there are two 
ways in which modernity 'conquers' melancholy. Firstly, and deceptively, in spiritless 
disregard of the human prompting towards self-transcendence. In the insistent assertion 
that life is 'nothing but' the satisfaction of artificially created and stimulated wants. 
And secondly, in the awareness of moments of blissful release from this 'nothing but'. 
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Notes and References 
I The self is incomplete but not unstructured. Swenson (1945), p. 27, is perfectly justified Mi 
claiming the central significance of Kierkegaard's psychology is 'to have shown us... that the life 
of the spirit has a structure as definite as the law-governed, inorganic universe, and an 
organization as specialized as that of the highest hvmg thing'. 
2 Beiser (1987,1992). 
3 Yack (1986). 
4 L6with (1964), Brazill (1970), Stepelevich (1983), Kolakowski (1981), 
5 Westphal (1987) 
6 Adorno, Eagleton (refs) 
7 L6with (1964) stresses their divergent attacks on Hegel. Marx turning Hegel 'back on his feet' 
but retaining his conception of the 'end of history' as an absolute, while Kierkegaard dissolves 
this dialectic through his insistence on the continuously present and insurmountable 
contradictoriness of experience. But, again, it depends which pseudonyms are taken to be 
'normative' for 'Kierkegaard's' view. 
8 Colletti, 'Introduction' to Marx (1975), p. 51. Compare Grundrisse, pp. 514-15. 
9 Lukacs (1975) argues for the critical distinction between the specific damaging form of 
' alienation' based on commodity-production, and the harmless inevitability of 'objectification'. 
10 Adorno (19 89), p- 29. 
11 Ibid., pp. 40-6. 
12 Heidegger (1967), p. 34. 
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13 From a somewhat different perspective Mackey, in Thompson ed. (1972), points to a 'loss of 
the world' M Kierkegaard's writings. But this 'acosmism' IS altogther approrpiate to the realities 
(as well as the appearances) of the Present Age: see also Mackey, (1986), pp. 114-15. Buber 
(1947), p. 65, similarly complains, 'It cannot be that the relation of the human person to God is 
established by the substration of the world'. 
14 Nordentoft (197 8) treats the 'spheres' as a theory of 'developmental psychology' and, 
consequently, place 7he Concept ofAnxiety, at the conceptual starting point of the authorship. 
This is one way of relating Kierkegaard to Freud, see also Cole (1971). 
15 SchiUer (1967), p. 105-07. 
16 Erikson (1963), pp. 239-43, recognises the importance of trust, but views it in relation to an 
alreading existing ego. 
17 Gadamer (1975), p. 93; pp. 91-99 for an important discussion of play. 
18 Postscript, p. 59 1. 
19 Shestov (1969), p, 21, remarks 'Dostoevsky is Kierkegaard's double'; it is illuminating to 
view Dostoevsky's huge characters as Kierkegaardian pseudonyms. 
20 A change in terminology, from 'melancholy' to 'depression, and a new 'sociological' account 
of its origins, is only the latest In a long series of failed attempts to assimilate 'sorrow without 
cause' to 'reasonable unhappiness'; Brown and Harris (1978). Not that the notion of 'depression' 
is without significance, see particularly Coyne ed. (1985), Klein (1988) pp. 262-89. 
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